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P R E F A C E  
TIIE following pages contain an account of Russia's 
advance towards Ilidia from the earliest limes up 
to the present day. During the past thirty years 
a very large number of books has been written 
\ ' on this subject; but while each of the various 
+; 
%' 4 t episocles of this great movement have been 
separately described, and although the political 
y. 
t and strategical aspects of the question have been 
frequeiltly discussed, no recent work has, to my 
knowledge, been publisl~ed urhicl~ gives a clear 
b historical account of R~lssia's March though 
't 
Central Asia in all its stages. 
'i' This want I have endeavoured to supply; but 
!L it is with many misgivings that I place before my 
1 couiitl*ymen the result 01 several years' close s l u ~ ~ ~ y  
9 of a question which is cjf the greatest importance 
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to all who are coilcerned in the safety and welfare 
of our great Eastern dependency. 
I n  former years it used frequently to be said 
that a Russian attack on India was, if not impos- 
sible, at all events, highly improbable, and some 
politicians even went so far as to scoff at the 
danger and declare that it was notl~ing but tlie 
phalltasy of a disordered mind. I know not if any 
Englishmen still adhere to these optimistic opinioils ; 
but, if there be any, I trust that the following un- 
varnished statement of Russian aggression will go 
far to convince them that a real d'mger does exist, 
I f and that the time has come when England can no 
longer place any reliance on Muscovite assurances, 
but must be prepared to resolutely oppose any 
further encroachnlents on the part of Russia. 
I have no desire to pose as an alarmist, for I 
confidently believe that Russia will never success- 
fully invade India if the English people make up 
their minds to keep the Cossacks behind the limitary 
line agreed upon in 1873. But if they fail to do this, 
( and permit the Russians to consolidate themselves 
\ at  Herat or in Afgl~an-Turkestan, then England'fi 
result in a triumph for Great Britain ; but if the 
Muscovites be allowed to establish theinselves on 
the frontiers of India, our po1it;ical and fitinancia1 
difficulties would be increasecl. a hundredfold, and 
the result would be by no means so well assured. 
The existing military situation has not beell 
dealt with, and all questions of strategy have beell 
carefully avoided, for I coileider it to be highly 
illjudicious-even for irresponsible writers-to 
discuss these matters. Tlle War O.ffice and Army 
Eeadquarters at Silnls are fully competent to 
determine what action shoulil be talcen in certain 
eventualities, and the discussion of the strategical 
situation can only tend to draw attention to the 
weak points which inay exist in our arinour with- 
out affording any assistance to those who are 
respollsible for the defence of India. But one 
thing I will say, and that is, that, in spite of the 
recent attempts which have been niade to revive 
the antiquatecl theory that tlie Indus is the true 1 
I first line of defence for India, I believe tliat i t  i; 
would be nothiag less t l~an an act of political4 
suicide to permit the tide of invasion to  each the 
I~lclus Valley willlout ei1lployiilg all the resources or 
tlie Bixt1)ise to avert such n cnt,zsLloophe, a i d  that 
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no Brilish commancler will ever be foound wlio 
would be willing to stake all on the result of a 
great battle fought on Indian soil. 
The most important publicatioiis which have 
been consulted by me in tlie prel~aration of tliis 
worlc are give11 in the followiilg list of references. 
THE AUTHOR. 
LONDON: Ootober 1, 189a. 
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IN the early years of the thirteenth century, at tile 
time when Henry 111. was king of England, the 
wilcl inhabitants of the regions on the extreme 
eastern borclers of Europe vere startlecl by clis- 
quieting rumours of thc iiiovcments of vast hordes 
of barbarians wllo were at that time devastating 
the unknown countries in the heart of Asia. Nor 
mas it long before these reports assumed a more 
definite shape, for it soon became known that a 
mighty chieftain had macle himself inaster of tlie 
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north-eastern portion of Asia, and was then march- 
ing with his armies against the kingdoins of Turan 
and Iran. 
This great conqueror was Gengliiz Khan, the 
son of Yissugei, the ' Emperor of the Great Moil- 
gols.' I n  the course of one campaign he had 
concluered the whole of the vast region wllich 
stretches hoin the Sea of Japaii to tlie inhospitable 
Pamir Plateau ; shortly afterwards Klliva, Samar- 
kancl, Balkl~, and Bokliara were captured by his 
warriors ; and by the year 1220 the frontiers of liis 
mighty empire had been extended to the soutl~ern 
slopes of the Caucasus and Lo the eastern shores of 
the Caspian Sea. 
I n  the following yeaT a consiclerable Moilgo1 
army inarcl~ecl into Europe ; but  after ravaging the 
rich valley of tlie Urd  it quicldy retired, leaving 
the startled Russians astonished at the seemingly 
superiiatural visitation. Again, in 1223, one of 
Genghiz Khan's generals crossed the C!aucasus, 
and, carrying everything before him, speedily 
subjugated the whole couiitry between the mouths 
of the Rivers Volga and Dnieper. 
At  this period the country ~vliich is now known 
by the name of 'Russia' was in a conditioii of 
complete anarchy, and was split up into a number 
of petty principalities. The rulers of these states 
were perpetually at war with each other, their 
subjects were devoid of the elements of civilisation, 
and throughout the country there was no state, or  
group of states, which was in a position to offer 
any effective resistance to the onaard march of the 
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barbarian invaders. At this tilize tlie most 11on-cr- 
fill of the Russian princes was Mitislnf of Gallicia, I-] mr frr/k 7 g 
ancl he speedily gathered round hill1 soine of tlie 
lni~lor clliefs and proclaiiued a holy war against 
tile savage uill~elievers who appea~ed to be bent 
on the extermination of all who att;empted to 
oppose their career of war and bloodshed. But 
the Russisiz armies were clefeatecl wit11 great 
slaughter on t,he banks of t,he River I<al.l;,z, and 
after t he  barbari,zns had again illillllgecl tlieir 
for clestr~lction all(] massacre, tliey once 
more retired, leaving behincl thein a desert to ~lzarli 
their pa th .  
Tllirteelz years elapsecl before these scourges of 
lzumanity again appeareel in Europe. In the mean- 
~vhile Ge.nghiz.:Iihal~ .- l a d .  .c!.ied, a i d  was Succeeded 
by hlig-,so; Oga&<-wllo, during ' h e  first years of 
his reign, \Gas occ~~pied  with the continuation of 
the m a r  against the Kin emperors of China, which 
his fakher had cominencecl with such rema,rkable ' 
success. I11 May 1234 the last of the Kin en.1- 
perors ~vns  overthrown, and wllile Ogatai was 
eniployecl in a great struggle with t'he Sung rulers 
of the southern provinces of China, he sent an 
m5my under his - n a e w  Batu K l ~ a n  to re-cstablifih 
'-"--___ *-_...--. 
Nongol sul)reiiiacg in Easter11 Zurope. - 
I t  is ieedlesa here to descrik tlie various 
campaigns which followecl ; it is sufficient merely 
to state that by the year 1241 Batu Khan hail coul- 
pletely overtllrown the armies of tlie Eussiail 
princes, their chicf cities had been captured, and 
t,he irresistible hordes of Asiatic barl~arial~s had 
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conquered Poland and Ihngary ,  and hail gained 
complete possession of the vhole of Eastern 
&'urol)e. But at  this juncture, when Batu was 
on the point of commencii~g a new campaign 
against Anstria and the Teutoiiic lcnights, he 
received news or the death of 113- sovereign Ogatai, 
2nd at once made preparations for a yetreat. 
Europe was tlius delivered from any further car- 
nivals of death,' and tlie terrible Mongol iilvasioiis 
came to ,211. end. 
On his return from Poland and Eungary, Batu 
settled on the banlrs of the River Volga, built the 
city of Sarai, and there established the lcingdofn of 
the Klians of the Golden Horde-a name which 
is said to have been derived from the gorgeous 
tapestry and sumptuous appointments of the tent 
of tlie Mongol prince. For more than two cen- 
turies after this the princes of the petty Russian 
priiicipalities were forced to pay lloruage to the 
Iihalls of the Golden Horde. They were obliged 
to attend at Sarai to obtain the Khan's decision 
regarding their various disputes, and co~~lc l  not 
ascend their tl~rones without first receiving the 
' Iarlikh,' or letters-patent, from the Kl~an, and they 
were speedily punished if they made any attempt 
to throw off the Moilgo1 yolre. 
But toxvards the close of this period the Mon- 
gol empire itself had, for many reasons, begun to 
show signs of decay ; and the victory which the 
Grand Prince of MOSCOMT-Dimitri Donskoi- 
gained over the Mongol army of Mamai at Kouli- 
















overthrow of the supremacy of the Golden LTorde. 
Rloscow, at that time, vTas gradnally ass~unina a ? 
leading position among the Russian princil,alitles, 
and when Ivan IIS., surllallied the Great, succeeded li m,dK 
his father Vassili the Blillcl in 1463, as Grwcl 3u7, L ,+(z 
prince of Moscow, the Russians obtzincd in him 
a leader wlio mas able to free them fro111 the 
oppression of tlie Mongols, and one who laid the 
foundation of that unity of the Russian people 
m~llich eilablecl tliein to take tlieir place among 
the nations of Europe. 
It would be out of place here to refer to Ivan's 
aotioils except in so far as they afrect the question 
of Russian coilquests towards the East, ancl these 
therefore oilly mill be co~~siclered. After subduing A. 3x1 
Novgorocl the Great, which had been hesitating 
between the rival Grand Pri~lces of Moscow, and 
Lithuania, Ivan conquere~l the whole of Nort11el:n 
llussia as far as Piilland, tlie White Sea, ancl the 
Usal MoullLains, and tlieil turnecl his attellti011 to 
the Kl~anates or Czarates of Sarai and Kttzan-two 
of the states which had g r ~ ~ l ~ j  out of tlie gradual 
decay of the Golden Ilorde. Ile, in 1478, refused 
to pay tribute to Aciiiiiet Kllai~ of Sarai, trainpled 
on the Khan's image, and puL all the Kllan's envoys 
to cleath, excepLing one who escal2ecl and conr:qc~l 
the news to -the, Horde. ' Achinet, of course, took 
t,lle field for the purp'ose of punislling 41is rebellions 
vassal, ~ u d ,  on ~narching tomarcls iVCoscow, found 
that Iv:~11, tvith a nllnlerous and well.-equipped 
a ~ m y ,  had taken up a strong posilion on the bnillrs 
of the River Olra. The Khan SCCKS to have been 
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disillcliiled to risk everything on a battle, and did 
not, attack ; while the Grand Prince, who, in spite 
of his repeated successes, does not appear to liave 
been possessed of much valour, neglected the 
advice of his b o y a ~ s ,  alld declined to cross the 
river to attack the Mongols. The two armies 
reinailled thus confronting each otller for many 
m~eelrs, conGniilg tllemselves to an occasional dis- 
charge of arrows and abuse ; and it was not until 
tlie river became frozen tllat this extraordiilary 
situation mTas brought to a close. Then, how- 
counter between the Russians and their former 
i oppressors of Sarai-a disgraccful Iliglit of both f o r ~ e s .  But the power of the Golden I'iorde was 
llrolren. Achmet on reaching liis country was pu t  
to cleat11 by one of his followers, and the Horde, 
attaclrecl by Ivan's f i r 1  ally, the Khan of the 
C'ri~lzea,' only existed as a separate nstjoii for a 
sllol. t time longer." 
lvan tllen marched against Icazan, captured the 
city in 1457, alicl carried the Khan Aleganl as a 
pl-isoner to l!toscow. The people were forcecl t,o 
smear allegiance to the Grand Princes of BIoscow ; 
but, as the city was not yet ripe for annexation, i t  
Tho Khannte of the Crilnea was one of the three cliief Tnrl t~r  
Sttttes wllich rose out of the ri~ins of the Golden Horde. I<axan 
nnd Snmi were the headq~~srters  of the othel* two. 
Ssrni, the gl.rnt capital of the Golden Horde, where Russinn 
prisoners lind grovellei1 before the Khans, was de~troyed in 1502, 
when tho potver of the LIorde was coinpletely brolren. 
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was placed under the sovereignty of a nephew of 
Ivan's ally, the Khan of the Crimes. 
Two years later Viatka, which had for a short 
time fallen into tlie hands of the Khan of Kazan, 
was reconquered; and in 1490 the governors of 
Oustiougue, of the Dwina, and of Via,tlra, aclvanced 
as far as the River Petcl~ora, and built a fort on 
ils banks. Then, crossing the Ural Mountains in 
sledges dratvii by dogs, ill the depth of winter, 
they slew fifty Samoyedes ancl captured 200 reiu- 
deer. Tlzey then illvaded the country of tlie 
Togouls and Ougriaus, toolr forty palisaded en- 
closures, and finally returned to M o s c o ~  with fifty 
cap t h e  chiefs. 
This raid had no pernzanent results, and is only 
interesting froni the fact of its having been tlie 
first Bussian advance into Asia. This advance 
aci-oss tlie Urals was made at a time when England 
was just recovering from the erects of the Wars 
of tlie Roses, when India mas only lrnoaii to 
Europe through, vague travellers' tales, and a 
hundred years before the formation of the  firs^ 
East India Company. 
I t  will be see11 that this first advance into 
Asia was merely a sudden and irregulas foray 
across the border. I t  had been made withont 
orders born tlie ceiitrd Government, ancl without 
any idea of pernzanent advantages being derived 
froni it. It, was a natural result of the disordered 
statc of t,he country, and was nlerely an episode in 
the general expansion of a people who hacl been 
doviitroddea for centuries by n race of harbarxms 
nomads, but who, talcing advantage of the gradual 
decay of tlieir oppressors, and feeling the growth 
of their own forces, began, under Ivan the Great, 
that expailsioil and course of territorial acquisition 
which has steadily contiilued ever since, and has 
brought Russia to the position she now occupies, 
as one of the most powerful nalioils in the world, 
with an empire extellding from the Pacific Ocean 
to the very heart of Europe. 
Ivan's conqnests towards tlle east have only 
been here referred to;  but he  succeeded also in 
greatly extencling and consolidating Russian power 
towards the west and north ; aud Russia day b y  
day took a more important sliare in European 
concerns, while eastern potentates also sought the 
Grand Trince's friendship. Amoilg these was 
Baber the Great, Mogul Emperor of Dehli, who 
entered into ilegotiations with Ivaa's son and suc- 
cessor, Vassili Ivanovitch. 
Vassili's rule, however, r a s  merely a prepara- 
tion for the inore imporlant reign of his son, 
Ivan lV., who, on account of his violent acts, 
earned the surname of ' The Terrible.' Vassili lost 
the frienaship of tlie Khan of the Crimea, and 
found that Kazan had fallen amray from its alle- 
giance to Moscow. E e  twice sent expeditions 
against the city, but both were complete failures ; 
and he tl~erefore devised other means for ruining 
his enemies. He establislied a fair at Makarief,' 
' Tho fair of Mdcariel mas afterwards transferred to Nijni 
Novgorod, where it still flourishes i~nd  attracts liundrecls of thou- 
sellcls of merchants I'YOIU all parts of Europe and Asia. 
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on tlle Volga, by nzeans of which the trade of 
Kazan was mncll injured. 
But the final subjugation or Kazan, t ~ i ~ d  tlie 
annexation of the Khailates of Icazan ancl Sai-ai 
(or Astralchan) was not accolnplished till some 
years later by the terrible Ivan IV. 
Throughout the firs1 years of the reign of 
Ivan Iv. the Czar1 found that Kazan was still 
greatly under the influeilce of the Khan of the 
Criinea, and dthouglz the Muscovite party at one 
tinie obtaiiled the ascendency, a revolution shortly 
after1~7ards brolre out, when the city gates were 
shut on the Muscovites, and 111e people proclaiilled 
a Tartar Kllaiz. Ivan then cletel.mincd to subdlxe h d -  
the Mussulman city once and for ever, and he E .  4 2 2  
therefore marched against it with a large arinp in 
1553, and, after a ~lesperate hnncl-to-hand struggle, 
gained colnplete possessioi~ of the town, and then 
inassacrecl the inliabitants. Tlle fall of Kazaa mras 
soot1 followed by the annexation of Astrakliau. WOW& 
The Nugais, who n~anclcrecl in the adjoining no 357 
steppes, tllen submitted to tlle Czar of Moscom-, 
and their exain1)le was followed by the Cossacks 
of tlie Don, trliile the Rashlcirs and other tribes 
on the Volga and Kama, who formerly llacl been 
subject to lhe Iilzall of Kazan, after a sllort time 
paid homage to 1~x1 the Terrible. 
Iiussin,-or, Illore correctly spealring, Moscow 
--thus ob t:~incd l)osscssion of tlle entire course of 
I llc Volga f ~ o m  its so~u.c.c to the C ~ s ~ i a i l  Sea,, a1113 
I V I L ~  tho Torril~la man the first Grn11d Prince of Moscow wlzo 
msumeil Lho titlo of Cztu7.' 
tlius secured one of tlie main tracle routes with the 
far East. By gaining a footing on the shores of 
the Caspian, she was able to exert some slight 
iiifluellce over Persia, and 'her faille began to 
penetrate far into the unl~iiown lands in tlie heart 
of Asia. I11 1557, anibassadors from tlie Khan of 
e Xliivn ar~ivecl at the court of the Czar to seek 
perniissioii to trade with Russia; and similar 
nlissiorls visited Moscow in 1563, 1666, and 1583. 
Nor mere these the only successes towards tllc 
East wliicli Ivan the Terrible coulcl boast of. Li 
s -9 * I .  $- 1558 he granted to one, Gregory Stroganoff, a 
k 
,&La- j strip of ltliid on tlie banks of tlie River Kama, 
f 
t 
where the Strogonoffs settled, and from whence 
4 they started on explorations of the mineral 1.e- 
d 
I sources of the Urals. Tl~ese colonjsts, in tlieir raids 
across tlie mountains, came into contact with the 
Siberian hordes of tlie Irtish, Tobol, and Baratin- 
ski Turtars, who were ruled by Kucliuni Khan, a 
lineal dcsceildaiit of the greal Genglziz Khaii. Tlie 
S trogonoffs applied to Ivan for 13ermission and 
I 
assistance to fight the Tartars. Ivan was at tlie 
time fullj. occupied elsewhere, but  he saw a y a y  
of furthering the scheines of the Strogonoffs. At  
tliat time ,z baiicl of brigands named ' The Good 
Companions of the Don' inaiiitained a regular 
system of bla.clrmai1 and pillage on the Volga, and 
h a d  on inore than one occasion ronsecl the ire of 
tlie Czar. These men l ~ e  now proposed to utilise, 
and pardoning one of their chiefs, nained Irinalr 
. q g I  - (or Yernlak) Thnof6eVitch, permitted hiin to take 








































of his followers -outcasts of every natioiia1i1;y and . 
description. Innnlr, with this motley army, crossed 6 .997 
the Ural Mountains in 1579, traversed tlie vast 
untrodden forests of Tobol, defeated Ku.chun1 in 
a series of battles in 1581, captured his capital, 
Sibir, and made tlie Khau's cousin, Mnhmet Kul, 
a prisoner. Many of the neighbouring chiefs sub- 
mitted, and the Russians then sailed d.own the 
River Irtisli, capturing, several forts on their way. 
Thus, before Ivan's deal;h .I which ... .. . occurreil ... . ... .... . . . ,, in 1$,&4-,. 
the Czar received news that a vast tract of hitherto 
unlmown coul~try had been conq~lered for Etim 
by the ~~r i ld  11rigani[ chief artd his ailventurous 
followers. 
Leavii7g Irmalc's exploits for the present,, it is 
necessary now to refer to tlie doings of the English 
in Russia a t  that time, in order that it may be 
clearly understood what were then tlie relative 
positions and cornlnercial aspirations of the two 
11at;ions v~hich now are rivals for empire in Asia. 
I11 tlie reign of King Edward TI. a coinpalqr of 
merchants was forinecl for the discovery of ' king- 
doms, islands, ancl places uillaiown and uilvisitecl 
by tlie highway of the sea.' The great navigator, 
Sebastian Cal~oh, was nominated governor for life; ;+o\r'vlik4, 
a n d  shortly n,fterwercls three vessels, under Sir 
TTag11 Willoughb y and Chancellor, were sent IX .4q i  
t,o~varils the Nortli to explore the unlinom~n sea 
wliicli was believed by some to offer a road to 
C)l\ina and tlie far East. These tliree ships en- 
countered s violent storm off l;he Scanclirlaviail 
coast,, :~ild 1)e~)nlne separated from each other. 
Willoughby, wit11 the ' Buona Speranza ' and 
' Buona Conficlenza,' was lost ; but Chancellor, in 
t h e  ' Edward Bonaventurn,' s~~cceeded in rounding 
t h e  North Cape, and found hiinself first in a 
strange sea, and then at llle inoutll of a river, lle:ir 
t o  wllicli stood two monasterie~.~ Here he landed, 
and found that lie was on the territory of tllc Czar 
of Moscow, alLlzoug11, at that time, 110 Czai: had 
visited this portion of his  dominion^.^ IrIe had 
ullwittingly reached the White Sea and i~louth of 
i;he River Dwina, close to where the tow11 of 
Archangel now stands. Cllancellor went to Mos- 
cow and clelivered to Ivan the letters wllicll lie 
had received from Icing Bdwasd VI. Tlzis hap- 
pened in 1563. 
On the accession of Queeil Mary, she confirmed 
the  privileges of tlle company, and in 16.56 
Chazcellor again sailed for the Dwiaa, and after 
revisiting Moscow, was accompanied to Ei~gland 
by tlie first Russian an~bassador, Osip Nepei. 
Nspei, on his return to Russia, was accompailiecl 
b y  . ~ n t , h o i ~ ~  Jenkinson, who, by his straigl~tforn~ard 
behavio~lr and wide knowledge, succeeded in 
gaining Ivan's favour, slid obtained froin the Czar 
a letter of recomn~endation to tlie neighbouring 
Asiatic princes. Jenkiizsoiz, thus armed, descended 
the  Volga, and flew the first British flag on the 
Caspiar~ Sea. Crossing from Astralchnn to the 
These were the nlonesteries of Saint Nicholas nncl Saint 
Michael, near to the latter of wbicll the town of St. Micllael tlie 
Archongal-or, shortly, Archangel-was aftarwa~ds built. 
" Pcter the Great was the iirst Czar who visited Archangel anrl 
the  TY7TThite See. 


means of coinilluilication wit11 India, but ~vhich 
now appears as a claiigerons axid powerful rival. 
I t  is inlpossible liere to review the effects which 
' the times of troubles' had on Russiail expnn- 
sioii ; and it is sufficient merely to state tliat m7lie11 
Ivan the Terrible, in a fit of uncoiitrolled rage, 
slew liis Eavourite son, Ivan, in 1681, lie com- 
~nitted an act  which had tlie illost disastrons 
re.sults for Russia, and tl~reateuecl. to overthrow 
the eiilpire tvliich lie and his ii~irlzediate precie- 
cessors had built up. Tlie country became the 
theatre of war for tmlo rival Powe.1.s who (letel.- 
misecl. to profit by the internal disorcler ancl 
weakness of the Russia11 Stmate. Russia, wliich 
llnd just become united, and w11ich was just 
appearing before X~~rope  as a powerful aation, 
appeared clooillecl to ilestruction, wlieil llelp came 
from an, uilexpected quarter. Tartar Kazan, ~v l i i~ l i  
llad been for so long a thorn in the side of Russia, 
liad gradudly been transformed, aixd n o v  stepped 
forward as tlie champion of the einpire of n/loscow. 
Joining in, if not actually leading, the natioiial 
rising for the delive~ance of Russia, the citizens 
of Xazan stepped into the breach, aizcl brilliantly 
assisted in the popular lnoveineilt for tlie salvatioli 
of the Muscovite empire, aild in defence of the 
orthodox religion. The foreign illvaclers were 
repulsed, and Michael Feoclorovitch . 2.., . the .. *.. . first, of 
the Romanoff dykksty, y+s proclaimed Czar. 
although, after the 'diit l i  of Ivan  the 
Terrible, Russia lost in Europe inuch of the power 
~ ~ h i c h  she had previously gained, she was carving 
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out for herself a new ailcl extensive enlpire in 
Asia. Irinak's exploits have already been referred 
to, and tlie story of Russian conquests in Siberia 
must now be res~ulmed. 
I11 the spriag of 1584 (tlie year in wliicli 
Ivan. IV. died), Irinak and his followers were 
besieged in Sibir by tlie Tartars ; but t.lle Russian 
leader sooil defeated his enelllies and then 
sailed up the Irtish, conquering many strong 
places during his aclvauce. His brilliant career, 
however, was fast. clrawing to a close, for i~ was 
clestiued that he sllould not loilg survive the , 7 
master svllolll he had latterly served so well. 
Hearing tliat a caravan from Boliliara mas crossing 
tlie Ishiln steppe on its way to Kuclium Klian, he 
halted near the River Bagatai wit11 tlie irltention 
of surprising tlie traders. There the Russiails lay 
down to rest, unconscious that their eileilly mas 
near. The sleepers vere suclclenly attacked by 
Kucliunl's follo~vers, ancl tlie gdlsmt; Iri l~ak was 
drowned, after having bravely cut liis a a y  to the 
river banlr. His followers then rec,rossed the 
Urals, and left K~~cliu.m, for a time, master of the 
sitaation. B L I ~  not for long ; for news of Irillalr's 
brilliant suc,cesses had reached Moscow, and a 
secolld exl~edition was fitted out and despatclied 
to Siberia in 1586. The t,erritory which Irinak 
had collqnerecl for Ivan was gradually won back 
for Russia, and by the en.cl of the sixteenth century 
the Russians had regained possession of Siberia 
from tlie Ural Mountains to the River I~ t i sh .  The 
tomil of Tinmen was built on the site of one of 
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Irmak's first conquests, and was thus the first 
permanelent Russian settlement east of the Ural 997 
Mountains. Tobolsk ,was also founded, and be- 
came the residence of the first Russian governor d 
Siberia. And Kucllum Khan, bereft of his wives 
and children, was clriven into the wild steppes of 
4 ,  laof  Ishim, where he died, or was put to death by the 
Nogai Tartars. 
But, thougll Russia gained vast additions to ~ A / J  
her dominions in Siberia, she was less [ortunate in 
her dealings at this time in the Caucasus. A 
force which was sent by Boris Goudonoff to oc- 
cupy Daghestan was annihilated ; while Alexander, 
Prince of Icachetia, who llad acknowledged himself 
to be a vassal of Goudonoff, had heen assassinated, 
and was succeeded by his son, who was a staunch 
defender of Islain, and ally of Shah Abbass of 
Persia. 
During this period Russia had but few deal- 
ings wit11 the states of Central Asia ; but, never- 
theless, the fame of her conquests in Siberia 
caused the great Abdulla, the Khan of Bokhara, 
to send an embassy to Moscow in 1589 with 
the object d obtaining the friendship of the 
Czar Feodor Ivanovitcl~. Tlie Khan, however, 
omitted to aclclress the Czar with liis full 
titles, ancl his letter was therefore not received. 
The Boyar, Boris Goudonoff (who subsequently 
was proclaimed Czar), informed the Khan that ' all 
sovereigns write to his Czarish Majesty with due 
respect, and to him, the Boyar, with love and 
compliments,' and said that it was only due to Iiis 
VOL, I. C' 
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intercession that the anlbassador 11ad not been 
ref~lsed an audience. 
The corninencement of the seventeentl~ century 
was mal-ked by a series of Cossack invasions of' 
I<hiva. I11 1602 the Ural Cossacks heard of the 
riches of Khiva from some Persian i~ierchants 
wlioin they had captured in one of tlieir forays. 
Tliey accordingly resolved to ~ n a k e  a raid on the 
Khanate, and, crossing the Kirgliiz Steppes, ac- 
tually captured the town of Urgeilj during the 
temporary absence of the Kllan. They tlle11 
star~ecl to return with large clualltities of spoil 
and about a tliousand women, lsut were overtaken 
and surrounded by the Kl~ivans. CUL off froin 
water, they still fought l'or"severa1 days, quenching 
their thirst nit11 the Hood bf the slain ; but finally, 
after being compelled to abanclon their booty, they 
were almost all massacred. 
A second expedition shared the same fate, 
while a tliird faced still worse. Caught in severe 
snowstorms, the invading Cossacl~s lost their way, 
and, instead of reaching Iflliva, found themselves 
on the shores of the Sea of Aral. Their provisions 
became exhausted, and, driven to madness by the 
pangs of h ~ ~ n g e r ,  they ldlled and ate each otlier, 
while the survivors were caplurecl and carried into 
slavery b y  the Khivans. 
Michael Feodorovitch had no easy task before 
him when in 1613 he found himself raised to  ihe  
throne of the Czars of Moscow. His dominions 
were threatened by Sweden in the north, while the 
Poles still ravaged the country to the south-west ; 
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and tlie traces of ' the troublous times ' were every- 
where apparent. Foreigil help was necessayy ; 
and after Holland had been first fruitlessly asked 
for assistance, Michael sent an ambassador to 
England to entreat for money with which to con- 
tinue the struggle. In the lollowii~g year (1614) 
John Merrick, wlio liad for some years previously 
traded in Moscow, appearecl before tlie Czar as an 
ambassador from tlie Englisli king, Jaines I. Mer- 
rick demanded that the English iilerchants sllould 
be permitted to tracle wit11 Illdin by tlie River 
Obi, and with Persia through Astrakhan and tlie 
Caspian Sea. He dso applied for concessions of 
iron and jet mines on the Soukliona, ancl grants 
of land near Vologda. These were tlie Englisli 
terms for mecliation between Gustwus Adolplins 
of Sweden and the Czar, and are curious in that 
tliey show that, fourteen years after the formation 
of the first East India Company, England was still 
desirous of obtaining a trade route witli Hindustail 
tlirougli Siberia. But tlie dificulties and dangers 
of the route were pointed out to the English envoy, 
and he finally consented to negotiate with tlie 
Swedes ; and through liis good offices the Pence of 
Stolbovo was concluded between Gustavus Aclol- 
pl~us and tlie Romanor Czar, AS a reward for 
liis successful mediation, Merrick again urgecl 
that the English demands should be conceded ; 
but tlie merc11ants of RIoscow so unanimously 
represented to the Czar tlint sncli a concessio~l 
woalcl meall their ruin, that tlie negotiat,ions fell 
t l~ ro~~gl l .  
I11 1620 the Czar Michael made a fresh attempt 
to opsn up a trade route with Central Asia, ancl 
sent an embassy, under Ivan Khokl~loff, to the 
Khan of Bokhara. This mission, however, failed 
to obtain any concessions from the Khan, and is 
chiefly remarkable on account of the instructions 
~vllich &ere issued to the Russian ambassador 
in order that the dignity of tlie Czar wight be 
fully maintained. KlzokhloE was ordered to give 
no presents if sucli should be delnandcd in order 
to admit liiin to the Khan's presence; and, if 
he were to be invited to dine with the IChaa, he  
was not to accept the invitation unless it was 
stipulated tliat he should be given a higher place 
than any other foreign envoys who might be 
present. This alnbassador reached Samarlcand i n  
safety, and obtained an audience of the Khan ; 
but, on presenting the Czar's coinpliments, lle 
noticed that the Bokharan ruler did not stancl 
up when the Czar's name was mentioned, and. 
he therefore remarked that all foreign potentates 
were in the habit of rising on such occasions as 
a mark of respect toivards the Czar. The Khan 
immediately stood up, and apologisecl for the un- 
intentional slight which had been offered. This 
incident, and the earlier treatment of Abdulla 
Khan's mibassador, show that, although the 
Russians were unable to obtain a footing in 
Central Asia at that time, yet they had no 
intention of permitting their nation to be in a n y  
way despised or treated with disrespect-Lan excel- 
lent principle in dealing wit11 Asiatics, ancl one  
which has beell of much. use to Russia in lier 
advances illto the heart of Asia. 
Two years after the clespatcli of this embassy 
to Bolthara diplomatic relatioils were also eiltereil ,> 
into wil;h Afgll,zn, the Iilia~l of Kliiva, .who, liavirlg 
been driv6n ' fiom liis Iririgcloin, soug11E the pro- 
tection of the Czar, nnd even offered, if restored 
to his throne, to become the vassal of Iiussia. 
At; the beginning of tlie seveilteenth century 
the Russians did little more t;llan liolcl their own 
i11 Siberia, and many attacks were made by the 
native tribes on their posts nild settlements. But, 
profiting by the quarrels of opposiilg factions, 
and by opening up trade with t l ~ c  Central Asian 
Irhanates, the Rilssian poxver i11 Sil~eria gru(1ually 
became consoliilated, and communicntions were 
entered into ?vit;h tho Cllinese allcl with tltc 
Dzungarian lialm~zlrs ~vllicli have resultecl in 
tlie gradual ext,ellsioii of Iiussiaii influence, first 
to Lake Baikal, ancl Llleri still further eastwards 
to tlie sliores of the Pacific Ocean, 
Tlleir advance thro~zgh Eastern Siberia, liow- 
ever, was by no mealis unopposed. l'lte Cliinese 
were i.iaturally alarrrlccl a t  tlieir movemeiits, and 
when the first Eussian cm1:)nssy visited Pekin, in 
1650, it mel; wit11 :L vcry colcl rec:t!ption,. Some 
years afterwnrcls the Cllii~esc IB~zperor ICanglli 
sent ,z force to su1:)tiuo G:~Id:ln, t l ~ c  Dz11iig;~ri:~11 
priizcc, whose prctm~sionwvere l)egiiiui~lg to im- 
peril the vcry existc!iice of tlic RTa~~cllu d y ~ ~ n s t y  ; 
and while 11c was so engaged the Rnr;siaus, t:~lcing 
advantage of t,he dispu t d ~ e t w e e l : i  the Cllinc~e 
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and Dzuagarians, built soine forts on the upper 
waters of the River Amour, the cliief of which 
were kllbazin and Astrog, and tlius brought about 
the first conflict between Russian aiid Cllinese 
troops. The Xmperor Kaiiglii viemed tlie exist- 
ence of these forts a s  a standing menace and 
insult to his authority; and as soon, therefore, 
as Galdan had been defeated, he ordered his troops 
to attack and demolish the objectionable Russian 
outposts. Albazin was captured and destroyed, 
the other forts in the neigl~bourhood shared the 
sanie fate, and thus all traces of the first Muscovite 
settlemeilts on the Aniour were completely obli- 
terated. 
But a fresh war soon broke out between 
Galdan and the Chinese, and the Russians were 
tlius for a while left undisturbed in their efforts to 
retrieve their shattered fortunes in Easteni Siberia. 
Albazin was rebuilt, and rose Irom its ruins 
stronger aiid more capable of resistiilg a siege. 
As soon as the Chinese had once again settled 
their differences witli tlie Dzungarians, an army 
marched against the Russians. Tlie first attack 
was repulsed ; but Kanghi sent large reinforce- 
ments, when the Russians, finding themselves to 
be conlpletely overmatched, signed the Treaty 
of Nipchu in 1689, whereby the fertile regions 
of the Amour were restored to the Chinese ; and 
ihus the Russians were seriously checked in their 
advance towards the Pacific, and for the next 
century and a half they were shut out from all 
colnmuilicatioll witli the eastern shores of Asia. 
Nor was it ollly in Eastern Siberia that 1,11(+ 
Russians failed in tlieir endeavours to extend their 
territories at the expense of their dsi:~lic neig11- 
bours. I11 1664 tlie Czar Alexis MiBI1:iilovilc:ll 
sent an embassy to the court of Shall Abbass TI. 
of Persia. The filthy habits of the Mnsc!oviles, 
however, utterly disgusted the Persian monni-cl~, 
who called them the ' Usbegs of the Pr:tnks ' ; 
aild when it was discovered that the object of 
the missioil was solely for the pul-pose of ~rnde,  
and that the Russians had adoljtecl the gnise of 
ambassaclors to evade the paylnellt of clucs, the 
Shah became incensed, a i d  sullimarily esl~c!llcd 
them from the country. I11 revenge for this 
afiont the Czar incited the Cossaclts of Soutll 
Russia to attack the Persiail province of iliI:iz:~~1- 
deran. The Cossacks prou~pily took tilt? I i i~l f ; ,  
overrail tlie province, saclied tlie city of Vcral)a(l, 
aild finally entrenched theillselves on tllc hliatl- 
kale11 peninsula, north of the Gulf of Astr:d~ncI, 
where they iilte~~cled to remain for the wiiltcr. 
Eere, however, they were attaclcecl by the l'cr- 
sians, and, being defeated, took refuge 011 tlie 
island of Ashurada, where they reln:dnctl f'or 
some time.' 
Two cxpeclitioi-~s were also sent against, tllc 
Crimea, in 1687 and l(j89, but 11otll prc~vt?tl 
This account oE tho first 12ufisian occuptrtion ol t110 I R ~ I L I I I ~  or ' 
Afihurada liaa boo11 talron from tho rocont axcallcnl. work nr1 I ' ( ~ ~ H ~ I L  
by tho I-Ion. G. N. Carzon, wlioro 6110 fnct i~ notiooll l i~r  t11tr 
first timo by an Bngli~h writor on ConLrnl AH~ILIX IL~TIL~I~H. It is 
interesting in that it ~hows tlint hhi~ islmld wan oc(!lipi(a~l 11y t l~o  
Russians 170 yoars bofore tl~oy permanently ~ottlctl tlown tllcrro. 
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complete failures ; and thus, when Peter tlie Great 
freed himself from the regency of his sister Sophia, 
and assumed entire control over the affairs of the 
state, he found that Russia's dealiilgs with her 
barbarian neighbours were marked by failure and 
retreat. 
CHAPTER I1 
'THE EEY AND GATE' 
Peter the Great conquers Azof-Pultawa-Peter's loss of Azof and 
his desire to open a trade with the East-fitories of the wealth 
of Asia-Submission of the IChan of Ilhivo, to Peter-Gold- 
mines of Irlset-Omsk and Semipalatinsk-' New Siberian 
Line '-Failure of Peter's expeditions to Little Bolthara and 
Uhiva-Russian conquests in  Persia-Proposed route to India 
vid Astrabad-Peter's ' will '-Persia regnins her lost provinces 
--Submission of the Wghiz-Kazaks to Russia-The 'key and 
gate to all the countries in Central Asia'-Orenbwg-The 
Persians defeat the Khan of Kliiva-Empress Anne and British 
trade with Persia-The blind Governor of Xhiva-Russia again 
obtains Azof-Russian acquisition of the Crimea-Russian 
designs on Turlcey, and Treaty of Jassy-Russians i n  Georgia, 
and their failure in Persia-The struggle for the Caucaaios 
provinces. 
PETER TI-IE GREAT had much to occupy his attention 
in Europe before he was able to turn his  thought;^ 
to Asiatic affairs. He discerned that, as air and 
freedom are essential for the growth and deve- 
lopment of mankind, so, for the expansion and 
progress of a nation, it is equally necessary that 
external trade and international intercourse should 
be fostered and extended. Russia had effected 
her unity, but was still surrounded by a cordon of 
states which checked her further development and 
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cut ller off from commercial intercourse wi th  the 
Western nations of Europe. Peter saw that b e f o r e  
Russia could cease to be merely an Oriental st ate, 
and before slie could take a befitting place am ung 
the European powers, it was llecessary t h a t  R ~ I  e 
should obtain a footing on the sea coast, in order 
that slie might be able to trade freely and d i r e c t l y  
with Western Europe. This was one of t h e  first 
tasks to which he applied his great l~owkrs, a.nd 
how well l ~ e  succeeded in his endeavours is gene- 
rally known. 
Sllortly after he had assunled supreme aut l lor i ty ,  
he succeeded in conquering Azof, whereby he 
gained a footing on the sea at the moutli of the 
IZiver Don, and at tlie same time took up a p o s i t i o n  
from which he  could keep the Tartars of the 
Criiilea in check. But the results of this c o n q u e s t  
did not fulfil his expectations. Before his vessels 
could freely navigate the Black Sea and pass froin 
thence into the Mediterranean, i t  was necessa ry  
that, the Sultan of Turkey should give his assent ; 
and as this was not forthcoming, and Pe te r  was 
not strong enough to cope with the Turks, he had 
to turn his attention elsewhere to obtain that 
' window towards the West ' upon wl~ich lie had 
set his heart. How he at first met wit11 reve r ses ,  
but  eveiltually triumphed over his enemies, and 
effaced the memories of Narva by the great .tictory 
at  Pultawa, are matters of European history, and 
require no notice liere, except for the p u r p o s e  of 
showing that Peter had many matters of vital 
importance to settle in Europe, which fully occu- 
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lly occu- ,  
pied all llis attention until tlie cornmencemenl; or 
the eigliteentll century, and prevented hiin from 
interfering to any great extent in Asiatic coiicerns. 
Even xfter P u l t ~ ~ v a  h d beell fought ancl won 
in 1709, the Czar found himself confronted by 
a ne.\n7 enemy wlio gave him ainple occupat;ion. 
This new foe was the Sultan of Turliey, rn~l~o, at
tlie instigation of France and S.meclen, declared 
war  g gain st I i~~ss ia ,  nd succeeded in regzzining 
possessioi~ of Azof. Peter thus found himself 
again completely cut off frollz the Blaclr Sea, and 
mas not in a pysitiou to attempt any further 
struggle with tlic Turks ; nltd it was after this 
disaster that he chiefly devoted his energies tjo the 
mainte~lance aud extension of bis acquisitions on 
the Ijaltic, aild to the development of commercial 
clea,lings vitll the East. IIe hacl gaiilecl a firm 
footing on the Neva, but had lost Azof ; and he 
iiow desired to obtain some ecluivalent for the 
latter by exploiting Asia, and inalring Bussia the 
great centre of trade bel;ween Asia and Europe. 
Sorne time previously, in 1634, lle Ilad sent a 
mercl~aut liameil Simon Malinlri to 11lcli.a provided 
wit11 governiilent stores and nloney for the purpose 
of opeilil~g up a l;raile wit11 the Grexl; Mogul. Rut; 
his rriissioli :Lpl~enrs to  liave borne no fruit, for no 
rccorcls of Iiis doings liave been Irept. 
In I.'i:l.:i, l~owever, m:~rvellons stories of tlle 
~ninelqnl we:~ltll of Asi:~ ~I(:~:LII to reach X'eter'ct ears. 
'.1!11c Governor oof Sibcri:~ reported that golil s:~ncl 
.mT:is to be i'ou~lil i11 nl~u~li[:~llce il :Lr the t,oan or 
Irlict, i.e. Yarlinncl ; ant1 a t  the same Limc :I 
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Turkoman chief named Hodja Nefes arrived in 
Astrakhan, where he related many stories of the 
gold which was said to be found on the banks 
of the Amu Daria-River Oxus. This Turlroman 
also stated that the Oxus used formerly to flow 
into the Caspian Sea, and professed to explain how 
its course had been diverted towards the Sea of 
Aral by the Usbegs, who had constructed dams 
across its former chaimel. From Astrakhan he 
went to Moscow, to propose to the Czar that he 
should take possession of tlle countries bordering 




Some years previously-in 1700-tbe Khan of ! I'F 
Kliiva had tenclereci his submission to the Czar ; ancl nc 
Peter had accepted the proffered allegiance. When ; in 
Hodja Nefes arrived in Moscow, his wonderful 1 t h  
reports were confirmed by a Kl~ivan envoy who 
f L 
P( 
was there at  tke Bussian Court, ancl Peter at  once i. fo 9, 
decided to despatch a military expedition to take [, cc 
possession of Klliva, and to establish his authority w: 
b 
over the districts on the banks of the Oxus which i, fo 
were said to contain such fabulous stores of wealth. 1. i. b € 
He also issued orders for the despatch of an j 
expedition to Little Bokhara, for the purpose of 1 ar: 
obtaining possession of the gold-mines of Irket. tr. 
This undertaking was entrusted to Colonel Buch- 1. B c 
holtz, who was directed to proceed thither, build- I> 6u E; 
ing forts along the line by which he advanced. t es I But the expedition was a disastrous failure, and its gir 
only permanent result was the erection of a fort on r 1; 
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Two years later another fortified post was built f i m & ~ .  d48 
at Semipalatiilslr ; and in 1720 General Likhareff 
was sent to establisli a fort oil Lalre Zaisan, and to 
explore the country lying between tllat point and 
Irket. Likliareff reached Zaisan Nor, and was 
continuing his advance up the Irtisli when he 
unexpectedly came across Galdan Tchirin, the . 
Khan of Dzungaria, who, with a large army, was ~4 . 
watching his frontier against tlie Chinese. He 
managed, however, to deceive the Klian as to the 
object of his mission and retreated, building a fort 
at Ust-Kamenogorsk on his .way baclr. 
Thus Peter's semcli for gold in Little Bolrharx 
resulted in coniplete failure. But althougll lie dir. 
not succeed in the immediate object which he had 
in view, the lnovemellts ~f Russian troops towards 
the head waters of the River Irtish had a very im- 
portant influence 012 tlie Russian position in Siberin, 
for in this way tlie line of forts on the Irtish was 
commenced, which line, by 1 7  52, was connected 
wit11 the Orenburg posts by a continuous series of 
forts which extended across the Ishim Sieppe ancl 
became known as the New Siberian Line.' 
Nor did Peter's expedition to Klliva meet m~ith 
any greater measure of success. The Czar e n - q a y d  
trusted tlie commancl to a Circassian prince named z, 9. 
Bekovitch Tcllerkasski, who spent three years in 7 
surveying the eastern shores of the Caspian, and 
established forts at Cape Karagan (on the Man- 
gishlalr peninsula) and on the Krasnovodslr spit. 
No further mention will be made of R~issian ndvnncos in 
Siberin except those towards TCholcclnd, vid Vernoye. 
'TIIE HEY A N D  GATE ' 1089- 
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I-Ie was orclered to approacll the IChan in tile 
character of a friendly envoy, and, before resortiilg 
to force, to congratulate him on his accession to 
power, and to explain illat the strength of llis 
escort was merely clue to a polite desire on the 
part of tlle Czar to give due importance to his 
mission. When the K11an had been persuaded, or 
forced, to acknom~leclge Russian supremacy, two 
trade caravans were to be despatched-one to the 
Khan of Bokllara and the other to thc Great Mogul 
of India. 
The envoy for 111clizl received special i~zstruc- 
tiolls from Peter to go ' by water as far up the Ainu 
Daria as possible (or by other rivers wllich may 
fall into it) to India, in the guise of a merchant, 
the real business being the discovery of n water- 
way to India ; to inquire secretly about the river 
in case progress by water be forbi~lden ; to return, 
if possible, by the saine route, unless it be 
ascertained that there is another and more con- 
venient may by water; the water-way as well as 
the 1:tnd route to be carefully observed and de- 
scribed in writing and to be inapped ; to notice 
the merchandise, particularly aromatic herbs and 
other articles that are esportecl from Inclia ; to 
examine into, and write an account of, all othcr 
matters which, though not lnentioned here, lnay 
concern the interests of the empire.' Such were 
the precise orders given by Peter himself to 
Lieutenant Kojin, of the Russian Navy, wllo had 
been selected as envoy for Inclia. But Kojin 
appears tollavebeen ill-disposecl towards l3eliovitch, 
--- 
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But Koj in 
Bekovil;cl~, 
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and even accused the Prince of a treacherous 
design ' to deliver the Russian troops into tlie 
hands of the barbariaas.' He was tlien recalled, 
and, after being subjected to a court-mar~ial, mas 
iliiprisoned at St. Petersburg, when Bekovitcl~, in 
accordance with orders froni the Czar, sent Murza 
Tevkelef with illstructions to proceed to India 
through Persia, returning to Russia by way of 
China and Bol~hara.~ But this mission caixe to 
nothing, owing to the tragic fate which over- 
took the over-confident Circas~ian Prince and llis 
army. 
Bekovitch left Astralrlian in June 1717 with 
a force consisting of 3,500 men, six gulls, and a 
train of 200 camels and 300 horses. He reached 
the Khivan oasis in tlie following August, but, 
falling into a trap cunningly laid by the Khan, 
he and his oficers were killed and m ~ t i l a t e d , # / ~ r ~ $  
while his troops were either massacred or reduced n+qdz3 
to slavery. 
While Peter was acting with such vigour in 
Siberia and against Khiva, he was not ueglectf~il 
of Russian commercial interests in Persia. Be 
saw that the trade of that state, especially in silk, 
was by no means inconsiderable, but that Russian 
merchanls had little or no sllare in it ; and he 
moreover knew that.  through Persia tliere was an 
excellent road to India. E e  at first resorLed to 
diplomacy, and seiit an 'agent to Ispahan to per- 
' See Notes on the Imtercowse of  Russia with Ichivfi, by 
G. ICiil~leweb, Secretary t o  Colon01 Ignstioff's mission to Co~itral 
Asin, trnnsbted from the lZussian by John aud Robert Micl~ell. 
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suade !;he Shah to turn the Armenian trade in raw 
silk tl~rough R~~ss ia .  But, although the Shah 
signed a treaty permitting Russian merchants to 
trade freely and to purchase raw sill< whenever 
they vishe~l, the agent reported that force woulcl 
be far more advantageous than diplomacy. A 
good excuse for such interference mas soon 
obtained. The Lesghians attacked the Persian 
t o m  of Shemalcha and pl.unc1ered the Russian 
~nerchants in colnmon with the other residents. thruug 
Orders were given for the Russian troops on the ever 1: 
Qolga to march to winter quarters, from whence know, 
they were to advance, viR Astrakhan, in the 
following spring. But, before the , expedition 
stasl.ted, Yersia had been invaded by the Afghans ; 
and then the Czar, instead of advancing against 
Persia to punish the attack on his subjects, 
announced that he mas going to assist the Shah 
against his enemies. This was in 1722. A large 
Russian aTmy having been collected at Astralrhnn 
ullder Peter's personal command, advanced against 
Derbent, ancl obtained possessioil of the city with- 
out difficulty. Peter then returned to Astrakhan for 
the tvinter; but lzis lieutenant, coiltiiluing the 
operations, captured Baku in the foll,owing July ; 
and t v o  months later the representative of the 
unfortunate Shah Tamasp was compelled to sign n 
treaty at St. Petersburg by which Mazanderan, 
Ghilan, and Astrabad were ceded to Russia-very 
important concessioizs, which clearly showed that 
Peter had fully realised the great advantage of 
obte.ining complete control w e r  L11e sliores of the 
Caspian, and that he ullderstoocl the great value 
of Astrabad. 
That the Czar clicl fully realiee the great 
strategical advantages which would be gainecl by 
a Russia1 occupation of Astrabad is coilclusively 
praved by the words he lnacle use of when at 
Derbellt in 1722. During a conversation he there 
had with one of his officers regarding the relative 
aclvaatages of the Oape route and the way to India 
tl~rcrugh Central Asia, Peter remarked : ' Bave you 
ever been iili the Gulf of Astrabnd? You must 
know, then, that those mot~iultains ' (pointing to the 
heights on the shore of t l ~ e  Caspian) 'extend to 
Astrabad, and that from there to Balkh and 
Badalcsllan with paclc camels is only a twelve 
days' journey, and on that road to India no one 
can interfere with us.' 
These expeditions of Peter's against Bhiva and 
Persia were the first organised attempts made by 
the Russians to obtain n permanent footing- in 
Central and Southern Asia. 
Having, by the conquest of the Baltic pro- 
~iaces ,  obtained a footing on the sea, Peter turned 
his attention to the countries with wliich the 11iost 
lucrative trade appeared probable, hoping thus to 
gain some of the wealth whicli Russia so sorely 
needed. He saw that the Portuguese liad greatly 
enriched themselves during the time of Albu- 
querque, and that at  a later period his friends the 
Dutch, as also the English and French, were ob- 
taining considerable stores of wealth from the 
East. If such riches could be gained by nations 
VOL. I. D 
' THE KEY AND GATE' 
--- 
whicll were sepnratecl from India by imperfectly 
explored and dangerous seas, Peter might reason- 
ably have expected to be able to gain an equal 
share by meails of the shorter and nioye direct' 
land route tlirough I<hiva and Persia. That such 
was his belief appears to be incontestal~le, ancl he 
mas the first Czar to organise and clespatcll espe- 
(litions for this purpose. That any idea of the 
conquest of Inclia ever entered his inil-~cl is, hov- althoug 
ever, liigllly improbable, and all he wished to a will, 
obtain for Russia was wealth, which he thought 01 the 
coinme 
document callecl the 'mill of Peter the Great,' and 
many, assuming that document to be genuine, en- 
cleavour to prove that ever since Peter's cleat11 
Russian Czars and diplomatists have steadily pur- 
sued a course of policy strictly in keeping with tlie 
principles set forth in the so-called will, and 1~7hic11 reasons 
virtually alnount to the conquest of the world. 
But the very existence of such a will is disrputeil, 
ancl its fictitious character, if not actually esta- c011cerns 
blished, is highly probable. Tlle first mention of , 
this will is contained in a book published by M. 
Lesur in 1812, entitlecl, ' Of the Progress of the Rus- 
sian Power fyom its Commencement to the Begin- 
ning of the Nineteenth Century.' This fainous 
book was apparently written by order of Napo- 
in the Frencl~ newspapers of a series of articles 
A t~anslntion of the will ns it appears in M. Lesnr'r; book is 
given ill Appendix I. 
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wherein he  endeavoured to prove ' tliat Europe 
found herself in train to becollie the prey of 
1.ussia.' IQar between France and ZZussia then 
appeared inevitable, and Na~oleoil was ailxious to 
prove that Itussia was tlie eileiny of Europe. The 
will reappeared on several other occasions 117hen it 
seeniecl desirable to revive tlie idea that Eussia was 
bent on obtaiiiing the Ellipire of tlie World. But 
although i t  is extremely donls~fill if Peter left suclz 
a will, yet he unquestionably liad a very keel1 sense 
of the advantages ~vhich Russia could obtain by 
coinmercial dealings with tlie Central Asian states, 
and tlirough them with Iitdia ; and he undoubtedly 
initiated a policy which had for its aim the inono- 
poly of-or a t  all events a share in-the trade 
with these countries. 
For several years afl;er Peter's cleath, in 1725, 
Russian aKk~irs in Asia were not collcluctecl wit11 
any inarkecl degree of success. There were several 
reasons for this. The Rus~iails had become im- 
buecl with a desire for still further intercourse 
with European natious, auccl neglectecl Orielltal 
concerns; large numbers of foreigners from tlie 
Weat had.  obtainecl service in Russia, ant1 were 
indiscrilniilately employecl in Europeall m1cl Asiatic 
affairs, to the detriment of tho 1;~t~ter ; and the fate 
of Bekovitch liad created so great an  impression in 
Russia tliat ' to perish like Belcovitch' becanle a 
sy~lol~ylnous phrase for complete annihilation, It 
was not long, therefore, before reverses were sus- 
tajl~ecl, which coinpletely neutralised Peter's suc- 
cesses in the Caucasus. When the wretclied Sllall 
0 2 
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Tamasp heard of the disastrous peace wllicll his 
envoy hat1 signed, he refused to ratify i t ;  arid as 
Turkey at the same time compelled Peter, under a 
threat of war, to abaildoii his aggressive schernes 
south of tlle Caucasus, the Czar finally came to an 
arrangement with the Sultan, by which all the 
Persia11 provinces whicl~ were not in the halids of 
the Afgl~ans should be dividecl between the two 
states. But, after Peter's death, Persia, having 
under Nadir Shah succeeclecl in expelling tlie 
Afgllalls, set both Russia ancl Turkey at cleGance, 
and, after a protracted struggle, regained her lost 
provinces, .cvhicli, together with Derbent, were - 
restored to her by the Treaty of Resht, mrhich cras 
signed by the Empress Anne in 1732. 
But this defeat was in some measure counter- 
balailced by the subinissioii of the Kirglliz-Kazaks 
of the Miclclle ancl Lesser Hordes, who inhabited the 
inhospitable Steppes to the east of the River Ural. 
Peter the Great appears to have had some 
dealings with these people, for i11 l i 2 2 ,  wlieil in 
Astralhan, he said : 'Although these Kirghiz are 
a roaming and fickle people, their Steppe is the 
key and gate to dl the couiltries of Central Asia.' 
Five years after his death (i.e. in 1730) Abclul- 
Kliair, the Khan of h e  Lesser Horcle, being 
oppressecl by the Dzungarians, and harassed by 
the Bashkirs and Kalmuks, sought the protection 
, lS3 of Russia. This act of subniission was at the time 
repudiated by the Kirghiz ; but  i11 17 34 bo tll the 
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to protecl Russian caravans, and to secure tlie 
Russian borders from molestation. 
This event mas the cause of much rejoicing in 
the Russiaii capital. Peter's aords  were called to 
mind, ancl the Russians tl~ouglit that by this sub- 
mission of the Xii-ghiz they had actually obtained 
possession of ' tlie lrey and gate to all the couiltries 
in Central Asia,' and that the wealth of India .and 
tlie East was within thejr grasp. They, hoaever, 
liad yet to learn the erulh of the axiom set Iorlli 
by 13yacinth Bitchurin, wlio said tllat ' Nomads 
consider allegiance a bargain wit11 their conscience, 
in ahich they expect to will at least four to one ; 
and for that reason, when a favourable case arises, 
they rival each other in their reacliiless to cleclare 
themselves subjects ; but if they be deceived in 
lheir hope of wiilning four to one, they are slirewcl 
enougli to repay themselves by pillage, rapine, ancl 
murcler.' As tlie Russians found to their cost, 
this subn~ission of the Kirghiz was due to no anxiety 
on the part of the noinads to come under the rulc 
of the White Czar, but mas merely for the purpose 
of obtaining protection from their numerom 
enemies; and by it Russia no more obtained any 
actual control over the country tllail slie clicl over 
Xhiva wlien Peter the Great accepted tlie allegi- 
ance of the Kliivans in 1703.l 
The tragio fate of Beltovitch, fonrteen years after Pctor 
accepted thc s~~bmission f Khan Shehmaz of Ichivn, shows how 
little meaning the IChivans attachcd to their offors of nlleginnce. 
I n  1731, also, Colonel Erilbcrg was scnt to Iihiva as nu envoy 
from tho Eillpress Anne, but ho 1v;ls attaclrcd op the rspd aud 
owpclled to roturn. 
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For the better protection of tlieir new subjects 
-or, probably, for prot,ection porn tlielli-the 
Russians considerecl it advisable to advance their 
frontier line, and the fortified town of Oznburg 
0-u cr& 1~ i r k a s  built in  1735, while at the same time a fortified 
li~le of Cossack settlements was established on the  
banlcs of tlie Xiver Ural. Tliese measures, how- 
ever, failecl to keep the Kirghiz in cl~eclc, althougl1 
they hail a salutary effect on the turbulent 
Baslikirs, who were cut off from the Steppe, and 
were thus forced to submit in some measure to 
Russian control, and to curb their turbulent pro- 
pensities. 
Shortly after this, the Kirgliiz chief, Abclul- IC-! bg6 i l lair ,  was elected khan of Klliva, but his reign 11, 
did not last for long. The great Nadir Shall of 
Persia, then in tlie zenith of his victorious career, 
was advancing to subdue the Khanate. 111 this 
emergency Alsdul-Khair cleclarecl the Khanate 
to be subject to R~zssia, hoping that by this 
subterfuge he would arrest Nadir's march. A 
Russian officer, who was then at Kliiva, was even 
I 4 sent by the Iaiaii to meet the Shah a~lcl ask for 
mercy ; but liis intercession was of no avail, for 
Naclir continued his advance and captured t h e  
~ l l a n a t e ,  driving the Kirgl~iz Khan back into t h e  
Steppes. 
About tliis time several attempts were made to 
establish a Russian post or town at the mouth or  
the S37r Daria, (Jaxart,es), a ~ ~ r l  a flotilla on the Sea 
of Aral ; 11ut this conlrl not then be acconiplislied, 

































I ~ O I I ~ I  








::LS e ~ t : n  
:~$k for 
v:1iI, for 
1 f l k e  
into tllc 
Russia was compelled to wait for inore than a 
century before this object was attained. 
Though the Zinpress Anne by the Treaty of 
Resht lost the proviilces which Peter the Great 
llad acquired from Persia, she nevertheless was 
not bliilcl to the aclvantages which Russia iniglit 
obtain through coinmercial dealings with that 
state. Slle therefore, in 1734, granted a con- 
ce~siolz to British subjects to trade with Persia 
through Russia on payment of a duty of three per 
cent. crd valo~vnz. Five years later an employ6 of 
the British-Muscovy Company, named Jolln Ell;on, 
left Astrakhan, and, proceeding to Persia, obtained 
a decree whereby he was periliitted to trade freely 
tl~rougl~out the Persian dolnil~ions, between the 
Caspian Sea and River Indus. Elton then returnecl 
to Russia, and wrote a letter to the British Mitlister 
at St. Petersburg, pointing out the great aclvan- 
tages which British merchants would obtain by 
means of the trade tl~rough Meshecl to Bokhara; 
and in spite of the opposition of tlie East India 
Company, an Act of P~rliainent was passed sanction- 
ing tliis tracle. Perlnissioll was received to builcl. 
two ships for the purpose at IKazan, and an expedi- 
tion set out from Ille Volga in 1742. Disse~lsions, 
however, arose ainoilg the factors, arid in the next 
year Elton took service ~uilder the great Na(1i.r Shall 
as naval constructor 011 the Casyian. He surveyed 
tlie east coast of that sea from the Bay of Astrabad 
to the ancient mout;l1 of the Oxus, X I I ~  set to work 
td l~uilcl. a Ilecl; 011 the Caspian :To]* t11.e Persian 
moi~arch. The Bgssiau Ei~ll)rcss, who llacl. no 
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desire to see a Persian fleet established in the 
cIlsl1iq ~ 3 s  greatly incensed at Xlton's proceed- 
illgs, while the English directo1.s of the new 
Colnpally became &]armed at his neglect of their 
illterests, They ordered him to return, but lle 
found his too aclvaatagcous, and therefore 
igllored tile message ; and as matters thns con- 
tillued in a most unsatisfactory state, the Elnpress 
Elizabetll Petrovna issued an ukase forbiclding the 
Britisli to trade on tlie Caspian. Thus ended the Russia 
last gttempt of the British to obtain a trade route 
During the latter half qf the eighteenth centnry 
Gussia made little progress in Ceiltral Asia, although were m: 
sorlle slight inte1:course was maintained wit11 Khiva, 
while Xussiail o@cials were also sent from Siberia 
to Bykllara and Taslikellt, for the pullpose of exa- 
mining the countries in the basins of the Oxus 
In 1750 the Kllival~s sent an eiivoy to the 
Empress Elizabetli with a request that inore in- 
tinlate relations might be entered into between the 
Blunl 
two states ; but this friendly overture was com- - I n tevco r~ rs  
pletely nentralised by the pillage af a Russian 
caravan in the following year. IV. of 1'1~~ 
I t  is c~uior 
Again, in 1793, ill tlie reign of Ahdulghazi III., 
the brother of the Inak 1 Ivaz became blind, and 
An Inalc or Inelch was ail hereditary governor of IChiva 
@loctea from the Icirghiz or ICwalrulpalc cl~iefs after the death of the 
ICirgllia IChan Xaip. Khiva at the e1lc1 of the eigl~teenth cenlwy 
was rnled by IChmla ancl Indts, the Khans being the nominal 
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the Einpress Catherine 11. was asked to send an 
oculist to cure the disease. Catherine a t  once 
conlplied with this request, and sent ' Doctor or H m d  
Major ' Blanlre~iagel to treat the ,sick man. On ' 9 ' 6 7  
arrival at, Khiva, Blankenngel cleclarecl. t l ~ e y e s  of 
the patient to be inourablk, and this so ailnoyed 
the Iilak that he callecl. a couilcil to clecicle how 
ithe Russiaii should be dealt with. I t  was decidecl 
that Blankenage1 should be allowed to start; for 
Russia and be put to cleacll on the mTay. Tlle 
doctor, however, heard of tliis plot, and managecl 
to escape to Bussia through the assistance of tlie 
Turkoman~. 
Tlie closing years of the reign of Catherine 11. 
were maylced by some importallt events in connec- 
tion wit11 Russia's dealings with lier barbarian 
neighbours, and were also remarkable for tlie 
preparation of the first known solieme for a 
Russian invasion of Indi8 through the I(llstnates 
of Central A ~ i a . ~  
This strango forin of dual government camc to an ond on the death 
of tlie Inak Ivrtz in 1804, wllon his son dl.0~0 out tho ICirghi~ Icllan 
and proclaimed himself solo ruler of tho State. 
Blanlrcnagel is thus referred to in the Notes  o n  Rzcssimz 
I n t o ~ c o u r s s  w i t h  Ifhiva, written by G. Iciihlwein, the Secrotnry $0 
Colonel Ignatieff's lniesioll to Central Asia, and given as Apl~enclix 
IV. of T l ~ s  R z ~ s s i n n s  in Cent~nl Asia by John and Robert I~iIiclieH. 
I t  is cnrions that suoh a well-informccl Iltsssian writer as I<iihlwoii~ 
slloulcl throw donbts on Blanlrenagd's real profession. I f  Elan. 
Irenagel was, a s  Iciihlwoin ali~lost hints, n militmy offioer and not 
a doctor, his inability to enre ophtliahuia and sul~sequeat rougll 
treatment are easily accoru~ted for. 
T11is scheme is thus roferrocl to by Sir John M6Neill in  his 
pampIzlel entitled T71c P r o g ~ e a s  m d  P ~ e s m t  Pos i t ion  o f  Russicc b 
$As B a s t  :- 
6 Tt wns 011 this oocasioil' (Lo, whon England, by bor l o a g u ~  
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I11 July 1774, by the Peace of Ksiniaclji, wliich 
was coilcludecl after one of the many v a ~ s  between 
Russia aild Turkey, Russia finally ob~ainecl 120s- 
session of Azof ailcl some places on the Euxine, 
ancl the Criiilea was cleclared to be independent of 
the Porte. From this time the Crinlean peninsula 
was in a colistant state of anal.chy. The Sultan, 
cleprivecl of his temporal sovereignty, still claimecl, 
as the successor of tlie Klialifs, to be supreme in 
religious matters ; while the people, abandol~ed to 
themselves, were clivided illto two factions-the 
Tzlrlrisl~ and tlie Russian. In 1775 the reiguing 
ICl~an, who was devoted to Russia11 interests, was 
deposed and replaced by a Turkish adherent, who 
in turn was detlwoned by Catl~erine, when another 
Russian puppet, ilained Scliagii~ Ghirei, was placed 
on tlie throne. 
Wllat followed is thus described by Sir Jolin 
M'Neill :- 
' But it was the possession, not the tranquillity, 
wilh Prnsfiia and EIolland for the preservation of the Tnrlrish 
Empim, forced the Empress Catherine to mdio peace with the 
Porte) ' that the iclen of clistwbing t11o British Emnpire in India 
was first suggested to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, as o checlc on 
the aggreesivo porver, which the indritiine snperiority of Xnglond 
onabled her to exert agoinst Rnssin. The Prince Nn,ssau Singell 
presented to Catherine a project for marching a1 army through 
Bolrhara and C,ashmere to Beugi~l to clrivo tho English out of 
India. The plan had boon draw11 up by a Frnnchmnu, aid tho 
first stop was to be a manifesto cloclnrh~g the illtelltioil o l  t h ~  
Empress to re-estd~lish the Groat Mogul on tho tllrone of Indin. 
This, it rvns supposed, would socrrre tho concurronw of tho inlor- 
ruedinto slates, and attract to the slandard of Russia a11 tho 
discontenteil fipi~its in IIincluetai~. Tho schcmo, though derided b y  
Potemlcin, wns favoursl~ly laoceiveli by UeLhorino, a1111 11ns llovor 
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of the Krimea that Russia desired; and, fearing 
the resistance of the people, she sought and founcl 
a pretext for innrclliilg an army illto the country 
without opposition. A Turkish pasha hacl occu- 
pied tlie islancl of Tamm, 011 the opposite shore 
of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, allcl tlie Russia~~s 
succeeded i11 perslxading Sc!~.czgin Geray to demaricl 
iLs evacuation. The fierce Turlr put the ambas- 
sador to death, ancl Russia ' called loudly for 
vengeance. The Khan, irritated by this barbarous 
insult, acceclecl to the proposal of his friends to 
entrust to tlielli the punishment of the Pasha, and 
a Russian army entered the Krimea for the pur- 
pose of driviilg the Ottonians froiii the opposite 
island ; but wlieii i t  had penetrated to the coast 
it sucldeilly fell back, occupied the whole penin- 
sula, seized by stratagem or force all the strong- 
holds, and, at the point of the bayonet, forcecl the 
Irnains and the people to take the oath of dle- 
giance to the Elnpress. Specious promises , of 
ailvantage were held out to all, but  the Tartars 
nevertheless prepared to resist ; and Field-marshal 
Potemkin, inforined of their intentions, ordered 
the priizcipal. persons conceriied to be put to 
deatll. The officer, Prince Proboroffslri, to wliom 
his coinniaild was first aclilress~ed, i~ldigllalltly 
refused to execute it ; 1,ut Geueral Yaul Poi;em- 
kin, a relation of the Field-i~iarshal, and General 
SuvaroE, mere obsequious instruments, ancl t h i ~ t y  
thousancl Tartars, of either sex and every age, 
were slaughtered in cold blood.' 
Thus, in a tinie of profound peace, clid ll~e, 
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E l l ~ ~ r e s s  Catherine gain possession of the Crimea, 
and so conlpleted tlie work of Ivan the Te~rible 
by finally subduing and aiinexillg to IZussia the 
last ki~lgcloin which recalled the mernol-ies of the 
Mongol yoke ancl the suprelllacy of the Golden 
Eorde. 
1 
The Sultan at first protested, and threatened 
a rupture ; but 11e eventually signed tlie Treaty 
H b - 4  . X ~ I  of ~ ~ n s t a ~ i t i n o ~ l e  in 1784, wl~ereby he aclmow- 
j ledgecl the cession of the Crimea, the island of 
, T+. q-733 Taman, and a large portion of the ICuban. 
NOL content with these ilnportant acquisitions, 
Catherine secretly prepared for nothing less than 
the partition of the Turlrish Einpire. The Emperor 
Joseph 11, acceded to her views, and the year 
1788 saw Turkey in imminent peril. Rut England, 
1~110 had during the previous Russo-Turkish war 
been fettered by the troubles in America, mras 
now free to resist Russian designs on the Bos- 
phorus, and fitted out a great naval armament 
for the Baltic. Sweden declared war, and Prussia, 
after sonle hesitation, coiicluded a treaty wit11 
the Turlrs, marched an army into Polaizd, and, 
by a convention with Austria, witlidrew the 
Zmperor Joseph from his Bussiail alliance. Europe 
was in arms against the aggressions of the Mus- 
covites ; Catherine was forced to abandon lier 
designs against the Ottomail Zinpire ; a i d  i11 1792 
a treaty of peace was concludecl at Jassy, by ahich, 
liowever, Russia adva~~cecl to the Dniester, and 
obtaiilecl the ackilowleilgi~lei~t of Turkey t,o liel- 
sovereignty over Georgia, 
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During the reign of tlie great Nadir Sliall, arid 
for several years after llis death, tlie Russians had 
abstained from any warlike ventures in Persia; 
but afterb the assassinatioll of Nadir, in 1747, 
troubles ensued which destroyed tlie integrity 
of the empire which the Kliorassai~. warrior hacl 
built up, left Persia weak ailcl divided, and 
afforded an opportuliit-y for the outlying provilices 
to throw off the Persian yoke. Afghanistall and 
Khorassan became inrlependent, and in 1752 tlle 
~r inces  of' Georgia (Tarnaras and his son Heraclius), 
being unable to protect tl~emselves against the at- 
tacks of the neighbouring lnoulltaill tribes, appealed 
to Russia for assistance. Eight years afterwards 
Heraclius drove his father fro111 the throne, ancl 
tlie whole of Georgia thus again became united 
under tl.le rule of oiie prince, who was conipletely 
under Muscovite influence, and who even assisted 
the Russiails in their war wit11 Turkey. I n  order 
to protect himself fTolm possible retribution in the 
event of Persia becoming re-united ulider a strong 
ruler, Heraclius, in July 1783, entered illto an 
offensive and defensive alliance tvitfl Russia, a.nd 
signecl a treaty whereby he renoui~cecl all connec- 
tion wit11 Persia, and ileclarecl liimself to be the 
vassal of the Empress Oatllerine II., a110 in turn 
boond herself ald her successors to protect llim, 
and to guarantee tlle possessioli of his clominions 
and such territories as mi& be acquired by him 
in future. ' 
Nor was it olily in Georgia that Russian in- 
trigue was at ~vorlc. Persia, IVLS clistractcil by a 
' TIIE KEY AN11 GATE' 
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civil war in diicli  several rival pretenders asserted 
tlleir cl'ainis to the tl~rone. Russian agents seized 
tile opportuuity; a Russian protdgi was supported 
in his attempt to overtllrow Aga 3'lahommed ; and, 
In  July 1'781 .Count Voinovitch sailecl froill 
Astrakl~an with four frigates and two armed punish 
sloops, ].laving 011 board the necessary troops and Mallon 
ammunition for a desceiit on the Persian coast. A, rival ( 
landing was inade in the Gulf of Astraba(1, and 1796 1 
the Rissians cornlnenced tlle construction of a 
fortification about twenty-five iniles to the west 
of Gez, whicli was to be arinecl. with eighteen 
guns. 
Aga Mal~oinmed Shah, on hearing this, visited 
the place, congratulated tlie Russian com~nancler 
on the result of his labours, dilled on board one 01 
the frigates, and, on leaving, invited ~oinovitcll  
and the otlier Russian officers in return to cline 
with him at  his r'esicience in the neig'llbouring 
mountains. When they, in response to this in- 
vitation, reached the SI1al1's house on the next clay, 
they ilisco~7ered that the wily Persian' had been 
inerely feigning satisfaction for the purpose of 
more surely getting the Russialls into his power ; 
fcl;. no sooner had they arrived tllall they were 
placecl in irons, aiicl Voiiio~itcl~ was forced t;o sign 
an orcler directing the conlrrlalldallt of the fort to 
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buildings. Then, loacled with abuse and exposed 
to every kincl of inclignity, the Bussiails were 
whipped down to their ships, ancl thus the se- 
cond Bussian ~ztte~nljt lo establish tllenlselves on 
Persian territory near Astrabacl ignonliniously 
hiled. 
For t ~ e l v e  years after the collclusioi~ of the 
trcaty betvreeil Heraclius and the Empress 
Catherine, llle Georgian Prince remained uiz- 
punished for his clisloyalty to his suzeraiil, as Aga 
Mahoinmed ~vas fully occupied in opposing the 
rival clailnczilts to the Lhrone of Persia. But in 
1795 the Shah, having pot rid of his rivals ailcl 
having received the s~tbmission of the souther11 
provinces of Persia, was able to turn his attentioil 
I,O his rebellious subject. He Grst summoned 
I-Ieraclius to return to his duty, and to attei~d 
at, the capital to lalre the oath of allegiallce ; 
but the Georgian Prince replied that he ,zcknow- 
ledged no suzerain but the Empress Catherine of 
Russia, Then Aga Mahommecl collected a large 
army of about 60,000 men; Heraclius was soon 
afterwards defeated in a pitched battle ; Tiflis, 
the capital, was occupied by the Persian army ; 
and Erivan opened its gates to the victorious 
Slla11.l 
By this campaign Aga Mahommed regainecl. 
The fortress of Sheefihah still held out, but was cnptnred by 
Age Mnllommed in the spriilg of 17'37. This was his lnst s~~ccess, 
for n, fow dnys nftorwrtrcls he was nssessinatod by two of his sor- 
vnnts whom hc htld condomnod to (lertth, bnt who wore allowell to 
poxform thcir dntios wllile nnclor sciltcnce of (loath. 
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complete possessioil of the Persian proviilces in 
tile Caucasus, and he tllen turilecl his atte~ltioll to 
tile subjugalion of El~orassan, which district had 
fallen away from Persia cluring the troubles which 
followed Nadir Shah's death; but while so em- 
ployed the armies of the Enlpress Catherine were 
advancing to re-assert Russian preslige, which had 
been so roughly shaken by the Shah's triu~llphallt 
campaign in Beorgia. 
When Catherine 11. received news of the aitzlck 
on her new vassal she at once took steps to recover 
the territory which llacl been lost, ancl to punish 
the Persian monarcll for his temerity in llaviilg re- 
asserted his sovereign rights over a feudatory who 
had, for a long series of years, paid tribute to the 
Shalls of Persia, but ~~110,  through Russian intrigue, 
had fallen away from his allegiance. I11 t,he spring 
of 1796 a nussian army, uilder Count Vnlel-iaix 
Zouboff, aclvanced against Derbent. The outworks 
mere captured, w ~ d  the town then surrendered; 
and sooil afterwards Baku was also talcen, trhile 
the island of Sari, near Lenkoran, tcns occupied, 
ancl an unsnccessful attempt was made to cczptnre 
Enzell, the port of Reul~t. In the rnollth of Oclober 
the Russians tools. possession of Bhemaklla, and 
before the close of the winter two columils had 
been ~ u s h e d  forward to the frontiers of Azerbijan. 
But before any decisive results could be obtained, 
nemTs reached tlie army of the death of Catherine II., 
and Zouboff received orders from the Emperor Paul 
to recire. The Russian general accordingly with- 
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hat1 been occupied, with the exceptioil of t l ~ e  
towns of Derbei~t ant1 Ra,lru, which were retained 
by Russia. On the death of Heraclius his so11 
Goorgeen, or George, tendered his subinission to 
Futteli Ali Shah, ai~cl thus Georgia once again 
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TIIE dawn of tlze present century foullcl Great 
Britain engaged in a desperate struggle against 
the power of the First Consul of France. I n  the 
~~revious year (17Q0), Pitt, fincling that England 
was freed from all dangers in Ireland, and seeing the Czar 
that she had quite regained her naval supremacy sian prisc 
by the glorious victories of St. Vincent, Camper- I Thus 
cIo\vn, artd the Nile, revived the coalitioil with 
Russia and Austria, lavished enorinous subsidies 
on England's two allies, artd macle strelluous eflorts 
to overthrow Napoleon. 
But the disasters suffered by the Russian troops 
in Central Europe, and the Iailure of the Anglo- 
Buasian expedition to Eolland brought arl angry 
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- 
appeared in the 'St. Pet,ersburg Gazette,' and he 
s~~llenly abstained from auy further attack on the 
French. 
This was Bonaparte's opportunity. By dexter- 
ous diplomacy he gradually persuaded Paul that 
Bngland was the coinmon enemy of Europe. By 
the Treaty of Luneville, France was secured from 
attacks on the continent, and Englancl stood alone 
opposed to the increasing power of Napoleon. 
The Russian Czar saw in the st;reiigtli of Great' 
Britain tlie chief obstacle to his designs onTurlcey. 
He claimed Malta, on tlie grouilcl of his alleged 
election as Graild Master of the ICniglits of St;. 
John, ancl was greatly incensed when the English, 
who had just captured the island, refused to re- 
linquish it. He daily became more aiid more iilz- 
bued with a passioiz for Boi~a~parte, surrounded 
lzinlself with his portraits, ancl drank his health 
publicly. The First Consul carefully fostered these 
sentiments. He offered to hand Malta over to 
Russia, and, to endorse his friendly feelings towards 
the Czar, liberated without excliange all Llle ELIS- 
sian prisoners who had been taken in the war. 
Thus the commencement of the year 1801 
found the Emperor imbued with strong feelings of 
friendship, amounting to infatuation, for Napoleon, 
and preparing to join with Sweclen, Denmark, ancl 
France in an attack against Great Britain, in the 
hope of being able to wrest 'from her the command 
of the sea. 
I t  was at this time that a second great scheme 
was prepared for a joint French ancl Russian in:va- 
:u a 
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sioll of Hilldustall for the purpose of driving the 
English out of lheir settlements in that country. 
TIle Frellcll troops still occupied Egypt, ancl Napo- 
leon still cherished the idea of being able to l'orce 
the English to abandou India. The Russians also 
hacl obtained an advantageous base from which 
operations against the East Indian settlements 
ll~ight, it was tl io~~pht,  he successfully launched. 
I 9 Sizlce Paul hacl recalled his troops from the Cauca- , 1 1  
L i L- sus, Russian agents lzad been busily employecl in 
intrigues for the purpose of preparing the way for 
a final annexation of Georgia. Their efforts were 
successful, for, on Septenlber 28, 1800, 
Prirlce George 2311. of Georgia renounced his 
cro\va in favour ol' the Emperor of R ~ ~ s s i a ,  nci 
thus Paul, without striking a blow, gained posses- 
sion of a considerable increase of territory, and 
obtained a more advanced base for the great 
Illdislil expedilion he mTas alsout to undertalce. 
This Franco-Russian invasion of India was to 
have been carried out by means of' two clistinct 
columns. One of these armies was to be composecl 
of 35,000 French and an equal number of Russians. 
The French were to descend the Danube, and then 
, to be transportecl across the Black Sea, in Russiail 
k ships, to Taganrog. From thence they were to go 
up the Don as far as Piati-Isbanskaia, cross to the 
Volga at Tzaritsin, descend that river to Astrakhan, 
re-cmbark on the Caspian in Russian vessels, and 
on reaching Astrabad would there be joined by 
the Russian army of 35,000 men-25,000 regular 
troops of d l  arms, ancl 10,000 Cossaclrs. The 
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coinlviiled force, uilder the coinrl~aild of Massena, 1 
was then to aclvance t l ~ ~ o u g l ~  Ihorassan, Herat,' 
Farah, and Kanclahar to the Inclus, ' chase tile' 
Englisl.1 fro111 Iadia, liberate that rich ailif beantirul 
country from the English yoke, and open new roads 
to England's comlnercial rivals, a i d  especially to 
France.' The project entered illto the most ininute 
delails, and on the margin were scribbled tile" 
criticisms of Napoleon with the Czar's replies. 
I t  was calculated by Paul that ' from the 
Danube to tlie borders of Illilia the advance will 
occupy the French ariny four months, or, avoiding 
rorced marches, Eve months.' 
The armies were to be prececleil by commis- 
saries who were to establish stations an(1 lialling- 
places where necessary, and to visit tlie Kl~ans ancl 
oreat laildowilers to explain illat the expecli ti011 
b 
RXS for the 11url)ose ' of driving away the Eng- 
lish from tlie beautiful couiltry wllicli they liave 
subjected-s couiltry formerly so reninrkable for 
its iiidustry and wealth, aild wllich it is IIOW pro- 
a ~tants  posed to open to all the world, that the illll. b' 
limy profit by the riches and other advantages 
niven to thein by heaven.' Tlle Russian note thcn a 
proceeclecl to s Late : - 
' The sull'erii~gs uiider which tlie populatioii of 
this coui~try groails llave inspired France and 
Russia wit,h the livclicst interest; aiicl Llle two 
Governrueills linve resolved to uilite hei r  forces in 
order to liberate India from the tyrailnical ancl 
barbarous yoke of the Blglish. Accordingly, the 
l~rir~ces and populations of all countries thl.oi1g.h 
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which the combined a.rinies will pass need fear perform E 
nothing. On the contrary, it behoves them to vith whic 
help wit11 all their strength and means so bene- are celeb] 
volent and glorious an undertaking, the object of vas to sei 
this campaign being in all respects as just as was industries 
unjust the campaign of Alexander tlie Great, who ariloiig th 
wished to conquer the whole world. The coinrnis- with the i 
saries are further to set forth tliat the combined miill enalj 
arillies will not levy contributions, and will pay in tlie ]nag1 
ready money, on ternzs freely agreed to, for all and will i 
things necessary to their sustenance ; that on this of coilmlf 
point the strictest rules will be enforced. More- Napol 
over, that religion, laws, manners, and customs, of the p 
property and women, will everywhere be respected 
and protected. With such aimounceinents, with 
such honest, straightforward statenlents, it is not 
to be doubted that the Khans and other sinall 
princes will allow the combiilecl armies i;o pass 
without hiiidrance tlirough their territories. 111 
a ~ l y  case, they are too weak and too much divided 
by clisseilsions ainong themselves to rnalre ally 
opposition. The corninissaries will hold negotia- 
tioils wit11 the Kl~ans, pcinces, and private land- 
owners about furnishing provisions, carts, arid 
kibitkas. They will subscribe conclitions, and 
according to circuinstances will require, or them- 
selves deposit, caution-money .' 
Learned and scient>fic societies were to talre 
part in the ' glorious expedition.' Aeroiiauts arid 
pyrotechnists were also to accompany the troops, 
and it was arranged by Paul, 'before tlie army 
starts from Astrabad, to hold grand fktes and 
perforin striking evolutions, in the style of those 
with which great events and memorable epochs 
are celebrated in Paris.' Tlle French Goverilment 
was to send rare objects and produce of national 
industries, which gifts, ' distributed wilh tact 
alnollg the princes of those countries, and offered 
wit11 the grace and courtesy llatural to the Frellch, 
will eilalsle those races to ibrin the highest idea of 
the illagiliiicence of Fre~ich irlduslry and power, 
and will in coilsequelice ope11 an importanl brailcll 
of colmerce.' 
Xapoleoll appears to have doubted the success 
of tlie proposed undertalring, and askccl, 'Sup- 
posing the combined army be united at Astrabad, 
how do you propose that il should gct to India, 
through coulltries almost barbarous, aild ~vithonL 
any resources ; having to march a clistance 01 300 
lcigues from Astrabacl to the froiltiers of IIindu- 
star1 ? ' Paul, ia reply, said, ' Tlle couiltrjr is not 
savage ; it is not barren. IL has long been Ira- 
versed by open and spacio~is roads; the soil is 
like that of Arabia and Libya-iiot cvvereil will1 
dry sand, rivers water i~ at alllzosi every step. 
There is no want of grass for focliler. Ilicle grows 
im al~undnuce, m ~ r l  Sornis tile 1)rili~jl)al food 01 the 
inl~abitants.' Alicl, after rel'cr*rii~g to Nailii. Slu~h's 
~narcll througll the salrie co~uit,ry Iron1 I.)cllli to 
the Cxspiail, the Cz:lr eiicleil 1)y saying: "l'lie 
Frellcll and Rnssian sriilies :I.rc eager lijr glory ; 
they a1.e brave, pnticlit, :~ncl ui~wenriecl; Ll~eir 
courage, lheir llersevcrallc7e, aild lllc wisilo~n of 
their lca~lers will 1~101v 1 1 0 ~  to surlliolir~t, a11 
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obstacles. . . . What a really Asiatic army did in 
1739 and 1740, we cannot doubt that an army of 
French and IZussians can do to-day.' 
The other army oS invasion was composed of 
35,000 Russian troops, and was to move by n7ay 
of Ichiva and Bolchara to the upper Indus. Tliat 
the Russian Emperor was fully determined to 
carry out this great scheme is shown by l,lie fact 
tllat the troops of this nortlierll army 
had actually proceeded for a considerable distance 
before tlle wl~ole scheme collapsecl on receipt of 
the news of Paul's death. 
On January 24, 1801, he issued the followii~g 
orders to Orloff-Denisoff, the Atamail of the Doll 
Cossacks : 'The Eilglisli are preparing for an 
attack by land and sea against me and my allies, 
the Swedes arid Danes; I am ready to receive 
them. But it is necessary to be beforeband with 
them, and to attack them on their most vulnerable 
point, and on the side where tliey least expect it. 
I t  is three months' march from Orenburg to IIi11- 
dustan, and it takes anotl~er mont1i to get from 
the encanlpineilts of the Don to Orenburg, malting 
in all four months. To you and your arms I con- 
fide this expedition. Assemble, therefore, your 
men, and begin your march to OrellLurg. Thence, 
by wl~icliever of the t h e e  routes you pl.efel., or 1,y 
all, you will go straight ~r i t l i  your artillery to 
Bolchara, Ichiva, tlic River Iiltlus, ailil tile Ei~glish 
settlements in India. Tlle troops of the couiitry 
are light troops like yours; you will IhereSore 


































Prepare everytliiiig for this campaign ; seilcl your 
scouts to reconnoitre and repair the roads. All 
the wealth of the Inclies shall be your recompense. 
. . . Such an enterprise will cover you p~it11 im- 
inortal glory, will secure you my goodwill in 
proportion to your services, will load you wilh 
ricl~es, give an opening to our comiuerce, and 
strike the eneiny a n~ortal blow. I selld yon 
maps, as lllany as I have, and remain your well- 
wislier, PAUL. 
' P.8.-My maps only go as fax as Kliiva and 
the River Ainu (Oxus). Beyond these points it is 
your afrair to gain information about the posses- 
sions of the English and the conclition of the 
Indiail populatioii subject to their rule.' 
011 the saine day tlie following aclclitional in- 
structions were sent: (India, to which I seilcl 
you, is governed by a snpreme heacl and a iiuilll~er 
of small sovereigns. The Eiiglish possess com- 
mercial establishments there, which they Eislve 
acquired by means of llzoney or coilyuered by 
force of arms. The object of this campaigil is to 
ruin Lliese establisliiuents, to free the oppressed 
sovereigns, to put tliein witli regard to Russia in 
the same state of clepeilcle~lce in which tliey now 
are with regard to  the English, and finally to 
secure for ourselves the colliinerce of those 
regions.' 
Again, on tlie next clay Orloff is told : ' Be sure 
to ren~emlser that you are 0111~7 at mar with the 
E~:~lglish, 2nd the friend of all who clo nol give 
hein help ; on your marc11 you will assure men of 
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tile friendship of Russia. From the Inrlus you 
will go to the Ganges ; on the way you will occupy 
Bolcllara, to preveut her going over to China. i t  
Khiva you will deliver some thousands of my 
subjects who are kept prisoners there. If you 
need infantry, I will send it to follow in your 
footsteps. There is no other way, but it will' be 
best if you can be s f ic ient  for yourselves.' Arid 
then again, 011 February 19 ,  comes the pressing 
note, ' The expeclition is urgent ; the earlier the 
I 
I Such were the instruclions sent to Orloff- 
Denisoff, who marched fro111 Oreill~urg, i11 tile 
depth of winter, with 22,000 Cossacl~s and two 
companies of horse -artillery. The Volga was 
crossed on the ice, amid great dificulties, and the 
force had proceeded upwards of 450 miles, ahen 
the Atainan received news of the suclden clealih of 
the Emperor Paul, wliicli occurred on the night, of 
j March 29. On the next day Alexander I. was 
1 \-.A proclaimed Czar, and peremptory orders were 
: issued for the return of the expeclition. Boiia- 
j parte's friend and ally was dead; ten days later 
*. the Danish fleet was seized at Copenhngen, the 
League of Arniecl Neutrality collapsed, and with it 
the fantastic scl~eine for the invasion of Iridia fell 
to t11.e ground. 
Although the Binperor Alexander I. put a stop 
to the expedition against the English settle~nerlts in 
Indix, he showed no clesire to abstain from extencl- 
ing Russian influence in the Caucasus ; ~ t  the ex- 
pense of Persia. I t  liaa been mentioned that i s  
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Seplember 1800 the Prince of Georgia d3clicated 
in favour of the Czar-an act which drew clown 
upon hiin the hatred and curses of the nobles of 
his country. The Queen of Georgia, who was 
ashamed of Iier husband's wealrness, did her best 
to stir up the people to resistance, ailcl when an 
attempt was made to seize her in order that she 
inight be deported to Moscow, stabbed the Russiail 
oficer wlio was sent to arrest her. George's 
younger brother, Alexancler, also did his best to 
raise a general rebellion for the purpose of throw- 
ing o r  tlie Russian yoke, and sougl~t lie aid of' the 
Kliail of Karabagh. 
But the Czar Alexailcler hacl no intention of 
renouncing his claims to sovereignty over Georgia, 
as the successor of George XIII., ancl on Sel~t- 
einber 1 2 ,  1801, he issued a proc1,zmation to tlie 
people of the principality, in which he forrnally 
annouilced his acceptatioil of the Georgian crown. 
The following is an extract from ibis proclama- 
tion :- 
' I t  is not for the sake of increasing our power, 
from no interested motives, nor for the extensioii 
of an empire already so vast, that we accept the 
cares of the Georgian throne ; it is oilly the senti- 
ment of our dignity, honour, ancl hulna~lity that 
has imposed on us the sacred duty, not to resist 
your heart-rending cries, but to relieve you from the 
evils which afllict you, and to introduce in Georgia 
a strong Govenl~ment, capable of administering 
j~lstice wit11 equity, l~rotecl~iug life anncl property, 
and extendiilg to all the zgis of the law.' 
Geilerd Zizianoff (a Georgian by extractiol~) 
was sent as Governor-General of the proviiice, allcl 
this officer at  once marched into Miilgrelia a n d  
occupied that province wit11 Eussian troops. 1x1 
tlie followii~g year the town of Geilja was take11 by 
assault, when the garl-isoii was slaughtered alllid 
sceiies of tlie grossest barbarity aiid ferocity ; allci 
5 .  
"1 . from thence Zizia,noiT advanced to Erivan, bei l lg  
led on by a promise of the goverilor of the  c i t y  
(Mahoinined Khan Kajar) that he would yield it to 
the Russiaii general. These proceedings caused  
the greatest d a r m  i11 tlie Court of Persia. T h e  
defection of Mal~ommed Khan necessitated p r o m p t  
measures, uliless the Sliah wished to see Erivan a l s o  
in tlie power of the Russiaii Czar ; and 'a Persia11 
anny uiider tlie Crow11 Pririce Abbass Mirza tlle~:.e- 
fore tooli t l ~ e  held early in 1804, m d  advancecl i;o 
p~mish  tlie traitorous governor a11d to prevent t h e  
Russiaii troops obtaining possession of the city. 
After several eiigageillents the city of E1-ivan 
was occupied by the Shall's forces, a i d  thus the 
close of the year 1804 found Llie Pe~s ians  o i l c e  
again masters of t11.e surroundin(r xovince. 4 
In  the followiilg spring the campaign was re- 
newed. Zizianoff gained possessioil of tlle p r o v i l ~ c e  
of Shelree, aiid ill July inarclled in.l;o Karabagh,  L.. 
where the fortress of Slleesllali was t r a i t o r o ~ s l y  
llailclecl over to hini by the govenior ; but  an. 
al;temptecl clescellt 011 the coast of Gllilnn a t  E ~ i z e l i  
was repulsed, ailcl tlic governors of Kuba, D e r b e ~ l ~ ,  
and Baku., and the chief of the Lcsghians appealed. 
to the Shall f o ~  assistance to enable them to t'hrox..? 
off the 
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off the Eussisll yoke. The Rnssian general, there- 
fore, inarched to reduce Balcu, svlzile the Russian 
squadron from Enzeli steered for the same place. 
While collducting the siege, ZizianolTwas foully 
murdered. Threatened with an attack in rear by 
the Persian forces who were advancing under the 
Crown Priilce from the direction of Ardabil, the 
Rnssiail general entered illto negol;iations with the 
governor of Baku for the sul~ender of the place. 
He was invited by the Khan to a conlerence for 
the purpose of arra,nging the terms of the capitu- 
lation, and while collversiilg with tlie chief unrler 
t,he walls of the fort, mas suddeilly assailed by n 
mailg of assassills a110 had bee11 statioiled there for 
h 
tlie purpose. I t  was a cruel and treacherous deed, 
but one which, however reprehensible, can hardly 
be woilclered at, for Zizinaoff had throughout llis 
career in the Caucasus rarely shown clemency to 
those ml~oin he conquered, ancl mTas perpetually 
ini;~iguiag with the Persian goverilors for the sur- 
render of their charges. E e  thus was in collstallt 
com~nunicatioll with traitors of the worst class- 
men who did not hesitate to cormnit acts of the 
Z~lackest treason towards their sovereigiz ancl coun- 
try-and i t  is not surprising that tlie men mho were 
thus capdde of bel;rayi.ng the charges comlnitted 
Lo their trust should sooller or later turn against 
the instigator of their treachery, and be found 
ready and willing to colllmit a cold-blooded mu~de r  
such as was perpetrated under the walls of 13a1ru. 
The cleath ~f ZizianoE .was a severe blow to 
the Iinssiaus. The news n.as received inc~-'crsia 
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mrith every sign of satisfaction. The Shah was 
exultanl, and issned a proclanlation annouilcing 
that a glorious victory had beell won, in which 
the rellotvned Russian cominander had beell slain, 
I t  was indeed a disaster for the Russiarls, but re- 
jlectecl little credit on the Persians. Ralcu was fol. 
tlle time saved from lZussian occupation ; but the 
Shah and his ministers fully expected that steps 
would be talcen by their adversaries to avenge the 
deed, and to prosecute the war with redoubled 
all fear of ar 
been gained by either of the belligerents, events pelled by tlie 
-cvere taking place in Europe wllicl~ conipelled 011 October 2 
rLussia to turn her atlention towards the west, and 1 But two d 
the tvar ill Georgia became a matter of veiy minor 1 Austria11 am 
importance to the Cza~  Alexander I. F Ulm, and, ral 
After the death of the Emperol* Paul, and the 1 parte hacl iilfl 
collapse o£ the League of Armed Neutrality, the j bined armies 
war between Great Britain and France continued. 
On March 21,1801, General Abercrombie del'eated 
tlie French army at Alexandria, ancl, in the f01lo~~- 
ing June, French rule in Egypt mas terminated by 
the capitulation of General Hocl~e. 
Both parties now desired peace, and in March 
1502 the war was brought to a close by the Peace 
of Amiens. But Napoleon was resolved to become 
rllaster of Europe, and it was not long before the 
pledges given a t  Amiens were set aside. Piedrnont 
and Parina were snilexed to France, and a Frellch 
army occupied Switzerland. I31lglis21 prohests were 
sia Lacl 1,ri!n 
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ignored, and war became inevitable. In May 
1803 the Brirish Government cleclarecl war ag,zinst 
France, aiid I3oaaparte, in the deterillination to 
I~umble his most persistent aclverssry, formed a 
gigantic camp at 3oulogae ancl made preparatiorls 
for the invasion of England. Pitt was recalled to 
power in this natioilal emergency ; by the offer of 
large subsidies he gained the alliallce of Russia, 
Austria, and Sweclen ; and thus the terrible struggle 
on the continent was resumed. The danger which 
threatened Napoleon from the East compellecl hiin 
to abandon his dream of crossing the Channel, and 
all fear of an invasion of Ellgland was fillally dis- 
pelled by the glorious victory off Cape Trafalgar 
on October 21, 1805. 
But two days before this great naval battle the 
Austrian arlnly had capitulated uncler Maclr at 
U'lm, and, rapiclly following up this success, Boils- 
p a t e  had inflicted a crushing clefeat on the com- 
bined armies of Austria and Russia on the field of 
Austerlitz. I t  then appeared as if nothing could 
save Europe from the ambitious designs of the 
French Emperor ; and it was then that Napoleon 
resolved to  lose no opportunity of injuring his 
opponents, sent Colonel Ro~iiieu as an ambassador 
to the Court of Persia, with promises that if the 
Shah would repudiate his connection with the 
Bnglish, and enter into an alliance with the 
French nation, the Persian troops would be sub- 
sidised, and a Frencli arlny would be sent to 
assist in driving the Russians out of Georgia. 
Such an alliance rould have been to  the ndva11- 
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tage of both nations, for thereby France could 
have struck a blow at Russia in a direction fa,r 
removecl from tlie European theatre of Tvar on 
whicl.1 the Czar's whole attention was directed, 
while the Persians would be freed frorn 'the 013- 
l~ression and increasing aggression of their great 
11orl;her.n neighbour. But still the Shah hesitated ; 
for hacl he not adreacly concluded a treaty with 
tlie British anthorities, and dicl it not appear most 
probable that in accorclance wit11 that treaty tlle 
Ellglish would help hiin in his hour of need ? 
Seven years before the Goverllinent or India 
hacl been in a state of the mildest ala~111 and 
esciteme~lt owing to the invasioil of the Puiijaub 
by the Afghans under Zeinaun Shall. At that 
time the people of India had not yet forgottell the 
areat invasion by Afghan hordes under the illus- h 
trious Ahrlied Sliali wliich culminated in the corn- 
plete overthrow of the Mahratta Confederacy on 
the plains of Panipat in January 17'6 1. 
I t  was believecl that such another invasion 
was imminent ; ancl wlien it  became kno~r~11 t h a ~  
several Indian princes had sent invitatio~is to ihc 
Afghan ruler, and hacl promised to aid him in tlie 
effort to free Ilindustm from the B~it ish yoke, 
Lord \Vellcsley determinecl to despatch a mission 
to Persia, to secure the friendship of the Shah, and 
thus to obtain an ally who coulcl, by a cliversio~l 
against Herat, prevent Zemaun Shah lrom molest- 
ing the territory of the East Tnclia Compaiiy. 
The presence of the Fre~lcli in Bgypt, ancl French 
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course  still 
niore imperative ; and in 1800 Captain Malcolm 
left Iizdia as eilvoy to the Court of Persia. But, 
even before Malcolm reached the Persian capital, 
the Sbalz for his owl1 purposes, ancl without any 
inclucenzeilt from the Indian Government, had 
carried out the very movement which was to 
ensure the security of the English in Iizdia. 
Klzorassatl had been iizvacled by Persian armies, 
ancl Zemaun Shah had been obliged to abanclorl 
his aml~itious clesigizs on Itldia to save the western 
provi1.c.e of his l~ingcloin.~ 
Two years before Malcolm went to Persia a Persin11 nobleman 
natlwalised in India, named Malldi Ali IChan, llad been sent to 
Teheran by the Governor of Bolnbny, with instructions ' to  talio 
ineasurcs for illducing the C0~u.t of Persia to lreep Shah Zenlaun in 
perpetual ccheclr (so as to preclude him hornreturning to India), but 
witliont any decided act of hostility.' This envoy found, on his 
arrivnl, that the Shah was disposed to assist the two refugee Afglian 
Princes, M a l ~ i n o ~ ~ d  and Firoz-ud-din, withont the adclitional indncc- 
illent cf nn Engliah subsidy, wl~ich he llad been authorised to offer. 
H c  therefore toolc upon himself a considerable ainoullt of responsi- 
bility, and by suppressing his credentials, and by leaving well alone, 
had Che satisfaction of secing the Afghan princes marching towards 
Herat, supported by Persian troops. This expedition failed, and 
sllortly afterwmh Zemaun Shah sollt an inlperions messagc to the 
Shall of Persia, doinanding tile ccssioi1 of ILhorassnn. Futteh Ali 
Shah roplied that it was his illtelltioil to restore to Persia the terri- 
torics wl~ich it  had possessed in the time of tile Sefavem lrillgs ; 
and following up the threat by action, he in  1709 toolr the field in 
person, and marched into Ill~orassau. By this movelllallt Zeillaull 
Shah, threatened with the low of his westel*n provinces, was forccd 
to withdraw from Lahore. This expoilition, howcver, lasted but n 
fil~ort illlo, and when Puttch Ali Shah retulrned tollis capital in tllo 
nutuin~l of 1790, the Afghan ruler once more turnccl hia dtelltion 
tolvards tho Bast. I11 the following ~prilig, ho~vevcr, the Shall of 
Persia again marched into Iihorafisan, and Zomnnn Shall wn,s again 
obliged to move westwards to wntcll JJerat. l1Iius, when Malcolm 
reached Tehornn, 110 found illat Pcrsitzn ambition had done 311 t l~a t  
was roquirorl to snve India from the ilanger ol nil Afgk~nr~ invasion. 
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In the following year Malcolm concluded two 
treaties mith the Shah-one political and the 
other The Shah engaged to over- 
run Afghsoistan with a great anny, in  the event, 
of ally attempt being made by tlie Afgl~ans to 
iilvade Inclia, and to conclude no peace with 
that state lnnless it mas accompanied by a solenin 
promise to abstain froin attaclcilig the Englisli. 
A remarlcable clause was also inserted w l l e r e l ~ ~  
it mas provided that, ' should an  army of the 
Freilclz nation, actuated by clesigll or deceit,, 
attempt to settle, with a view of establisling 
tl~emselves on any of the islands or  shores of 
Persia, a conjoint force shall be appointecl by the 
two high contracting parties, to act in co-opera- 
tion, for their exp~~lsion ancl extirpation, ancl to 
destroy ancl put an end to tlie foundatlion of tlleir 
treason; and if aizy of the great men of the 
Preilc21 na~,iou express - a, wish or desire to obtaln 
a place of residence, or dwelling, in any of 
the islands or sllores of the kingdon1 of Persia, 
that they may raise the standard of abocle, or 
settlement, leave for their residing in such a place 
shall not be granted.' T11e Shall believed this 
treaty to co~latitut,e a c,omplete offensive and de- 
fensive alliance between Great Brita,iu ancl Persia, 
and, therefore, wlle~z the Prencll eiivoy appeared 
in Teheran, lze was coldly receivecl. Persia already 
possessed a powerful ally, who, she believed, would 
defend her interests, and who had taught her to 
consider the French a dangerous and deceitful 
people ; and Colonel Romieu therefore found, in 
through El 
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ktV0 spite of his large suite, hanclsoine presents, and 
still nlore tempting promises, that Futteh Ali 
Shah still looked to the English for aid. 
But the British Government viewed 1\4alcolm's 
treaty in a di@erent light. It  is true an offeilsive 
and defensive alliance had been coilcluded against 
France, but the Shah wanted assistance against the 
Russians who were not referred to in the compact, 
and who were then allies of the Britisl~ Govern- 
ment. Thus, when Putteh Ali in his clistress sent 
Mirza Nubbi Khan as an envoy to aslr for assist- 
ance from the Governor-General of India, help 
was denied to him ; and then, when the Shah 
through English inaction was forced to realise 
that lie could expect no support from Great 
Britain, he threw himself illto tile arms of tlic 
very people whom he had been taught by England 
to shun. I n  the summer of 1806 Mirza Reeza 
was despatched post haste with instrncl;io~ls to 
proceed to the camp of the French Emperor, ancl 
there to enter into negotiations for the yurpose of 
obtaining French aid againsl; the Russians, .who 
were referred to as bei~ig 'equally an enemy of 
the Icings of Persia and France, a id  wl~ose clestruc- 
tion accorclingly became the clut,y of the two 
kings.' The , Tersian envoy was also instructed to 
inform the Empei-or that ' if the French have an 
in~ention of invading Khorassan, the king will 
appoint an army to go down by the road of Kabul 
aid Kandahar.' 
What fairer terms . could Napoleoil desire ? 
Persia was tllus spoi~taneously offering to hilri 
E 2 
- -- -- - 
an alliance whereby an opportune diversion could 
be lnacle against the Russians, mhile at the same 
time assistance would be provicle(1 in furthering 
his ambitious designs on India. A treaty was 
clrawil up and ratified by Napoleon at Fenkeu- 
stein in &lay 1807, and Monsieur Jaubert was at 
once sent to Teheran to ailnounce to the Shah the 
terms of the agreement, and to collfirm the friendly 
relations which had been entered upon. This 
envoy was soon afterwards followed by a more 
brilliant embassy under General Gardanne. The 
Persian troops were drilled by French ollicers, 
French counsels mere predomi~laat in the Shall's 
couilcil chamber, and the hopes of the Per- 
sian Government were centered in the French 
alliance. 
But while ~ u t t i h  Ali Shall mas congratulating 
himself on thus having gained a new and powerful 
ally, by whose aid he could beat back the tide of 
Russian invasion, a great change was occurrillg in 
the relations between the European courts mliich 
were most interested in Persian affairs. The 
bloody and indecisive battle of Eylau hacl been 
followed by the great French victory at Friedland, 
.which broke down the resistance of IZussia and 
forcecl the Czar Alexander to seek peace. On 
July 7 the two sovereigns inet on the famous raft 
at Tilsit, and there arranged the terms of a peace 
whicli put an end to the war betwecn France and 
Russia. 
At the conference then helcl, the two Emperors 
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revived the project for an invasion of Inc7.ia by a 
Franco-Russian army ; Sebastiani ~1rgec7. the Por-e 
to grant permissioil for the passage of Freacl~ 
troops through Constantinople , a11c7. Asia Minor ; 
am1 Lucien Uonaparte, the most capable of Napo- 
leon's brotllers, was destillerl for the Teheran 
mission, lo corsliilue the negoliations which Gar- 
dai~rle had so successlillly iilaugurated, to orgailise 
tlie Persia11 foiaces and lo persuade the Persian 
Goveriii~ieizi lo take ail active part in Lhe projected 
invasion. 
When these facts became known the British 
aizc7. Inc7.ian Goverilmen ts were filled wit11 consterna- i 
tioiz, 2nd became possessed with a sense of un-I 
I reasoning and exaggerated alarm. Simultaneously , 
they both decided to talre steps to avert the new 1 
de~sger which lhretlte~ieil India ; and each, un- 
krlovrrii to the other, deteriniriecl to sencl an embassy 
t o  the Court of Teheran. Brigadier-General Mal- 
colm, tlie eisvoy froin India, sailed from Boinbczy 
in April 1808, a Scw days before the British ain- 
l)assador, Sir Llarford Joncs, reached that porl. 
The lnlter., in accordance with the iiisl,ruct,ioi~s he 
hacl received, ren~niiiecl at 110111bay availing the 
resull of Malcoli~i's proceedings, while ille India11 
rliploinatist, coi~linuing 11% journey, reached Bu- 
shire on May 10. 
1311~ nt tlli~t tiiile Ii'r(+iic11 illfllzerlce in Teliemn 
was SII~)I'C:I 110 ; G:LIY~:L~I~I(? ,  i 11011511 d d ~ a r r c ~ l  1 ~ y  tllc 
r~ 1 renly o l  l.'ilsiL fro111 ol ) l~os i~~g liussiau adv:w~ccs 
i ls  Georgi:~ by Tol.clc ol' :u.lns, i~ovcrlhclcss wits 
usill: his iufllzcn\cc! to ~ ) ~ ( I V C I L ~  fiir t l~cr (~11(:roac11- 
ments; and thus, when BIalcolm for the secorid 
time set foot on Persian territory, lie found that 
Be was coldly and even discourteously received, 
The mission was a complete failure, alicl in July 
the ambassador from the Governor-General of 
India was forced to re-einbark without haviilg 
even received an audience. 
As soon as Lord Minto heard that Malcolm 
had withdrawn from Persia. he reauested Sir 
L 
Earford Jones to proceed tliere vr~itli the utmost 
despatch, and on October 1 4  tlie ambassador froin 
the Court of St. James reached Bushire. At first 
he encountered the same irritating opposition and 
insolence that hail caused Malcolm to c l ~ ~ i t  Persinii 
territory ; but he steadfastly continued his onwwcl 
progress, and succeeded in reaching Teheran, where 
he was well received. Gardanne withdrew on his  
approach, the British ambassador having stipulated 
that he would oilly advance to the capital 011 the  
condition that the French envoy received his pass- 
ports. A remarlcable change hail indeed talcell 
place in the sentimeats of the Persian ruler anci 
his a,ilvisers. The French had coillpletely over- 
reached tliernselves, ailil were now cliscreditccl. 
When tlie Shah first hearc1 of the Peace of Tilsit, 
axid realisecl tlmt he coulcl expect no srined rc- 
sistai~ce from the Prencl~ against Russian aggres- 
sion, his faith ill liis new allies was sorely sliakeil. 
.Nevertheless, Qards~ll~le still promisecl mucll, ail( t 
F ~ ~ t t e l i  Ali Ella11 skill believed that through French 
mediation he would recover Georgia sncl K;kr:t- 
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in anxiety and fruitless negotiations, it was seen 
that the inexorable Muscovites retained their 
position in spite of fiencll promises, and even 
threatened further encroachments ; anil then all 
faith in the Frelicll alliance vanished. Sir 
ford Jones reached Bushire when this reaction was 
setting in, and lie skilfully took advantage of it. 
Gardanne had, ia tlie early clays 'of his mission, 
iinpressed on tile Persian ministers tliat t l ~ e  true 
friend of Persia was the nation which was Russia's 
enemy. At that time France was at war against 
England ancl Russia, and the mgument was all in 
favour of the French. But the Treaty of Tilsit 
dtered the conditions, England ;low was the 
e~iemy of France :~ncl Russia,l ancl Gardanne's 
cloct~ine therefore afforded a good reason for 
an alliance with Great I3ritain. The Rritiish en- 
voy wit11 consuinmnte skill toolr up the French 
line of argument; and, by utilising Gardanne's 
own precepts, clrove off the field. On Marcli 
12  a prelimiilnry treaty was signed wherein it 
was stipulated that ' in case ally European force 
had invaded or shoul(l invacle the I;e~*ril;o~ies of the 
Icing of Persia, l~ i s  1:3rit:ua1ic Majesty shonld aKord 
to t l ~ e  Sllali a force, or in lieu of it a subsidy, 
wit11 warlike a~nmuilition, such as guns, muskets, 
kc., to the amount t11:iC iaigllt; he to the advantage 
of both parl;ies, for tl1e csl)nlsion of the force so 
i11v:~cling' ; while i:lle 81l:il~ 011 his 11:~rt agreed 
kllat ' every trc?;~ty or n,grcenicilt wliicli the 
-., . 
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King of Persia might have made with any one 
of the Powers of Europe became llull and vo.id, 
ancl that he tvould not, permit ally European 
force wlint,ever to pass through Persia either 
towards Iizdia or towards the ports of tha t  
country.' 
in 
Sir Harford Jones's conduct has by many writers 
:,;' been severely criticised, but he unquestionably 
: was very successful in his negotiations, ancl by his 
i skilful cliplomacy restored British credit in Persia, 
and put an end to foreign intrigue. He appears 
,? 
t o  have been one of the first Xnglish diplomatists 
who recognised that the greatest external danger 
which threatened British India was to be found, 
not in French intrigues at Teheran, nor in tlie 
possibility of an invasion b y  the wild hordes of 
Afghanistan, but in the steady but insidious en- 
croachments of Russia beyond her European 
frontiers. English statesmen at that time only 
perceived one danger, which sprang from the in- 
ordinate ambition of the French Emperor, and 
which threatened to overwhelin the whole of 
Burope. What cared England for Fersia a i d  its 
troubles, while the very existence of the British 
nation was at stake ? With their scanty knowledge 
of the history ancl geography of Asiatic states, 
how coulcl they realise that the subtle inovements 
of Russia were infinitely more dangerous to India 
than the stratagems of the French? So long as 
the French occupied Zgypt, ancl while their fleet 
in tbe Mediterranean remained undefeated, the 












uncloubtedly seriously endangered ; but at no time 
did the danger lie through Persia ; ancl when the 
French had been driven out of Egypt and the 
Englisll ileet hacl regained undisputed supremacy 
in the ~editerranean,  then all dangers to India 
from the French disappeared. 
To Sir Harford Jones must be given the credit 
of having first recognised that another great Euro- 
pean power was stealthily aclvancing to~vards Hin- 
dustan ; advanciag, it is true, at that time slowly 
and with uncertain steps, but neverlheless gradu- 
ally moving forward, at one time by force of arms, 
and again by means of intrigues and cunning; 
rarely receding from a position once taken up, 
and reacly to seize every opportunity lor lurlher 
territorial acquisitions. 
Tlie preliminary treaty was conveyed to Eng- 1 
land by Mr. Morris aud IIadji Dilirza Abul Hassar~ -9 
IChan, was illen drily ratified, and Sir IIarford 
Jones was confirmed in his appointmeilt as ~ i n i s t e r '  
at lfic Persin~l Court. 
I n  1810 tfie Inclian Government again de- 
spatdlcil General niIalcolm to Persia, and wit11 him 
were sent several ofIicers who were etilployed in 
drillii~g the Persian troops and in exploring tlie 
country. 
Bil'c!ar~while tllc war betwcen nussia and Persia 
1i:ail l1ee11 cc~ii~inucd, the Persians being organised 
:ant1 led l ~ y  13ri~ish oijicers. 13aku, Shirwan, Shelree, 
U t ! i~ j :~ ,  Yhlisll, anil Mugail were occupiecl by the 
Ibussin~ls, nliil :LIL unsucccssfnl arlv,znce was made 
ng:~ii~si 15rivali. 
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But Russia was still occupied in the mar witll 
Turkey, and was eagerly watcl~ing the movements 
in Western Europe. Alexallder I. had, it is true, 
made peace with Napoleon, but he nevertheless 
watched with growing anxiety the gradual exten- 
sion of the J?rench Empire, In 1810 Hanover, 
Westphalia, and Holland had been annexed b y  
France, and iu the following yeaT Hamburg shared 
the same fate. I t  was necessary for the Russialls 
to be prepared to face any sudden change in tlie 
I political sit;uation, and their troops could not be 
t 
- 
spared to stpike a crushing blow in Persia. In - 
1812 matters reached a crisis. The suspensioil of 
all trade with England proved irksome t o  Russia, 
mcl even threatened the Russian landowners a i t h  
ruin. Napoleon insisted that E~lglancl shoulcl be 
completely isolated, and became irritated when the 
Czar refused to entirely suspend a l l  columercial 
relations with Great Britain. 130th nations now 
began l;o prepare for the struggle .cvhic.li appeared 
ii~l~nineat ; a great movement of the French troops 
began, whereby the armies of the First Empire 
mere drawn Roin the West ancl concentrated o n  
the frontiers of nussia, while Russian colui~ins 
were hultrieil westward. ,011 May 28 the Czar 
~nade pence a i t h  Turkey, and concluded t h e  
Treaty of B~icharest, wliercby the Porte regained 
possessioi~ of Wallachia and Anapa, Russia merely 
nsiniug Uessarabia as (;he ruibs of a long allc7. a 
arduous caxnpaig~~. 
But t;he safety of the Rlissilzn l3mpi:l.e clepencle(1 
on the res~~l t s  OF the war whicli was about to 
co~lllile 
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coililncnce, and it mas necessary that the entire 
liii1it:~ry resources of the state sl~ould be ulilisecl 
to heat back the ticle of Preilch invasion. On 
Julie 22 Napoleon declared war, and two clays 
later crossed the Xiver Niemen. I11 Septeiliber the 
llosts of France a~icl R~zssia met on the bloody field 
o f  I$orodiilo, where, though tcrribly sl~alien, the 
17rench troops once again forced their brave 
c.ncnlics to fall baclr ; nnil the ancient capital of 
Ii~zssin Tras sliortly after%-itrils occnpied by 
Nap oleoil. 
'l'lie outbrealr of hostilities betwccn France and 
l t ~ ~ s s i n  1lntar:~lly l~rouglit about n recoi~cilialion 
l)et,~veen tlie latter 1)ower and Englniitl. Ulldcr 
tllese cii-cuiilst:~~lcei; lh.it,isl~ olficcrs coulil no longer 
I)(: l)crii~ittccl to 1c:~cl tlic Persian arnlies, and Sir 
(I;orc Ouscley, ~ 1 1 0  relicveil Sir Ilnrf'ord Joilcs i11 
1,lic sniilruer of 1S11, tllerci'ore ortlered tbem lo 
tnl;c! no f~irtlier l):~rI, i1-t tlic iililitary vperntions 
:~g:~i~ls t  I'L~~ssia ; tllougli : ~ t  he e:~rnest entreaty 
ol' llic (~ro~vil  l'riil(le :LINI liis l~liilis~ers, C!aptaiil 
( '1il.istic ' : u ~ l  T,icul(~~la~~t I,iil(ls:~y wit11 lllirleeli 
~(~i .g(~:~i l l s  a.(:l.e l)rniiil,tcd to rem:~in wit11 the 
1'crsi;ul alqilly. 
121it ~11c war  llow was ilr:~~~vi~ig t,o :I close. Tlie 
I ' t*l*si :~~~ -rlly 11:~il iu :~r(~l~: t l  to 1,11(: Ar:~xes, :~ri[l re- 
i l  f i I I I s :LL Asl:~~ldoon wii.11uut ti~kiilg 
I I I(* 1st or(li11ary l~ r ( i c :~~~~ ; io t~s  1 o g~l:~r(L ~gaiilstf 
SI l~.l ,~.ixta.  ( 111 111~1 1s ,rilillg of ( )(:lol)o~+ 31 a Russian . . 
j i~~*,*tfi  , * o , l s i . < t  I I I ; ~ ~  of 2,:;110 ~ i l r l i l  : ~n{ l  six !;~II~s si~ilcle~lly 
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attackecl the camp and causecl the Persians t o  fall 
back to a position about half a mile distant. There 
the Crown Prince's army was again surprisecl on 
the following morning and completely rles troy ed 
by a Russian force of comparatively insigniiicaut 
strength; all his guns were lost ; and his cnnlp, 
with everything it contained, fell into tlle hallds of 
the victors. 
This disaster was followed by tlle loss of 
Lenlcoran, which was captured by the Bussiaiz 
General KotlareEsky in the following January; ailcl 
although the Persians were able to check the 
Russian advance on the Araxes, and even made 
preparatio~ls for assuming the defensive, a rising 
amoug the Turkomans caused the Shah to lend an 
ear to the counsels of Sir Gore Ouseley, who had 
been strenuously endeavouring to re-establish 
friendly relations betveen the two powers. The 
British Ambassador's eKorts had, up to that time, 
proved unsuccessful, as the Russians would make 
no concessions, while the Persian Governmeilt re- 
fused to  accept any settlement wlzich was based on 
the actual state of possession of territory. But 
new clangers having arisen, the Shah was per- 
suajlei-2 to accept the Russian conclitions, which, 
thouglz harcl, were the best t h a ~  coulcl be  obtained 
thl-ough the good offices of Sir Gore Ouseley. 
On Octol~er 12 ,  1813, a treaty of peace was 
signed a t  the Russian camp near Gulistan, whereby 
t l ~ e  Shall acknowledged ' the sovereignty of the 
Emperor of Xussia over the provinces of Karabagh 
and Georgia, now called Elizabeth Paul, the dis- 
tricts of Shekee, Shirwan, Kuba, Derbent, Balroo- 
beh' (Balru), and such part of Talish as is now 
possessed by Russia, the whole of Daghestan, the 
tract of Shoorgil, Achook, Bash, Gooreea, Mill- 
grelia, Abtichar, the whole country between the 
boundary a t  present established ' (by article 2) 
' and the line of the Caucasus, and all the territory 
between the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea.' I t  
was also agreed that the ' Russian flag shall fly in 
the Russian ships of war., vcllich are permitted to 
sail 011 the Caspian as formerly ; no otlze?? 7zatiolz 
zul~ateveq* shall l i e  allowed ships of way on t1;e 
Cct,spian' ; ancl thus, by the Treaty of Gnlistan, 
Eussia gained possession of a large slice of soine of 
the most fertile districts of Persia, and converted 
the Caspi.an into a Russian lalre. 
The coilclusion of this treaty necessitated 
tain modificatioils in the understanding between 
Great Britain and Persia. Ou March 14, 1812, 
Sir Gore Ouseley had signed a treaty based up011 
Sir Earford Jones's preliminary one ; but before it 
was finally ratified still further cllanges in its con- 
ditions were made by the British Government. 
After Sir Gore Ouseley's cleparture from Teheran, 
Mr. Morier, his Secretary, was left in charge of 
tlie Mission, and in 1814 Mr. lrleilry Ellis was sent 
out from Englanil for tlie purpose of obtniniizg the 
Shah's assellt tr.) the alterations 1\~1iicll were required 
by Erig1:~nil. On November 25, 1814, the treaty, 
motlified to meet, the wishes of the British Govern- 
tnent, was concluilecl :LI; Telleran by Messrs. Morier 
ancI Ellis. I t  mas very si~~iilar to klle one ~vl~icli  
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llad beell signed by Sir Gore Ouseley, and its lz?ost; 
noticeable features were : 
(I) The suppression of a clause \v1lereby 
England had engaged to supply naval officers, 
sailors, ancl artificers, if the Shah should at a n y  
tinle clesire to establish a naval force on the  
(2) The Persian Government bound itself not; 
to permit an European army to enter Persia £01. 
the purpose of invading India, and even agreed 
that; shbuld any European Powers wish to i&adc 
India by the road of Kharezm ' (Khiva), ' Tai-tari- 
stan' (Kashgar), 'Bolrhara, Samarkand, or o ther  
routes, his Persian Majesty engages to induce the  
kings ancl governors of tliose couiitries to oppose 
sucli invasion, as ~nuch as is in his power, either 
by fear of his arms or by conciliatory measures.' 
(3) If the Afghans were at war with the  
British, the Persian Government undertook t o  
send an army against them; but if war should 
be declal-ed between the Afghans and Persians, 
the Bnglish Government agreed not to interfere 
wit11 either party, uilless their nlediation to efrect 
a peace were solicited by both parties. 
(4) I11 the event of Persia being invaded by an 
European nation, the British Government engaged 
either to supply a force to assist in repelling the 
invasion, or, i11 lieu thereof, to pay a n  annual  
' The Treaty of Gulistail liad rondered such an agreenlent 
between Ellgland nnd Persia devoid of mosiliag, ns by that treaty 
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subsidy of 200,000 tomaas on the unclerstan~lin~ 
that such subsicly woulcl be aithhelcl, if the war 
with the European natioii was brought al~out by 
any act of Yersian aggression. 
Thus the close of (;he year 1514 found Persia, 
thong11 dcprivcil of some of her fairest provinces, 
at peace with Russia ancl in close alliance wid1 
(;.r(-bat I:i:itain : an alliance carefully clescribed in 
Llle treaty as 1)eing of a strictly clefeilsive clia- 
r:~cl;es, l ~ u t ,  nevertheless, one which bou~td E11gla11~1 
to l~roix:r:t Iicr from ally furtliei* Russiall attacks SO 
long :IS I'essin was not the aggressor. But the 
Ckovc?r~lment; of, the Wllite Czar llas never wanted 
astute politicians 'cr~llo were able to gain their ends 
1)y mt?:ms of sfiatecrart and intrigue wibllout rislriag 
011~11 liostilit,ies wil;h po~verful nations ; and it mill 
I)(: sc!c.11 how Persia zous iilvailed by an Europeaa 
I'o~rer, s11il Tirns 01,liged to undertalre a disastrous 
c:unl)~igu ~vitllout t11c: sill)port of El~gland, because 
:Llussia, t;l~roug11 unwarranted acts of encroach- 
I~~(;LIIL, ji)rct!cl tlle 1'crsi:lns to strike the first blow. 
I)uri l~g the long Ixace which followed the 
lin:~l over l;l~row of N:lpolcon Bonapar te, Russia dis- 
1)l:~ywI ilrt:reasetl ac:t,irity in Asia, alld was able to 
c:~rry ont -a l)c)licy of :~ggl.ession asld conquest, 
wllicll is rein:~slc:~l)lc! for tllc? unt1eviczting perseve- 
r:u~ c:c! ~irit,ll \vllic:l~ it 1 ~ : ~ s  l ~ e ( ~ 1  pursu~cl, for the 
skilf~zl, 1u:Lllrlc:r ill which c::~s,l~ new :~dvance has 
1.,(.!(!11 l~lannecl :lnd c;:~r~*io(I out, nlliI for i11e vast 
,z(l(lj,tic)jl.c; of tc!rrit;ory .~\rl~i(:Il l.lavc thus been iacor- 
l~)r:~t(! i l  irLLo tllc :l.Inssi:u~ IC111l~il:c. 
'L'l~c: Trcaky 1':lris 11:lil not 1011% 1)een signed 
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when orders were issued for the despatch of Russian 
officers to tlie eastern shores of the Caspian, for 
the purpose of selecting a suitable site for a fort, 
to enter into negotiatioils with the Turkomans, ancl 
if possible to penetrate to Xhiva itself. 
Seine years previously, certain of the Turlro- 
man tribes are said to have inade overtures to tlze 
Russiali authorities, asking for protection ; and ill 
1803 the Abdal tribe were granted a document 
which declared that they were the vassals of the 
! 
t White Czar. I t  is also said that, in 1511, two 
/ deputai;ions repaired to Astrdclian, asking for 
siinilar protection, and these .overtures were 
repeated two years later. From the subsequent 
attitude of the Turkoinans it is highly probable 
that if sucli deputations actually did reach Astra- 
lcha,n, they cannot have represented any consider- 
able section of the people, and that they merely 
claimed Itussian protectioil to  escape attacks from 
Persia an.cl Khiw. Nevertheless, the opportuility 
thus presented was a favourable one for renewed 
explorations in the direction of Khiva ; 'and Captain 
Mouravieff accordingly set out with Major Po110- 
rnareff in 151 9, carefully recolinoitred the south- 
eastern shores of the Caspian, selected two suit- 
able sites on which forts could advantageously 
be erected, and entered into friendly negotiations 
with the Yornud tribe of Turkomans, m7ho are saicl 
to .have again applied for Russian protection. 
MouraviefF then, escorted by a few Yomuds, crossed 
the desert and succeedecl in reaching Khiva, where, 
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subsequently released, was forced to hastily quit 
the Khanate. 
Attempts were also made to iitroduce order 
into the Kirghiz Steppes. The greatest clisorder 
and unrest prevailed throughout that region, and 
i t  became absolutely necessary that so~lle steps 
should be taken to induce the wild ilomads to 
abstain from their reckless acts of outla~rry and 
violence. Since their submission, the Kirglliz had 
been nominally under the rule of Khans who were 
, 
the descendants of Abul-Khair, tlie Russians having, :; .? ,, ,,::, ,,: .. 
in 1734, agreed to recognise the sovereigilty of -i:r..k,;6 : $&f 
Abul-Kkair's descei~clants, i11 return for their sub- 
missioil and the protection of Russian boundaries - 
and trading caravans. Rut, although this system 
of governmelit lasted for nearly a hunched years, 
it was a most pernicious one; for the people 
ignored the titular K h ~ n s  thus placed over them, 
and became inore violent and unruly under t,he 
nominal rule of Russia tlian they had been pre- 
viously. In  1824, therefore, the Khanate xas , 
abolislled, and the Steppe was divided into three [ 2 ' ~ ~ .  1- 2 
rayons, eacli of wliich was to be governed by a 
r .  d 
Sultm-Ecgen t, nominated by the Russian au thori- 
ties. Tliis chan.ge, however, did little good, for 
raiding and clisol.cler still coiitinued; and, as will 
be seen, gave Russia :L pretext for sending a Iarpe 
expeclitionnry force, not against her I(irg1iiz vassals, 
but against the ruler of one of the Centiral Asian 
Khanates, who was rnade n scapegoat for'the ofrence 
of the Czar's o ~ l n  suI.)jects, thus demonstrating the 
t,rutl1 of Peter's saying : ' Albhongh tlie I<irgl~i.z are 
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a, roaming and fickle people, their Steppe is the 
key a11d gate to all the countries in Central 
Asia,' 
d though by the Treaty of Gulistan Russia 
had gzzinec' very material concessions from Persia, 
it was not long before fresh clificulties arose, whiell 
were due to certain portions of the new frontier 
having been iimccurately clefinecl. For several 
years after the raliification of the treaty no steps 
were taken to remove this obvious source of 
clanger, and when eventually commissioners were 
a~pointed to settle the disputed poinl;s, 110 agree- 
ment coulcl be arrived at. 
The district of Gokcheh, wllich unques t io~iabl~  
belonged to Persia, was the chief cause of the  
quarrel, while further disputes arose over the  
possession of Guni, Balalsloo and Kapan. Since 
the conclusion of the previous war, Russia had  
gradually s trengtbened her y osition in her Cauca- 
sian provinces, and she was able, if necessary, t o  
force the Shah to accept her reading of the treaty. 
All attempts to arrive at an understanding were  
therefore met by a persistent refusal on the pa r t  of 
the Russian agents to reduce a~iy  of their demands, 
while tlie Persian Government, feeling that they  
had right on tlleir side, stoutly colltested tlie 
Russia11 claims. 
Twice a satisfactory set tle~nent appeared t.o 
have been arrived at, but on both occasions t h e  
negotiatiolis fell through at; the last moment ; a1lc1 
finally, in 1825, when a third eflort p~oved unsuc- 
cessf~~l, a Russian force occupied the district o f  
tan ~ t l s s i a  
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Gokcheh. This step, which was m unwarranted 
act of aggression, and one which clearly shotved 
that Russia was cleterlnilled to provoke war, 
occurrecl at a tinle when the Shall's subjects vere 
in a highly excitable state. The Persiails llacl not 
yet forgotten the previous war by whicll they had 
lost so many rich provinces, and their anger against 
the Russians mas greatly increased by the accounts 
that reached them of the mann.er in which their 
co-religionists in the ceclecl districts were treated 
by their sew master$. Tlle popular excitement 
was fostered by the priests, who preached a religious 
war froin the pulpits of the mosques, and thus, 
when the Bussian forces occupied Gokcheh, the 
Shah found it ahnost impossible to avoicl hosti- 
lities. 
One hope, however, still remained. In 1826 
the Persian Court received news of the death of 
the Czar Alexallder and accession of his brother 
Nicliols~s, and it was also known that Prince Menchi- 
JioK was on his way to Telleran as anibassador 
from tlle Itnssian Emperor. Futteh Ali still be- 
lieved illat peace coulcl be maintained, and nego- 
tiatioils were re-openecl as soon as the Prince 
reached the S11all's suiilmer camp. B u . ~  Atenchilcoff 
h:~d beell wilt to Tel1era~l for a very difl'erent 
pnrpose. His luission ~~~\.czs to endeavour to divert 
tlle :~tl;en~ion of the Sliall and his people from the 
north-west tow,l.srils the east, and, by encouraging an 
attnclc on I lert~t ,  to simultaneously destroy tile 
Anglo-Pc:rsinn alliance, to enable Russia to quietly 
(rain poas"ssion of tile clispnted provinces, and still 
b 
G 2 
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furtlzer to advance her interests in the direction of 
India. 
The fanatical :frenzy of the people, however, 
had become far too great for any such schemes to 
succeed. Tlze populace, excited by the appeals of 
the mullahs, demanded the evacuation of Gokcheh ; 
the Shah, threatened with the forfeiture of the joys 
of Paradise, pledged himself to vindicate the claims 
of his subjects ; and nothing else would satisfy the  
nation. 
When, therefore, Menchikoff declined to con- 
sent to the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the  
negotiations were broken off, and hostilities com- 
menced. 
From all parts of the kingdom thousands of 
armed men flocked to the standard of the Crown 
Prince, and the entire Persian nation united in t he  
effort to avenge the long course of insult and in- 
dignities to which they had been subjected. 
The Russian authorities on the frontier were 
completely taken by surprise at the suddenness 
of the Persian attack. Although by their action 
they had been steadily provoking aa r ,  they did 
not believe the Persians to be capable of any 
prompt and united action. When, therefore, the 
people, carried away by religious fervour, invaded 
the Russian frontier provinces, they carried every- 
thing before them, and forced the Russians to 
evacuate nearly all the territory which had been 
acquired by the Treaty of 6.ulistan. 
But, as was inevitable, the tide of Persian 
successes soon slackened, and then followed a 
series 
armie: 
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series of disasters which speedily swept the 
armies out of Russian territory, and forced Putteh 
Ali to conclude another liu~niliating treaty of 
peace. 
As soon ns tlie Foar commenced, the Persian 
Gover~llnen~ applied to Great Britain for the assist- 
ance which had bee11 promised in the last treaty 
which hnct been signed by Mr. Ellis. Tlie 81iah 
fully expected that sucli assistance mould be forlh- 
coming, either in troops or money ; for, although 
tlie Persians had fired the first sliot, and struck 
the E11.st blow, such action llad been forced on 
then1 through the lltlprovolied invasioii of their 
territory 1)y the B~zssians. Nevertheless, England, 
as representecl b y  her ~iiinistc~s, did iioL inteilcl to 
enter inlo a war with a great European Power to 
save Persia, and therefore preferred to adopt an 
interpretation of the treaty mhich would enable 
her to escape from the engagements which had 
been contracted ; and thus wlierl a reply was sent 
to the Persian Court, it was to the erect tlzst the 
occupatio~i by Russian troops of n portion of lzn- 
inllaljiterl ground, ~vllich by right belonged to 
Persia, even if ailini~ted to have been the proxi- 
mate cause of hostilities, dicl not cons~itute the 
case of aggression contcr~~platcd in the Treaty of 
TcI~er~rl . '  
It is needless now to criticise this action on\ 
the part of ~ l lo  Hrilirll Govcrnn~clll,~ but there is\  
L 
F r ~ r  nn irnpnrtinl ~ ~ R C I I R R ~ O I ~  of thin rluostion, ~ o o  pqos 40 nnd 
41 of -I,:?~yl/itud and Rlraaia it& Ibe Enat, by tho lnto 8ir IIcnry- 
-cia 
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no doubt that before the next tell years had /i elapsed, they hacl good cause to questi.oll the pru- \ dence of so llaving deserted their ally. 
Left thus to ller own resources, it was inevit- 
ablesthat the war should end in the disco~nfiture 
of Persia, and a further advance on the part of 
Russia. 
Tlle conflict, which con.tinued until the s ~ i - i n g  
of 1828, was an unvaried Russian triumph ; and 
at last, when the Persia11 disasters had culmina,ted 
in tlie loss of Erivan and Tabriz, the Crown Pr ince  
Abbass Mirza once again appealed to the Bri t ish 
Ambassador, through whose good ofices p e a c e  
was restored by tlie signature of the Treaty of 
Turkomanchai on February 21, 1828. By this 
treaty the Shah lost possession of the provinces 
of' Erivan and Nakhtchivan, and agreed to p a y  a 
war indemnity of ten crores of tomans, or t h i r t y  
millions of' sil.ver roubles. 
After this treaty had been coi~clucled, it became 
again necessary to modify the terilis of the under-  
standing between England and Persia. The Shah's  
appeal for assistance hall placed the Bri t ish 
Government in an awkward position, and they 
then realised the dangers contained in the subsidy 
articles of the Treaty of Telierar~. Talring adban- 
tage, therefore, of the Shah's necessities, the Bri t ish 
Anlbassador oKerecl to pay 250,000 tomans towards 
the liquidation of the war indemnity, if the subsidy 
engagements were cancelled ; and subsecluently, 
after a boncl to this effect had been passed, t h e  
necessary erasures were obt,ained by payment of  
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four-fifths of the ainonnt ; a transic(;ion which has 
been sufliciently condelnned by the able author of 
' England and Russia in tlie East.' 
The reconciliatioil of Russia and Persia had 
scarcely been effected wheii an event occurred 
which would ~ indo~~b ted ly  have led to a renewal 
of hostilities had the Emperor 11ot then heen en- 
gaged in a war against TuTkey. I11 October 1828, 
M. GriboiedoK, the poet diplomatlist, arrived a t  
Tibriz as envoy extraordinary and nliilister pleni- 
potentiary froin the Czar to the Court of Persia. 
Continuing his progress, the Russian Alllbassador 
proceeclecl to Teheran, arld was there received with 
every mark of respect a,nd consideration. But 
the Persians had not yet recovered from their 
fanaiical outburst against the Muscovites; and 
irritated by the blustering conduct of the Ambas- 
sador's Cossack escort, they became still Inore 
incensed when M. Griboiedoff hnuglltily refused 
to grant redress for tbe wrongs coinmitted by  
llis followers. Error followed error, and instead 
of conciliating the people, the Ainbassador imperi- 
ously put form?aril demands which tended still 
further to widen the breach. A eunuch of the 
royal seraglio was granted protection in the  
Russian Elnbassy on the plea of his being a native 
of the district of Erivan, now a Eussian province, 
and finally a demand was inade for the surrender 
of two Arinenian women, vho had been drxfted 
from the ceded provinces to the hazein of tlie 
As&-Ed-Dowlelz. Aftcr ,gome hesitation the 
1 See pages 41 t o  48 of EnyTnl~rl a7i.d Rzs.ssia in. I k c  East. 
women were given up and conveyed to the Em- 
bassy. The infuriated Persians could stand no  
more; the people ,rose, and after obtaining the  
sanction of their priests, flocked to the Russian 
Embassy to deliver the women from the lzands of 
the infidels. The offer then made to restore the 
ladies to their master came too late ; the Einbassy 
was saclred, and the ill-advised Alllbassador with 
all his staff and escort slain. The Shah was Glled 
with dismay, and an envoy was sent in haste t o  
St. Petersburg to offer reparation. The Czar, 
however, had no desire to resume hostilities 
against, Persia ; for Russia was tlzen engaged in a 
war stgainst the Ottoman Empire, and it was 
necessary that Persia should take no part in the 
contest. When therefore Khosroo Mirza, the  
Persian Envoy, obtained an audience of the Czar, 
and, presenting the handle of his sword to the 
Emperor, declared himself willing to give his life 
for that of the Russian Ambassador, he was in- 
formed that it would be sufficient if the plundered 
property mTere restored, and the persons concerned 
in the tumult were punished. 
4 ot- % b 
ATThCliS O N  IIICIUT AND RI-IIYA 
(i!*owth of IZn~6inn i~lfli~olicc in Per~in-l%nsao-Turlii8ll war, and 
'L'rc~~ty of h d r i ~ ~ ~ ~ o p l c - R ~ s ~ i n  incites I'er~in to nttnclr Hcrnt- 
Ih~ssinn intrigue in Afghnrrist~~n-hlissioxl of Uunlcs to ICnb~d- 
I 'C~R~IL'H w i t l ~ l l r ~ ~ w ~ ~ l  from I-Icrnt-Lord Anclrlnnd's oxpodition to 
lifghnnistn~~, tho S i ~ n l t ~  hfntiifesto, nnd tllc restorfition of Sl~ujn- 
d-hl~~lk--Russinl~ ospoclition for concli~ering lihivn-Rnssin and 
the I<irgl1iz--1?'1~ililre of llnseiun udvl~ncc upon IChiva. 
Trrrc Trcnty of Turkollinnclini mnrlcs n tunling poi11L 
in I'crsin's relations witli Great Britain ancl Iinssia. 
On tlie one linncl tlie Sliali liacl on illore tllnn one 
o ~ c ~ a s i o n  fiilt the tvcigllt of Itussin's power, and was 
aware tliat Ilis great ilortlierrl neigllbour was in a 
positioll to i~iilict still greater h~uniliation on Persia 
~rllenc?ver coercion illigli t considered desirnble ; 
wllile, on tlie other. hanrl, he, rightly or wrongly, 
c~onsiclerrtl t,llat he had bccn deserted by Xnglancl, 
:nld his bit,ter resentx~lent .tms not appeased by the 
~nc!tliocl ac1optc:cl in obt,zinirq tlze cnncel~lient of 
tile sul)t;icly engagcrncrltx. Moreover, tlic 13ersinns 
't~cag:~~l to 't~i~lieve that Er~glmld was unable or 1111- 
willing to duf(~rid t,llern from their clncmics, and 
illis i ~ ~ ~ p r c ~ s i o n  pecilily gxinecl ground when tlie 
13l:rlplish Gorcrrinlent, will1 rcnixrkable cnprir:ious- 
rless, at~ilnrlonetl t,lieir provinns forward policy, and 
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enterecl upon a course of studied illdiffererlce to 
Persian concerns. Thus Russia, triumphant a t e r  
her successful campaigns, became ernbolclened, 
took up a position of coinmandiilg and almost 
offensive superiority ; wliile England, hastily arriv- 
ing at tlie conclusion tliat Persia was useless as a 
barrier against Russian advance towards Inilia, 
tools. but little interest in Persian ~Rairs,  and per- 
rnibtecl A'Iuscovite influence to gain coinplete as- 
cendency at the Court of Teheran. 
But soille yeam elapsed before the full efect of 
these cllanged coilclitioils becarne apparent. Russia 
had gained mucli by her. wars mith Persia, 
and her interests coulcl best be served, not by open 
hostilities, but by taking aclvalitage of her newly 
acquired ascenclency in exerting moral pressure on 
the feeble ministers of the Sliali, thus causing tlleiu 
to becoiue the tools whereby her aggressive sclieines 
could be carried out. The war with Turkey also, 
for a short time, caused Persian affairs to assume 
but a secondary place in liussia's Eastern policy. 
Six years before. the Treaty of Turl.coll~anchai hail 
been signed, tlie Greeks had revolted against the 
Porte, and declared their independence. A bitter 
struggle ensued, and after it had lasted for some 
years, the despatch of an Egyptian expedition to 
the Morea, with orclers to devastate the country 
and carry off the people into slavery, forced 
Englancl, France and Russia to interfere. On Octo- 
ber 20, 1827, the combined squadron of the allies, 
under Codrington, destroyed the Turlco-Egyptian 
fleet a t  Navarino, and tlle Greelrs were saver1 from 
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their oppressors. But Russia remained un.satiufied. 
Canning, who had skilfully. arranged the joint 
action of the Powers against tlie Porte to keep 
Russia in checlc, died without seeing the Greelr 
question settled, and his successors were unable to 
prevelit Russia from using the troubles of the 
Greelcs as a pretext for attacking the Forte. 
As soon as peace was restored between Russia 
and Persia, the Czar, joining his personal grievances 
to the claims of Europe, declared war against 
Turkey. Paslsievitch, the first Count of Erivan, 
wheeled his ariny and entered Asia Minor, ml~ile 
Witgenstein crossed the Pruth. The Russia11 
troops crossed the Danube under the eyes of their 
Czar, and captured Brailof and Varna; while in 
Asia the Turks were defeatecl in a bloody battle 
near Abhaltsgkh, .aucl that town and the fortress 
of Kars fell into the hands of the renomiled Faskie- 
vitcll. Xngland and Austria became alarmed, but 
Russia had the encourageme~~t of France, and so 
the war continued. Dikbitch, the successor of 
Field-Marsllal WitgensLein, defeated the Grand 
Vizier near Pravady, and forced liim back on 
Schurnla ; Silist,ria capitulated, the Balkarns were 
crossed, and Adrimople occupied by a Russian 
army ; while in Asia, I'asbievitcl~, continuillg his 
victorious career, twice defeated the TurKisll ar- 
mies in the field and captured Erzerouin. At last 
Turkey, defeated in. Europe and Asia, a i d  with- 
out allies, was forced to pielcl, trusting tcj the, 
good oilices of England and France to obtain for 
her the best terms possible after her humiliating 
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overthrow. On Seplenlber 14,  1830, a treaty of 
peace was signed at  Adrialzople, whereby Russia, 
in addition to a large war indemnity and cer- 
tain concessiolls in Europe, gained in Asia t he  
districts of Anapa, Poti, Alchaltsylrh, ancl Akhal- 
kalalci, thus rounding off her possessioas soutll of 
the Caucasus. 
After the corlclusion of this war with T~lrkep,  
the Russians once more turned their attelltioil to 
Parsia, and began to urge the Shah's Government 
to undertake aggressive movements towards t he  
East. The disorders which prevailed in Afghan- 
istail at this period p v e  the Russian Ambassnclor 
an excellent opportunity for exciting the ambition 
of the Persian monarch; and after the Crown 
Prince Abbass Mirza had concl~lded a successful 
campaign in Xhoras~an,~ it was clecided that an 
attack should be made on the city of Herat, which 
was then under the independent rule of the Sudrlozai 
Prince Ka~nran. 
For a brief space, however, the project remained 
in abeyance. Abbass mas summoned to Teheran, 
his son Nahommed Mirza being appointed governor 
of Khorassan in his stead, and Persian reinforce- 
ments were marching eastwards to talce a part in 
the war which was to be conducted by the young 
' During this campaign, Abba~s Miraa dostrogod the Salm 
Tllrlroman fort of Old Sardhs,  which stood on the right bclnlr of tho 
Hori.Itud, within a few miles of tho Persian town of tho samo name 
on tho opposite S i d ~  of the river. Tho placo waa mxod to the grotinii 
by the Pursieris, tho garrison was messaorod, find G,000 slnvo~ wore 
cclptured, but wero aftsrwarils rnnaomed by tho K l ~ l ~ n  of' R h i v ~  for 
60,000 tomans. 
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of the SIlall, when Mr. MNeill, in 
defence of Bri~isli interests, threw the whole of 
his energies illto the task of averting the projected 
invasion. IIis efforts were in a measure successful, 
for the altaclr was delayed. But, though post- 
poned, the idea hacl not been abandoned. The 
Czar's agents, by tlieir intrigues, which had beell 
too long unopposed, succeeded in tlloroughly rous- 
ing the ninbition of tlie Persians, and in the autumn 
of IS3 3 Prince Mallommed Mirza crossed the 
eastern frontier of Persia, and advancecl upon 
Ghurim, a st,roilgly fortified place, about forty 
miles west of I-Ierat. The inhabitants of ,  that 
place, Ilo~vever, obstinately refused to surrender, 
so the Prince left it in his rear, and marclied 
for~varrl Lo the attack of the capital of Prince 
Ka~nran. Here also he eilcoullterecl a stubborn 
resistxrice. Tlie Vizier of tlie Suddozai prince was 
a lilnli named Yar Mnhommed, tvho had no desire 
to see Llernt turned into a Persian province, as he 
mroulcl there1 )y lose n1ucI1 of his power and dignity. 
Tlie Herntis, u~ider  the guiclance of this chief, 
prepared for n vigorons defence, and there was 
every prospect of a long struggle, when Mahommed 
received the news of his father's death. Abbass 
Mirza, :uixious to take co~nmancl of the Persia11 
army, Tl:~cl, contrary to the advice of his physicials, 
rat,urncil. to Mesllc!(l; 11uL aflcr his arrival there, 
the disease from which lie sunered rapidly grew 
nrorsc, :~nd 11c iliec'l in tllc I-Toly City of Ichorassan. 
l'llis cbvent c:~usrtl his son LO a;l,nndon the siege of 
kltrnt, and return to I'ersian territory; and thus 
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the aggressive designs of Persia and the deeply 
laid of Russia were for a time defeated. 
On the death of Abbass, the Shah nominated 
Maholnmed Mirza as his heir, and appointecl him 
to tile governorship of Azerbijan-the province 
which had for many years beell ruled b y  liis father. 
But the young prince, who was at this time twenty- 
eigllt years of age, did not long remain a t  Tabriz, 
for his aged grandfather, the Shah, died 011 
October 23, 1834, and the B~~itish and Russian 
representatives each hastened to be the first t o  
congratulate the new sovereign on his accession to  
the throne. Rival claimants, however, soon ap- 
peared in the field, and while the Russia11 Ambas- 
sador was offering armed resistance, the  English 
Minister took prompt action to overthrow t h e  
pretenders. Sir Lindsay Bethune--who had for- 
merly served in Persia as an artillery subaltern- 
had once again been sent out from England for the  
purpose of drilling the Persian troops, and a large 
number of oficers and sergeants were at the same 
time sent from India, with the same object, while 
arms and alnmullition were also transmitted for 
the use of the Shah's army. The presence of these 
officers enabled the British Ambassador to  adopt 
very effective measures lo ensure the successiol~ of 
Mahommed Mirza, and thus rendered it unnecessary 
for Russia to supply the military force which h a d  
been offered for the purpose. Colonel Bethune h a d  
under his command a force far superior, both in 
arms and organisation, to any which the pretenders 
could bring against him, and by his prompt march 
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horn Tnbriz to Telleran, and from tlience to Sliiraz, 
lie sl~cec'lily silenced :dl oppositioil aild secured the 
tllroile to i\.'[nliomn~ecl. 
11 \I~QS 3 service mliicl~ sllould. 1mve secured tile 
gratit~ztle of tlie new Persin11 ' JCing of JCing;rs ; ' 
l ~ u  t, ~~nfor tu l  ~ai,ely, J'Iallommed liacl for lrialljr years 
lived ~znc'ler tlr e sll aclow or liussinli illflu ence, and 
merely 1oolrc:cl up011 tlic action of Sir Linclsay 
13etliune as an eflbrt 111:~de l ~ y  tlie IS~lglisli to prevent 
liis 1)(3i11g placed on the tlirone by t l ~ e  aid of tlie 
lilzssimns. 'l'l~e :~l~rndolmient of tlic siege of IXerat, 
~vllicll lincl l ~ e e l l  cansoil ljy liis ralllcr's deatll at 
a time 1~11~11 liis mul>ition 11ntl l ~ e c ~ l  t l iorougl~l~ 
arousecl, llnd co~ltin~znlly rnnklecl in l~is  mind ; lle 
11acl s \ ~ ~ o r n  :L solel~lzi anth to return lo the att,zck 
on tlie first ol~l>orllliiily, 2nd lle brooilecl sulleiily 
over llis c1isnl)l)ointmelzt. Tllus nl'lcr ~'~al~ommecl 
SJlall was c,ro\\-llcil .King of I'ersin, on Jsnunry 31, 
1835, liis first t l~ougl~ts  were l~urnc:cl to~rnr(1s Uerat, 
and liis lirsl utLcr:tnccs in pul~lic, ilurl~zr were full 
of refc)runccs to tlie great c:lmp:~ign ~vllicl~ lle was 
;tl)ont, to U ~ ~ ~ C T ~ L ~ Z C ,  to huml~le the pride of tlie 
Afghs~ls nntl tlle Usbegs, arlil by nir:~ns of wllich 
Pcrsin TI~:IS once illorc to regniii possessioll of the 
tc~rrilorics ~vhich nd l~cen snl~jcct to the princes oS 
tllc Saf:~vcan clyrinsty. 
Tlla ~ K : L T  I 8 36, llo~rrc:vcr, II;LSSC~"~ 1vitlloltt ally 
at1v:uiclc ljciing ~m:~dc, a~lul the 1)cst part of l,lic ilesL 
ye:br W:LR also spc!nt, in mist~r~r:essful opwrntio~~s 
:~~:liilst. t , l lo 'I'urkoni;~n st!~tl(i~~~c!nts OIL th(? Ciurgen 
Ttivrr ; ljut in I,llc, :~uLu~rui 01 1837, :LH Shnli IZnm- 
r:m ~tc!il(If~~tly resistchtl tlte I1c>rsi:m pretensions to 
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sovereignby over his State, Mahommed once more 
set out towards the east, fully determined to break 
down the independence of J3erat. 
Mr. MLNeill, ~ h o  by this time had returned to 
Persia as British Ambassador, found that BriI;ish 
credit had sunk to the very lowest ebb, and that 
there was then no chance of preserving the peace. 
Nothing short of the armed intervention of Great 
Britain would suffice to turn Mdiommed Shah from 
his purpose ; and how could England possibly in- 
terfere without violating her treaty engagements ? 
For had she not, in the ninth article of the Treaty 
of Teheran, agreed that, ' if war shall be declared 
between the Afghans and Persians, the English 
Government shall not interfere wit11 either party, 
unless their mediation to effect a peace sl~all be 
solicited by both parties.' Persia, in pursuit of her 
ambitious schemes, did not desire British mediation, 
and when such counsel was voluntarily tendered, 
it was rejected. And thus the English, who had 
formerly urged the Persians to invade Afghanistan 
for the purpose of shielding India from an Afghan 
invasion, now harl the mortification of seeing a 
Persian army repeating the invasion, not in defence 
of British interests, but in furtherance of the ag- 
gressive designs of a Power whose advances in Asia 
were-and still are-made for the purpose of 
threatening the very staltl~ility of British rule in 
Hindus tan. 
Early in November 1837, the Persian troops 
crossed the Herat frontier ; by the middle of that 
month the strong fortress of Gliurian liad sur- 
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rendered, sutl a, week later l,lie ailvancecl guartl of 
the invading army toolr up a position before tlie 
capital of Shall I(arnra11. I1 is not the iillelltion 
bere to enter illto a de~cript~ioil of tlie long siege 
which followecl, ac; every ~r~g.lisl~ma,n who takes all 
inleresc in tlie gallalit (loii~gs of liis countrynieil 
has, or sliolllcl h ~ v e ,  rend of tlie stubborn clefelice 
made hy the Afglians, eiicour~tged thereto by thd 
~ulfailiiig coilstancy a i ~ l  ullfliiicllillg courage of tlle 
young artillery subnltern, Elilrecl I'ottinger, Nol. 
is it llecessary to clescribe at length how tlie Per- 
sinus during their ten molitlis' iuveslment of tile 
fortress were ni(leil by a Russian regiment of so- 
cnlleil cleserters : liow ~lleir operatioils were clirected 
1.y Rus$iail oificers ; allil how the crowllillg ass,zult, 
of June 24,183 8, wllic11, it was colllicleiltly believeil, 
u~oulcl 1.esult in the capture of tlie place, was 
plannecl by Coulii, Siinonilcll, the 1-iussinn Ainl~as- 
s:tclor hiinsell', who, ' wliile Mr. 3ICNeill was all- 
l~mliil~g t o  tlie l)ruilcnce a11d the reason of tlie Shnli, 
was exchiliiig llie anil)itioil :ulcl inllnnling the 1):~s- 
sioris of tlint sovereign.' 
Mr. M'Neill, leaviilg Teherau on Marcli 10, 
163 8, rcac,lied l l ~ e  S11:~li's cai111) 011 llle 6th of tlie 
Eollowiilg 111011t11, :~ i~ i [  fi'olli t l i a l ~ l l o ~ ~ ~ e n t  dicl every- 
illii~g tli:~t was 1)ossil)lc to iiiduce the Sliah to raise 
ille siege. Unt Llle Ibussi:w Ambassador arrived a 
fortiiiglit later, :uid syst~~i~intic:~lly set to worlr to 
f,ll~varl all tllc clyor ts  of  tlic Ilri tisli IGivoy to ljriiig 
nl~out :L s(:tllr!illcnt OF [,lie ililIi'r(?i~~es I~etwcen Lhe 
contailtling ~) :LYL~I : s .  ' Wllil~I; llle OIL(: TVRS ~ ~ ~ C L Z C ~ L -  
ills I ~ O ( ~ P ~ : L I  ion :~licl l~o:~ci~ ,  tlie ol,li(v was i11(0ili1ig 
\'OL,. 1. I I 
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t o  war and conquest ; and whilst the one pointed 
out the dificulties and expense of the enterprise, 
the otl~er inspired hopes of money and assistance.' 
Such mas the state of affairs in Persia duriilg 
the sumlner of 1838. The British Mission had 
fallen illto contempt, and the British Ambassador 
Tvas treated with marked discourtesy, while the 
Czar's agents were triumphantly ~7ii;nessing the 
successful results of their long course of intrigue. 
The Russia11 Goverizment, however, did not 
confine their atterltioil only to Persia ; it  was in- ' 
tendecl that Russian illfluence sl~ould be extendecl 
far beyond Herat, and right up to the borders of 
the British settlements in J:Iinclustan. Persia, it  
is true, was to be the principal agent for tlze 
furtl~erance of Russia's designs, and the chief 
interest in Russia's doings at that time centred in 
tlie siege of Herat, becr~use in that event the resull; 
of Russian machinations was most clearly clis- 
cernible. But; the siege of Eel-at was only the 
first move in the great game which was to end ill 
the establisl~ment of Russia11 influence on tlie 
threshold of India. The next move was an 
attetnl~t o p i n  the alliance of the Barakzai rulers 
a t  Kabul and Ksnclahar. This was necessary for 
the complete success of the Bussis11 project ; aslil for 
this purpose a Russia,n captain named Vitlcievi tch 
was sent on a lnissioil to Afgl~anistan. Wllel~ iG 
becmlie evident that Mahornm.ec1 Sllali had deli- 
nitely determined to attack Ilerat, Vitlrievitch was 
despatclled fro111 Orellburg to Tellerail ; there, ill 
Se~-'tenlI)er 18  3 7, he receivecl horn Count Z;il~lollil~;~~ 
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his final instructions, and set out for Kabul as 
envoy from the Emperor Nicholas to the Amir 
Dost Mahommed, bearing with him letters from 
the Russian Ambassador aild fro111 the Czar 
himself. 
The following is a translation of the Emperor's 
letter :- 
' In  a happy moment the messenger of your 
I-Iighness, Mirza IIosan, reached my Court wit,li 
your friendly letter. I was very much delighted to 
~ c e i v e  it, and highly gratified by its perusal. The 
coilteilts of the letter prove that you are my well- 
m-isher a i~d  have friendly opinions towards me. It 
flattered me very much, and I was satisfied of your 
friendship to my everlasting Government. In con- 
sequence of this, and preserving the terins of 
friendslzip mhicl~ are now conlrnellcecl between you 
and myself in my heart, I will feel always happy 
to assist the people of Kabul who may come to 
trade into my kingclom. On the arrival of your 
messenger, I have orclered hini lo make prepara- 
tioiis for his long journey back to you, and also 
appointed a nian of dignity to nccompaiiy him on 
the part of my Govemnlent. If it please Gocl, and 
lie reaches safe, Ize will present to you the rarities 
of lily couatry which I have sent tllrough him. 
13y the grace of God, may your days be prolonged. 
Sent Eolll St. Petersbourg the Capital of Russia, 
on April 37, 1837, A.D. aild in the twelfth year of 
jny reign.' 
Vitldcvitdi first visited Kai~clahar and suc- 
ceedecl in winning over the Rarnlrzai brothers to 
l r  :! 
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tlle Russo-Persian alliance,' and having thus satis- 
f2Lc~orily carried out the first part of his mission, 
he proceecled to Kabul, ailcl arrived there or1 
December 19, 1837. But Captain (afierwards Sir 
Alexancler) Burnes was the11 in the Afghan capital, 
and Dost Mal~ommed fully realised that a co1nplel;e 
ui~derstanding wit11 his near neiglibours the British 
would be,far inore czclvantageous to him than an 
alliance with the Russians, and he cllerished (;he 
hope that the English, in order to secure his 
friendship, would inciuce-or compel-the Sikhs 
to restore Peshawar to the Afghans. The Amir 
considered the Silrhs to be his greatest enemies, 
and his policy at that time was to secure an 
overthrovir Runj eet Singh, anti recover the pro- 
vinces which had been lost to Afghanistan. 
Burnes arrived at Kabul on September 20, 
1837, in charge of a so-called ' conzlnercial mis- 
sion ' which had been sent by Lord Auckland ' to 
work out the policy of opening Ille River Inclus to 
commerce,' and t;o establish commercial relations 
with the Afghans. But he hacl not been many 
days in the Afghan capital belore the real object 
of his inissio~l became apparent. His duty was to 
A treaty was prcprtrea and sent to ~ b r s i a  for tho ~lln,h>s s i r  
nature, ancl when signed, it was ret~wned to I<n,nilahar through tho 
Rllssiall Ambassador, who, in forwarding it Lo tho Sirdnrs, wrote :- 
' Mal~omnled Shah lias proiuised to give you the possessioll OF 
Rerat ; I ~inoerely tell you that yo11 will also got Ghurian on 1 1 3 ~  
account, from the Shall. . . . When Mallommed Onlar IChna arrives 
here, I ~111 nslr the Sliah to quit Herat, and I willremain here with 
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in Kabul possessecl over the po1il;ics of Afgl~anistan, 
in order that tlle Indian Govenlment might Inlo~v 
what steps to take to  elrectually prevent the Ainir 
from becoillillg a pasty to the Russo-Persian 
~llliance. 
Dost, Mahomnled saw in the arrival of this 
Elllbassy a possible opportunity of regaining 
possession of Peshawar, ailcl he received Burnes 
wit11 great pomp and splendour. Every possible 
llonour was paid to the British EIIVOY, a,llcl the 
Aillir clisplayecl the greatest anxiety to enter into 
an alliance mrii;h the lildian Go~~ernnlent. Thus, 
wlieu Vitlcievitch reachecl Cabul, he founcl that lie 
lind been forestalled ; bis reception was of a most 
discouraging nature ; and, for illany weeks after 
his arrival in tlie Afghan capital, he experieilcecl 
great cliffic~~lty in even obftaining an audience of 
the Amir. 
BLI t dl;er marly montlis sy ent in negotiations, 
tlie oiily promise wl~icll Dost Mal~ommecl could 
obtain as the price of his complete abstelitioil from 
i~~tercourse with Russia arlcl Persia, was t,hat the 
English woulcl restrain Runjeet Siligh from attack- 
ing tlze Ainir's clomiuions. Such a promise coilz- 
pletely failed to satisfy the ruler of Kabul. He 
Se:trecl 110 aggression fro111 the direction of Lahore, 
but on the contrary desired to attack the Sililis 
was given 'that his domii~io~~s should be defei~cled 
against the Russians and Persians, although he was 
to risk incurring the enmity of these Powers by 
abstaining from a11 intercourse with them. Xe, 
however, made one further attempt to secure the  
friellclship of the Indian Government, and his 
brother, Jubbar Khan, who was notorious for liis 
friendly feelings towards the English, strove hard 
to obtain from Burnes some hope that more 
advantageous terins would eveiitually be conceded. 
But the Envoy had received precise instructions, 
and could make no concessions, and although he 
remained at Kabul for a short time longer, a i d  
had many friendly interviews with the Amir, i t  
became daily more apparent that there was no 
l i o ~ e  of bringing matters to a favourable issue. 
Vitkievitcli, who in the meanwhile had been 
quietly watching the course of the negotiations 
between Burnes and the Amir, ancl had also 
commenced a correspondence with the Sill1 
Maharaja Runjeet Singh, was then sent for, a i~r l  
was accorded a reception whicli fully coinpensated 
for the previous neglect with wliicli lie had been 
treated. Dost Mal~omined, abandoning all hope 
of concludiilg an advantageous treaty witli the  
Eilkish, threw hiniself into the Rnsso-Yersia~i 
Alliance. Vitkievitch proinised everything that  
was asked of him, and M-hen Burnes turned liis 
lnck on the Afghan capital on April 28, 1838, 
tlie Barakzai ruler of Kabul had become a n  
avowed ally of the Persian Shah, and therefore tlie 
eilelny of Great Brilain. 
Russia11 diplolnacy Iiacl thus gniiied ,z remark- 
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able series of iriumphs. The Shall of Persiz, 
appareiltly in pursuit ol' llis own ambition, but 
actually for tlie furtlierailce of Russia's aggressive 
designs, was besieging Herat ; the Kandahar 
Sirdars, at Ihe instigation of a Russia11 agent, hacl 
ilnilg iheinselves into the Russo-Persian alliance ; 
ancl finally the Amir of Kabul, by proinise of 
12ussian money and assistance, had been dra~vn inlo 
the same net. A Russi~ll~ arllly mras also beiug 
prepared for an advance against Khiva, whei~eve~ 
such a lnovenlent mig1iL be necessary to give a 
finisl~ing touch to the great design which had beell 
plannecl with so mucli care ancl cral'tiness. 
I t  was, however, but a short-lived triunlph. 
Tlle Persian army before Herat was uil~zble to break 
ilotvll the resistnilce of the gallant derei~ders, ancl 
the Sllalis ministers, sllelterecl under the wing of 
tlie 13ussian eagle, at last o~e~reacliecl t lemselves, 
wllell Englancl inlerveiieil, a i d  the attack on Herat 
co1lal)sed. 
The i~lllue~lce of the British Mi~lister in Persia 
llnd long been s~earlily cleclining, mil at last it 
reacher1 such a low ebb tliat the Pe~siaizs 11ega11 
to sl~ow their contempt for the Mission in petty 
aluioyances nizd insulk  A courier of the Missioll 
I d  beell stol?pecl, seized ancl ill-trealecl in Octo- 
ber 1898, wlle11 the Persian army was aclvn~ici~,g ' ' 
towa;&-Xerat, 1 ancl althougll Mr. M'Neill lzad 
' J 
This lllesscngor mas on his way from HC~LLL to Tchernn with 
lotLars from Yru &11~1101111~1~d r ~ l ~ c i  IJottii~ger to Mr. MLNoill, and 
111~i~ing pnssccl thso~igh tho Persit~n cnlrlp, hnd nl,riveclncar to Mesheil, 
whon 110 WLLS seixocl by horsemen who hncl beon son1 ~ ~ f t c r  hinl, nnd 
was forceil to rotnm LO tllo curnp, wherc 11c wus placed in custocly. 
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re-peateclly demanded reparation for this grievous 
insult, no redress was offered, and the Persiaii 
G;overnment declared that they had t l ~ e  right to 
punish, or even put to death, any Persian elnployPs 
of the Britisll Mission, M-ithout reference to tile 
Ambassaclor. The Governor of Bushire also had 
used offensive language and threats towards the 
British Resident at that port, ailcl in this case also 
Mr. M'Neill's cleinands for redress were studiously 
ignored ; while, in addition to these clirect affronts, 
the Shah, tllougll pledgecl to the conclusioll of a 
commercial treaty with England, put forward inany 
frivolous excuses, whereby the long proinisecl set- 
tlement was illdefini tely postponed. 
Ally one of these offences was suficient in itself 
to have caused a ruplure with the Persia11 Court ; 
but Mr. M'Neill had still remained at his post, in 
the hope of inducing the Shall to abandon the 
attack on Herat, and believing that the Persiaii 
Go-c.erl~llzent woulcl eventually accede to the British 
demands. As time passecl, however, i t  became 
Hc succeeded, however, in making his way to the teat  of Colono1 
Stoildart, rtnc7 was by that oHicer conc111cted to tho Prime Minister, 
who, aftor he bad been inforlned by Coloncl Stodilart that the 11la11 
was in the service of the Mission, again placed hiliiin custody, wllilo 
I-Iaclji IIhm, an officer of the rank of brigadier in the service of the 
Slinli, not only used offensive language iri aililressing Colonel Stoil- 
r l ~ r t  in presonco of t11ePrin1o Minister, but nfier the inessengor had 
been relotlsed by order of His Excellency, ~cizcil iiin again in t l~o  
niidst of the ca~llp, ~ll'il1pcd hiin to sefirch for [my letters he might 
11nvo conccded about his persoll ; took from ]?ill1 Lio~~tennnt  I'ot- 
tingor's lottor, wliich was sent to tlic I'rinlo Minislor; I I B G L ~  to tho 
lnclsacngor tlic m o ~ t  v io le~~l  threats ctncl tlio most ilisgnsting nrlcl 
opprobrious language ; nnil toolr fro111 Iiilii R l~ortioii uf his i~cco i~ t~c-  
rilanls.' 
daily more obvious that notliing less than a 
complete cessation of diplolnatic intercourse would 
tnrn Mal~omrned Shah from his wild schellle of 
(~aressiou, and show the Persian Court that, even a,, 
tbougll they were aided by Russia, Great Britain 
hail the power to enforce compliance with Jler just 
demands, and was resolved to uphold her cliiguity 
and defellcl her interests. Mr. heLNeill therefore 
wrote a letter to the Persian Governnlent, in mrllich 
all the British demallds were clearly set forth. The 
Sllall then began to sllnme and prevaricate. He 
clid not desire that lnatters sllould be brought to a 
crisis, aild he therefore first offered to comply with 
a11 the demands excepting the aballdonment of the 
siege, if the cluestion of Herat vas treated sepa- 
rately; but sllortly ~~ f t e r~a rc l s  he changed his mincl, 
and said thaL he woulcl 0111~ adopt that course if 
Lieut. I'ottinger was orclerecl to q~luit the city, and 
if no fnrtl-ler reference was lliacle to TIerat aEairs. 
I t  thus became clear that Mallolrlmed hacl no 
iil~elltioil of mritlldraaing froill belore Herat, unless 
coiupellecl to do so by a display of force, or unless 
the Englisll purchased the safety of the place by 
ille r~aymcnt of a large suin of money. Mr. 
$['Ncill, ho~~ever ,  ol~jectetl to any half measures, 
:t~lcl declared Ll~at,, mlless tslle whole oS the British 
dcln:~licls were nccecleci, he would quit Persia. As 
tlle S11:dl still refused to raise the siege, he, on 
June 3, a~~nouncecl his illtention oS leaving ille 
('nil111 011 tile Sollowing day, a i d  clelnalliled per- 
1llissio11 to I)rocceci to  the frontier. The Shall then 
1,r.c t cl~doil  iiu t to u~iilcrst:uid wliat was roclaireil oS 
- - -- -- -- - 
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him, and stated that no insults had been offered 
to the members of the British Embassy. M'Neill 
however, reiterated his demands, aiicl insisted on 
their compliance-excepting the conclusion of the 
corninercial treaty-within three days ; and, as 
this was ilot clone, he left the Persian camp oil 
Julie 7. 
I n  the meantime the Incliai~ Government had 
tardily resolved to make a deinonstratioii in the 
Persia11 Gulf. For this purpose sollie mar vessels 
meye sent with the steslillers ' Semirainis ' a i d  
' Hugh Lindsay ' conveyiiig detaclilneilts of the 
l h h ,  23rd, a id  24th Eegimeiits and Marine 
Battalioils with a couple of field guns. This in- 
sigilificailt expeditionary force reacllecl the islancl 
of Karraclc on June 19,  when the trool~s 
mere at once landed and took possession of the 
island. Orders mere at tlie same tiiiie sent to Mr. 
Jf'Neill, iiistructi~ig him to inform the Sliall tliat 
the British Governilicnt wonlcl view tlie occnpatioil 
by Persia of Herat, or any portioiz of Afghanistan, 
in the light of a hostile demonstration agninsl; 
England. He was also directed to refer to the 
despatch of tlie espeditioll to the Gulf, ancl state 
that, if Malioi~imecl Shall clesirecl tlie suspension oS 
I~ostilities, he must at once witl~clraw froin IIerat. 
M'Neill received these instructions when 11c was 
a t  Sliahrucl, on liis way to Teheran, nncl he at  once 
orilerecl Coloiiel SloililarL to reluril to tlie roy:~l 
caainp ancl deliver tlie message. 
Sloddnl-t reachccl the cnlrip on August, 11, and 
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I Sliah, alien he found the Persian King 1nol-e dis- 
poser1 to listen to reason. The great assault w1lich 
hail been plaimed by Count Siinonitch had already 
failed, and the Shall had begun to grow weary of 
the long siege. Moreover the news of the occu- 
pation of the isla~lcl of Karrack had already 
reacliecl the Court, where it was believed that ail 
Eiiglish ariily had lalldecl at Busllire, a i d  was 
nilvancing through Shiraz to tile Persian capital. 
While the British olGcer was cleliveri~lg his nles- 
sage; the Shah interrupted lliln with the remark : 
' Tlle fact is, if I clo not leave Herat there will be 
a .  IS not that SO ? ' Stocldart replied, ' I t  is 
war ; all clepends on your Majesty's allswer, ancl 
lnay God preserve your Majesty.' Whereup011 
Mahoinlllecl Shall, taking the Englisli message into 
his liniicl, saicl, ' I t  is d l  I wisliecl for.' Two days 
later Stoclclart was callecl before the King, a i d  was 
then i~lformecl by tlic Shall that he woulcl con~ply 
wit11 a11 the clelllanils of tlie I3ritisb Govcrninent. 
But before the I'ersian army coulil retire, it 
was iiecessary that baggage animals shoulcl be 
c.ollcc:tcd for the transport of tile Shah's carilp and 
the large force which been assembled before the 
cait,y. Tllus sollie delay occurrecl ; and Count 
Siiiloiiitcli seizcd this opportunity lo try ancl bring 
:d)out an nrrnr~gcnienl whicli wotdcl enal~le llle 
~ ' C L ' S ~ ; L I ~ S  to ~vitliclra7vv vith some appearailce of 
b su(:ccss. IIe sent 3 letlcr into IImat olreriiig lo 
i ~n cltliat e bet~veeil Sll:~h ICa~nra~i a11d Mal~oml~~ed 
tjIl;~li, allil a11 :I[ ltln11)t w:~s 11i:~i[e to pcrsuaile Sllali 
J<:~nlrnll 1 ( ) s . i~i [  1 llc l1(:rei;lil r , n n q ~  nll(l l)ay llorrlage 
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to  the Persian army. But the wary Vizier, Yar 
Mal~oinmed, supported by tlie advice of Eldyed 
Pottinger, clecliiled to be drawl1 into the trap, ancl 
thus the Russian diplomatists failed to secure for 
their ally even the faintest semlslance of victory. 
British interference had colnpelled the Persians 
to withclraw from before I-Ierat ; this fact was well 
laiown throughout the length and breadth of 
Persia ; and the Shah's proclamation that he l~acl  
raised the siege ' in sole consideration of the inte- 
rest of our faith ancl country, and from a d u e  
regard to the welfare of our troops and subjecls,' 
clicl not lessen the humiliation. By September 9, 
1638, the Persia11 army was in full retreat, and on 
the morning of that day Colonel Stoddart reportecl 
to Mr. M'Neill that ' the Shah has illounted his 
horse " Aineerij," and is gone.' 
Sonle tinie before Mahonllned Shah advanced 
agajnst I-Ierat, the British anlbassador in l'ersia 
llnd earizestly exl~ortecl the British Government t o  
make some moveinent in Afghanistan which would 
co~ulteract the ambitious projects of the Persian 
I<ing, and thwart llie designs of his Russia11 cou- 
federates. The Indian Governinellt llacl long mis- 
trusted the Barakzai Sirdars, ancl when the Persiail 
army invested IIernt, and it became known tlmt; 
the Knnclahar chiefs were iiltriguing with Persia, 
Lord Auclrland began seriously to consicler the 
expeiliency of reinstating Shuj a-ul-Mullr on tl ie 
Afghan throne. As the dangers in the West began 
to tl~icl~ell, this idea gaii~eil a stronger llolil on the: 
rlii~lil 01 the Governor-Gei~eral, a i d  lle eveiltually 
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decided to send a xllissioli to tlle Court of the Silcll 
lbli~llaraja Runjeet Singh for the purpose of ascer- 
taining on what conditiorls a Silch army woulil 
advance to Kabul in support of the exiled Sud- 
clozai. I11 accordarlce with this resolutioll Mr. 
Macnaghten was sent from Silnla to the Court of 
Lahore, accolnpailied by Captains Osborne and 
Macgregor and Dr. Dr~unmoncl. The Missioil 
reachecl Adeena-uuggur on May 31 1838, and 
there received a cordial and gracious receptio~l 
from Rulijeet Singh. 
I t  is unnecessary to enter into details of the 
s~ibsequent negotiations, ~vhich resulted in the sig- 
nature of tlle Tripartite Treaty of Alliance betxeen 
Maha.raja R~tnjeet Singh ancl Shall Shuja-111-Mull< 
-a treaty executed with the a p p ~ o b a t i o ~ ~  of, and 
in concert with, the British Government, and by 
whicli it was agreed that a Sikh army should 
marc11 on Kabul from Peshawar, while Shuja-ul- 
Mulk ailvanced Ihroug1;ll Shikarpur ancl Kandallar, 
the Indian Government aiding the moveliients aitli 
their moral support and pecnniary assistance. 
Nor is it necessary to describe how the ideas of tlie 
I~ldian Govel-llment gradually expanded until in 
August IS3 8 it  was decicled that a large Englisll 
force sllould be employecl to clepose Dost Ma- 
hammed ancl reinstate Slluja-111-Mullc on the Afghan 
throne ; how Lord Auckland inet Runjeet Sing11 at 
Ferozel~ore alniclst the roar of artillery and braying 
of military bands, while the British and Sikh 
armies tvere reviewed ancl fought mimic batiles to 
clisljl;iy tlleir prowess axtd to add importance lo 
tlle occasion ; how the famous ' Simla Manifesto ' 
was publislled, setting forth the reasons whicll llacZ 
led the Govel.ninent to despatch a 13ritish a rmy 
across the Indus ; and how Lord Aucklai~il stiil 
4 
8,/ persistecl in his fatuous design of invacling Afghan- 
' istan British troops, e17en after he hacI re- 
ceivecI news that the Persian army had retil-eel 
froln before I-Ierat, and wlien i t  thus becanle 
k110~~11 in Iuclia that there was no longer any imme- 
diate danger to be expected fro111 Persian aggression 
or nussian intrigue. Herat was safe ; but  still tlle 
Bnralczai Amir of Kabul had to be deposed ancl 
the feelsle Suddozai puppet placed on the Afghan 
throne, and for this purpose the British army, 
though somewhat recluced in numbers, moved for- 
ward across the Indus. 
The combined colknns from Bengal and Bola- 
bay, with Shall Shuja's contingent, reached Quetta 
on April 4, 1839, ancl three meelcs later appeared 
before the walls of Kandahar, when Xohundil 
Khan and his brothers Becl towarcls Persia, ancl tlie 
. . 
city was occupiecl without resistance. On Nay 8, 
a grand review of the entire force was held oil the  
plains outside the city, and Shah Shuja was there 
installed as King of the Durani Empire. 0x1 
June 27 tlie march was resumed towards Kabul ; 
Ghuzni was captured at claybreak on July 23 ; a n d  
Dost Mohammed rnovecl out of Icsllsul towards 
Maidail-about twreuty-seven iniles to the south- 
west of Kabul-1v11ere he intended to dispute t h e  
nritish aclvance. l3ut the news of I;he fall of Gl~uzni  
paralysecl the Afgllan defence, and one by one the 
1s29- 5 
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Amir's adherents went over to the enemy; tlie 
Kizilbashes traitorously deserted, their example 
being cluickly followed by the greater part of the 
Afghan troops ; and, finally, Dost Mahommecl mTas 
forced to take refuge ill fligl~t, without being d ~ l e  
to strike one blow in defence of his crown. Tlie 
news of his flight sooil reached the British caillp, 
and Captain Outrain, mlitli 500 horsemen, eagerly 
started off in pursuit. But tlie fugitive had a day's 
start of his pursuers, and, aided by the treacl~ery 
of an Afghan Sirdar named EIaclji Kllan Klialcur, 
who ac.companiecl Outrain, succeeded in escaping 
across the Hindu Kush into the domiiiioils of the 
Usbeg ruler of Kunduz. On August 7 the 13ritish 
army entered Kabul, and the Suclclozai king mTas 
again seated on the throne from ahicli he hacl been 
driven twenty-nine years before. 
Thus was the restoration of Shuja-ul-Mullc 
accomplished. The chief cities of Easter11 Afghan- 
istan were occupiecl by Britisli garrisons ; ihe 
Baralrzais had been overthrown, and forced to jJy 
from tlie country ; and in the first flush of success 
it appeared as if a great triumph had been achieved. 
It was believed that a friendly Governmeilt had 
been permanently established in Afghanistan, and 
it  was confidently expected that in a short time the 
British troops might be sakly withdrawn, and 
the Snddozai ruler left in Grin possession of the 
country. 
But shortly afterwards vague rumours began 
to circulate that a l3assian army was aclv~znciilg 
sc~ulhwarcls, across the mild unlrriown Steppes of 
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Central Asia. Tllese indefinite reports graclually 
began to assume a fixed shape, and a t  last i t  was 
]cnown for certain that the Czar llad ~lespat~ched an 
ariny to conquer Khiva. 
This expedition hacl been planned some years 
at the time when the Czar's agents 
jlrere striving to induce the Persian Governmel~t to 
attaclc ISeral;. The Russian Government hail pre- 
pared n gigamtic scheme of attack, which was to 
111slre Russian influence supreme througllout the 
whole of Western Asia. Persia was to conquer 
Herat ; by means of the alliance with the Baralczai 
Sirdars, Russia11 influence was to be pushed for- 
~ ~ a r c l  to the Indus ; and while this portion of the 
programme was beiug carried out, a Russian arnly 
was being preparecl at Orenburg, froin whence i t  
~7as  to be puslied forward to Khiva, whenever a 
demonstration against tliat Khanate coulcl be made 
with the most telling effect. Such was the sc l~eme 
prepared by the Russians-amazing in its audacity, 
and preposterous because of the ellorinous cliilicu.1- 
ties in the way of its redisation. In the early 
gears of the llineteenth century the Czar Nicliolns 
and liis advisers tried, by one great stroke, to 
secure a position 01.1 the borders of India wlxich 
their successors have not yet gained after an ii1t;erval 
of threescore years spent in constant warfare, m ~ d  
unceasing in1;erference and aggression. The time 
for such a illolTe mTas not yet ripe ; the intervening 
countries were uillrnou~n and unexplored; t;he 
characteristics of their inhabitants hacl no!; been 
stuilied ; and, above all, it was not renliseil th;~t; 
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Ilussia, with lier froi~tiers at Ol-elil~urg anct on t l ~ e  
River Araxes, .was quite unal~le to establish ally 
perinanent influence in tlle courltries bordering 
India, or to destroy tlle stability of British rule in 
I-Iinclusta~l. T11.e Czar's government, bowever, felt 
that sornetlling had to be done to ileutralise tlle 
effects of the retreat from Herat, ancl as a counter- 
strolre to tlie British ~c~cupation of Afgllanistai~, 
and it was therefore decided that the iiivasio~l of 
I<hiva slloulil be carried out as speedily as possible. 
A plausible pretext for this readily obtaineci. 
Russia11 subjects were la~lguislliilg i11 horrible dun- 
geons on the banlis of the Oxus, and the Kirghiz 
Steppes were the scenes of constant clisturbances, 
which were said to have been due to I<hivan insti- 
gation. 
I t  has alreacly been related how the Kirgliiz- 
I<azalrs were gradually (11-iven nrestwarcls by the 
Dzu~ga~ ians ,  rultil in 1723 the tribes of the*~icldle 
and Lesser Borcles, settled in the Steppes to the east 
of the River Ural. In  1734 these tribes tenclerecl 
their subnlission to the Czar, in order to ob~ain 
Russiaill~ro tection from their numerous eneiliies, bu t 
with little illten~ioil of bowi11g to Russian authority. 
Tlie Russiaris tllen advmced their frontier line, au(1 
built tlie town of Orenburg, while at the same time 
IL fortfied line of Cossczclr settlements was esta- 
blished on tlie banks of the River Ural. Tllese 
measures, however, faileil to keep the Kirgl~iz in 
check, froin tllat time they co~ltii~uecl to carry 
on. a system of raids, in whicl~ 110 respect was l~aicl 




The methods which the Russian authorities 
adopted for governing these people were ill- 
advised, gave rise to the greatest discontent, and 
tended to create opposition rather than to pacify 
the district.. This misgovernment was due to the 
complete ignorance of the Russians concerlliilg the 
customs, ideas, passions, and even language of the 
Kirghiz. At first, although these nomads were in 
name the suljjects of the White Czar, they displayed 
but little respect for their masters ; and the Russian 
settlers on the ba11cs of the Riyer Ural considereil 
ib a matter of some good fortune if tlze Xirghiz did 
not break through the line of fortified posts, ravage 
their villages, and carry off the people into slavery. 
But when the Russian position on the Ural became 
strengthened, and their settlements behind the 
fortified frontier line were no longer exposed to 
attacks, they then began to devise measures for 
the purpose of turning the Kirphiz from noillinal 
into actual subjects; and then their ignorance in 
all matters concerning these noinad people became 
aburldantly evident. For many years all corre- 
spondence was cqrried on in the Tartar language, 
because it was believed that the I<irghiz were of 
the same race as the Volga Tartars-a metllod of 
commuliication which was about as useful and 
intelligible to the Khans as a letter written in 
Spanish would be to an Il,alinn. Then, again, i t  
was believeil that the Xirglliz were Mahoinmedans, 
a11d they were trea~ed as such ; tvlleil, ns a matter 
of fact, tliey were Shamanists, and have only 
1,ecome Maho~nn~eclaris through t1he Mussulman 
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religion having been forced on them by Russia. 
But their chief mistalre was in considering that, so 
long as the IChans were friendly, the people also 
woulcl be obedient; ; arid this error was the cause 
of inost of the troubles which followecl. These 
mistakes, conlbined with others, tended to increase 
the already wide-spread cliscontent which was still 
clisplayed in cons1;ant pillage ancl disorder. Cara- 
vslils were plundered ; Russian subjects mere carried 
illto slavery ; and, whenever an opportuizity arose, 
the people gatherecl rouild some trusted leacler a i d  
opel~ly rebelled against Russian authority. 
Such being tlze coilditioil of the I<irghiz a110 
were under Russian protection, it; can readily be 
imagined that tlle independent tribes of the ac1joi1:- 
ing- states were not loth to take advantage of these 
continual disturbai~ces in orcler to enriclz thein- 
selves. Thus the Khivaizs ancl Khokailclians were 
at one time accused by the Russians of iilcitiilg 
tlze Kirghiz to make forays, while at another time 
they were charged with attacking these same 
Kirghiz ancl , prevent.ing them from liviug quiet, 
peaceable lives. Both charges had, no doubt, a 
considerable substratum of ttrutll ; but had the 
Bussia~l autl~orities adopted a Inore popular sys- 
tem of government aillong their Kirghiz subjects, 
and encleavoured to nlalre them take to a more 
settled mode of life, one great. reason for the 
frontier troubles would have been removed ; ancl, 
although the Xussialls could not haye entirely 
prevented tlze traffic in slaves at Khiva without, 
iilvadillg that Khanate, it is probi~hle that Llie 
.r "' 
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Khivalls would have, to a great extent if not alto- 
gether, been obliged to obtain thcir chief supplies 
of slaves through the Turkoniails from Persia. 
Instead of doiiig this, however, ' the authorities 
at  Orenburg,' accordiilg to a Russian writcr,l 
triecl forinerly, by every possible means, to pre- 
vent the wandering Kirghizes from adopting a 
settleci mode of life ancl pursuing agriculture, 
beillg afraid that cattle-rearing woulcl be neglectect.' 
And tlius, rather than rislr angT neglect of cattle- 
rearing, the Russian authorities preveiited tIle 
~ i r g h i z  from settling ~ O M T ~ ,  and SO indirectly 
that very condition of 'disorder throughout 
the Stepper; whicli resultecl in incessant raids, and 
the capture of Russian subjects who were sold as 
slaves in tlie iiiarkets of Central Asia. 
During the course of about fifteen years ( f rom 
1820 to 1835) Russia clespatclieci several smal l  
expeditions against the Kirghiz tribes ; but  her 
wars with Persia and Turkey, tlie revolution ill 
France, wliich clrove Charles X. froin the throne, 
and the insurrection in Poland, compelled her to 
ahandon for a time the idea of collcluering Khiva. 
In 1834 the Russians constructed the fort of 
Novo Alexczndrovslr at tlie lieacl of tlie Mertvii- 
Kultulr bay on the east coast o l  the Caspian, for 
the protection of the Emba fisheries against the 
Turkoman pirates ; "and they also comirlenced the 
The Rz~sainns in Centval A~icc, by Cnptnin VnlikhnnoK, MM. 
Voniukoff, and othor Russian travcllors ; trrtn~liltod by John and 
Robert Mitchell, p. 482. 
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erection of a cont,inuous rampal-l;, somewhat lilie 
the Chinese Wall but on a smaller scale, u~hicll 
was to connecL Orsk on tlie River Ural with Omslr 
on the Irtisli. This bulwarli was actually corn 
menced a d  about twelve miles were comp1ei;ed in 
1836, when it; was abaildoned. 
But matters remained in an unsettled condition. 
The Kirgliiz continued 1;o carry on t;heir ' barantas,' 
or forays, a i d  displayecl on every possible occa- 
sioil their discontel-it with the R11ssia11 adniiliist~a- 
t,ion. They received support from the IF'hivwns, who 
found the traff~c ill slaves to Be most advantage- 
ous ; while the Russia11 authorities, ins~eacl of en- 
deavouring to find a remedy by ineans of a more 
satisfactory governmenl; of the li'irgl~iz tribes, and 
by encouraging, or if necessary forcing, them to 
adopt a more settled illode of life, coritiuuecl to 
~nisgovern tlieu~, whereby their discontent and 
predatory instinch were fostered; an.d then the 
whole blaine xras t,lwown on Kliiva. The acquisi- 
tioil of IClliva Iiad loilg beer; coveted by the 
Russians, and the Ellan was therefore made the 
scapegoat for all the oirences of the Kirghiz. 
Wheil ,Mouravieff returned to Russia in IS22 
from his lliissioil to Khiva, he wrote an account of 
his journey in wllich there is Llie following para- 
p a p h  :-' Xliiva is at this moment an advanced 
post which iinpedes our coinmerce with Bolchara 
and Northern India. Under our dependeilce Khiva 
would have Become a safeguard for this coinmerce 
against the attacks of populations clispersed in the 
Steppes of Central Asia. This oasis, situated in 
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the midst of an ocean of sand, woulcl have become 
a p i r i t  of assembly for all the corliliierce of Asia, 
and woulcl have shaken to the centre of India the 
enormous superiority enjoyed by the rulers of the 
sea.' Mouraviefs worcls expressed the opinions of 
dl Russian politicians and soldiers from the reign 
of .Peter the Great downwards, and until Khiva 
became a Russian possession in 1873. 
Ever since the time of Peter the Great the 
Russians endeavoured to obtain a footing on tlie 
Oxus, as they believed that river to afford the 
easiest route to the heart of Ceiitrd Asia. But in 
order to obtain control over this water-way, it was 
necessaTy to subjugate Kliiva, and the acquisition 
of that State has therefore beell steadily kept in 
view. The importance to Russia of a successful 
campaign against Khiva had, i11 1839, become 
doubly great. I t  was necessary that the Russians 
should take immediate steps to minimise tlie effects 
of the failure of their intrigues in Persia, and the 
advance of the British troops illto Afghanistan, 
and this could be best done by an advance on 
Khiva. What better reason for the movemeilt 
could be desired than the suppression of the hor- 
rible and degrading t raac  in slaves? England 
herself had been for years, engaged in the suppres- 
sion of the slave trade, and it surely was paTt of 
the duty of Holy Russia lo take her share in the 
crusade ! No one could cleny that Wiiva was one 
of the centres in whic11 this abominable trade was 
carried on, but how many persons were aware 
that among tlie most prominenl offenders in this 
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respect were Russia's own subjects the Ilirghiz, who 
sllould first llave been brougllt illto subjectioa alld 
eilcouragecl to lead peaceable and settled lives 
before tlle crusade was carried further afield. 
011 March 24, 1830, wheil the Britisll troops 
were toiling through tlie Bolan Pass, the Czar 
approved of the following recolllmendatiolls of a 
special coininiltee :- 
I. To coiuineilce at once the organisation of an 
expedition against Rhiva, and to establish tllc 
necessary depGts and stations on the routc without 
clelay. 
11. Tu conceal the yen1 object of the expedition, 
which zuas to be given out  CLS a scientijic c,xpedition to 
the AYCIZ Sea, 
111. To postpone the departure of the expedi- 
tion until tlle settlerllellt of English matters in 
Afgllanistan, in order illat the influence and im- 
pression of the Russian proceedings in Central 
Asia lniglll have inore weight, and that Englancl, 
in consequence of her own coaquests, might no 
longer llnve any right to trouble the Russia11 
Governnlent for explanations ; on no account, 
however, to clelay tlie expedition later than the 
spring of 1840. 
IT. I11 the event of the expedition termiilatiilg 
successf~llly, to replace the Khan of Khiva by a 
trustwort,lly ICazak Sultan ; to establish order and 
security as far as possible, and to give full freedorn 
to the Russian iracle. 
V. To assign 426,000 silver roubles and 12,000 
gold ducats for the estimated cost of the expe- 
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dition, and to supply the detachment \vitl~ arms 
aud the indispensable ~naterial, and to allow the 
Governor-General of Orerilnurg t'o avail llirnself of 
the assist,ance of Llie local artillerjr and engineer 
force. 
011 October 1.0, 1831), linal osclers were issued 
regal.cling the liussian ol)cr;ztioris ~~'11icIl ~ w r e  to 11o 
carried out after tlie capture of ICliiva, and a 
clocuineilt was preposcd fbr tlle guic1:~nce of t1lc 
i~ew IChan, in which his relations towards Russi:~ 
were clearly set fort11 ; ancl finally, oil Kovember 
26, a inai~ifesesto was publisllecl at Orenl~urg, st,ating 
tlie causes nild ol~jects of t11.e l~rol~osecl expedition, 
wherein it was said that 'just and reasonal~le 
considerations have induced His Majesty the  
E ~ n ~ e r o r  to sei~(l a military force agaiiist ICliiva, 
in order to secure by i-brce of arms the rights 511~1 
iiiterests of Rnssian r;ul.)ject.s, to put an  encl to 
pillage and rapine, to liberate prisonc!rs tllen in  
ICl~ivn, to inspire tlle respect clue to 12ussin, and  
to establisl~ tlie iniluci~cc inclisputnbly l.)c:longing 
to Iier, and w l ~ i ~ l l  is tllc: only gunrantec for the 
mainte~ia~ice o' peace ill that portion of Asia. 
Such is tlie ol-~jcct of the il~tendtrtl expeditioii 
ngczinst I<hiva.' 
Meanwhile preparations fur the ai[varlce l~.:~cl 
been pushed forw;~rcl. 1,:~rgc sto1-cs of l~rovisiol~s 
:uid forage wt?re purcliasccl :~riil collect'eil :L[, 
Ore~ll.)arg, nl~tl every l)ossil)lc want was :~nCicipntetl 
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absence of sufficient water for the large force 
which it wjs  proposed to sencl. I t  was kllowll 
from Kirghiz reports that wells existecl'on tlle Ust- I . 
Yort plateau, bu t  these only gave a snfficient supply 
for small caravans, and were totally ii~sufficieiit for 1 
the recluirements of large parties. I t  was there- \ 
i fore considered advisable that tlie aclvailce sliould I 
be il~ade in tile winter ; ancl this decisioll was the 
i cause of the disasters tvhicl~ followed. Tlle troops: 
were saved from the distress and dangers of march- 
ing through the desert in the bu~ning  lieat of 
summer, but they had to face an exceptionally 
severe winter, which paralysed their inoveineills 
and eventually necessitated a retreat. 
As the stores were received at Orenburg they 
were sent forward to the internlediate clcpOts 
which it was intended to establish at various 
points along the line of marcli, and for this 
purpose 7,750 carts were obtainecl fioin the 
Bashkirs. 
011 June 30, 1839, the first dei,achment, con- 
sjsting of a small force of infantry with 400 
mounted Bashkirs and 2 howitzers, marched out 
of Orenburg, uncler Colonel Heke, for the purpose 
of establishiilg aclvailced posts. Tlle last portion 
of his march was attended wit11 the greatest hard- 
ships, owing to  the great heat and scarcity of 
water;  but on July 27 he arrived at Ak-Bulalr, 
and there coillmenced the construction of a fortified 
post. Convoys of stores were i,llen sent forward, 
and by the end of October the preparations for the 
general ailvance hacl beell completed. Early in 
November a detachment was sent forward under 
Colonel Danilevski, who was ordered to aaait the 
main army at a post which had been coilstructed 
on the River Emba. 
At the end of November 1839, tlie main body 
coinrue~lced its advance under General Perovski, 1-t m/viph~ 
11. C ~ L .  wlio had been entrusted with the command of 
the expedition. The total strength of the army 
(including the detachments which had been sent 
forward in advance) amounted to 5,325 men, with 
22 guns and 4 rocket stands. I t  was divided into 
five columns, four of which were to advance from 
Orenburg, while the fifth marched from the 
Kalmykovski Port on the lower Orenburg line 
direct to the River Emba, where it mas to effect a 
junction with the remainder of the army. 
But intense cold, frequent snowstorms, and 
terrible hardships decided the result of the expedi- - 
tion, and by the time the columns reached Alr- 
Bulak, during the first week in February, it was 
evident they could go no further. 
General Perovski, who had remained at  Fort 
Einba till the whole of the troops had left, and who 
passed the columns on their march to Alr-Bulalr, 
and thus saw the enormous difficulties and hard- 
ships they had to contend against, then began to 
realise that a continuance of the advance would 
probably lead to the total loss of the force. He 
therefore consulted his commanding oficers, who 
unanimously decided that it aould be madness to 
go on. 
011 mustering his force the General also found 
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that il had been sadly tllinnecl Illrough sicliness and 
death, and that the loss in camels had been so 
nreat that even if the weather had been more h 
h o u r a b l e  it would have been impossible to reach 
Khiva. 
The effective force of inen available only 
amounted to 1,856. 
No alternative now remained but to retreat, ancl 
Perovski was therefore reluctantly compeIled to 
issue a general order, thanking the troops for the 
unflagging devotion and energy they had displayed, 
and ordering the return of the expedition. 
Thus the second organised Russian invasion of 
Khiva was a miserable failure, and little short of 
disaster. Snow and pestilence had done their work, 
and Kl~iva was delivered, not by the valour of its 
people, but through its peculiarly isolated situation, 
surrounded as i t  is on all sides by hundreds of miles 
of barren, pathless, and waterless deserts. 
When it became known that Perovski's force 
would not be able to reach Khiva, and had been 
conzpelled to retreat, steps were at once taken 
to repair the catastrophe, and great preparations 
were made for the despatch of a new expedition : 
orders were issued for strengthening the Orenburg 
Corps by six more battalions; and Admiral 
Korsakoff was sent to report on the number of 
vessels on the Volga and Caspian available for 
transporting troops to the eastern shores of the' 
Caspian, in order that the new expedition might 
follow the route taken by Prince Bekovitch 
Tcl~erkasski. 
But it was found that there were not sufficient 
vessels for the purpose, a i d  arrangements were 
therefme illade for the new expedition to again use 
the Orenburg-Ak-BulaB line, the advance being, 
however, so timed tllnt the w11ole force inight be 
concentrated at Alr-Bulalc cluring tlle autumn, and 
tllus have only to cross the Ust-Yurt plateau in 
the early winter. But filly years ago there were 
no railways in Russia, by llleslss of which troops 
auil stores could be rapidly puslled forward to 
O.l.enburg, ancl before the preparations for a 
renewed attack on IClliva were coinpletecl, tile 
English, by obtaining the liberation of the Russian 
captives, deprived Russia of all excuse for inakii~g 
war again.st the Khan. 
111 June 1839, Major il'Arcy Todd, an  artillery 
of ice^, was deslmtclied on a special missioil to 
I-Ierat, and on his arrival there he seilt EL Mahom- 
meclan priest, nained Mullall Husszln, t,o Klliva with 
a letter of friendsllip to the Ialan. This messenger 
arrived in the Khanate at the time xllen the  people 
were in a wild state of alarm on acc.o~inl; of the 
12ussian advance, ailcI11e was therefore co~:clially 
received, as Bngla.nd was the only nation wllicll 
could save IClliva froin falling into the hands of 
It~zssia. Mullall I-Iussan on his return reported the 
~;uccessful results ol  his mission, and was ac- 
coinpanid by a ISllivnn aml~assador bearing letters 
f ~ o m  the Kllan full of declaratiolls of friendship. 
Major Todd tllerefore clcspr~tched Captain Abbott to 
IChiva in order to ilnprove the frie~ldly relaliio~ls 
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instructed to persuade the Khail to liberate the 
Russia11 prisoners, in order that Russia inigllt h x ~ ~ e  
no further excuse for invading tlie Klzanate. 
Abl~ott  obtained perinissioil lor a Russian oflicial 
to visit Khiva and take amray any Russia11 captives 
wllo wished to return ; and he then set out for 
the Caspian, but  was robbed aiicl cruelly treated 
on the way, and only reached Astral~hsn tvitl~ 
dificulty. Meanwhile Major Tocld heard tllai, 
Abbott was dead, ancl lie tlierefore sent Lieutenant 
Slisllrespeare to coinplete the work which Abbott 
hacl been sent to perform. Shslrespeare obtainecl 
the release of all the Russian prisoners, to tlic 
nunlber of 416, and in the sulnmei- of 1840 ac- 
companied tllem across the Steppe to the Caspiai~, 
and hancled them over to the Commandant of tlie 
Russiail fort of Novo Alexanclrovsl~, wheiz tllc 
Russians, in their turn, releasecl many Kl~ivan 
subjects whom they hacl previously captured micl 
detained as hostages. 
TROUBLICS I N  AFGHANISTAN 
Dost Mal~ommed's attempt to regain his throno--0ntbrenlr in I<%- 
bul, and m~lrder of Sir Alexander Burnes ancl Sir William Mao- 
naghten-Fate of General Elphinstone's army-T11e only sur- 
vivor of the army-Disaster to Colonel Palmer his troops- 
Critical situntion in Afgl~~nistan-Stoddart's and Conolly's mis- 
sions to Xl~iva nd Bolrhara-Failure of Russianmission to IChiva 
-Russian mission to Bokhara-Russian occupation of Ashurada. 
IF events in Afgllanistan had turned out d i r e r e ~ l t l ~ ,  
there is no doubt that the Russian Government 
would have found some fresh pretext for puslling 
forward. But even while Shakespeare was march- 
ing across the desert toward the Caspian with llis 
little band of liberated slaves, events were occurring 
in Shah Shuja's dominions which were shortly to 
culminate in an appalling disaster to the British 
arms, which completely dwarfed the failure of 
Perovski, and rendered it quite unnecessary for 
Russia to think of invading Khiva for the purpose 
of resisting British advances into Central Asia. 
From tlle very moment that S11uj a-ul-Mull<, sup- 
ported by a British army, had been reseated on 
tlle Afgl~an throne, it was evident that he hail no 
hold over his subjects, and that h e  xfould be un- 
:~1)1~ to maintain his position oncr tBe T11.itish t,roops 
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were withdrawn.. His installation on tlie plains of 
Kandal~ar, when only about a hundred Afghans 
assembled to do honour to their sovereign, shoulcl 
have plainly warned the British authorities that 
their policy was inherently weak and ill-advised. 
But Mr. Macnaghten, the British envoy, shut his 
eyes to facts which were patent throughout the 
army, and continued in his firm faith in the popu- 
larity of the Sudclozai Shah. He believed that 
there would be 110 further trouble in Afghanistan, 
and fixed his attention on affairs far beyond the 
frontiers of the lringdom of Kabul. He urged that 
Herat should be attacked and annexed to the 
dominions of Slluja-ul-Mullr, and even consiclered 
the advisability of despatching n force to Ball& ancl 
far distant Bokhara. E e  had a firm belief in the 
success of the British policy, and believed that a 
beautiful game ' could be played by pushing the 
British armies far beyond the position they t l~en 
occupied. But while he mas thus engaged in tlie 
contemplation of grand operations which were to 
place ' the safety of British interests on a firm ancl 
solicl basis,' and ' effectually frustrate the designs 
of Russia,' everything was going wrong in the 
dominions of the effete Sucldozai king. The British 
were standing on a mine which was shortly to 
explode with terrible results. 
When Dost Mallommed fled from Argandeh in 
Angust 1839, he toolr refuge in  Bokhara, but was 
tllere ill-trea tecl by  the Amir Nasrullah Ichan. 
E e  therefore fled to Shnllr-i-Sebz, and from thence 
~ ~ e n t  to Is'hulin, wllcrc he was well received by 
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tile Wali, wlio assisted liiiii to raise nil army for 
tile purpose of recoveriilg his throne. By the 
autulnil of 1840 he was in a position to take the 
field, 2nd advanced to Heibak, a fort about 150 
miles north of Bamian, which latter place was 
the11 occupied by a sinall Brilish detachment. In 
September he forced the British to evacuate the 
advanced posts of Saighan and Bajgali, but rein- 
forcelneuts under Brigadier-General Den~lie were 
hurried forward from Kabul to Bamian, a11d OIL 
September 18 he, with his small force of about 
1,500 men and two guns, inflicted a severe defeat 
on the Amir's army, which was said to be 40,000 
strong. Deizrlie tlleiz advanced to Saighan, cle- 
stroyed that place, and forced the Wali of Khulni 
to lnalre terms. Dost Mahommed nieaizwhile fled 
to the Nijrao valley, in the Kohistan north of 
Kabul, where Brigadier-General Sale hail bee11 
sent with a column, to chastise some chiefs a110 
refused to acknowledge Shall Shuja. 
After several slrirmishes, Sale on November 2 
a,pproached Parwan, a small village on the southern 
slopes of the Hindu Hush. E e  tliere saw the 
enemy evacuat,ir,g the village aiid i~eighbouring- 
forts, and flying to the hills ; and the Rrilish cavalry 
was phshed forward in pursuit. But when thry  
had advanced about a inile i11 ad~rance of the 
column, Dost Mal~onimecl, at the head of 200 
Afghan horsemel~, rode form~arcl and prepared to 
meet his assizilaiits. Uncovering his Iiea,d, hc 
called upon llis adherents to follow him in tlle 
ilaine of God :~nd the Prophet, or he wonlil be :I, 
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lost inan ; and tlzen, placing himself at the liead of 
his small band of followers, he rode forwarcl to 
drive tlie infidels from the field, or perish in the 
atteinp t. Captain Fraser formed the Light Cavalry 
into line and solu~cled the charge; the British 
aficers rode steadily forward, believillg that tlleir 
Inell viTere following ; but the native somars held 
back, and then fled ill conf~~sion before the Afghan 
horsemen. Of the five British &cers who rode 
in the charge, three-Lieutenants Broadfoot and 
Crispin, and Dr. Lord-were cut to pieces, while 
the other two, Fraser alfl Ponsoiiby, were severely 
~ i~onnded.  
But Dost Mal~ommed's triumpli did not lasl; long. 
The British infantry, coluing up, quickly recovered 
tlie lost grouild ancl, driving tlie Afglians away 
from tlle hills overlooking the Parwa11 Pass, forced 
them to retreat tovr~arcls the Pailjshir Valley. Dosr; 
Mahommecl hacl ~nacle one last gallant attempt to 
save lnis cause, and had failecl. I-Ie now clearly saw 
that it was llopeless to continue the struggle against 
the British, and on the next clay he rode int,o 
Kabul, there surrendered to Sir TVilliain Mc7,cnagli- 
ten, and witlliil tell clays was on his way tto Illilia 
uncler a stroiig escorL. 
During the n.ext twelve inonths there were 
Illany signs that the affairs in Afg11a11ista11 were by 
no meails ss~l;isfactorily settled. Early in 1841 a 
serious risi~lg of the Duranis took glace in the 
Zeminilevvar to the north-west of Kandahar; Yar 
Mallommed, the Vizier of I-Ierat, was doing his 
ut;inost; to cleskroy Bri;,ish influence, and to stir up 
VOL. I. 11 
130 TROUBLES IN AFGI-IANISTAN 1840- 
t l ~ e  Duranis against the unbelievers ; British troops 
were twice repulsecl by the Klialcars of Sibi in all 
attack on the village of Kojnk; and a British 
columll was busily employed in coercing refractory 
tribes in the neiglzbourlzooil of Jalalabacl. During- 
the swniner troubles arose at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, fresh 
clisturbtznces broke out in tlie Zemiildewar, and a 
trifling outbrealr in tlie Kol~istai~ liail also to be 
suppressed. 111 October Brigadier-Genera1 Sde 
started lor Ilzdia with liis brig,zcle, and had seine 
sharp fighting iiz the passes. Before the eilcl of 
'I I 
tliat month the Kohistailis were again in open I 
revolt, ancl ilews was received that Dost J ~ a l ~ o m -  
inecys son, Malioinmecl. Altbar Khan, liacl lelt liis 
asylum at Rolrliara a i d  reacliecl. Bainian. 
At last tlie storm broke. On Noveinber 2 a 
tumult arose in tlle city o l  Kal~ul. Tlie i-tlob, act,ii~g 
in o.ccorcl.ance with a ~~reconcertecl p an, attaclred 
the house ol Sir Alexancler Burnes, inurclei-ed him, 
his brother, and Lieutellant IVilliam P,roacl.foot ol' --- --..---. I 
the Engineers, ancl tl~eil looted the Treasury. It 
is ueedless to repeat the oil-tolcl tale 01 tlie follies 
which were tlleil comnlit,t,ecl; of [lie liesibation ancl 
vacillation of the i ~ ~ f i n n  General in cliiel' comniand, 
and of the impractica1:~le teinper and perversity of 
his second in conllni~~ld. Mist,:~,lce I'ollowecl. inistake, 
ailcl tlle nriny rayicllj~ became so clemoralised, that 
when Sir \Villi:~m Macnaglltcn was traitoronsly 
lriurclerecl. on 1)eceinber 2.3, 1541, 1 ry M:~lioininecl 
Al;lsar Kl1a11, cluri~lg c0~1fererlce llelcl within 400 
yards of thc British cailt,onmcutJs, no at~,culpt was 
made to rescue liiili or to : L V ~ I ~ ~ C  t l l ~  cleecl ; his 
-18.1.5 ? ' I I I~  RICTI~EAT FROM I(AI;UL 
- 
J 3 1 
-- 
body w;iS l1~1niI;l eel tb rema,in 011 tile plain in full 
view of tlie force, and to be carried thence by the 
Afgllai~s, aild parniled nl~out the slreets and bazaars 
of tlle city. 
After M:acnaghten's death, political ~llatt,ers 
were eill;rusi;ed to Major Eldred Pottinger, tlle 
o.:illnnt dcfcnder of Herat;, and 11e appealed to tlle .'I 
1iiilit:iry c.:liiefs to conl;inue tile struggle a11d to 
occupy tile Baln I3issnr, wliicli, wit11 a determinecl 
O-arrisoi~ ulliler competenl; leaders, migl~t have been 
L? 
ilefentled ml~i l  reinfoorcerneuts a~rived from India. 
But his exliortations were unlleecled, and on 
J:inu:~ry G ,  1842, the British army, coi~lmaniled by 
General Elphinstone, co~~imenced it,s retreat from 
I<abnl in xccordance with the terms of a treaty of 
capil;ulation, ~vliich Ilacl been ratifiecl five days pre- 
viously. What followed is well knonrn. Out of an 
army ~vllich nul~lbered 4,500 fighting men and 
13,OQCI camp follovirers, otie solitary El~glisl~inan 
alone succeeded in reacllii~g Jalalabad, where Sale 
liail eiit;~e~ichecl himself on hearing of the disast.ers 
in I<al:)~ll. 
011 J a l ~ l ~ a r y  13, virliei~ the garrison were busy 
on the morlrs, toiling with axe and shovel, with 
tllc?ir arins piled aiid their accoutremel~lts laiil out 
closc! at hand, a s e ~ i t r j ~  011 the raanparts, looking 
ont tow:~rils tllc Kabul road, sn.w a solitary white- 
f:~c.e(l horsell-1:~u st,ruggling on tovirards the fort. 
r l  l h e  word v7ns passeil, the Lirlings spread. Pre- 
sc?,l~d~ the rnml)art,s were lined witfill oficers, looli- 
illg out lfritll t,llrol~l)illg liearts t;hr'ongh unsl;eady 
telesc:c.,l)cs, or with straining eyes tiracing the road. 
n 2 
Slowly and painfully, as though horse and rider 
both were in an extremity of mortal weakness, the 
solitary mouilted man came reeling, tottering on. 
They saw tllat he was an Englishman, on a 
wretched, weary pony; clinging as one sick o r  
wounded to its neck, he sat, or rather leant for- 
ward ; and there were those wlio, as they watched 
his progress, tbought that he coulcl never reacli 
unaided the walls of Jalnlabad. A shudder r an  
through the garrison. That solitary horselnail 
looked like the messenger of deatli. Few doubted 
that he was the bearer of intelligence that woulcl 
fill their souls with liorror ancl dismay. Their 
worst forebodings seeilied confirmed. There was 
the one man who was to tell the story of tlle 
massacre of a great army. A party of cavalry 
were sent out to succour liim ; they brought him 
in, m~ounded, exhausted, half-dead. The mes- 
senger was Dr. Brydon, anil he now reported his 
belief that he was the sole survivcr of an army of 
some sixteen thousand men.' ' 
After this fearful dis~~ster to the Kabul force, 
only Gliazni, Jalalabad, Knlal-i-Ghilzai, ancl I<an- 
dahsr remained in the hands 01 the British. Gllazni 
was, however, lost; sliortly afterwards. Town~*cls 
the end of November, 1841, tlle eileriiy appeared in 
force before tlie place, but withdrew on 11ea;r.ing 
of the advance 01 n brigade under Maclaren from 
Kandahar el2 ~ o z ~ t e  for Kabul. Hut Mac1:wen only 
went two marches north of Xalat-i-G1iilz:~i ailcl 
' History of t7,a Way h~ Afqhanielnn, by John TVillinla ICngc?, 
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then retraced his steps, when the Afghans ~ ~ 1 -  
lectecl again roulld Gllazni and completely invested 
the place. Colonel Palmer, the commandant, llad 
omitted to expel the illhabitants from the city, ancl 
they a passage under tl-e malls by which 
t;he besiegers entered the town on December 16. 
The garrison then retreated to* the citadel, and 
there held out for several weeks. But, on March 6, 
Paliner ancl his troops opened the gates and 
inarched out of the citadel, trusting to the Afghan 
promise of safe conduct to Peshawar. It is need- 
less to  state that this promise a a s  not kept. On 
the following day the troops mere suddenly at- 
tacked while they were cooki~lg their dinners, ancl 
after three clays of 11ar.d fighting those who sur- 
vived the slaughter were carried off into an 
apparently hopeless captiviLy. 
Thus, iil the spring of 1.842, the British posiliol~ '1 
in Afghanistan appeared to be well-nigh hopeless. / 
Incompetence and vacillation on the part of tlie j 
military commanders had brought about a condi- 
tion of affkirs such as a British army had never 
before experienced. Xandahar, Kala't-i-Ghilzai, 
a i d  Jalalabad alone remaillecl in British hands, 
I 
ancl the ciefeilce of the two la-tter places were t?.ie 
only bright spots during this terrible crisis. 
While fresh armies were being collected mld 
hurried forward to avenge the disasters which hacl 
occurrecl ill Afghanistail, a dark tragedy was being 
far llortll of the 1 l in .d~ K ~ s h .  Shor'hlJ' 
aftel. the of the siege of Herat, Dfr. BIcNeiU. 
sellt Colonel Stoddart on a mission to Bokhara to 
counteract the inacliinations of the Russians, who 
were known to be intriguing in that state ; aiid to  
Tenlove a possible excuse for Russian interference 
by obtaining tlie liberation of such Russian subjecis 
2s were in slavery there. In 1520 a Russiaii em- 
1)assy had beell sent to Bokhara under M. Negri. 
I n  1834 another mission was sent under M. De- 
maison, who adopted the disguise of a Tartar 
Mullah. In  1835 Lieutellant Vitkievitcll-m.110 
afterwards appeared i11 Kabul-visited the Kliaaate 
disguised as a Kirghiz-Kazak ; aacl since tliat time 
several Uokharaa envoys were sent to Russia, their 
visits being returned by the despatch of llussial~ 
agents. I t  was, therefore, time that England took 
steps to prevent the Amir Nasrullah from falling 
completely under Russian influence. Stoddart, 
arrived in Bokhara at the close of the year-183 8, -. - - -  - - -  -- -- 
Tjut on his arrival there he fooljshly refused to 
conform to the customs xiid etiquette of the Bok- 
haran Court, and within three days of his arrival 
11e found himself prisoner. He was suddenly 
seized in the minister's liouse, thrown l;o tile 
grounil, bound with cords, ailcl shortly afterwards 
cast into n filthy 2nd iioisolne pit, where he rc1- 
niaiiled with criminnls for liis companions, ' covercrl 
will1 vermiii nncl surroundecl by ~eptiles, in k i l l i ~ ~ g  
~,~li icl i  they were constniltly occupied.' At tile 
elld of two 11ioilL1ls he wxs released fioni this rear- 
Cu1 clungeo~l ancl rcinoved to the house of the cllicl' 
of the Uokllarali police, bul two days later lie vrr:ls 
i.ufornied that 11e would be 1,ut to deal11 unless 11(? 
, m7110 
n d  to 
rence 
bjec ls  
H em- 
Jegri. 
C. a e -  










ecl to  
1301~- 
r r i v a l  
rlenly 
t h e  
vax-cis 
e 1-cl- 
r e  1.c t 1  
illi 1 1 ~  
tl1c 
fear- 
r l l i c f  
mT:1S 
;S 1 1 6 %  
s t c c l  
-184s STODIIAI~T AND CONOLLY IN , ~ O X I I A R A  135 
/ 
in bocly and ~lziilcl by the terrible orcleal he hacl 
passed through, he reluctantly collsented to toll- 
form to the rites of the Malloinnleclall faith-an 
act wliicll lle bitterly rel~entecl of througllont llle 
reinai~lcler of his miserable existence. Froln that 
time he M~SS treated wiLh less brutality, as the 
Ainir Eiacl hearcl of the British successes in Af- 
\ ghanistan, lrnew that British troops hacl aclvancecl across the Einclu I<ush to Bamian and Saigllail, 
nncl feared 1;hat a force would be sent across the 
I Oxus to avenge 11is cruel treaLment of tlle British 
am.bassador . 
1x1 Se~tember,  1840, Captain Arthur Conolly 
was seilt on a similar inissioil to Klliva and Khokand. 
1, I'Ie Grst went to E<liiva, where he was well received, 
i ancl thence to Khoka'ild, which state was then at 
war wit11 Rolrliara, Maclali KIian, the ruler of 
I<holrancl, having ilivaclecl Bokharan territory and 
captured tlle strong fortress of Ura TepB. Nasrullah 
believed that Coaolly liad advised this movement, 
4 I!  and he therefore determined to get the ~ i i t i s l l  
dGcer into his power. E e  accordiilgly invited 
lliin to visit his Court, a1:1c1 preva,iled upon Stoddart 
to use his influetlce to persuade hiin to do so. 
Conolly, in spite of the advice of the Kl~an of 
I(holrand, accepted the invitation alld arrived in 
13old1ara in November, 1841. 
For n short; space dl weat well ; but soon afl;er 
liis arrivn.1 news renclied Uokhara that the Afghans 
were in revolt against Shah Shuja-ul-Mull<, that; 
! 13ar11es had been murclered, and that the British 
i arlny llad bccu clefcateil, aiid were closely ljesieged 
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i n  their cantoi~ine~lts outside Kabul. This mas 
Nasrullali's opportunity. Tlle British envoy who, 
according to his belief, hacl iiicitecl tlie Khokaildians 
to invade his dominioiis, ailrl tlle other Feringlli 
wlio llarl defied him a i d  insulted liis minister, 
mere both in his lia~.ids, a i d  he could iiow punish 
thein as he willed witllout fear of consequences. 
S~oclclart ancl Coriolly were both seized niiil iin- 
~ r i soned  in the liouse of the Topshi-Uaslii, or  cliief 
of the artillery, in Bolrliara, where tliey remailleel 
for rnore than six znoiltlis in a coudition of the 
inosl; abjecl; anel heart-reiidii~g nlise~y. The l-ain 
leaked freely tluough tlie mud-roof of the niisei.:~ble 
hut  in  which they were coiliinecl ; the very clothes 
they wore rotted from OK their I~oclies, and tliey 
suffered indescribable torments from the att aclis of 
vermin, wliile ague arid fever s:~pped tlicir strengl;li 
ancl reilucecl tlioiil to the condi~ion of illere livilig 
skeletons. 
But; the end cailie at  lasl;. !rile Bokharan Ai~iir, 
after soiile clelay, liacl collected an nrrny for t41ic? in- 
v:~sion of I~holraucl, and after a sliort l ~ u t  snccess- 
ful campaign, returlzed to liis cal~itnl ill triuiul~ll. 
Iiztoxicnted ~vitli liis success, tlie cruel tyr.:ull; r(:- 1 I 
meinl~crecl his Feriuglii captives, ancl ~ : L T ~ I :  ori[(!t's I 
for them to 11c put to i1e:~tll. 011 Jnllc? 34, :l.IC;!IY, 16 , I  
t,lle ~TTTO Eilgl.isliluel1 \irere t:llicn out, of their 1,risc ,n I 
nncl coniluctecl to n 8111:~~ co~~r ty ;~ r i \  (:1ose : ~ t  ll,:~llil, j 
~vllctre Sl;odd:~rl; w:~s iirst put Lo de:~lll ill 1,l~c 1,l.c:- 
sencc of an asse~r ik"  ~;ron~iL 01: 1i:~tivo~. C,'o~loll~ 
I ~ ~ L L S  hl~cii ollk?i*(!(l lis life 011. [ I L ~  (!o~lilit (.)u I , I I , : L I ~  
I 
:L~Ic)~JLC~I  Ll~e hil:~lloil~~l~(!il:.~l~ 1':~it.  ; lj1,tL l ~ c  s ~ : u r ~ ~ l ' ~ ~ l l y  
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was rejected. the proposal, saying :-G s toc l i l~ t  
7 1 1 0 ,  Yusuf, my servant, turliet~ $~ilnhornmednos, mid yel 
ians you have killed them ; I have 110 co~lfide~lce in your 
Lglli promises ; I will llot turn from 11ly f;~itl l ;  I
.ter, prepared to die ; finis11 your worlr.' Tlle tmgedy , 
was finished. Arthur Coilolly was speeclily p ~ t  to ' 
cleath; and thus died ~ I Q O  brave Britisll officel-s 
who, taking their lives in their hands, went clieer- 
fully into unlmown lands ancl there laid clo~rn their 
lives in their endeavours to ailcl to the glory of 
their dearly-loved country, ailcl to t l~~\rart  'the 
ain desigils of Eilglancl's enemies. 
ble While Stoddart and Conolly were ill Central 
Lies Asia, Russia was not idle. As the I<linn uS Xhi~ra 
ley !\ i liacl released the Russian prisoners ,zilcl issued n 
I of 13roclalnation abolisliing tlie trade in llussinu slaves, 
the Czar's Governizzeilt decided to reopen negotin- 
ng tions with him, alld Captain Nikiforof TVRS tlierefore 
sent on a mission to  Jnliva i11 1841, accoinpanieil 
~i L-, !\ by an escort of twelve Cossacks. 011 liis nrrivnl 
ill- 8, : lie behaveil in  much tlie same ~ ~ ~ a y  as Stoclilal-t hail 
S S -  clone a t  Bokliara, refused to yield to the clcinn~lils 
111. of Khivan etiquette, treated tlie Khan's officials in 
t -e -  a co~ltemptuous manner, and generally assullied n 
?rs bold and defia~it demeanour. Fortmitttely for the 
-2, Russiail envoy, Allali Ilul ~vas not au inll~ullan 
3 11 monster of the type of Nasrullali of Bolrllnra ; tlie 
~1, Kllivan Khan, moreover, had not forgotte11 
-e- alarnl occasiolled by Perowki's advance; and the 
IY Byitis11 oi?icers, Abhott and Shakespeare, llad beell 
~e athisillg llim to abstain f ~ o m  ;~11y act n.hich nlight 
l~ give Russia mi excuse for a fresh attack 011 the 
1 
13s TROUBLES I N  AFGI-IANISTAN 1840- 
Khanate. Nikiforof, therefore, experienced no un- 
pleasant results from his overbearing conduct. Bis  
mission, however, was completely unsuccessful, for 
he was unable to secure ally tracle concessions, ancl 
the Khan declined to enter into any treaty. 
In the following year another Russian agent, 
ilalnecl Colonel Danilefsky, was sent to Klliva. 
During his stay in the I<hanate, Allall I<ul Ifis11 
clied, and Danilefsky succeeded in persuading his 
son and successor, Rahim Kul, to sign a treaty 
engaging not to undertake hostile acts against 
Russia or to permit robbery or piracy. 
An important embassy was also sent to the 
Court of Nasn~Uah Khan of Bokhara. In 1840 
tlie Auir  began to fear tliat his dolninions woulcl 
be illvadecl by a British coluinn from Kabul, a i d  
he therefore sent aii iilfluential envoy nailled Mukin- 
Beg to St. Petersburg, wit11 letters and presents 
for the Czar, besides gifts for various other nus- 
sian autl~orities. The Russian Government seized 
this ol)l)ortunity, and despatcl~ecl a missioil uncler 
Colonel Buteneff, charged with the collection of 
' positive and reliable information coi~cerning the 
Kllanate of Bokhara and neigllbouring countries, 
mcl with tlle arrangement of terins for regulating 
tlle mutual relations between Uokhara aild Bussin.' 
In the instructions which he received froin the 
Russia~l Minister of Foreign Afl~~irs, he xras d s o  
directed to observe tlie effect proiluced on Uolthnra 
by the recent events in Afghanistan, as the acqui- 
sii;i.on of this inforination ~rould  eanble lliili ' to 
suggest the best nienns for strc~lgtheuiiig 1>1ic 
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political influence of Russia and for developing 
Russian trade in this part of Asia.' 
Butenef, accolnpanied by Captain Bogoslovski, 
M. Lehmann, M. Klianilroff, aild a slllall stxff of 
been escorted as far as the Syr Daria by a detach- 
ment of 400 Ural Cossacks. Shortly before he 
crossed the Russian frontier, Lord Palmerston hacl 
directed the British ambassadors at St. Petel-sburg 
Russian and Turkish Governllients in the cause of 
the captives in Bokhara, and both the Sultan ancl 
\ Czar did what they could to obtain the release of 
i Stoddart Conolly. 
1 
1 
When the oficers of tlie R,ussiam niission reached 
Rolrhara, they receivecl a very favourable recep- 
tion, and Buteneff lost 110 time in exertillg liis 
ilifluence for 1;he purpose of obtaining S~ocldart's 
release.' As a result of his friendly efforts, Stod- I \  
\ \, 
i ! dart was permitted to live in the liouse occupied 
by the Russiaii n-~ission, where l-ie received great 
lrindness from the Russian officers ; and the An-~ir 
even proinisecl to permit hiin to leave the conntry. 
But S~odclart hacl beell sent on his mission to Bok- , 
hara by the British Government, a~id he considererl 
it to be his duty to remztiiin until recalled, and thus 
the opportnllity of escape was lost. ConoUy soon 
afterwards arrived ; news of the British disasLers 
rencl~ecl Bolrhara, ancl the ttvo Rritisll oacers were 
closely coi~hled until their death. 
Coilolly hnd not tllcil nrrived in Bolrhr~~~1.a, 
The British defeat in Afghanistan liad also a 
very marked eflect oil the Amir's behnviour toafards 
the Russia11 embassy. So 101l.g as the British a~mies  
remailled at Kal~ul and Bamian, he was xlraiil t l ~ a t  
an advance would be made against his dominions, 
and he therefore was anxious to be on frienclly 
terms with the Russians ; and thus for the first few 
lnontlis of their stay in the country tlie Eussinu 
missioil was treated well, and the mei~lbers of tlie 
elllbassy were permitted to visit tlie easterii ancl 
less known portion of tlie I(l1aiiate. Rut ns sooil 
as the British evacuatecl. Kabul, and all danger of 
iilvasioil from the soutll was removed, Nnsrullah 
began to show his disiilclination to liave ally (leal- 
ings with the inlidel-whether Russiail or English 
-ancl. from this tiine the positioil of tIie Russiaiis 
becaine daily more and iiiore clillicult. B ~ ~ t ' c i ~ e f ,  
hewever, remained i11 hopes of being able to ell'ect 
tlie release of Stoddart aiid ~ o n c h ~ ,  ant1 of tlie 
~nany Russiails who were cletaiile(l. i11 slavery ; nn.cl. 
he also tziecl liarcl. to obtain the Aniir's signature 
to a treat,y wit11 Russia. But N:~srnll:~lL clearly 
showecl. that he no longer ~visliecl to come to ally 
arrai~geinerlt ; the Ellvoy's lqeqnests were ig~lori:d ; 
and tlie n~einbers of the iuission were in il:aliger of 
slinring the f:~tc wlliCli 11:1c1 overtakcil Lliu :lh*itisll 
:~~nb:~ssacl.ors. Nothing reinainecl. 71ut to (]nit t,llc 
iuhospital~le and tre:~cl~erous Court. (ILL t,llc! iligllt 
of April 1 (1, 1842, Uatc:l.lelP :ulcl. his con~~)n l~ io~ l s  
sl;~rl;cd on their way 7):~ck to Itussia, 1;11(? 1~o~ol;ia- 
tions having beell com1)letcly ni~succc?ssl'l~l. I j u k  
greai; acquisitioi~s to scieilcc wt;rc nl:~de (11u.ii~g 
'AN 1840- 
~n had also n 
bviour tow :~l*cls 
r Brilish aTn l i e s  
vas afraid that 
his d o m i i i i o i ~ ~ ,  
)e on f r i e ~ ~ c l l y  
'or the first fe~v 
y the Russinn 
embers of  tlle 
e eastern and 
But as sooil 
all danger of 
red, N a s l - ~ ~ l l a h  
lave ally c lea l -  
in or English 
' the Russiai ls  
~ l t .  B u t e ~ ~ e f f ,  
able to effect 
y, and of the 
I slavery ; a n c l  
~ir 's  s igna tu re  
rullall c l e a r l y  
come t o  ally 
were ignorecl ; 
in danger of 
en the B r i  tisll 
~t to quit t,he 
On the night; 
s companions 
, the nego t i a -  
:cessful. But 
made cl~~u-illg 
their eighl 111ont1is' sojour11 ill the country, an(]- 
what was of more advantage to Russia-extensive 
surveys of the Klianate had been made by Khani- 
Boff and the topoglaaphers, which proved of lllucll 
assistance ahell the Russians made their great 
advance a quarter of a century later. 
Wllile these events ae re  occurring ill Afghm- 
\ istan and the Khallates of Central Asia, 72ussia 
did not remain inactive ill Persia. By the Treaty 
of Gulistan, ancl again by the Treaty of Turko- 
I mancllai, Persia had her right of ~lznin- 
taining war vessels on the Caspian, alld tllus TI';LS 
unable to check the piracy of the Turlro~nnns, 
who infested the shores of the sea between Kms- 
\; 
novodsk and the Gulf of Astrabad, and carried off 
hunclreds of Persian subjects into slavery. As tlie 
Shah was thus unable to repress the piratical 
Turlromans, he in 1836 pointed out to tllc IZussian 
Government the dificulties of tlle situation, and 
\i 
foolishly appliecl for their assistance. The Czar's 
Governinent were not slow to comply with the 
request, and in 1837 ariil 1838, vessels were sent 
fro111 the Russian naval station at the islailcl of 
Sari; to cruise off thc south-eastern shores of tlle 
Caspian Sea, while at the same time the island of 
Ashuracla (at the mouth of tlle Gulf oP Astrabad) 
was quietly occupied. This step alarmed the 
Persi,z~s, and a r e q ~ ~ e s t  was inacle that the Russinx~ 
naval com~nancler shoulcl either be placecl under 
the orders of the Go~rcrnor of Astuabad, or failing 
this, that naval aid might be withhelcl. Tlle Rus- 
sians, Izoaever, hacl no intention of mithrlrawing, 
as they had ma~laged to get 1101~1 of an excellent I 
ancl long-coveted point d'appui, from whicli they I !
1 
C :OLI~~  tlireaten Astral.mil and I<horassan. 
This first lancliiig on the island attracted b u ~  
little nttenti,on, and mas apparently increly n tern; 
110~a1-y occupation ; but in 1841  Ashuracla was 
permenently taken possessioii of, for the osteiisible 
l)~n-pose of protecti~lg Persia11 tracle against the i' 
Turlcoman pirates. Sir John lVPNeill reportecl the 
matter to the Britisl~ Goverllillent in 1542 ; and in 
1849, as Persia was unable to induce the Russialls 
t,o evacuate tlle islanil ancl had petitioned Englanrl 
for aid, Lorcl Aberdeen applied to Russia to with- 
draw. But they had mesnwl~ile been strengthen- 
ing their position ; extensive lsuilclings had been 
erected ; and negotiations were opened from thence 
wikh the Turkomans. The Englisli represenl;ation, 
therefore, had n.o erect, and Ashuracla has since 
remained in Bussinn hands. 
f This seizure was an act for wllich no possible 
-! excuse can 1)e founrl. Ashurada xras as inucll a, 
portion of Persia as I-Inyling Islanrl is of Englancl ; 
il;s l~ermauent occupation by Ilussin was tliercfore 
: L I ~  ~znl~rov~lceil violatioil of tlie Sllnli's domiirions, 1 wllicll arlnlitted of no jnstificatiou. But the Czar's 
, G.overnment lmew that the tllougl~ts of everyone in 
Il:11gl:niil were then t~wuetl towards Afghanistan, 
i wl~c?rc tile aven.giag :~rinies were movil~g for\~rnr(l 
.' t.r) 1C:~I)nl I.)(-) wipe out: t11.e disgrace mrliich 1l;~cI 
sullil!il tdie Ili~itish rel~utntion ; and t;liat; it was not 
likc~ly i d ~ i ~ I ;  inncll nttcnt..ion wonld 1)e given to tlic? 
ochc-!nl):~,l.io~l 1 ) ~ .  I.:IISS~:L i)1' a slriall r;:i,ntl.jr islet ill t;llc~ 
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Caspian. Persia, unaiclecl, coulcl do 110 tliiilg Inore 
t71ai1 expostulate, ancl thus Russia was able to 
q~~ie t ly  take lip a positioli from whence she can, 
 lien desirable, move forward to tlle 111aii~la11cI, ai1d 
p i n  1)ossession of the narrow neck of fertile 
country which connects tlie province of Uhorassan 
wit11 tlle remainder of Nortlier11 Persia, ancl wllicli 
tllus forms one of tlie iilost v:~luable slrategicnl 
posiiiions in Soutlle~n Asia. 
CHAPTER VI 
RUSSIAN ADVANCB ACEOSS TI-IE KIRGI-IIZ STEPPES 
Russian Frontier-Line at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century- 
Operations in the Soa of Aral and Construction of Fort Raim- 
Subjection of the SoutthernKirgl~iz to Rnssia-Founding of Xopal 
-CollisionsbetweenRussiansnndKhivai~s-Thehal ScaFlotilln 
-KhoBantLian attacks on tho R~zssians-Siege of Alr-WIechet 
and its capture by the Russinns-Khokandian Expeditions for 
retaking Ak-Mechet--Pnrtl~er Russian Aggression across tho 
Ili-Tho Crimean War-Two Bnssian Plans for the Invasion of 
India-Herat again besieged by Persia-British Porce des- 
patched against tho Shall-Intrignes and Inswrection of Iezct 
Icutebnr-IgnatiefPs Missions to Kllivn o,nd Bokhara-Furtlicr 
E~zssim Explorations of Central Asia-IChanilcoff's Mission. 
AT the comiiieiicement of tlie presenl; century, 
the R~zssiaii frontier from the Caspia~. to Eastern 
Siberia was defencleil by a colltinuous liue of forti- 
fied posts, which protect,ed the Russian settleillents 
from the athacks of the ailcl tribes m~hicli nhs~bit~eil 
the Steppes of Central Asia. Tliis frontier line 
comlnellced at Guriev, at the mouth of the Rive~: 
Ural, and followed the left baiik of that river as 
far as the town of OrsL ; from thence it rail to 
Troitslca, ancl then across the Ishim Steppe, past 
Petro-Paulovsk to Olnslr on tlie 1rl;ish ; the line 
i;hen follox-ed the lefl; ba i~b  of that river to Semi- 
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Cliina. But, altl~ough this frontier mas a good olle 
for defensive purposes, being on the llortherll 
extrenlity of vast, barren, and sparsely populated 
Steppes, the Russians had no intelltion of treating 
it as a permanent line beyond which tliey should 
not advance. 
I t  has already been shown how they en- 
deavoured on more than one occasion to get a 
footing on the great River Oxus, the main water- 
way into the heart of Central Asia, ailcl llow their 
attempts had failed. The disastrous failure ol' 
Perovslri's expedition, together with the lessons 
which had been derived from the previous attaclis 
on Khiva, taugllt the Russiails that the tiine was 
not yet ripe for the conquest of that Khanate, and 
that they could not yet acquire control over the 
liavigalion of tlie Oxus. 
But some distance to the north of that river 
there is another great stream, the Syr Daria, or 
Jaxartes, which rising in tlie Thian Shall Bai~ge, 
appeared to offer a line of advance alnlost as 
favourable for their purpose ; and the Russians 
therefore begail to tnrn tlieir attentioil in that 
directioil. 
E~ren before the failure of Perovshi's exl~edition 
they llad determined to examine this line of ad- 
vance, and in 1837 the Asiatic Colnnlittee decided 
to despatch a so-called scientific illissioii to the 
north-easten1 shores of the Sea of Aral, and up 
the syr Daria. But this inissioll was indefinitely 
postpolled on account of the serious events which 
were occurring ill Persia and Afghanistan, fo l lo~~ed 
VOL. I. I> 
by Perovski's abortive attempt to reach Khiva. 
Then troubles broke out among the still discon- 
:tented Kirghiz, ancl a serious rebellion of these 
turbulent subjects had to be suppressed ; so that 
it was not till 1846 that steps could be taken to 
carry out l;he recommen.dation of the Con~mittee. 
In that year, however, General Obrucheff, who was 
Governor-General of Orenburg, obtained permis- 
sion to occupy a point on tlie shores of tlie Sea of 
Aral ; and for this purpose Captain Leo von Scllultz 
was despatched to survey the nloutli of the Syr 
Daria, and to select a suitable site for a fort. As 
a result of his investigations a forb, which became 
known as Fort Raim or Fort Aralsk, was con- 
structed in 1847 at tlie mouth of the river, while 
at the same time three other fork were buill;, as 
links in the chaii~ con~lectiilg the old Orellburg 
line with the Syr Daria. These intermecliate posl;s 
were Kurabutakski and Uralski on the River Irghiz, 
and Orenburgskoi on the River Turgai. 
While the Russians were gradually pusliillg 
forward from Orenburg, in order to gain a footing 
on the Syr Daria, they were also throwing forward 
their left Rank in the clirectioll of Littlc Bokliara 
or Kasligar. Tl~us, after the lapse of more than a 
century, they commenced a series of movemeiits 
precisely similar to those which liad bee11 initiated 
by Peter the G-rest. Peter, at the commerlceinerlt 
of t11e eigliteentll century, liad irivacletl l'ersia, 
attacked Khiva, axid sent an expeclition to gain 
possession of tlie golcl mines of Little Bolriiarn ; 
wllile liis successors ill Llie present century d s o  
ES 1848- -1868 I<IRGHIZ OD TI-IE MIDDLE HORDE 
1 Khiva. invaded Persia on two occasions, tried to conquer 
discon- ICliiva, alld pushed forward towards Kashgar. 
3f these As has alreaci beell mentioned, the town of 
so that Onlsk was founded in 1716 by Bucl~holtz on his 
;aken to retreat from Lake Yamyshef. Two years later the 
mmi ttee. first fortress was built at Seinipalatinslr, and in 
1720 Ust-Kamen.ogorslr was founded by LilrhareE 
on his retirement from Zaisan Nor. The Orenburg 
and htish forts were connected in 1752 by the 
New Siberian line of posts across the Ishim Steppe, 
the Syr and in 1.760 the Buktarininsk Fort was erected as 
3rt. As an aclvailced post sgaiilst possible attacks from the 
became L Chinese. At this tinie the country round the head- 
vas con- i , waters of the Irtish was pop~~lated by the Kalmuks, 
x, while but in 1758, the Clinese having conquered Dzun- 
built, as garia, set to work, and indiscriminately massacred 
~renburg the Kallnuk inhabitants of the province. The 
~ t e  posk Kirg11iz-Kazaks of tlle Middle Horde then hastened 
r Lrghiz, to occupy the vacant pastures, and thus became 
the neighbours of the Russians. These people, 
pushing . ~ however, coquetted with both the Ghinese and the 
L footing Russians, and a t  first gave some trouble, but in 
forward 1760 their Khan, Sultan Abdul Faiz, sent an ain- 
Bok11,zrs bassador to St. Petersburg asking the Czar to take 
e than a him under his protection, and prolnisillg to protect 
tvements Russian ca~avtliis tracling with the states of Central 
Asia. This request was granted, and thus all the 
ncement Kirghiz-Kazahs between the Irtish ancl Orellburg 
Persia, became the nominal s~~bjecl;s of the White Czar. 
'Those to the south of the Irtish, however, behaved 
\okiiara ; in exact.1~ the same way as their lrillsmen to the 
ury also west had done. Caravans vere plundered a i d  the 
Steppes were tlze scenes of continual disorder and 
violence. At tlze commenceinelzt of the present 
century the Eussian authorities begail to adopt 
measures for ellforcing order among tlzese unruly 
subjects. Each caravan proceeding southwards 
was escorted by a sinall cletachinent of Cossaclrs, 
and between 1808 and IS19 a c:onsiderable force 
was enlployecl urider General Glasenap, for the pur- 
pose of coizzpletely subcluing the inarauders. These 
operations were crowned with success, ancl tlie 
Kirglziz on tlze Irtisli Steppes were so reduced to 
subjection that solitary travellers could traverse 
the country in complete safety. 
But the Russians were determined to a;lvance 
southwards, towards the unlmom~n lands froliz 
whence continual reporLs were received of the 
great stores of illinera1 wealth wlziclz lay lliddeii in 
the mysterious regions to which but few Europealls 
had yet penetrated. Tlie I<irgliiz were again to be 
made the excuse for aggression, a i d  once again 
were Peter's words to be verified :-' The Kirgliiz 
are a roaming and Gclcle people, yet their Steppe is 
the key and gate of all the lailds and countries of 
Asia.' In 1827 Cossacks were stationed at Icok- 
clzetaf and Karlraraly ; in 1831 the town of Ser, 
giopol was founded; and in the following year 
Alcmolinsk and Dsiaii-hul were maile the head- 
quarters of sub-districts. At  this time, a portioil 
of the Great ITorde of Kirghiz tencleretl their sub- 
mission, arid the re1:~tions of tlic lZussit~ils wii,li 
their ICirgliiz subjects became much more satis- 
factory. Ijul still l;hc advance was coillii~uctl. 
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Scientific officers and topographers were sent 
foraarcl to make surveys alld to report on the 
mineral resources of the countries visited ; ancl in 
1846, the tow11 of Kopczl was foundecl by Prince 
Gortcl~akoff, the Governor-General of Wester11 
Siberia, on a fertile plateau at the base of the Ala- 
Tau range. 
Sucl? was the conditionof affairs at the eastern 
end of the Orenburg-Siberian line  hen Fort Bairn 
was built at the mouth of the Syr Daria. The 
Russians, aclval~cing beyoncl their line of fortified 
post" had tllroan forward their right and left 
flanks - ostensibly for the s~ibjugation of the 
Kirghiz, but really in the cleliberate pursuit of a 
well-matured scheme of aggression. The extremi- 
ties of these two arms which were thus thro\~cl 
forward were far in advance of the old fortified 
line, and were sepalbated froin each other by many 
hundreds of miles of barren Steppes and unexplored 
mountain ranges. The position for a time was a 
weak one ; but the Russians soon begall to consider 
the best means of closing the long undefencled gap 
between Fort Railn and Kopal. With this object 
it was considered necessary that the whole of the 
Steppes between the two advanced flanks should 
be anuexecl, and that a new line of fortified posts 
should be construct,ed along the southern limits of 
the territory so appropriated. 
The Russian Government professed to believe 
that by doing this their Kirghiz subjects would be 
brought uilder proper control, and protected from 
the attacks of the Khivans and I<hokandiaus ; but 
they ignored the fact that by abandoning their 
old defensive line, and taking up a nev ~osition 
at the southern edge of the Steppe, they ran the 
risk of collisions with the Khivans and Khokandians, 
which would necessarily prove far more trouble- 
some than the aorst raids of the Icirghiz, ancl 
inevitably involve Russia in constant v~arfare with 
the Central Asian Khanates. 
The Khokandians and Khivans naturally con- 
sidered the Russian occupation of the mouth of the 
Syr Daria to be an unwarranted act of aggression. 
The former had, early in the century (about 1817), 
constructed the forts of Y ani-Kurgan, Julelc, Alr- 
Mechet, Kumysh-Kurgan, Chim-Knrgan, Kosh- 
Kurgan, and others, and had since that time 
regularly levied taxes on the Kirghiz who settled 
on the banks of the river; and in 1830, the 
Khivans, who considered that their authority ex- 
tended throughout the Kizil Kum desert to the 
south of the Syr Daria, had also erected several 
forts on the left bank of the Kuvan Daria (a branch 
of the Syr). 
But the Khokandiaus were at tl~is time engaged 
in a bitter civil war, and could therefore oirer 
but slight opposition to the Russians ; ahile the 
KIiivans could do little or nothing at  such a dis- 
tance from their capital. During 1847 ancl 1848, 
however, the Khivans macle repeated inroacls into 
the country round Fort Raim, and tlzere were 
frequent collisions between them and the Russian 
detachments which were sent against them. Tlie 
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encounters, and eventually the IChivans were 
obliged to give up the struggle, and contented. 
themselves with merely demanding the evacua- 
tion of the fort. 
When tlie Russians built the Raim fort, they 
at the same time commenced the formation of tlie 
\ Aral Sea flotilla. I n  1847 t~vo  sailing vessels were 1, built at  Orenburg. One of these, the ~J~iEolai,  was 
1 a war vessel intended for surveying purposes; I'tiu+ tvhile the other, the &Ii?chnil, was a merchant ship 1.57 
for establishing fisheries. These vessels vere 
transportecl i n  pieces to Fort Raim and were there 
put together and launched. The Nilcolui at once 
I put to sea, but owing to the laleness of the season 
could do little in the way of surveying. However, 
in the spring of 1848 the whole of the norther~l 
coast of the Aral Sea was surveyed, and another 
and larger war-vessel, the Constnnti~ze, having 
mealiwliile been sent froin Orenburg, Lieutenant 
Butalcoff commencecl in the following autumn to 
make a thorough survey of the whole of the Sea of 
Aral-a work whicli was satisfactorily completed 
in two years. 
I n  1850 two steamers were ordered from the , 
Motala lionworks in Sweden, for the navigation of 
the Syr Daria. These steamers, the ' Perovski ' and 
the ' Obrucheff,' reached Port h a l s k  in November, 
1852, and were there put together, being ready for 
work by the end of the following May. 
At this time the Governor of Ak-Mecl~et was 
a man n a m e d ~ a k o o b  Beg, who had gradually been s 
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1 of Khokaiicl, aiid who some years later, as the 
Atalyk Ohazi of Kasligar, occu.pied a prominent 
$ position in Eastern politics, and became inlomrn as 
i the most powerful sovereign in Central bsia. In  
1,' 1845 he was Chamberlain to the newly-appointed 
Khan Khudayar ; shortly after he was made a 
' PansLzcl Bashi,' or commander of 500 men ; ii-L 
1847 he married a Kipchak lady of Julek-a 
Khokandiail post some iniles east of Alr-Meche t- 
and towarcls the close of that year he was raised 
to the rank of ' Icush-Begi,' alld entrusted with the 
commaiid of Ak-Mechet and the surrounding IC11o- 
kandiaii district on the banks of tlie Lower Syr 
Daria. 
Yakoob Beg appears to have been imbued with 
strong feelings of hatred towards the Russians, 
ancl as soon as lie arrivecl at Ale-Mechel; he began 
to adopt measures for tlie defence of his clistrict. 
The establishment of the Russians at Fort Rniin 
constituted SL standing menace to the Kholcandian 
posts liigher up the river ; and Yakoob anxiously 
watched the preparations which were being made 
for a fresh advance. The Hhokandians did not; 
realise that their best policy was to abstain from 
attacking the Russians, and bhus to have given 
Lliern 110 excuse for furt;her eiicroaclirnents. They 
had no idea of the streiigtli OF the great Power 
whicli hacl iiow become their iieigbbour. They 
only knew that tlie troops of the White Czar had 
ailvaizced across the wild ICirghiz Steppes, n11d had 
witlroul; provocatiou seized upoii a porl;ioii of 
lC11oli:~nclian tr:rril;ory, wllere khey llncl esl;abIisheil 
< 
-1858 FIRST MOVE UP TIIE STR L)AIIIA 
soine years later, as the 
ar, occupied a prominent 
ics, and becanle known as 
,eign in Central Asia. In 
,in to the ne~ly-appointed 
;ly after he was made a 
nn~ander of 5 00 men ; in 
ipchalr lady of Julek-a 
liles east of Ak-Mechet- 
f tliat year he was raised 
zi,' ancl ent~ustecl with the 
ancl tlie surroullcling Ifio- 
banlrs of the Lower Syr 
to have beell imbued with 
3cl towarcls the Russia~~s, 
d at Alr-Mechet he began 
Le defence of his  district. 
le Russians a t  For t  Raim 
enace to the JChokanclian 
- ;  and Yakoob anxiously 
3 which were being made 
!he Khokandians did not 
llicy was to abst.ain from 
and tlius to have  given 
er encroachments. They 
ngth of the grea t  Power 
their neighbour. They 
s of the White Czar had 
Kirghiz Steppes, and had 
izecl upon a portion of 
lere they had established 
themselves, ancl were lnalciilg prep:~ralious Tor a 
further advance against the otlier I<l~oka~~ilia~i 
forts along tlle banks of the river. Yalioob be- 
lieved that unless the Russians were driven out of 
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\ raicls against tlie fort :mil the acljuining Bussinn 
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9 and in 1551, Major Engmann, the Commanclaiit of 
? Fort Ardslr, attacked a party of Ifllokandiaas nrllo 
r liad adva~zced to the neigl~l~ourl~oocl f the fort,, 
ailcl pursuing tllem along the balllis of tlie river, h,-a 
t captured their fort Kosli-K~wgzzn. n. ~ 3 3  
But the Russiail preparatiorls for a general 
advance were not then complet,e, and until tlie fol- 
lowing year no decisive measures could be talcen 
lo  drive the Kl~olranc~iai~s fro111 tlieir strongholds 
lligller up the  rive^. 
111 April, 1852, however, a surveyi~lg party 
was despatched np tlie Syr Daria, but on reaching 
Ak-Mecliet mas very naturally slopyecl ancl turned 
CII I-- -  
baclr. This act was Zenounced as n piece of in- 
tolerable interference, and General Pero~rslri, the 
Governor-General of the Orenburg district, re- 
solvecl to despatch a strong force to curb the 
insolence of the Khokandians, and to reduce their 
chief strongllolcl, Ak-Mechet. Acco~dingly, on 
July 3, 1852, a detachment left Fort Aralsk, con- 
sisting of 1 2  officers aucl 420 men, with 2 guns, and 
accoinpanied by 36 irregulars. 
This small coluillil was placed u~lder tlle coni- 
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lnancl of Colonel Blaramberg, who received the 
followiilg orders :- 
(1) To survey the right bank of the Syr Daria 
as far as Ak-Mechet. 
(2) In the event of an encounter with the 
Khokanclians, OT in case they s?~oe~lcl make any 
z~lzcallecl-for clemc~lzds, to attaclr them immediately. 
(3) Without touchiilg at any fortiGcatioils 
lying nearer to Aralsk, to lxoceecl d i rec~ to 
Ak-Mechel, aild there act as circumstaiices inigbt 
require. If Ak-Mechet lies within Russian limits, 
to encleavour to raze il ; but, z~lzde~ d l  ci~cz~mstances, 
to ~zotiJSy to the li=ho?cn~zdialzs that the f o ~ t  nzz~st not 
lvmailz on its actz~nl site. 
Warned of the enemy's approach, the Khokand- 
ians clestroye(1 the dam which diverted the waters 
of the Syr into Lake Ber Kazan, and thus flooded 
the adjacent couiztry. Rut the Itussians, in spile 
of this obstacle, managed to safely cross five 
branches of the river, and eventually arrived be- 
fore the fortress on July 19. Here Blaramberg 
found that the capture of the place pras not such 
an  easy laslr as had been expected. He founcl 
that the defences consisted of an outer wall, within 
which there was a strong citadel, the ramparts of 
which were conzposed of hard clay, about 25 feet 
high and 10 feet thiclr. His force was unprovided 
with scaling ladders, the whole couiltry was in- 
undated, and a coilsiderable rise in the water was 
by no means improbable. Moreover, he heard 
that a strong Khokandian reinforceinent was daily 
expected. Under these circumstances he decided 
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to attack the outer portion of the fortress, and to 
destroy all that lay be~ween the exterior walls and 
the citadel; ancl he therefore commenced a pre- 
liminary bombardment of the place on the night 
of July 19. The Khokanilians at once returned 
the fire, but by claylight on the 20th their guns $ 
J 
had been dismounted, and the outer gate of the 
I fortress had been desiroyed. 
i Blaramberg then formed his small force illto 
two columns, ancl -assaulted the place; while one 
party forced an entrance tllrough tlie brolreil 
WB?, the other scaled the wall by the aid of pick- 
axes and hatchets. In less than ten ~ninut~es Llie 
Russians obtainecl cornplete possession of l;he ~ l i o l e  
space between the outer svalls ancl citadel, ancl ad- 
vanced to the foot of the rainparts of the keep. 
But here their progress was stopped; it was im- 
possible to malre any iinpressiou on the massive 
: decided to abandon the attempt, ancl to retire to 
Fort Arczlsl:. Before retiring he, however, set fire 
to all the buildings outside the citadel, ancl com- 
pletely destroyed everytl~ing of value. The con- 
flagration lastecl the whole night, during ~vhich 
many of the- garrison who endeavourecl to save 
their property were killed. 
On July 21 the retreat commenced, and on the 
way bczclz to Fort Aralslr, Colollel Blaramberg de- 
s troy ed the snlall forts of Humysh-Kurgan, Chim- 
Kurgan , ancl Kosh-Kurg an. 
1 
1 
Thus the first serious advance which the 
lrZussialls made along the Syr Daria was repulsed ; 
b u t  Perovski cleterininecl to renew the attaclr on 
Alr-Mechet as so011 as possible, and to ernploy 
I 
- 
such ,z formiclable force as ~~roulcl render success 
certain. Preparations were accordingly pushed i 
forwarcl, every possible precautioil being taken t o  
insure the success of the uiiclertalring ; ancl in the  
spring- of 1853 a force of 2,168 men, wit11 1 2  
guns, left Orenburg under the commancl of t he  
Governor-General of the district in person. The 
force marched in two colulnns and colicelitrated at, 
Aralsk. 
Altllough one or the reasons for the Russian 
advance dong the Syr is stated to have beell for  
tlie purpose of protecting the Xirghiz from tho 
oppressions of the Xhokanclians, yet Perovski 
appears to have been afraicl that these Russian 
p~"otdgds would, instead of ,zffording assistance to 
their deliverers, attaclc the convoys; and he there- 
fore gave orders to the Sultan rulers to remove 
their followers into t1.e Steppe, and prohibited 
thein from encamping dnring the summer near t o  
the  road leading from Orenburg to Aralsk. This 
ordel. was carried out ; but tlze Kirghiz openly 
displayed their urlfrienclliliess by refusing to supply 
camels for tlie expedition. 
Towards the end of June the force detailed for 
the attack on Ak-Mechet marched out of Arczlsk. 
It consisted of 1,500 infantry, 750 cavaIry, ailcl 1 0  
uuns, and mas accompaniecl by 780 waggons an cl h 
1,160 camels, besides numerous baggage-horses 
and oxen. 
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Meailwhile the Xhokanclians llacl not been iclle. 
As they fully expected that tlle Russians woulcl 
renew the attack on  heir strongliold, they had set 
to work t;o improve its clefences. The cle'bl-is of 
the old outer fortification ailcl buildillgs was re- 
moved, aud the citaclel was greatly strengthened. 
The plan of the place had been improved, the 
walls made tl~iclrer, and the g,ztes carefully 
screeaed by outvi-orks. Three guns \Irere nlounted 
oil the raiilparts, aild l ~ ~ r n l ~ s  of sun-dl-ied clay, 
called ' kisi~k, '  were prepared in readiiless to hurl 
dowil at tlle assailants. 
As so011 as Perovski a~r ived  before the fort l ~ e  
sent a messenger under a flag ol  truce clemaiirl- 
ing its immediate surrencler ; but when tllis mml 
arrived withill gun-shot, the I<holrandians ol~eucd 
fire on him, and he was obliged to 1.eturn. 
011 July 21 tlie bo~nbarclinent coinnlel~cecl, but 
&cw v/4: 
its effect was found to be very uilsatisfaactory, nud ;; 
Perovski therefore determined to advance l ~ y  
ineails of coniinoll saps, ancl to forill a breach by 
inining. Systeinatic approaches were accordingly 
started on July 22 and were steadily pushed for- 
ward ; lsut the slowness of this forin of attaclc 
caused considerable discoiltellt among 111e troops, 
mho bad expected that the fort would be taken by 
storin immediately after their arrival. 
011 July 25 a Khokandian prisoner was sent to 
tile fort mitli the following surnilions to surre~lder :-
'From the Governor-Geiierd of Orellburg to 
the Commander of tlie Fortress of Alr-Mecllet. 
' By order of lily Sovereigu, the Emperor of All 
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tlie Russias, I have come to take Ak-Mechet, 
erected by the KlioBaadians on Russian territory 
for the purpose of oppressing the Kirghiz subjects 
of His Imperial Majesty. 
' Alc-Mechet is already taken, althougll you are 
inside it, and you cannot fail to perceive that 
without losing any of my men, I am in a position 
to destroy every one of you. 
'The Russians have come hither, not for a day, 
nor yet for a year, but for ever; they will not 
retire. 
' If you wish to live, ask for mercy; should 
you prefer to die in Ak-Mechet you call do so ; I 
am not pressed for time, and do not intend to 
hurry you. I here repeat that I do not come to 
offer you combat, but to thrash you until you open 
your gate. 
' All this I wouldhave told you on the first day 
of my arrival, when I approaclled the walls of your 
fort unarmed, had you not traitorously opened fire 
on me, which is not custoinary among honourable 
soldiers.' 
In  the evening the messenger returned with a 
reply that while the Klioka~idian Government de- 
clined to be answerable for the acts of oppression 
committed by the Kipchaks, the Commandant was 
willing to evacuate the fort if he were allowed fifteen 
days for the purpose, during which time the Rus- 
sians were to retire from under the walls ; otherwise 
the garrison would resist 'so long as the gun- 
barrels remained in their stocks, or their sword- 































'EPPES 184~- C X P T U I ~  OF AK-MECHET 
Ak-Meche t, supply of " kisiak " was unexhausted.' At the same 
time the Commandant explained that the first 
Russian messenger had been fired upon because 
the Russians had illvacled I~hokanclian territory ancl 
,ugh you are approached the lort without any declaration of war, 
erceive that or explanation of their reasons for so acting. The 
in a position attack was therefore continued, and on July 27 
the approaches had reached the clitch, which was 
shortly arterwards crossed by a covered sap, and a, 
mined gallery was rlriven under one of tlie bastions. 
At three o'clock in the grey dawn of August 9, 
:rcy ; should three rockels were discharged in rapid succession ; 
a11 do so ; I I ,  a few moments later the eartli trembled, and wi1.11 a 
ot intend to dull roar a great black mass of earlh mras seen to 
not conle to rise in the air and then settle down into two con- 
ltil you open fused heaps oil the ground. The mine had been 
sprung, and a great opening was formed in the 
the first day walls more than thirty feet wide. Alc-Mechet was 
valls of your enveloped in dense clouds of smoke and dust, 
y opened fire which for a time concealed the breach froin the 
; honourable Russiails ; but the piercing shrieks and cries which 
i 
rose from behind the walls proved to the besiegers 
urned wit11 a that their work had been well done. The Russian 
rernment de- batteries at once opeilecl a heavy fire of grape 011 
~f oppression the spot where the breach was lrnown to have beeii 
nandant was made, and the storming parties rushed forward to 
[lowed fifteen the attack. But the Kllolrandians were not talcell 
me the Rus- by surprise, for before the smoke and cle'bsqis froin 
Is ; otherwise the explosion lzad cleared away they hacl lined the 
as the gun- breach, and, although exposed to a heavy fire from 
their sword- the Russian guns, pourecl a continuous fire of 
{ 
Iren, and the musltetry into the aclvancing txoops. T11e Russians 
1 
t 
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were twice driven back, and it was only after they 
had received reinforcements that their third as- 
sault proved successful. At half-l3ast four all 
resista~ice had cea,sed, and the Russians becanle 
masters of Alc-Mechet, which had beell tlie chief 
barrier against their advaiice tom~arcls tlie Kara- 
Tau Mountains. 
Yalroob Beg appears to have left the fort 
cluring the siege, ancl his successor, Mahomxned 
Wali, was killed, while out of a garrison of 300 
men, 230 were found dead in tlie ditch or illside 
tlie fort, which proves the desperate bravery with 
which the Ifllokandians clefended Lheir stronghold. 
The Eussiail loss consisted of 13 inen lrilled, and 8 
oficers and 52 inen wounded. 
The loss of Alc-Mecliet was a severe blow LO 
the power of Khokand, as i t  was the chief bulwarlc 
of that State on the Lower Syr Daria, and it was 
not long l~efore the Khokandians begxn to make 
efforts to recapture it. Rut Perovski had taken 
steps to his position as strong as possible. 
During his ad.vance up t,he river 1.le llacl given. 
orders for tlie coiistruction of two forts, wliicli 
were to coililect Ak-MecheL with 1 k - t  Aralslc. 
One of these forts was built on tlie I<nznla l.rnn(:li 
of the river, and became kilowli as tlie ICxzala For[,, 
or Fort No. I, while Llie seconcl was built liiglier up 
the Syr at t;he ICarmakclii setLle~.l:ient, aiicl bec:uri.e 
lcnown an Tort No. 2. The I<l:holiandia~i fort; of 
Kum.ysh-Kurgan, wliicli had 1)celi a1)aildor~ecl by 
its g:~rrison during tlie siege of: A,lc-Mc:cliet, was 
also occupieil by tlic Eussiaiis, aiicl r~a~ucd YorL 
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No. 3. These three forts, together with foYls 
Aralslr and Alr-Mechet (which was re-named Port 
Perovski), formed the new line of the Syr DariaS1 
At  the end of 1853, Fort Perovslri contained a 
garrison of 1,055 men, wit11 1 4  guns and 5 mor. 
tars, and was suppliecl. with provisioils for eighteen 
months. 
Early in September, 1853, the commanclant of 
Fort Perovski received iiltelligence that a force of 
h d  about 7,000 Khol~ai~ldi~ms had arrived at Julek, 
6y 
arlcl were advancing against him. But they were 
speedily routed by the troops despatched by the 
G'ommandant. 
Undaunted by this hilure, a fresh Khokandiail 
force of about 13,000 men wit11 17 guns left Tash- 
lrent in November, 1853, under Ynkoob Beg, for 
the purpose of driving the Russians out of their 
posts on the Syr, and messages were sent to the 
Kirghiz, inciting tl~ein to join in the attaclr. But 
this expedition also entirely failed. More than 
2,00 0 Khokanclians were lrilled, whilst the Russian 
loss oilly a~nouuted to 18  lrilleil and 49 wounded. 
This aEair completely put an end to the Xho- 
kanclian atteinpts to recover possession of Ak- 
Mecllet, for although there were several rumours 
of further attacks being illeditated, the Russian 
posts on tlze Syl. Dnria were not iilt,erfered with. 
While these events were occurring on the Syr 
Dasia a similar advance was being inacle far away 
in the East. The town o l  Kopal was originally 
Por t  ICumlysh-ICurgan was abandoned by the Russians in 1855, 
and in tho sntno year Fort Ardsk was removed to Port NO. 1. 
VOTJ. I. M 
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supposed to have been built for the protection 
of the Great Horde of tlie Kirghiz-Kazaks, the 
majority of whom had beconle Russian subjects 
some fern gears previously. But this town was 
situated on tlie nortllern confilles of the tract which 
was iiihabiteil by the Horde, and a new advailce 
was soon said to be necessa1-y for the purpose of 
protecting these people ii.0111 the .Kara-Kilgliiz, or 
Dikokamenni-Kirghiz, ~ ~ 1 1 0  frecluented tlie moun- 
t:~illo~ls districts furtlier to the south. I t  was 
merely a repetition of the old story. The Kirghiz 
were once ixore to be put fdrward as an excuse for I furtlier aggression. I t  is doulstf~~l wlietller any 
B 
1 Government has displayed such an allioullt of 
solicitude and thoughtful consicleration for any 
section of its subjects as the Russians have mani- 
fested with regard to these u~lruly I<irgliiz. But 
this anxious solicitude for tlie welfare of these 
people was unforlunately only displayeil when an 
excuse could lhereby be obtained for fresh aggres- 
sion. For many decades after these nornads 
tendered their sub~nission to Russia, no steps 
1 were talcen to iinprove their mode of living, or 
1 I to int~aduce among them m y  of the blessiligs of 
; civilis,ztion. They llave always beell wild, reclr- 
: less barbarians, livilig in the most primitive man- 
ner, and but little lias ever been dolle to better 
i' .their condition. But; wllenever the Bussia~ls llave 
est;ab'lished tllclrlselves in an advanced position, 
:~11(1 have corrlpleted their preparations for a 
fur1;lier forward inoven~ent, it has i11vni;i:~bly lsccn 
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1, 
iag h.- tlie Kirghiz, and must tllerefore be pullished, 
Anil SO the game has contiuued ; tile lZussian ' 
frontiers ineanwliile having been p~zshed forwar(I 
inally hunclreils of miles, until the extreille lilnits or 
the coulitry occupiecl by the Kirghiz-Kazalrs have 
been reached, aild the excuse no longer needed. 
' 
Thus, a few years after the building of Kopal, 
it was decided that a new advance shou'lcl be ~naile 
across the River Ili, and that the t~rllole coul~try 
between that river aliil Lake Issik KLII shoulcl be 
occupied, in order that tlle Great Horde mnigllt 
be ilefe~iilerl from its enemies, and that permanent 
peace miglit be obtained by making the ~ u s s & n  
frontier coiitermi~~ous with the borclers of the 
Chinese Empire. Such were the motives which are 
said to have illduced the Russi'ms to pus11 south- 
wards across the River Ili ; and it will be see11 ill 
tlie serluel how utterly erroneous it was for tlieili 
to imagi~ie thal, by advancing far into tlie ailds of 
Ceiltrxl Asia, they tvould be able to secure peace. 
I11 1853 a Rnssian detacll~nent crossed the 
Eiver Ili, but instead of being welconied as tlie 
saviours of a down-trodcleii and oppressed race, 
they were violently attackecl by strong bodies of 
the very people mrhom they liad come to deliver. 
A coiisiderable section of the Great Horde had 
not submitted to the Russiails, a11d now stoutly 
opposed their aclvmice. Their chief strongl1olcl 
was tlle Fort of Tuchubek on the Kaskdail River, 
fro111 wliellce they bolilly attacked tlie Iiussiail 
troops, aiid clearly sl~owecl that they hail no 
ilesil.e to ljcco~ue sul~jccts of the FVhit e Czar. 
11 2 
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1 
But in the following year a larger force was 
sent across the Ili, Tuchubek was destroyed, and 
the I(irghiz were colnpelled either to subinit to 
Russian authority, or to take refuge in Kholcaa- 
dian territory. Many preferred the latter alter- 
native, and either fled to the Naryn Valley or 
settled dotvn on the banlrs of the Talas River. 
The Russians wintered on the banks of the Tolgar 
(a small tributary of the Ili), and in the follow- 
ing year, 1855, advancecl to the northern slopes 
of tlle Ala-Tau Mountains, and there founded the 
town of Verrloye or Alinaty, on tlle banlrs of the 
little Almatinky stream. Thus, while the Russians 
were extending their right fro111 Orenburg towards 
the Syr Daria, the left fla11k mTas also pushecl for- 
ward to the borders of Eastern Turkestail, then a 
province of the Chinese Empire ; and preparations 
were macle for n simultalleous movelneilt from 
both flaalrs towards the centre, which would rourld 
off the Russian possessioi~s to the soutll of Siberia, 
and extend Russian authority to tlle very borders 
of tlle IZllallate of Kllokand. 
But in the meanwhile events had occurred in 
Europe which forced the Czar Nicholas t,o aban- 
don filrther military operations on the frontiers o f  
llis vast Asiatic dominions. The peace wllicll llacl 
been maintainecl in Burope for so Inany years was 
riow drawing to  its close. 011 Dec. 2, 1851, TJouis 
Napoleon, taki~lg nclvau~nge of certain unpop.c~lar 
acts of the ~cpu1)licaii c l~put ie~,  overtllrewr the 
TZcl3~lblic which hc 11x1 sworn to clef'ell(1, a11cl a 
year later assumucl the title of Einpcror of the 
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rce was French. The European Governments viewed this 
yed, a n d  change with considerable apprehension, as it was 
lblnit to generally expected that the new Emperor would 
Kliolran- endeavour to strengthen his position by aggressive 
~er  alter- enterprises against liis neiglibours. Tlle Russians 
also liad been, as usual, intriguing in Turkey, 
1s River. and finally deinanded that the Sultan sEiould ac- 
e Tolgax- t knowledge tlie Czar's right to protect the Chris- : follow- tian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan 
.n s lopes  4- ref~lsecl to agree, and England and France sup- 
nded the porLed the Forte. Napoleon was desirous of goiug 
:s of t h e  I to war to divert the tlioughLs of his people from 
Russians 110111e affairs, ancl the English Ministry failed to 
towards  make the Czar understand that a Russia11 attack 
shed f o r -  on tlie Porte would mean war witli England. In 
a, then EL July, 18 5 3, Russia11 troops occupied the Dailubian 
P1.imcipalities ; tlie Sultan declared war in the fol- paration s 
!nt f r o m  lowing October ; and by tlie e11d of March, 1554, 
~ l d  r o u n d  Great Britain and France had forined an alliaace, 
f Siberia, 1 and the Crimean war began. 
b o r d e r s  \ While this great war was in progress, two 
schemes for the invasion of India were laid before 
curred in the Emperor Nicholas. After the failure of the 
to a b s n -  siege of Elerat, and the British invasion of Afghan- 
ontiers of istan, the Rus~ian Goveriimeilt did their utmost 
rhich had to allay the comlnotion which had been caused 
years w a s  t11roug.h their iiztrigues on the borders of India. 
51: L o u i s  Qitkievitch was therefore disowned; and Count 
~ n p o p u l a r  Simoilitch was recalled from Persia, as he was 
hrew the said to have exceeded lzis instructions. Simoliitcli 
was succeeded at Teheran by General Dullamel; 




presented st memorand~un to the Czar, wherein he 
rocomillelided that a Russian force slzould be sent 
agaillst India, in order that the English might be 
,zlarmecl for the safety of their East Incliail posses- 
sions, ancl thus be unable to concentrate the whole 
of their attelltion on the struggle which was being 
fought out in Europe. 
In this project General Duhamel stated :- 
' ~ l ~ e n , ' t o w a r d s  the close of the last century, 
an army corps was quartered oil the Eastern 
borders, b y  order of the Czar Paul, for the pur- 
pose of attacking ~ilclia, the English people, 
although not certain of the fact, were greatly 
startled when they received reports of the concen- 
tration. Since then British writers have never. 
ceased to point out, in various ways, t11e dangers 
of a possible Russian invasioil of Inclia, and their 
Parliament has often discusseil the question. 
' The present war, m~l~iclz is to be ibuglzt out to 
the bitter elid, iillposes on Russia the duty of 
showing how slie can attack Xnglalld in her olily 
vulnerable point, i11 India, and tlius force her to 
assemble so great a force in Asia as to weaken her 
action in Europe. 13istory tcaclles us that nearly 
all the Powers which conquered Inilia fouilil their. 
way lo it through Central Asia and l'ersia, and that 
the roacls by ~vllich Alexander tlie Great, Ge~.englriz 
Khan, Talnerlnl~e, Unlser., aiiil, finally, Nadir Sllah 
broke into India arc still open. They traverse 
Khorassan. a11r.l Afghnnistnii, wliethcr tliey lead fi-om 
Persia or from L1j.e river Oxus. Tlle cities of 
Haildabar t~ncl 1C:~l~ul :/re tbc! gates of Iildia,. 
lerein he 
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' Tlle first route leacls from Orenburg over tlie 
Ust-Yurt plateau to k'hiva, and thelice tllrough 
Merv ancl Herat to Kanclaliar and Kabul. 
'The second goes from Orsk or Orenburg to 
Fort Aralslc, and tl~ence to Bokllttra, Balkli, 
Khulm, and I<abul. 
' Tlle third leads from Orsk or Troitska, 
through Fort Aralslc aiid Ak-Mechet to Tashkent ; 
or goes direct to Petro-paulovslc, aiid thellce on to 
Khokand, Mlulm, Bamian, and Icabul. 
'The fourth is by water from Astralcllaz1 to 
Astrahad, and thence, througli Xabushan (Kuslian' 
or  Slidlrud, to Meslled, Berat, Kaiidahar, and 
Kabul. 
' The fifth ailcl last route leads froin the frontier 
on  the River Arslxes to  Tabriz, Teheran, Meshed, 
Berat, Kanclahar, and Icabul. 
' The first three roads lead through the desert 
where it is widest, and by these, even if the oases 
of Klliva mcl Bolcllara were inade use of, mauy 
i;housaiicls of camels would be required for trans- 
11or1' purposes. The last two routes lead througli 
a courltry where there are no deserts, 'wcl ~ ~ l l i c l l  
in  sollle places is very fertile, aizcl inhabitecl by a 
sturdy race of people. These two liiles of advance 
do not traverse any such inaccessible points as are 
laet witll in the IIindu-Kush l!To~~iitains, nor are 
tliere ally illlpassalsle rivers, such as the Oxus, 
betweell Bokl~ai-a and Ualkh. \Vlien once the 
necessary transport vessels are collec led 011 the 
Caspian Sea, tllen tlie Astrdih:~11-A~tr8b~d line is 
to be -preferred tu all the otliers, for it is the 
$11 
shortest. Once in Astrabail, a footing in Khor- I! 
sssan can easily be obtained, and the remaining 1. 11 
clistance to Kabul is only 1,870 versts. The in- 
fsultry, guns, and amillunition would be carried 
across the Caspian Sea, while the cavalry and 
train marched froill Circassia through Persia. 
' A marc11 through Turkestan would be a clan- 
gerous operation, for the Mlans and their tribes 
woulcl have to be fought, and, even when defeated, 
they would attack our rear, and thus cut our coin- 
n~unications. The march through half-civilised 
Persia would, however, be conlparntively easy, for 
that State is: so bound by trea1;ies as to be ill- 
capable of oEering any serious opposition, and is 
moreover threatened from all sides (especially froin 
Circassia), aiid thus reiiclered powerless. What 
more, then, can be manted ? Active co-operation 
011 the part of Persia illvolves active co-operation I 
I' 
on the part of Afghanistan, on account of the 
j. I: 
deadly hatred wllich exists between the two I: 
peoples ; a id  this is the conditio sine yz~d non of an , 
11 
ntt;nck ngainst I-Iindustan. . . . Naturally Engluncl : I  
woul(1 take st;eps to prevent all this; but even if 
, 
I 
slie liad time a~ id  meails for clespatching an expe- I 
dition to  the Persian Gulf, aiicl occupiecl the islanil 
of Icarrack and Buncler B~~sliirc, or r;~isecl up a 
rehellion arnoag tile tribes of Southerll I1crsin, ir; 
would 'be of little avail if Itussia, g~~ar :~~l tecd o tllc 
Shall the secure l~ossessioil of his tllrone an(1 
cluminions, ailcl still less sllonld slic promise the 
restol*:~tion of tlie l.'~vkisll provinces of Jh~phd,a(l, 
I<erfiel(li, :~ncl n part of I<urilistan, Ihcrcl~y l~iiidli~ig 
I 1 ., 
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a mar between Persia and Turkey. The route 
tllrougli l'ersia is therefore for many reasons to be 
preferred to those through Turlrestan. 
' There are three roads from Afghanistan to 
India :-(1) from Kabul, through Jalalabad and 
L. l'eshawsr to Attock; (2)  from Gliazni to Dehra 
Ismail Khan ; (3) from Kandahar, tlrough Quetta 
and Dadur to Shikarpur. 
' Tliese three roads lead through defiles which 
are easily defended, but which we all more ex- lr com- 
posed to a successful attack fi-om the west than 
horn the east. The best, shortest, and most 
healthy, is the first ; altlzougli in 1839 the English 
arlopted the third. From Attock i t  is easier to 
reach Lahore and Delhi, tvl~ich are the principal 
objectives. The selection of this route would give 
rise to a rebellion in the very heart of tlie Englisli 
~eratioli possessions, and cause all the Mahommedan races 
to rise against them. This line also offers to the 
he two Afghans the rnost tempting prospects of plunder 
and extension of territory. If the Sikhs were also 
won over so much the better, but the friendsl~ip 
; even if r of the Afghans is of the most vital importance. 
Once this is gained all is won; for we invade 
llldia not to make conquests, but to overtllrow 
the English, or at all events to weaken England's 
power. To effect this but a small force is re- 
cl~~ired to form the nucleus of the attacliing force, 
round whicll all the conquered races would gather, 
and which might even be gradually reduced as a 
general rebellion brought fresh recruits to the 
1 
Such was the scheme submitted 'by General 
Duhalzzel in 1854, and i11 Ihe 'following year 
Gelzeral. Kliruleff prepared anotlier project for n 
~uss ian '  invasioiz of India. This was very siinilar 
to tlie one which had been drawn up by the 
Russian Minister in Persia. I t  was proposed that  
an ariny of' 30,000 nzen sliould advance fi-om Alr- 
Knla, . near Astrabad, to X a ~ ~ d a l l a ~ ,  viA B~tjiiurcl, 
Xusllau, Meshed, and Herat ; that wllei~ ICaiiclalx~r 
had been occupied an enzbassy sl~ould be sent 
from thence to Kabul, to gain tlie alliance of the 
Afghans ; and that tlzen Illdia should be invaclecl, 
the people incited to rebel, and tlie Eilglisll driven 
out of the coulltry or so wealrened tliat tliey would 
be forcecl to abandon tlze war in Europe. Khruleif 
considered that for such a scheine to succeerl 
it was iilclispeilsable that Pers.ia should observe 
perfect neutrality, alzcl tlzat tlle Afghans slloultl 
co-operate in tbe invasion. He explained llow the 
friendship of Persia could be obbained, stated that 
the Afghans would welcome the advent of n 
Russian army, mid ' be grn~ified at our encleavcrul. 
to overtlzrow the English ' ; ancl then proceerlecl to  
discuss the precautions whiclz aoulcl be izecess:l.ry 
to guard against possible :ittacks fi-om tlle K1liv:~ns 
and Turlro~nans. Then, after esplnirdng tlie l ~ o -  
~osecl inetliod of invasion, tlie Bussi:~n C3cner:il 
continued :-'I ain deeply imbuecl wi t l~  a COIL- 
viction of tlie possibility of c a ~ r y i l ~ g  it illto exe- 
cution, and of tliis tlie E i ~ ~ l i s h  are more ;~ss~lrc!d 
than we are. A large arilzy woulcl be cml):~r~:ass- 
iizg ; we sliould try Lo raisc a native ibrcc ; our ovrll 
~ U S S I I ~  IUMILIATED 
slloulcl merely forin the reserve. We sho~lld in- 
struct the people in onr methods of opposing tlie 
oppression of the English, wliose army in India 
consists of oiiiy 25,000 Enropeaix soldiers. The 
1ndia1 ariny, accordiilg to Majoy Everest, consist- 
ing of some 300,000 meI1, is dispersed over at1 area 
of l,O'TG,SSO square miles, nild is called upon to 
defend a, frontier 707 illiles ill length, being at tlie 
same time coilulianded by olily 7,345 Zuropenti 
oilicers, mliiol~ was the establisli~llent in 1847. 
There hxve been inany instances in wliich these 
troops have retreated before compact masses of 
Englalld's native enemies vhen the oacers have 
been lrillecl. The adveilt of a long clesirecl arilly 
of 30,000 Inell would rouse the ilatural hatre~l of 
I succeed the Afghans tovards the English, ancl will shake 
tlie power of the British in Inclia. We may 1na1ze 
colnpromises wil;ll our otlier enemies, but Ellg- 
lancl's bearing tom~arcls ns, ~ ~ l i i c h  teacls t)o weaken 
our power, clo&s not justify us in leaving her ill 
peace. W e  must liberate the people mrho are tlie 
somces of her wealth, a11d prove to tlie wliole 
oceedetl to world the might of the Russiail Czar.' 
necessary But these schemes were never carried out, and 
~e Khivans the Russiails were unable to prove the migllt of 
their Czar* before the wliole world. Their forces ; tlie pro- 
n General had been defeated in the field, and their inost 
th a con- powerful strongl~old in the soath, tllougll bravely 
clefended, was closely besieged by the amlies of ; illto exe- 
r e  assureil t l ~ e  Allies ; the Baltic ports were bombarded, ancl 
ernl~arrnss- tlleir colnlllerce destroyed ; tv11ole clivisiolls wllile 
to the front perislied 011 the frost-bound 3 ; OUT OW11 
Steppes, and defeat and ruin stared them in the 
face. They had no time to devote to wild ventures 
in the inhospitable countries of Central Asia, and 
were forced to concenl;rate the whole of their 
energies on the s1;ruggle in Europe. 
I t  may be asked why, when Russia was con- 
templating an al;t,aclr on India at the time of the 
Crimean war, did not England take advantage of 
her enemy's crippled condition, and coinnlence 
operations in Asia which would have driven the 
( Russians back to the northern extremities of the 
1, Kirghiz Steppes, and forced them to abandon their 
i conquests south of the Caucasus ? An English corps operating in Georgia, with the aid of Turkey 
I and Persia, aiid backed by Schalnyl and his hardy , mountaineers, would certainly have driven the 
\ Russians beyond the Caucasus ; while a little 
j assistance to the Khivans ancl Khokandians would 
1 liave raised such a convulsion in Central Asia that 
' the Russians could not possibly have mailitailled 
: their isolated posts in the Steppes, aiid would have 
been forced back to tlie frontiers they occupied 
i a t  the commenceinent of the century. 
! Such scheives weye laic1 before the British 
Government, but found no favour for several 
reasons. Just as the English people suspected 
t,hat they had been dragged illto the war in order 
that the popularity of the new French Emperor 
mighl; 'be enhal~ced, so tlle French believed thal; 
they had been drawn into tlle quarrel to aclvance 
Englisli interests in the East;. Any attempl; on the 























therefore, have been viewed with tlie greatest sus- 
picion i11 France, and might even have caused a 
rupture between the Allies. Then, again, England 
llad not forgotten the last movement beyond the 
Indus ; and although the avenging armies success- 
fully performed tlieir taslc, and in a great measure 
re-establisl~ed British credit, still the entire nation 
llacl become possessed with an intense dread of any 
interference with the States of Central Asia, ancl 
shranlr from the very idea of clespatcliing troops 
beyoncl the Indus. I t  was not unclerstood that the 
ICabul massacre had been due to the utter incoin- 
petence of tlie inilitary coinmanders, and woulil 
never have occurred if even an average amount of 
decision and military capacity l ~ a d  been displayed. 
The disaster hat1 been of such a11 appalliilg nature 
that the very judgment of tlle English people 
appeared to have been affected. Instead of appre- 
ciating the tr~ze causes wllicEl led up to the cata- 
strophe, it was erroneously iinagined that the 
country was so inaccessible, and its inhabitants of 
such a formiclable mid even terrible character, that 
any new movemeill beyond the Indus would in- 
evitably result in renewed defeat and disaster. No 
British Minis try tvould therefore under take the 
responsi1)ili ty of waging war will1 Russia in Central 
Asin ; ancl tllus no attempts were n~acle to shake 
her 1)osition on the Syr Daria, while even a hostile 
delnonstratioil in the Caucasus was abandoned, in 
order that Freilch susceptibilities might not be 
~vonntleil. 
During the Crilnean war the relations between 
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England ancl Persia were most unsatisfactory, 
Mahommed Shall died i11 1848 ancl was succeeded 
by liis son, Nasr Eddin, tlie present Shah of 
Persia, 111110 had not long beell seated on tlie 
throiie before lie began to ineddle with I-Ierat 
~fl;iirs. Pa r  Mal~omn~ed Khan, who had formerly 
beell S11.ah Kamran's Vizier, but who murdered his 
master in 1842,,aiid hacl since been tlie inclepen- 
dent ruler of Hel*at, died in the autumn of 1851, 
a.ncl was succeeclecl by his son, Saicl Mahommed. 
Tliis prince, on his accession, nlet with considerable 
o~position from the chiefs of the city, and appealed 
to the S11ah for support ; and I-Ierat would tlieri 
'E have become a province of Persia if the British 
Government had not interfered and insistecl on its 
independence. On January 25,1853, a treaty was 
concluclecl, whereby the Persian Government en- 
gagecl to abstain from all iiiterfcrence in Herat 
al'hirs, ancl renounced all claims to sovereignty 
over tile State. I t  was also agreed that noPersian 
troops shoulcl on any account be sent to IIer;~t, 
nuless the place vere attackecl by troops froiri 
Kabul or k'anilal~ar, or from other foreign terri- 
tory ; nncl tlie Persian Government also relinclnisl.~ecl 
all claims to tlie coinage of money, or other sign 
of subjection on Ole P ~ L T ~  of the people of TIerat to 
Persia. This coiivei~tion was a source of con- 
siderable irritation to tlie Shah, artd preclisposed 
him to be influenced by counsels wliicll were hostile 
to X~~glancl. When, the~.efore, late in the autumn 
of 1853, a Russiml anny was concentrated south 
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provinces in Asia Minor, ancl. tlie Rus~iail Minister 
(Prince Dolgoroul~y) suggesbed that Persia shoulcl. 
GO-operate wibh Russia in an attack on Turkey, 
the shall was not uilwilling to enter illto the pro- 
posecl. alliance, a i d  eve11 issued orders for the 
collcent,ration of 40,000 troops in Azerbijail a i d  
15,000 men in Kermanshah. But tlie Persian 
Prime Minister suggested that i t  mould be more 
aclvantngeous to Persia if the Shall were to throw 
in his lot with the English ancl Frencll, as thereby 
Persia might recover the proviiices wliicb she hacl 
lost in the previous wars with Russia. Acting on 
this advice, Nasr Eddin decided to watch the 
course of events before he coinillitted himself; and 
the Russiall Aillbassaclor shortly afterwarcls de- 
stroyecl. all chance of a Russo-Persian alliance 
through an act of uilseemly violence. At an inter- 
view with the Vizier, Prince Dolgoroulry reproachecl. 
him with the evil couilsel wliich he had given to 
his master, a i d  v~arnecl. liiin of the disastrous con- 
sequences that would assuredly follow; a i d  then 
completely losing control over his temper, he 
assaulted the Minister with a cane vidlich'he held 
in his hand. Such an act naturally P L I ~  a11 end to 
the projected alliance, and Persia reillained neutral 
tlwoughout the war. 
But altlhougli the Shah t,ook no part in the 
. 
great struggle which was being fought out between 
Russia and the Western rowers of Europe, it was 
not long before lie displayed his enmity towards 
the Ellglish by clirect acts of hostility. I-Ie first 
triecl to form an offeilsive ancl defensive alliance 
-~ 
with the rulers of Kabul, Xandnhar and Herat ; 
and when this scheme was frustrated by the oppo- 
sitiou of Dost Mahommed-nl.10 had been restored 
to the Afghan throne after the first Afghan war- 
Nnsr Eddin tried to bring about a collisioil between 
Kandahar and IIerat, in order that he might have 
a pretext for interference. In March, 1855, Dost 
J4ahommed, alarmed by the threatening attitude 
of the Persian Court, concluded at Pesllamar a 
treaty of perpetual peace and friendship with 
Bngland; but, at about the same time, Said 
Maliommed of I-Ierat was deposed by Maholnmed 
Yusuf, a grandson of the Suddozai Prince Firoz- 
ud-din. This prince had been for many years a 
refugee in Meshed, and it was believed that he had 
talcen possession of Herat through the instru- 
meiltality of Persia. That such tvas actually the 
case mas soon proved beyond any doubt. In March, 
1866, Nasr Eddin threw off the mask, ailcl n~arched 
an army across the frontier. The gates of EIerst 
were thromrn open, and Mahoinmed Yusuf operlly 
declared liis allegiance to the Shall. But short,ly 
afterwards the people, led by Isa Khan, broke illto 
rebellion, deposed the Suddozai Prince, expellei1 
the Shah's troops f om Herat, and prepared to 
clefei~il the city against the Persians. Herat was 
once again besieged by a Persian army. But Isa 
Khan hncl not the energy and cap,zcity with which 
Yar 11alloinlned was endowed, nor was there an 
Eldred Pottinger within the walls; and afker a 
desultory contest, wllicll lasted for four mouths, Isa 
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tlie Afghans, surrenrlerecl the fortress to the 
yersialis on October 25, 1856. 
Nlean~vl~ile the relations between England ancl 
Persia had been daily becoining more strainecl, and 
after a long course of studiecl provocation, Mr. 
Murray, the British Minister, was i'orcecl to sus- 
peilcl relations with the Courl; of Teheran, ancl left 
for Baghdad on December 6, 1855. When, there- 
fore, it was lrilomn that in acldition to pl*evious 
illsults the Shah had deliberately aktaclced Herat 
in spite of the Convcntioil of 1853, the British 
Goverrin~ent decided to despatcl~ an expedition to 
the Persian Gulf. On Noveniber 1,1856, a procla- 
mation was issuecl in Calcutta, declaring war with 
Persia, on account of the hostile expedition against 
Berat ; on Deceiuber 4 the Island of Karraclr was 
once more occupiecl by British troops ; five days 
later the Persians were dislodged from the old 
DULC~I Fort of Resliire, after a short but fierce 
encounter ; and on the next day Bushire was oc- 
cupied by the invading army. After the arrival 
of Sir Jaines Outram, on January 27,1857, pre- 
parations were made for striking decisive blows 
which would speedily force the Shah to sue for 
peace. On February 8 a Persian force was de- 
feated at Kushab ; on Maarch 26 Mohamreh (at the 
lnouth of the Icarun River) was bombarded, and 
the enemy's batteries captured; , and by April 1 
the British troops had ad~~anc,ed far. up the I<al.un 
River, ancl driven the Persian.~ from Ahwaz. But 
eve11 before Mohainreh had beeil attiaclred, the 
Persian Alnhassador at the Court of Pra~ice had 
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concluded a peace, whicli was signed in Paris on 
March 4, 1857. Intiination or this event reached 
Outralli at Mohamreli on April 4, ancl the treaty 
was ratified at Baghdad in the following montl.1. 
In the lneanwhile the Russiaiis weye occupied 
I in the suppression of a serious revolt of tlie 
Eirgbiz, which co~npelled them to re~nain inactive I 
on the Syr Da,ria for some years after the coiiclu- I 
sion of tlie Crimean war. 4 
After several fruitless expeditions, and when 
1,he rebellioil hacl lasted for five years, General 
Kateiiin, wlio had succeeded Perovslri as Governor- 
General of the Orenburg district, determined in 
1858 to resort to conciliatol-y measures. Izzet 
Icutebar, tlie chief leader in the revolt, was pro- 
lllised complete forgiveness in the evelit of his sub- 
Russian authorities, but having heard of the 
arrival of General IgnatieK's niission at  the Emba, 
en route for KKha and BokliaTa, he changed his 
mind, aiid on June 4 surrendered himself to the 
R~~ssiaii Envoy. Re begged Ignatieff to inform 
the Czar of his Grni desire to at,one for former mis- 
deeds by future loyalty ancl zealous service, and in 
order to emphasise his devotion to ilie Russian I 
Govern~uen~, he sent liis soil wit11 the mission as 1 
far as Klliva. 1 
This iilissioil of IgnnticlT's l,o IChiva ancl 
Bolrllarn was clespat,cheil in yesponse to nn invita- 




led ilr  
Izzr. t 
s pro- 
is ~ 1 ~ 1 ) -  
lzilesty 




;eel l ~ i s  
t o  1 1 1 ~  
illfc)l~ll 
LCS utis- 
, nncl i l l  
I knssi :~~ I 
i s i o ~ ~  :t n 
I -185s IGNATIEFF'S MISSION I79 
Bokhara. I n  July, 1857, an envoy from Khiva I '  
arrived from Orenburg with a suite of sixteen men, 
?I and requested permission to proceed to St. Peters- 
1 burp f9r the ~ u r ~ o s e  of deliveriiie letters from 1 J " L L - 
the Khan ancl his Ministers, ~ o n g ~ a t u l a t i i ~ g  the - 
Binperor Alexander 11. on his accession to the 
A 
throne. This Khivan Embassy was followed by 
the arrival of a similar missioil from the Amir ~ j f  
f Bolchara, which reached Fort Orslc on August 22. 
The Bokharan Envoy was the bearer of several 
presents for the Czar, and a letter from the Amir, in 
which Nasrullah, after having congratulated the 
Czar on his accession to the throne, ancl announced 
his victories in Shdir-i-Sebz, aslred that ' the pre- 
cious and brigl1t intelligences of the Sovereign 
niight be directed towards the sending of an 
Enlbassy from lzimself.' 
These ambassadors went on to the Russian 
I 
capital in September and October, 1857, and after. 
a short stay there returned to Orellburg in January, 
1858, and soon afterwards returned to their re- 
\ spective countries. 
Tlle Russian Government determined to accept 
the invitation which had been given by the Amir 
of Bolchara, ancl gave orders for the equipment of - 
a inissioil which was to proceed to that State under 
Colonel Ignatieff, who was afterwards R~~ssiczn Ain- 
h a ~ a s l  nr at. CY,nnsi.~nt,innnle. rpnatieff mas directed Ji ! U C Y U ! . z C Y U " I  "- -.., ---- "--^ ----- r-- -a 
to proceed tl~rougll Khiva, for Ole purpose of con- 
cl~icling a treaty with the Xhan, Said Mahomn~ecl,~ 
Said Mallommed, the son of I<han Mal~omruecl R a h i  ella 
brother of I i l is i~ Allah-ICul, snccceded to tho IiMvan throne ill  185 G .  
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one of the chief clauses of wl~ich was that Bussian 
vessels slioul(1 be permitted to navigate the Ainu- 
Daria. IIe received special instructj.ons to collect 
information regarding the ancient bed of the Oxus, 
mcl. to caref~~lly survey the course of that river 
from its mouths as far as Bal'lth if possible, ancl 
for this purpose the Aral flotilla nncler Captain 
13utalroff was to co-operate with tlie mission. 011 
May 15, 1858, Igilatieff started from Orenburg 
wit11 an escort of 57 men and I gun. But his 
illissioil Lo Xliiva was a complete failure ; for tlie 
Kllaa, afi;er much hesitation mzc1 delay, eveiltually 
deciclecl that no Russian vessels should be permitted 
to remain on the Oxus. T l ~ e  negotia,tidils mere 
then broken off, and Ignatieff ,was obliged to leave 
Khiva wit11o.ut having gained. permission for Russian 
vessels to navigate the Oxus, whicli was the main 
object of his mission. But, after leaving IChivn, 
he went on to Bokliara ailcl obtaiiied this privilege 
from the Arnir of that State, although the con- 
cession so obtained was of but little use so long as 
the entrance to the river from the Sea of Aral was 
barred by the Khivans. 
While Igilatieff was thus employecl, other Bus- 
siail agents were busily eugaged in explol*ing the 
countries af Central Asia. 111 1857 ancl 1858 M. 
Uorsl~choB mcl M. Syevertsoff exainiiied the courrtry 
lying between the Ural Mountaiils nncl the Csspi:~n 
Sea, and thorougl~ly explorecl the Mogadjnr Noun- 
tains and t11e UsL-Yurt pla,i.eau ; in IS59 Captain 
GoluLefl; a,ccomp,znie(l by M. Matlcof, went forth 
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E v e r  Ili, a~icl surveyed Lake Issik Hul; iu tlie 
same year Captail1 Valilthanoff, the son of a Kir- 
ghiz Sultan, crossed the Thian-Shan range with a 
coiiipany of trailers, spent; .the winter in ICashgar 
aiicl its neigl~bourhood, and collected niucll valu- 
able information regarcling tlie geography, eth- 
nology, and history of Bastern Turkestan ; and a t  
the sanie time oklier parties of surveyors inapped 
some 35,000 square versts on the eastern shores of 
tlle Caspian, aiid gaiiieil accurate i n f ~ ~ i l ~ a t i o n  re- 
garding tile sllores of that; sea in tlle neiglibour- 
hood of tlie Kara-Uug~zz Gulf arld Balltan Bay. 
But tlle most important mission was one under 
M. Nicholas Khnniltoff, wliicli was clespatclled for 
tlle exploration of Khorassan. This expedition 
started in Marcll, 1858, aud travelled tlirougli As- 
trabnd, Nisllapur, and ~ b s l i e d  to Herat, and tlien 
returlled by the Lalre of Hamun, Kernlan, Yezd, 
niid Ispallan to Telleran. When it  reached Herat,, 
Illilia was still in tlie tliroes of the terrible Iiicliali 
Mut.iny, and Khaiiikofl' Llierefore turned his atten- 
tion from scientific pnrsuits to political intrigues. 
Wllen Mahonirnd Yusuf, the ruler of Herat, liad 
been deposed by Iscz Khan, he had been sent as a 
prisoner to Teheran; and after peace was con- 
cluded bekween England and Persia, the Persian 
Government, ki~owing that if t l ~ e  Sucldozai Prince 
was restored to liis i;hrone, lie would feel that lie 
owed its possessiorl to the Bl~itisli, and t11.u.s be 
lios~ile to Persia, determi~iecl to get rid of liini and 
place a ruler on tlie throne of Herat wllo woold 
o-cve his aclva~icen~ent to t l ~ e  good~vill of the Shah's 
-- 
Government. They accordingly permitted Ma- 
hornined Yusuf to be put to death by the relatives 
of Said Mahommed, ancl. then Sultan A.liined Khan 
-Dost JIahommecl's nephew and son-in-law-was 
placed on the throne. This mail, who had pre- 
viously quarrelled with his uncle, Dost Mahommed, 
and had sought the protection of Persia, vas  the 
ruler of Herat when Kllanilcoff arrived, and the 
Russian Eiivoy succeecled in conGrmiilg the Barak- 
zai Prince in his depeildency on Persia. Nor mas 
he content with this, ror be intrigued in Afghaiiis- 
tan, aiid even proposed that Russian officers should 
be sent to Kabul and Kanclahar, to revive the 
alliances which Vitkievitch had concluded. But 
fortunately Dost Mahommed remained true to his 
friendship with England, and tlius tlie Russian 
plot failed. 
Ma- 
latives [ Khan 
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ATTACKS ON ILHOILAND AND BOIIIIAlth 
Civil w a  ill Kl~olrand-Rnssirtn forward movement in Ifioltand- 
Capture of Aulie-ah .and Haarot-i-T~lrlrestan-Tchernaieff 
Chimlrent-British policy of ' masterly inactivity ' in 
Inclia-Frinco Gortchalcoff'~ circ~ilar-Ball of Tnsl~lrent- 
Russian declaratiolls regnrding Tashltant-Russian invasion of 
B o l c l ~ a i - r t ~ ~  t~rritory-Capture of Khojont-Capture of Ura- 
Tepd, and occnpation of Jizalch-Tho ' Steppe Coiilmission '- 
F o r n ~ a t i o n  of tho Province of T~~rkosten-Occ~~patiou of 
Samarlcaiid--Treaty of Peace with Bokl~ora. 
As soon  as nussia llad recovered fiom the exllaus- 
tion caused by tlie Criirleail 11-ax, ancl hacl quelled 
the iusurrec tion of the Kirghiz uiicler Izze t I<u te- 
bar, she o i ice  rnore fo111ld herself in a position to 
resulne her aggressive rnove~ne~lts on the Sys Daria 
and in the country between Alc-Mechet and Ver- 
noye, and preparations were tllerefore made for a 
canlpaign ill Central Asia, which was to be coil- 
clucted on n f a r  grcatlc~ scale. than any of the 
previous Russian elTorts iu that direction. 
K l i o l r a ~ l d  hail for mimy years been in a con- 
stant state of civil war, a11d llad been subjected to 
repented iuvasio~ls from Bolrliara-a state of 
alrair-s wl l iu l l  sapped tllc str..mlgtll of tllc SLnLe, and 
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prevented the people from opposing a solid front 
to the Bussian ar!vance. IVlien the Russians were 
making their first advailce up the Syr Daria, the 
Kl~iokandian regent, Mussulman Kuli, was f ~ ~ l l y  
occupied in his endeavours to subdue the rebellion 
of t l ~ e  Sarts iii Tashlcent ; and then followed the 
split between Iihudayar Klian and liis ' JIing 
Baslii,' whicli enrled in the execution of t l ~ e  latter 
and t l ~ e  inerciless slaughter of the Ilipclialcs. 
Thus, when Perovski attacked Ak-Mechet, tlie 
Kholcandians were fully occupiecl with the bitter 
.struggle between the rival factio11.s of tlie State, a ~ i d  
were unable to pay any attention to the advances 
of tlieir powerful northern neigllbour. Ak-Mechet 
and the other Khokanclian forts were thus easily 
captured, and the Russians yere able to consoli- 
clate their position on the Syr Daria ~vitliout en- 
countering any serious opposition from the main 
Kholcanclian armies. Even xfter this, when Russia 
was frui1;lessly struggling against the great Western 
Powers of Europe, and was subsequently obliged 
to'devote ller attention to tlie restoration of order 
in tlie ICirghiz Steppes, the miserable dissensions 
in Kliolcand still continued, ancl tlie Klioka~ldians 
thus threw away their last cliance of regaining 
possessioii of their sl;rongliolcls on the J>~xn~:tcs. 
Tlie opportunity so lost was golie for ever, for as 
soon as tlie Itussians liad recovercrl from. the 
exliausting en'ecLs of lllc Crimeail war, a i d  h:~d 
subdued the Ilirghiz, they 1.ecoir111ie1~ceil t;liei I. 
of nggressio~~, sl)eedily oal~Lurc!d t,hc cliic!f 
towns of I<llokalld, ancl by sal)iclly l)aiic~rnl~il.~g iuLo
:Ig 
L!r 
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the heal% of the country, obtained a positioil from 
which it was impossible to ciislodge them. 
I t  has already been mentioned that the Rus- 
sian authorities coilsidered it  necessary to close 
the undefended gap between the Orenburg and 
Siberian lines by a series of forts between .the 
Syr Daria aiid Vernoye. Just before the Crimean 
mar it had been decided that this new frontier line 
should run froill Fort rerovski (the new name for 
Ak-Mechet) along the northern slopes of the Kara- 
Tau Mountains to the Chu River, and then along 
the course of that river to Vernoye. B ~ l t  he local 
commanders now strongly urged a reconsideration 
of tlie matter, and it was finally determined that 
the new frontier should start from a point higher 
up the Syr Daria, and, after includiiig the Kho- 
liandian towns of Hazret-i-Turlrestan aiid Aulie- 
ata, should follow the line of the Talas River and 
Alexandroffski Range. This decision meant that 
tlle Russian Govenmient deliberately determilled 
to seize two important Khokmidian towns and to 
occupy a large portion of Khokandian territory 
without provocation, and solely because it  suited 
their policy Lo do so. 
The first forward movement in pursuance of 
this Russian scheine was made in 1859, when the 
Khokailclian fort of Julek was captured aiid Jt- !In. 837 
c1estroyed.l In  1861 a Russian fort was built on 
the site of the old Kholcandian post, and i11 the 
This post, which was on the Syr Daria, some seventy or eighty 
nliles abovo Port Perovslii, was destroynd by General Pod~u'oi'f in 
J111.y~ 1853, wllcn Perov~lri was bosicging Nr-EIechot ; but when tho 
same year a detachinelit advanced sonie fifty miles 
further up the river and seized Pani Kurgan. In 
the meanwliile another column, under Colonel 
Ziminermann, was moving forwarcl from the Irtish, 
a i d  in 1860 the two Kllokandia~n forts of Pishpek 
and Tokinak were captured. Tlle Iiussian force 
available for operations west of Verl~oye was at 
this time inconsiderable, ancl after tliese first 
successes it was split up into several small cletacli- 
ments for the purpose of watching tlle extensive 
frontier. One party was left in a fort on the River 
Ili to cover the cominunicsLtions with Sernipalatinsk ; 
a.nother detachment occupied Vernoye ; while the 
main body was posted ill a sinall fort at the 
-mouth of the Kastelr Pass, with a small party at 
Uzun-Agatch, for the purpose of maintaining com- 
munication between Veriloye and the Kastelr fort. 
It was expected that in tlie event of the Klio- 
kanrlians retaliating, tlieir first attaclr mould be 
through the Kastek Pass, wliicli offered llie easiest 
line of aclvance froin Kliokand to Veriiojre, and it 
1r7as for tlie purpose of resisting such a lnoverllei~t 
tliat Lieutenant-Colonel IColpnkofslslry placed Iiim- 
self at Kastek with the main body of tlle Liussian 
troops. 
I t  was not long before tlie ICl~okanclians col- 
lected an army of some 30,000 illen, and aclvnnced 
under Kliannynt Shill, one of tlieir best generals, 
to rehuild Pishpek and Tokinak, ancl if possible to 
Russians rctirod, tho 101okc~ndinn~ robr~ilt tho fort, nr~d llol(1 































-18~8 BATTLE OF UZUN-AGATCI-I 
expel the Russians from their posts south of the 
Ili. The Kholrandian commander lrilew that it  
would be useless to attack the Russian force ai; 
Fort Kastek ; a i d  he, therefore, crossed the 
mountaiils by another pass in October, 1860, and 
with the greater porbion of liis force fell on the 
cletacllment at Uzun-ADatch, hoping thus to cut 
b 
off Kolpakoffslcy from his supports, and to be able 
tlien to reduce Kastek and Vernoye a t  his leisure. 
The attacking force coilsisted of some 16,000 men, 
and as the Russian party at Uzun-Agatch was 
very small, i t  appeared almost impossible for them 
to escape aimihilation. They, however, defended 
thelnselves with the greatest fortitude, a id  nlanaged 
to comn~ullicate with Kolpalcoffsky, ~ ~ h o  at once 
sallied out from Kastelr, and attacking the I<hokan- 
clians in rear, drove them in confusion from the 
field. I t  was a brilliant victory, and reflected tlie 
greatest creclit on Kolpnlcoffslry and his troops, 
for mitli a strength of only 800 men and 6 
guns they conlpletely routed a force of vastly 
superior strength, and deniordised t l ~ e  Khokandian 
defence. 
In  1863 preparations were made for important 
combined operations from both flalilcs, by wl~ich 
the long wished-for junction between the Orellburg 
a i d  Siberian lines was to be effected. But the out- 
brealr of the Polish Rebellion and the threatening 
aspect of affairs in Western Europe, forced the 
Czar l;o clefer tlie attack till the following year, 
when all danger of a general conflagration in 
Europe had disappeared. In tlie surnlner of 1864 
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the advance began. Colonel Tchernaieff inoved 
forward from Siberia with a force of 2,500 men, 
and assaulted the town of Aulic-ata on June 1 6 .  
The attack was completely successful, and the 
place was soon occupied by the Rnssians, who 
oilly lost five inen wounded, while over 300 
Khokandiai~s are said to have been killed in the 
fight. This town, which stailds on the banlrs of 
the River Talas, is of insignilicailt climensions, ancl 
its capture was important oilly because it is situ- 
ated in  a fertile dislrict about half-way between 
Fort Perovski ancl Vernoye, ancl is at the julictioli 
of two important routes which lead to Chimkent 
in the west ancl to Namangan in the south. 
While Tchernaieff was aclvanciag a'gainst 
Aulie-ata, anotl~er column, 1,200 strong, was 
moving eastwards from Fort Pe~ovski, uncler 
Colonel Vereflciiz, to effect a junctiom with the 
Siberian troops. A glance a t  the ]nap will show 
that unless Vereflcin kept to the north of the Knra- 
Tau Mountains, he woulcl necessarilj~ pass close to 
the tovr~11 of Hazret-i-Turkestail (the illost sacred 
city in that part of Asia), and a collision tvith tlie 
Eliokartdians woulcl inevitably follom~. But it has 
already been sllown that the Russian Government 
had deliberately rejectecl the frontier line of the 
Kara-Tau inountaiizs, ancl hacl determined to seize 
liazret-i-Turliestan ancl to absorb the neighbouz.ii!g 
Khokanclian clistrict ; nncl in accol.ilnnce with this 
decision, Verefliin attnclred the city in Jane, 1864. 
The I(llolinnrlian g~~rr ison manf~~lly defended tile 
place ; but, in orcler to hasten it;s fall, the lZussiall 
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artillery were directed lo ope11 iire on ille great 
mosque over the toinb of the Saint Hazret I-Iodja 
Achmet Yasavi, a substantial builcliilg constructed 
of well-burnt briclrs, wliich rises to a height of 
over. 100 feet, and is flanhed by two massive towers 
or bastions. The Russiall fire did considerable 
hmage  lo llle mosque and had the desired effect. 
A flag of truce was soon hoisted by the Slieikli-ul- 
Islam, and shortly afterwards the city surrendered. 
By the capture of Ha2ret.i-Turlcestan a l ~ d  of 
Aulie-ata, tlie Russiaii design for closii~g the gap 
between the Orenburg and Siberian lilies was 
successf~~lly accomplislied ; for the two Russian 
colunlns sliortly afterwards joined hands, the two 
towns were held by Russian garrisons, and tlie 
surroundiilg country ITas taken possession of ill 
the name of the White Czar. Vereflrin mTas then 
recalled, and Tcllernaieff assumed command of the 
united columns. 
Tchernaieff, however, was by no meails content 
tyith tlie success which had been achieved. Cliiin- 
lcent, which mas now the most aclvancecl Khokan- 
dian fortress, cornmailding tlie maill road between 
Hazret-i-Turlrestan and Aulie-ata, was occupied 
by a garrison of some 10,000 KhoHandiz~ns who 
tvere fairly well provided wit11 artillery ; the forti- 
fications were being strengthened, ancl preparations 
were lnacle to stoutly oppose any further advance 
on tlie part or tlie Russians. EIe saw the im- 
portance of the place, and determined to attack it 
belore its defences could be completeci. I t  was 
said to be intoleral~le that a Kholrandinn army 
should be permitted to assemble so close to the 
Russian frontiers. The stronger Power, Russia, 
had unprovolredly invaded the temitories of a 
weaker neighbour, occupied its towns, and shot 
domil its inhabitants ; but whcu the outraged 
people assemnblecl a force to clefelld tlie residue of 
their possessions, it was declared that such 
clefensive measures coulcl not be permitted, and 
'necessitated further punishli~ent. Undoubtedly, 
#,.i 
' 1 where Russian interests are concenled, there is 
! I tlleir communicat~ns between JIazret-i-Turlresta~i d 
and Aulie-ata ; ailcl Tcl~erilaieff, therefore, IT-it11 
between 4,000 ancl 5,000 men, rapidly pushed 
Formlard and captured the place on October 3, 
1864, with the trifling loss of five men. I t  
was a brilliant affair, well conceived and boldly 
carried out, and one which stamped Tchernaieff as 
a leader of great daring and enterprise. Uy it llie 
safety of the Russian line from Fort Perovski to 
Ve~noye was secured, and a wedge was drivell 
into Khokand by which Tashlrent, IChojent, and 
tlle capital itself were brought witllin easy striliiug 
distance of the Russian frontier. 
When the news of these operations rencllc!cl 
England, but little inlerest was maniJeatec1 in the 
Russian n?ovements. Far more momen~ous occur- 
rences were taking place elsewhere ; Denmnrli haci 
bcen attaclserl by Prussia and Ansl,ria, nncl tllc? 
whole synlpathies of the English were exLollc1cii 
toyards the ilatioil ~rllic11 llad just given t,hr!il. 
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fairest Prillcess to be the bride of t,lle future Ii-ing 
of Ziiglaud; a desperat'e struggle also was being 
carried on in No~t'll Ainerica, ~711ic11 caused much 
distress in Lancashire by it,s interference wit11 the 
war between Ellglancl. nncl. America. f 11 Indin 
also the policy of ' masterly inactivity' mas in 
full swing; and Lord Lawrence, the ilesr Viceroy, 
was inculcatillg the doctrine that 'Russia might 
prove a safer ally, a better neiglil~our, tllall the 
Maliomnledan races of Celltral Asia arid Icabul.' 
But though the British public clisplajrccl but 
little interest or conceril in the anilexntivii by 
Russia of the northern districts of tlle ICllanate of 
Xholrand, Prince Gortchalioff, tlie I%ussiall Chan- 
cellor, corisidered i t  necessary to publicly Lzriiiouiice 
the causes which liacl iilcluced the Czar to sanction 
the illvasion of I<hokand. This explanation was 
given in the now fttinous circular of November 21, 
1864, to all the Russian embassies and legations in 
foreign countries,%whicl~ professed to place tlie 
Asiatic policy of Russia i11 its true liglit. After 
explaining the causes of the invasion, Prince 
Gortcl~aBoff stated that there was no intention on 
part of Russia to make any further aclvallces, :ur - 
1 See p. 41 of Pape9.s relrctiqtg to CentrnZ Asia and Quetta, 
printed by order of the House of Commons, F e b r ~ ~ a ~ ~ y  26, 1879. 
2 A translation of this interesting document is given in  
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as they found tliemselves ' in l?reseii.ce of a more 
solid, compact, less unsettled, and better orpnised 
state ; fixing for us with geographical precision 
the limit up to wl~ich we are bound to advance, 
and at which we must halt, bec:~use, a-hile on the 
one hand any furtlier extension of o m  rulc, meet- 
ing (as it woulcl) no longer wit11 unstal~le conl- 
mnnities, such as the nomad tribes, but wit11 more 
regularly constituted states, would entail con- 
siderable exertions, anil would draw us oil koni 
a~znexntion to alulexation with unforeseen coilipli- 
cations.' 
Tlle specious phrases anrl plausible arg~unents - - - 
coiztained in this remarltable circular were con- 
sidered to be fairly satisfactory ; for it was now 
for the first time clearly stated tllat Rnssia hail 
bee11 forcecl to advance in spite of all its efforts 
to the contrary and in opposition to the wishers 
of the Czar ; that n.o further aggressive move- 
ments were contemplstecl ; a11il Lliat it was hoped 
tllt~t the day might corne when regular relations 
iuigllt, to the aclvantage of bot,li parties, t:die 
tlie place of tlie perniauent troul~les whicli 11:~d, 
up to that time, p e ~ ~ l y s e d  : l progress iri those 
countries. 
At th:~t time the Er~.glish 11:~l yet to lcanl t;ll:,~t; 
i Russinu promises are 1i:~ble to bc ljrokcn, ;ulil tl1:~t 
: Ii~lssinn :~g~.c!eineuCs :lro not n11v:~y~ wot'tll tllc 
p :~pe~ -  on wlzicli tlley n1.c wl.iltc~n. I'll(? 13I:~ck S(J:I, 
i' 
cl:~uscs of tlie l!~cnt:y of I'aria lind not 'I-)er:n t,11011 
rep~~diai;ed ; ICllivn allil M C ~ V  llail~iol; 1)(:(?11 aullcscil, 
in spite of repc?:~tcil proniises I8l1:~C no suc.ll stcil)s 
would be take11 ; ar~il Russia11 agents had not lseen 
intriguing in Afghanistan after positive assurances 
had beell given, and reiterated, that Russia con- 
sidered Afghanistan to be outside her sphere of 
infl~zeizce, and that no such ens70ys w o ~ l d  be sent 
illto that country. 
But even before this circ:ular was written, 
hostilities had beell resumed on the Sys Daria, 
aild the nussiails had begun a new ailvaiice whicll 
marlied the commencement of a series or cam- 
~ a i g n s  wliich ended in the coilquest of Tashkent 
and Snrnarkand, anil was the stepping-stone io 
the establishmellt of Russian illfluelice throughout 
Central Asia up to the borders of Afghanistan 
and Enstern Turkestan.' 
As sooil as Chiinkeilt liacl been capturecl, 
Tchernaieff' rapidly advanced against Tashlient in 
hopes of being able t,o gain possessioil of that 
iinportailt city by a cou,p (16 nzain,. 011 October 
15, 1864, he sudrlenly aljpeareci before the town, 
placed a battery in position, ~ i ~ a d e  a breach in the 
mralls, and then deliverecl an assault. The attempt, 
however, failed ; and the IZ~~ssians were forced to 
retreat to Chiniltent. The I<lloltanilians quickly 
follomreil up this success, aiicl a considtrable force 
sooil n~~ , r ched  nortli~rards for the purpose of re- 
gaining l~ossession of I-Iazret-i-Turltestai1. On tl~eis 
al)proacll a s~nall  force of Co~saclis was sent out; 
to tlle village oT Ilti~rl, a h i c l ~  lies solve eighteal 
llliles to the soutli-eas~ of Bxzrei, on the Cl~imltent; 
~.o:~cl. This party, m~liich was uncler the coinmallcl 
nl' C,hl,t,ain Scrof, only consisted of one sotnia of 
rr01,* I. 0 
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Cossacks-120 men-witlzone Geld-piece ; and when 
they arrived near Ilmn on the evening of Decem- 
ber 16, they found the place swarming with 
Kl~okandians, wlio speedily surrounded the slnall 
c'letachmenl. Serof tlius found liiinself in a position 
01 extreme danger ; but tlie gallant little band of 
l3tlussians clefenclecl tl~emselves with t l ~e  utmost 
valo~zr, and absolutely ref~~secl to surrender, al- 
tliougli they were offered a safe retreat to Hnzret. 
Throughout the eveiliilg ancl niglit of tlie 16t11, tlie 
whole of tlie next day and night, and ui~til the 
evening of the 18111, these brave Cossacl~s helcl 
their own, ancl eventually, after having lost 67 
of their p a ~ t y  lcilled ancl 43 wounded, the few 
- 
survivors spiked their gun and forced their way 
back to Hazret. By this splendid piece of bra- 
very the I<liolranc'liau attack was brolcen, Hazret- 
i-Turkestau was saved, and tlie Russiails were de- 
livered fiom a very serious danger to their newly 
acquired positioa on the Syr Daria. 
Tchernnieff's sudden attack on Tashkent in 
October 1864 grenlly alarmed the Amir of 
Nol<hni~a, who loolred .11po11 Kholrancl as liis lc!git,i- 
mate prey, and resented the I%ussinn inrrasion of 
that State. I t  lias beeii mentioned tliat Kholranc'l 
was constantly invaclecl by the Arnirs of Bokharw ; 
arid one such irivasioii took place when tlie Rus- 
sians were ac'lvancing . against Rnzret-i-Turkc!stn~l 
arid. Aulie-ntn, on ~ ? l l i c l ~  occnsion Mozulrer-Xddin 
was supporting Kliuclnynr IClinn against the Bcgent 
i n  1 i .  Ai'~er Alini 1Crlli was ilel'ei~tctl, tlie 
Amir returned to Bokllara,, wlleu the Regeri~ o~icc 
- 
illore t o o k  tlie field, and d~.ove I<huclayar out 
of I i l~okani l .  The exiled Khan took up llis 
abode i l l  Jizak, there secretly inade preparations 
for a f resh  campaign, ancl. fillally persuaded the 
Amir t o  again support lliin in his attempt to regain 
the throne. I t  appears lhat Nhzuffer-Eildill's object 
in marchiilg into Khokancl was not merely to re- 
instate Khudayar, but at the saine lime to pre- 
vent Tasllkeilt from falling into the hands of the 
Russians. At all events, Tcllernaiefr viewed Lhe 
Amir's att i tude a t  tliis time with tlle greatest 
suspicion, ancl. when he heard lliat a Bokha~nn 
a.rmy mas being asselnblecl. a t  Ura-teph, 1112 de- 
termiilecl once more to advance againsl Tashkent,. 
At t h i s  tiine the city-vrrlxich coiltainerl a popu- 
lation of osrer 100,000 souls and was defended by 
a gar r i so i~  of about 30,000 men-was encirclecl. by 
a hard c l a y  rampart from: twelve to fifteen feel 
high, sixteen ~niles in circumference, of consirler- 
able thickness, well provider' wit11 loop-holes and 
embrasures, and pierced by twelve gateways. T l~e  
chief water-supply was obt:~inecl from the River 
Chirchilr, froin whence it was brought by ineans 
of a l a rge  canal, called lhe 'Bos-su,' ahic.11 left 
t,lle river a t  a place namecl Niazbelr, some sixteen 
miles to t he  nortll-east of the city, where there 
was a small fort. This canal hacl. four branches, 
tvhich colirluctecl. the water to all parts of the 
town. 
On account of the great size of the cily, 
Tchernaielf' tvas unable to invest it, and as he 
did not feel inclinecl. lo l-isk another assuull,, he 
0 2 
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first attacked Niazbelr in April' 1866, and, by 
the capture of the fort, obt'ainecl cnillmand over 
the water-supply. l 'l~en he took up a position 
qyitl~ii~ six miles of Tashlient, and entered into 
correspondence with some of the ilihabitallts 
of the city, who, being cliscoi~tent~ed with AIiin 
Ruli's gos7ernment, were incliiled to favour a 
l i u s s i ; ~ ~  occupatioil ; aild lie arrangetl with them 
that on May 20, while lle made a clemonstra- 
tion against the north-east front of tile town, they 
should atl;aclr the garrison ancl open the gal;es. 
This plot was, liowever, frustrated by the Regent 
Alim Knli himself, w11o on that day entered the 
city with some 6,000 fresh troops ancl forty guns. 
On the i'olloving clay (May 21) tlie Kliolran- 
dians made a det,ermined attack on tlie Bussisn 
positioi~.. For a short time t l ~ e  Russiaiis were liard- 
pressed, and it seemed as if they mere about to 
experience a second reverse before Tashlrent ; but 
during the battle Aliill Kuli mTas liillecl, and tlie 
Kllokandinns were eventually ~epulsed at all  points 
ancl forced to talie sllelter uncler the walls of the 
town. 
Aft,er the Regent's ~leat~h the inlial~itants of' 
Tashkent sent an e~nbassy to the Amir of Xol-1 L lam, 
orering their submission and begging of liim to 
send assistance. To prevent Bokl~aran interi'ercnce 
Tchernsier occupied the fort of Chin~zz on the Syr 
Daria for the purpose of gunriling t-lle ferry at that 
place, and then, hearing Ll~nt the A~mir's troops 
bad retreatecl across .the river, he uel;urned and 
toolr up a posiLi011. about tli~~cc iuiles li:0111 Tashlc(?ut. 
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111 tll& llleallwllile, ~ ~ o z u ~ e r - E ~ l d i ~ i  liad informed tlie 
Tashlrellcli:tns t.llat ~ l luclczyaI"~ nephemr, Said S~1lta.n 
I<llan, ~ ~ 1 1 0  was tllell in tile cit;y, rllust be surrelldered 
to hiill 88 tile p i c e  of his assist;ance. Said Sultall, 
on ilearing illis, flecl 011 the nigl l t  of June 21, all.lld a 
party of ~ ~ k h a r a l l ~  tl eli maz.c,liecl into the city, 
wllile the Aillir.'s t,~oops b e g a n  to show tlieinselves 
at val-ious points aloilg the Syr Daria. 
Tclleriiaieff was t l lus  placed in a critical 
position; but he cIet.errrlilzed to  illake a bolcl bid 
for success by assaultiiig 1;ll.e city before the Amir's 
army could rencler such  a course impract.icable. 
ilccorcli~iglg, at three o'cloclr in the niorllillg of 
June 27, a storming party, u n d e r  Captain Abralnoff, 
scaled the walls iiear t h e  X a t ~ l e l : ~ n  gate, xurprisecl 
the guard, and after s i lencing -the guns which were 
turned on them from the  aclj oilling basf;ions, opened 
the gaLe to the Russian t r o o p s .  AZ~rmnofT the11 
aclvxiced for about six m i l e s  along tlie ramparts, 
as far as the Kara-Serai ga te ,  whi le  a secoiicl column, 
uncler Major de 18, Cl-oix, entered by the Kholrantl 
gate and captured t h a t  por t ion  of the fortress. 
Tlironghont the whole o f  that day the Russiail 
troops mrere engaged in. ii.lcessnilt street-fighting, 
and a1 tllough clurii~g t h e  ens~1.i i ~ g  nigl.11; there was 
a p a u s e  in the conflict, at daybreak 011 tlie next 
day they found that IiLunerous 1:)xrricades had been 
erected in the priilcil~al s t r e e t s  an.cl alleys. The 
whole of tlie 38th was spent; i n  desl;roying these 
obstacles alicl in s ~ ~ b c l u i n g  1;1le resistance of 
ga,rrison ; but; on. the n~or1:li-n~ of !;he 29(;11 a 
deputation of  the leading i,~lhabil:ants waitecl on 
I 
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Tcheri~a-iefi; a.nc1 ui~co~lcZitiollall~ surrendered the 
city to the Russialis. 
Tllus was Taslllreilt ca11t;ul-eil arlcl tlie fate of 
Kl~olcaud sealed. U~lt  while these illoveilierlts 
were being cnn:ied out, ancl three rnorlths after 
Tcllernaieff had cut OH' the water-supply st Niazbek, 
and llacl conline~~ced systeiuatic opel-ations for the ! 
retluction of the city, t,he IZussian C3ovel.nment 
~1ecla1-ecl that tliep hail no iutel~tion of occupying 1 
the place. 011 July 21, 1865 (a, month after the 
city had been taken), the director of the Russi,zn 
ilsiatic, Department (M. Strenioouchoff) igforlned 
the British Charg6 d'All.?lises at St. Petessburg that 
' the Russian G-overniiient hoped, at no distant date, 
zuit1~ozc-t occty2ying Tc~sl~ke~zt, Lo inske that place the 
great enk.ep6t for l l ~ s s i ~ l l  coInmerce w i ~ h  Centnil 
Asia.' Ai1c1 itgairl, 011 September I1 (two and a 
half rnorltlls a.Ftel* the cil;y liad f~rllen), Prin.ce 
Gorl;ch&off inlonned tlie British Ainbassador tlzat 
i t  was tlle irlterltioil of tlie Irnperial Government 
from KLolranclinii territory, a7zcE 072 T~~shlce~.at being 
dec:la7?ecl C L ~ L  iladepeyztie7zt toton.' SucIl cleclarntions 
C~LII  oilly have been nlaile for the purpose "of ~nis- 
leuiliiig the I3ritisli authorities, for the Russial~ 
Goverllment inust have been. aware of Tchernaieff's 
movements, whip11 lls~cl beell coillmenced in the 
previo~ls spri~lg ; and u 1-no111;h before it was stntccl 
that Taslilceiit would be t1ec;lilrecl to be an inile- 
pellilei~t, towil---the Go~~c.r*no.r-Genc~*:~l, of ( )rt:nbi~rg 
llslcl actually visiLec1 the place and promised tllc 
inhabitants that tllcy woulcl be ' ac11nil;ted to t21e 
I 
i ic~l~  
ned 
tll,zl, 
privilege of becoiniiig subjects of the '' White 
Czar." ' General Krijhanoffsky, the Governor of 
the Orellburg clistrict, visited Tashkent in Arigust A m  r"K, 
1865 ; convoked an assembly of the elders of the 2 . k 3 8  
city, and then accepted their subnlission ; declared 
Tashlcent to be a province of tlle I3ussis11 Elupire ; 
and proinisecl to protecl the people with his troops, 
and to respect their manners ancl customs. This is 
a fair example ol the value of Russian declarations. 
The c a p t ~ ~ r e  of Tashlcent greatly iilcellsecl the 
Alnir of Bokhara, who wrote to Tchernaieff, cd l i l~g 
on him to evacuate Khoka.ndian territoi.y, ancl 
threatening in the event of refusal to kindle a 
religious war against the Russians. In ordcr to  
emphasise his demai~ds, he also confisca,tecI the 
property ol  such Russian n~erchants as happened 
to be in Bolchara. Tchernaieff ecoraf~~lly rejected 
the Amir's demands, and made reprisals by detain- 
ing the Bokharan merchants who were found in 
Russian territory. ,310zuffer-Ecldin was at this 
time engaged in the suppression of x rebellion at 
Shah-i-Sebz ; and as lie hacl no desire to be drawn 
into a war with IZussia, lie clespatcl~ed a man, 
namecl Hoclja Nedjm-Edclin, on a mission to St. 
Petersbura to coinplain to the Czar of the un- 
9 
provokecl invasion of Khokancl. This envoy mas, 
however, arrested on the road ancl detailled a t  
Kazala ; ancl shortly afterwards Tchernaieff sent 
an einlsassy to Bokhara, under M. St;ruv&, to de- 
mand the release of Russia11 subjects. As might 
have been foreseen, the Amir was not likely, after 
what had oc~urrecl, to treal the R~~ss ian  embassy 
ally col~sideration ; aucl. as soon as Struv6's 
party reached Rolrliara tliey were iletah~ed, two 
of the luelnbers of the lnissioil being cast illto 
~jrison. 
Wlleli Tchernaieff heard of this he collectecl 
a force of 2,000 inell aiid fourteen g ~ u ~ s ,  aml, 
crossii~g the Syr Daria 011 F ~ ~ J I ' I I L L ~ Y  11, lSG(i, 
illarched agaiiisl; Rokhara to force tlie Alllir to 
release the captives, Crossiiig the ' Golocln:~ia,' or 
' famished steppe '-a barren, wntcrlcss dcsert 
between the Syr Daria and tlie 13okIiaran fortress 
of Jizakh-the Russian coluill~l arrived before 
Jizakh on February 16, 1866, 1~711e11 it 1~7;~s found 
that the place mTas too strongly fort,iGed to l)el.ini~ 
of its being carried by stornl, while regular siege 
operations were out of the cluestion, 011 accomlt 
of the considerable l3okharai~ army wllicll -mas 
close at hanil. Tcl~eriiaieff was thus uilable to 
capture Jizn.kli, and was ohligecl. to fall back, liis 
force being surrouiicleil duri l~g the reLr~:~t l)y 
swarms of Bokharan irregulars, 1~1110 ~iiaiingc.cl lo 
inflict some slight loss oil the colunin. 011 ncni~ing 
Tashkeat the Khok,z~icl.ians also joined ill tllc : ~ i  tack 
on the infidels. A large force in:~rc~l~ecl. o u ~  of llle 
city and attaclrcd tlie 12ussinn troops, while i~Iv tllc 
same time the Rllolcnrldian gnrrisoll of Ni:~zl~c~l< 
openecl. lire on a Xussian cl.etachmc?ilt as it 11r:w 
~~ la rch ing  towards the Cllircllik. Alt,lic )ugl 1 11 losc 
ntl,aclrs were clnif,e m~c.xl)cc:tccl, 11i(* I ~ l t ~ l < : ~ ~ ~ ( l i : n ~ ~  
wer(? y L C  o I i r l ,  :LLI{I 
T~he~na ie f f  regaiiic;cl posscssioil oS T:~sllIi~!~ll, wi 11- 
o i ~ t  diificilltgr, wllcl~ tlle garrison of Ni:lzljc~lc 
I- RECALL OF TCIIEIZNAIE~;P 
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nlarclied out, lcaving 570 prisoners, six guns, and 
a considerable quantity of srnall ariris and ainiilu- 
ilitioii in tlie llaiiils of the Russians. 
Dilliitri Ilyitch Bo~iianoffsky. The Rnssian Govern- 
ineiit stated tliat Tchernaieff liad been recalled 
becanse he liad exceecleil his orclers, a i d  hail 
ailvaiiced in direct oppositioii to tlie wishes or 
the Czar. The Bniperor was, 110 clonbt, aniioged 
tliat the promises and explanations contaiiiecl in 
r e  Priiice Gortchakoff's circular should have been so 
speedily proved to be nothing inore tllan liollom 
cliplomatic phrases publislied for the purpose of 
ae 
3 throwing clust iii the eyes of tlie British public ; 
but it, llas never been satisfactorily explained wliy 
as -if Tcheriiaier hail really aclvaiiced in defiance 
of the Czar's orders-lie was not recalled mrlieii 
li s his first attaclr on Tashkent becaine kiiowri to 
the Imperial Government. I-Ie assaulted TasIi- 
keiit in October 1564, but was not recalled ; tlien, 
again, in April 1865, he advanced against the place 
ancl captured it after a tliree months' campaigii, 
he but still lie was not recalled, nor were any orders 
11 e issuecl for the purpose of i~ioderating his aggressive 
designs ; and it was not till the spring of lSGG, 
ra.s when he hacl failed to capture Jizakh aiicl was 
forced to retreat before the Bolrharan forces, that ?se 
tlie Czar's Goverlimelit tliougllt fit to remove him 
from his coininand. When these points have been 
satisf:~ctor.ily explained-if sucli explailation is 
possible-the Eilglisli people inay be asked lo 
1 
I 
i I I 
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I believe that Tcheruaier was deprived of his coin- 
I 
i lnancl because he exceeded his inslruclions ; otlier- 
I 
; wise they inay rest assurecl that he  m-ns recnllecl, 
] iiot because lie clid too nluch, but bccausc lle failed 
i in his nttempl to seize Jiznlrh, and was foorcecl to 
i 
' retreat, on the first occasioll that 12ussian troops 
1' 
/ were brought face to £:ice ~ r i t l l  tlie U0kli:~r:~i1 
; forces. 
1 If TcliernaieB' had ~ealljr  beell supereccle~l 011 
acconnt of his u i i a ~  tliorise~l ~ C ~ V : L I  ( ' ~ s ,  i l  ~liiglil 
be assnnlecl tliat, liis successor wonlcl 
have been war~led to avoid si~nilnr excesses. Hni,, 
never theless, no sooner (lid liomauuKsliy 1 t~ke  
coil~nlallcl than lie proceeclecl to luake pre1>:lrf CL t' lolls 
for a still inore serious and uiiprovokecl : ~ t t ; ~ c k  
against Bokhara. Large qua,iitities of s1,ores were 
sent up from Kazaln to Cliinnz, aiirl in Mny 1 8G(i 
a Rnssinn force rnarcliecl sonthwar~ls for tlie in- 
vasion of Bolrliaran terrilory. 
Mozuffer-Eclclin hncl in llic inen11 while c*ollec:[ eel 
an army of 5,000 1.egulx troops mid 35,000 Tiir- 
ghiz, wit11 t~renty-one gulls ; and nmuelsolls l ~ c ~ i  l y 
encounters took place on l l ~ c  b t ~ i ~ l ~ s  or 1 1 1 ~  S ~ I .  
Dn,ria. On May 18 Rolunno[Ibky lie:lr(l i,11;~1, t11(: 
Uolrllarnn army w:~s moving ill the i[ir.tlr:l,ioil OS 
Tashlceilt,, led ljy the Amir ill ~~cl-sol l  ; :uld :~111101~~1~ 
lie C O U ~ L ~  0 1 1 1 ~  n l ~ s l e r  fourlcen c'011ll)i~litlr; of itl- 
faiitrjr a i d  live so Ltlias of Cl( )ss:~c:lrs, wi 111 ( ~ ( 1 1 1  ~ ,y  
guns nnii eight, roc:lret-sl:u~ds, 110 t l ( !~c r~n inc~ ,  
lievc~~llieless, to ni:~rcli :~g:~insl 1,1i(? ~11(~1113'. 'yJy0 
clays laler the Eussi;ulfi reilclic~tl tIi(1 l)l:lill of J1:j;Ly, 
where tlie SoBhnr:uis litid Laken 111) a l)osi~ioll 
011 
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about two alld a half liiiles in estp~lt, lrllc ,le 
frolit being coverecl by swnrllls of irreglllnr llol-se- 
men. After a consitlernble alllollllt of skirmish- 
illg be tmen the Cossacks ntlcl 13okll:lr.an c:lvall-y, 
Romanoffsky, towards noon, commenced a heavy 
artillery fire on tlie enemy's iutr.~ncl~li~eilts, atld 
shortly afterwards tlie infantry advanced to the 
attack. The battle ended in tlle complete rout 
of the Bokl1arai1s. Tlie Aillir f l td  \\'it11 n s inal l  
escort to Jizal~li ; and tlie Bok11:ir:ln troops \\-ere 
scattered in all directions, leaving tllc nrholc of 
their artillery, treasure, arid large qualltitics of 
stores in the hmlds of the Iiussi:llls. 
In  this battle the Bokharzrnns arc sniil to l m v e  
lost over 1,000 men, while tlle Russiaus liail only 
between 20 and 30 inen killed :ulil n-onililccl-a, 
very trifling loss, consiclesing tllc great iml)ort:uice 
of the victory ancl its far-re:~ching cfGcts. 
After this defeat 3fozufl'er-Ecltlin released 
M. StruvB allcl his cornl~aiiions, niiil sclit t h e i n  
back to Tashl~ent loacled with prcseiits. I ionlal~- 
offslry, however, rapidly pushecl for~\~nrtl, ancl, 
after capturing Nau, aclvanccd against the taitjr of 
Kllojent. The Russians appemecl before tlle p l ace  
on May 29, and while part  of tlie force occupier1 
P ~ ~ i t i ~ i ~  about four miles froill the city on the 
Bokhara ronil, ailother column took possessio~l of 
the rigllt ballk of the Syr Daria to the iiortll of 
the ~ 0 ~ 1 1 .  After two clays spent in ~ a r e f ~ l l  recon- 
naissances, -j&)lnanoffsky conimencecl the ~~~~~~~~~(1- 
lnent 011 JLLlle 1. Par four days a heavy fire was 
lllaill~ainecl frolll eigllteeii gulls lllol'tar~, 
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anil at  'claybrealc on June 6 the :~ssault was deli- 
vered. Tllc Russia~is, tn1;iag xclvnntage of the 
ruggeilness of tlic grounrl, mma.ged to ap~~roacl l  
unobses;vcil to urithin a short distnrice from tlie 
i~iiiler Captain UarailolI' rushed forwarcl urit.11 
ailcl defenclecl themselves fiom liouse to Iiousc 
~~ricli relllal.ltnljle vigonr, ancl it nTzs ilot u~i t i l  
1 t l ~ c  follo~ring (lay that all resistance ceaseil, 
:ai~il the city of 1chojen.t swrenilered at discretion 
to tlie victol*ious troops of Llie powerful ' White 
Czar.' I11 tliis aflhir tlie Russians snstainecl a loss 
of 11 iueil killed or missiag, ai~cl 122 wounclecl, 
~ ~ l i i l e  illore tllail 2,500 Iiliolranilia~ls were placecl 
I101.s cle C O ~ L ~ ) ~ Z  t. 
13y t.lle captnre of I(1iojen.t Eussin, 11x1 gai~ietl 
~)ossessioil of the last iml~ortaiit town in Llie 
~ ~ e s t e r i i  11ortior~ of Llle khanate of Klloliand. 
KIlu(la,yar I<linu, pa11.i~-striclrcn :uiil hell~lcss, ~ i o w  
fout~d Ili:~t half liis kiiigclom liar1 been seizetl, 
a ~ u l  liis cliicf' c.:it;ies occupietl, by i~~sal;i i~blc 
iil[iil.cls, ~vliti ~ ron ld  isli(1 oul-)tc(lly rob liiiil of liis 
rc!~uni~iillg posst~ssio~ls ~ulless - fo1~ig11 lielp colrllil 
I i ~ l .  111 Iiis i[istr(~ss 1 1 ~  al)l~c!:~l~!(l to t*l~c? 
1<11:~1i t tf I<Ili\r:~~, t ~ )  : I ~ ~ ~ ) l i l l ~ ~ ~ : : ~ ,  :LI 1(1 t , ~  the ~111(! 1,s 
of tile Usl.)cg S(.,:~lcs 011 ill(: 1)a11l;s of l , l~e IT11l)cr 
OX~IS, :LI ~l t;~:i(xl tJo Iii11(11(! a l~oly I V ~ I , ~  :~,g:~il~sl~ 
1 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 i s .  No11(? d' t:~l~cse St: l~;cs ,  Ilo~\-cvc?~., 
CRL'C~[ to i l i i ! , ~ ~ ~  Ilic: wr:~lll 01 t;l.le po~vcr.T111 Musco- 
i 
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vites ; a i d  vhen Ii_'liudayar ltruuil llilllsL~lf ltli'r cleli- 
- the nlonc opposed to tlie Enssinns, lie slr.0~-e to snyth 
the remnmts of his kingcloln 1 ) ~  l)rt)l)itiiLlillg .oacli 
1 the his enemies, Roma~~offslry nrged illa[, the ~ ~ l ~ c ~ l t ~  
khanate sl~ould be annexed to Itussin, :lni[ t l l : ~ ~  
SO011 
the capital shoulcl be &cupied by a Dossi:lll 113 ally 
with garrison. Tlie Government, also, t,hollgll oljjcc~ti~lg 
to such wholesale conquest,, desircil to oc7cnl)y rallce 
the province of Namaugnn, anil thus to liluit out, 
Kholrandian rule to the comitry soutll oi' i11t. house 
until Syr Daria. Oize false step or olie :~ggrc~hi~re 
lnovemeilt on the part of tlie K110li:~l~di:uls wonltl :ased, 
assureclly have been follo~~~ecl I)J' a Bnssi:~~l occ2ulr:l- retion 
White tioil of Narnangnn, and possil~le nilliexntioll of t l i c h  
entire ldianate. At Lliis time, lio~vever, Xllud:~y:u' a loss 
Khan was fortunate i11 llaviilg n sllren-d :lilvist1r 
~ndecl, 
ill the person of his Atalyk, or colllili:tl~ilrr-i~;- 
)laced 
chief, Ata Belr ; a11d when he founcl that lit3 
would have to Iigllt the Russians si11glr:-llnl~ilecl, 
;ainecl 
he acted on this chief's so.~~11(1 ncl~ice, 2nd sell1 
11 the 
ellvoys to Romanoffslcy to coligrntulnte llirn OIL 
~Iralzd. l ~ i s  s ~ c c e s s f ~ l  campaign agniilst llle Uoldl:w:\us, 
3, now 
allcl to declare his frienclly feelings t o ~ ~ t ~ r d s  the 
seizecl, 1 Russian Govealment. Thus there n.ns no pos- 
 tia able sible excuse for any Russian illovelllcrlt agnilisl 
of his : Khokancl, and tlie conc~uest of that khnlinte h:~d 
could , to be postponed. 
to the Eomanoffslry, moreover, hacl not yet sufi- 
rulers cielltly ]1~lmblecl Bol.ihara, arid further operations 
u ~ ~ e r  towards the soutll vere considered necessnry. 
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to be advisable ; but the attitude of tlle Bolcharaii 
Amir coastituted a standing nleli.ace to the Bus- 
siail position on tlie Syr Daria. Moznffer-Eddin, 
tliougb ilefeatecl, was by no means subdued; 
a i d  although lie entered into negotiations with 
a view to tlie restoration of peace, it was evident 
that lie liad no iilte~ltioil of submitting to tlie 
Russia11 demands. Tlie truce lasted for some 
montlis ; but eventually, in October 1866, a Rns- 
sian detachment marcheci. against Ura-tepd, wllicli 
was defended by on.e of the strongest citadels ill 
Central Asia. Batteries were established before 
the place on October 6, and after a close siege 
for eight days, the fortress was assaulted a i ~ l  
captured,' after a severe figl~t, which lastecl for 
about ~~1.1 hour and a half. Abdul Gaffar, the 
Belr of t,he place, wibli most of its defe'endcrs, 
illallaged to escape to the mountains ; but many 
of 1;he garrisoil were overtalreil in their fliglit;, 
and hnuc11-eds of corpses testified to tlie severe. 
11~11islillzen t tvliich liacl heen i~iflicted. The 
lhssians lost 3 oficers aiid 200 men, but matlc 
nnnny prisonel~s, ancl anlong their trol~liies \vel:c 
1 G  guns alnd 4 stanclarcls. 
While Ura-tepB wns being atJtaclrc(l, nllol;h~~. 
force, ~ui~der the command of (3eneral I<~ijl la] lofli'Irs, 
moved againsb Jizakh, ~vhic!l.i hat1 hccll g,rr.e:~t;ly 
inc,rcased iii st;rc!ilgbli sinc:e 'I.'clir!r~laio:II"s luls,lc.!- 
c.!c:ssf~~ 1 attei-r~pt o recluce it. 
A . k r  carefully cx:unining tlie plnn:, allil 
spendirlg soiue (1:~~s iu col~sl~~,ncl;il.ig ~ic c! lx~l,l,c:r*i(l,.;, 
l<~~ijl~:~i~o.f~sl~-y r,orn~rl(:~ir:c(l f,li(+ I ) I . ) I Y ~ I  ) ~ L ~ Y ~ I T I ~ ! I  I 1; 011 
i 
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October 25, and at llooll on the 30th all ns~:~ull 
was ordered. 111 spite of the natural strcll~tll 
of place and its strong defences, and not~yitll- 
I standing the determined resistance of tllc garrison, 
1 
the Rnssians gained a footing ~~-itllin the ~yxlls 
after an hour's figllting. But the erlellly for some 
time refused to surrender, and were sl,zuglllcre(l 
by hundreds, while some, finding furtllcr rrsist- 
ance to be useless, blew tllciilselves 1111 iu the 
I powder-magazine. Out of the eigllteen ]leks 
~ 1 1 0  were in the place, oilly two escnpccl ~rit l i  
their lives, Allayar Bek, the brave comnl:l~ldn~lt, 
being among the slain. Nearly G,000 I3oklinr:uis 
were killed, and 2,000 were taken l~risoncrs; 
while the Russians only lost G nlerl ltillc~cl, :1il(1 
92 wounded. Altllougll the important fortrc~sscls 
of Khojent, Nau, Urn-tepB, and Jiznkh h:~d 1,rcil 
thus occupied, there still reniainecl, one importallt 
point which the Russians wishecl, to possess, he- 
f 
cause it commandecl, the water-supply of Jiz:tkli, 
and thus, if held by the Bokharans, would hnl-e 1 
, enabled the111 to place the Russian garrison of that, 
n place in a very critical sitiation. Tliis r ~ ~ a  t h ~  
fort of Yani-kurgan, in the Knra-Tnu branch of 
I' the Nurata Mountains ; and in the spring of 1867 
it was seized and occupiecl by a Iiussian detach- , 
Y ~nent .  
The result of Lllese fresh trimuphs was that the 
Amir, Mozuffer-Eddin, recognising the futility of 
:I continuing the struggle alone, was compeliecl to 
sue for peace. IIe first vainly endeavoured to 
; , 1 forln an alliance with the Amir of Afghanistan. 11 I 
Ab 
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R u t  the country to the souLll of the Osus mas tlien 
in a very troubled co~lditiorl on acc,ount of tlle 
bi t ter  struggle betweell Dost Mahommed's sons ; 
ancl althougll he succeeded ill establishing friendly 
relatiolls with Fniz Mahomineil Xllan, Lhe Ciovernor 
of Ralkh and half-bro~her of Shere Ali, he fo~ui(l it 
impc)ssib1e to procure A(q11an assis~xnce agai~ist- 
llis ~~igorous  and triulnphailt enemies. A : k r  l.l~is 
11e tried to enlist the syinpn,thies of the 1nili:ul 
Government, ancl sent an envoy to Calcutta t o  
seek t l ~ e  assistance of .the British ; 1.nt Englai.~l 
ii~ducecl by tlle Kabul disaster. Tlie Amir's Am- 
chiefly t41.11.0ugll tlle ggency of native oi.lic.:i:~ls, : a ~ ~ t l  " 
no serious attempt hacl 1-)eel1 laatle to inll)rovc! tllc? 
13~1; at  about the time wlicli I'Loiil:~lloflkky W:LS 
:-~pl)ointed G~ovel.ilor ia snl~crscssic-)rl of' l.'[:l ~e l.~~:licll; 
a special co~nmissioii was alq~cri~ 1 l (!fl 1 )y tl~c: (l)xiir 
to report on tlie 1:)esL 1-nc!:~11s of g:.t rvc:1*11i11g 11~: 
c:c-)uxl.try. This r:oininission, wllicll is k~lowll :LS 
and these officers, after careful inqniries, sub- 
mitted ail elaborate report i11 the spring of 1867, 
'which was submitted for the consideration of a 
superior committee, under the presidency of the 
Russian Minister of War, who was assisted by 
delegates from tlie Ministries of the Interior, of 
War, +lid of Foreigii Affairs. As the result of 
these deliberations, an ukase was published oil 
July 23, 1867, announcing the formation of the 
. . Province of Turkestan, which was to be ruled by 
.. . a Governor-General, who would be appointed by 
tlie Emperor, and placed under the orders of tlie 
Russian War Office. This new province was to 
include the whole of the newly acquired territory, 
t,ogetller with that port;ion of the Siberian Province 
of Semipalatinsk ~rliich lies to tlie south of the 
Tarbagatai Mountains. Tashkent was fixed as the 
lleadquarters of the province, which was divided 
into the two cIistric1;s of the Syr Daria and Semi- 
retchinsk, each of which was to' be controlled by a 
military governor noliiiilated by the Ministry of 
War. The district of Syr Daria includecl tlle 
' uyezcls,' or sub-districts, of Kazala, Perovslri, 
Turkes tan, Chiililrent, Alllie-Atn, Kurama, Kllojent, 
and the city of Tashkent (whic11 formed x sepn- 
rate sub-district of its own) ; ~vllile the district of 
Semiretchimisk was clivittetl into tlle ' uyezcls ' of 
Sergiopol, Kopnl, Tenloye, Issilr ICul, and l'olr- 
niak. These ord.ers were not promulgated wiL11ouL 
a certain a~nount of opposition. General Krijllan- 
oEslry, the Governor-Ci.e~i.eral of O r e i i L ~ ~ r ~ ,  wllose 
;~~tlloriky had 11iLlierto cstended over the whole ol' 
I VOL. 1. 1' 
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tlle newly acquircil tracts on the Syr Daria, and . 
under mliose orclers tlie military operatiorls bad 
bee11 carried out, was 10th to liave his power cur- 
tailed, and he protested against the proposals of 
tile Steppe Commission, basing his objections on 
tile c1is:~ilvaiitages m~liicli I T O L I ~ ~  result if tlie 
Kirgliiz were placed under two separate admiais- 
trations. The correctness of this arguil~ent was to 
a great extent provecl by tlie disturbances 11-1iicl.r 
arose among the Icirghiz in 1860 ancl 18'70, wlien 
they again revolted, destroyed stations on tlie 
postal route, aild captured travellers, who were 
eitller killed or sold as slaves in Kliiva. But 
Yrijllanoflslcy was unsuppol*ted. The Kirghiz hail 
playecl their part in the game of Russian aggres- 
sion, aiicl when no longer u s e f ~ ~ l  as an excuse for 
fresh conquests, were to be permitted to lapse into 
their former neglected ailcl despised condition. 
TU-o of tlie nleinbers of the Commission-viz., 
M. Giers aild Colonel Protsenko-also objected lo 
the inclusion of Seilliretchiilsk in the new province, 
on tlie grounds that the frontier affairs of Siberia 
and Turlcestan required different methods of treat- 
ment, and could therefore be best controlled by 
two clistincl sources of autllority. These and other 
minor objections were, however, overrulecl by the 
War Ministry, and the new Province of Turkes- 
tan was formed on the lilies already described. 
Romanoffsky continued to hold cornmaod till tlle 
arrival of the first Governor-General in the person 
of Adjutant-General voii Kaufmann, who reaclled 
Tashkent. on Novemher 17, 1867. 
1 
y 
At this time ilegotiations for peace were still 
proceeding between the Russians and the Amir of 
Bokllara. General Krijhanoffsky hacl clraftecl a 
treaty of peace, whicli had been sent for Mozuffer- 
Ecldin's signahre in the previous September-that 
is, sonle ten inonths after the capture of Jizalch 
alld the suspensioii of hostilities. I11 this treaty it 
was stipulated that a part of tlie frontier line 
between tlie new p~ovince of Turkest an and Bok- 
hara sliould follow the crest of tlie Nurata 
Range, the Russians being uncler the impression 
that there was only one sue11 range, while in 
reality there are tvo branches--the Kara-Tau on 
the north and the Ak-Tau 011 the soutli-between 
which lies the fertile Bekship of Nurata. Before 
signing the treaty the Amir wishecl to kllow which 
branch of the range was referred to ; and thus the 
ilegotiations draggecl on, the Russians declaring that 
the point had been raised for the sake of procras- 
tination, ancl through a clesire on Mozuffer-Ecldin's 
part, to avoicl conling to terms. 
I n  tlie meanwhile irresponsible bands of Bolc- 
hczrans made raids on the Russian frontier, aud 
a Russia11 officer (Seconcl-Lieutenant Slushenko) 
ailcl three solcliers were captured by robbers on 
the road between Chinaz and Bokhara. A small 
column, under Baron von Stempel, w u  sent against 
tile village which was believed to be mixed up in 
this affair ; but although tlie place was b~un t ,  the 
villagers fled to the moul~tai~~s,  and so escaped 
pniiislin~ei~t. Kaufi~lann, l~owever, asrived shortly 
altel.warcls, and he at once denlanded the release 
P 2 
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of the captives and illsistecl upon the ilninediate 
sigiiat~~re of the treaty. This action 1-esultecl in 
the release of Slusbenko and his companions, but 
the treaty remailled unsiglled ; and in March 1868 
the Russia11 Governor-General deterillinecl to adopt 
strong measures for the purpose of ellforciilg 
compliance wit11 the Russia11 demands. A force 
of some 500 Cossacks was accordillgly sent to 
establish a permanent camp close to the city of 
Samarkancl. and to there comlnence the erection of 
a fortress. This step ilaturally roused the anger 
of the Bokharans, who had not yet forgotten their 
previous defeats, and mere burning to avenge 
themselves. The progress of the Russians was 
opposerl, and a fight eilsuecl at  a place called 
Uchum, which, of course, resulterl in the flight of 
b the native troops. Then, during the absence of 
the Ainir from his capital, the Kazis and Mullahs 
~roclaiined the necessity for a holy war, ancl 
rousecl the people to 'esist the unwarranted ad- 
vances of the infidels. Mozuffer-Eclclin, knowiilg 
that his army was powerless to oppose the troops 
of the White Czar, tried to pacify the people ; but 
riots took place in Samarlrand, and when he re- 
turned to his capital he mas thcrc ill-treated by 
the enraged populace. 
At this time there were two distinct parties in 
opposition to the Amir. His elclest sou, the Katti- 
Tiura, mas intriguing against his authority, and 
his nephew, Said Khan, supported by the Belrs of 
Shahr-i-Sebz, Chilelr, nncl Ura-tep4. was also trying 
to gain possession of the throne. Being aware of 
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the diflkrefices between Mozuffer-Eddin and the 
Russians, Said Khan's party ordered Omar Belr of 
Chilek to attack the Russian forces near Jizakh, in 
order that the Russians might be provolced to in- 
vade Bokham, and that Said Ifllan might t l~us 
obtain a chance of seizing the throne during the 
disturbances which would follow a foreign inva- 
sion. This attack was made, 1mt Omar Bek was 
easily repulsed and iled to Shahr-i-Sebz, lest he 
inigllt be punished by the Amir for having thus 
aff'orded the Russians an excuse for attacking 
Bokhara. 
A few days before this affair, Islcander Khan, 
an Afghan prince, deserted to the Russians with 
some 2,000 follomers. This prince had beell 
driven out of Afghanistan by Shere Ali during 
the intestine troubles in that State, and had 
placed his services at  the Amir's disposal ; but, 
becoming discontented with the treatment he 
received, he, with true Oriental treachery, de- 
serted MozufSer-Eddin and went over to the enemies 
of the State which had helped him in his distress. 
The lZussiails believed that Omar Bek's attack had 
beell made in retaliation lor Iskander Khan's - 
desertion, and Kaufmann therefore decided to 
strike a blow which should finally break the power 
of Bokl1al.a and reduce the Ainir to a condition of 
complete vassalage. Hastily collecting a force, he 
marcbecl to  Jizalch, and from thence moved for- 
ward towards Samarkand, driving before him the 
small parties of Bolcl~aran irregular troops which 
,zt8Lcmptcd t,o bar his progress. When he reached 
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Yani-Kurgan he received inesseilgers from Jura 
ancl. Baba Bek ol Shahr-i-Sebz, two of the 
rebellious leaders of Said Khan's faction, promising 
either to afford active assistance against the Amir, 
or to remain neutral, on the condition that their 
presence should not be required in Samarl~ancl. 
when the city had been capturecl. by the Russians. 
Kaufmanll expressed his great pleasure at the 
friendly spirit which had been displayed by tlie 
Shahr-i-Sebz chiefs, and assured the envoys that 
dthough he stoocl. in no need ol any assistance 
from the Beks, he would respect their wishes in 
the event of strict t;~eutrality being observed. The 
Amir also made several attempts to avert hos- 
tilities, and sent several inesseilgers to state that 
the treaty would be signed if further delay was 
granted. Matters, however, hacl. gone too far, and 
as the Amir was believed to be desirous of gaining 
time for the purpose of coiupleting his warlike 
~reparations, tllc advance was continued. 
On Ma.7 13  the R~~ssians reached the banks of 
the Z a r a f ~ h m  River, and found the enemy drawn 
up on tJLe hill of Chupan-ata. Here another 
ambassacLd~. arrived,. with a treaty signed by  
Mozuffe - Gildin, which purported to be the same 
that hall seen prepared by Kaufmann. On exami- 
nation: nowever, it was found to differ in  many 
important respects from the Russian original, and 
Kaufmann therefore demanded that the Bokllarans 
should evacuate their position within two hours. 
But, illstead of retiring, tlie Amir's troops kept up 
a desultory fire on the Russians, who were drawn 
up in orcler of battle ; and, therefore, when the 
stipulated time had expired, Kaufinann ordered 
the attack. The fight mTas short and decisive, and 
the Bokharans soon flecl in the wildest conf~~sion, 
leaving their camp and twenty-one guns as tropllies 
in the hands of Kaufnlann's victorious troops. 
, AS soon as the iilhabitaiits of Samarkand heard 
of this Russian success, they closed the gates of 
the city against the Bokharan army, and on 
May 1 4  sent a deputation to Kaufmailn oflering 
their submission, and recluesting that the place 
might be occupied by Muscovite troops. At the 
same time the other chief towns in the neighbour- 
hood sent delegations to declare their allegiance 
to the 'White Czar,' the ollly ex~ept~ions to the 
general surrender being Omar Bek or Chilelr, and 
Bussein Belr 01 Urgut, who declined to treat with 
the infidels. Samarlraiid was at  once occupied 
by  the Russians, and thus the ancient capital of 
the Tinlurids became an appanage of the Russian 
Crown. 
But although the great Bokharan city had 
been thus easily captured, the war was by no 
means at an end. While the main body of troops 
under Golovatcheff was pushed forward in pursuit 
of the Amir's army, two detacl~ments were sent 
against the recalcitrant chiefs of Urgut and 
Chilelc, and another party under Abramoff was 
sent soutllwards to watch the movements of the 
Shahs-i-Sebz troops. At first all went well. 
GolovntcheK captured the town of Katti-Kurgan ; 
U r g ~ ~ t  was talcen, although the Belr, Hussein, and 
his followers escaped ; Cliilek was forced to sub- 
init ; ancl Abramoff, after a. slight encounter with 
the troops frorn Shahr-i-Seh, forced thein to retire 
to the hills south of Samarliancl. But in spite of 
the sai,islac tory coinmencelnen t of the cnmpnigil 
the position of the Russians became daily more 
critical. Wlien Kaufrn:~nn entered Samarkaiiil lie 
sent ICamal-Bclclin, the Kazi I<i~lian of tlie city, to 
sum~~lon  Jura Belz and Babn Bek to attencl at the 
Russian headcluarters-n clemaircl tvllicli was in 
violation of the assurailces wllicll llacl been given 
to tlieir envoy at  Yani-Kurgan. The chiefs : ~ t  
first disbelieved the ICnzi's story a~ id  cast liim into 
prison ; but wl~eii tliey found that Kaufll~ann ]lad 
cleliberately broken faith with tliem, they bcgaii 
to  suspect treacllery, and wrote to the Arnir 
offering to make peace with him, and to help lliln 
to continue tlie struggle against the Russians. 
Thus these powerful chiefs were, through Kauf- 
manu's ill-advisecl and uilscrupulous action, turiled 
into active enemies, ancl the Russians ~iarrowly 
escaped n crushiilg disaster which might have 
causecl t l ~ e  loss of all tlieir recently acquired terri- 
tory in Ce~ltral Asia. 
3lozulTer-Eddin, e~lcouragccl by the assistance 
of the SlinJir-i-Sebz troops, repined conlidenc:~, 
:mcl col1cc:tecl a Ires11 army to the west of 1C:~tLi- 
Kurgnri, wliile his cavalry cut ICnufmann's coni- 
mmlicatio~ls mrith Jizakli ; some 16,000 l~ovsenlt~n 
tvcrc asseinblerl at Clhilelr u~rder a nel)liew of 
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with armed irregulars. Rut Kauiinann, though in 
great peril, and cut off from his base at Tashkent, I 
I 
I 
was equal to the emergency. . He decided to effect 
i a junction with Golovatcheff at Katti-Kurgan, and j then force the Amir to a decisive engagement, 
I 
1 which, if successful, would break up the combin&-, 
tion against the Russians. He therefore left his 
1 
i sick and wouiided in Samarkand, with a small !I garrison of 762. men, all told, and marched with I '  
I the remainder of his force towards Katti-Kurg an. , But he had only gone a few miles when he re- ceived an alarming report from Golovatcheff, who 
stated that he was completely surrounded by the 
enemy, who were in great strength. Making a 
forced march, Xaufmann relieved the garrison of 
Katti-Kurgan, and then, on June 14, totally 
defeated the Bokharan army on the heights of 
Zara-bulak, some few miles to the west of Katti- 
K ~ ~ r g a n ,  on the Samarkand-Bokhara road. 
But during Kaufmann's absence from Sarnar- 
kand, the little garrison which had been left to 
defend the city mere having a very anxious time. 
The main Russian force had scarcely left the place 
allen parties of the Shallr-i-Sebz troops began to 
appear on the outskirts of the city, and Jura Bek 
and Baba Rek, wit11 many other minor chieftains, 
advanced to try and recapture it. Major Stempel, 
who had been left in command of the garrison, 
found that it was impossible to defend the great 
lengtll of wall surrounding the city, and he there- 
fore concentrated his force in the citadel. 
A determined attack commenced soon after- 
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wards, ancl on June 15  the enemy succeeded in 
setting fire to the gates, their total clestructioll 
being oilly prevented by piles of sand-bags which 
were placed against them. The garrison was by 
this time reduced to great straits, aild although 
, Steinpel sent seven messengers to inform Kaufmann 
of what was occurring, there were no signs of his 
return. 
At this juncture, when it appeared impossible 
to save the place, Jura Belr received news of 
the Amir's defeat on the heights of Zara-bulak, 
and being misled by a false report that Kaufmann 
was illarching against Shahr-i-Sebz, withdrew his 
forces, ancl left the other Reks to their own 
resources. They, however, still kept up a constant 
series of attacks until the evening of June 19, and 
it was not until the arrival of Kaufmann on the 
20th with the main lZussian army that the re- 
maining irregulars were finally driven from their 
positioi~s and forced to raise the siege. The relief 
came just in time. The brave garrison had lost 
3 officers and 46 men Irillecl, and 6 officers ancl 
167  men wounded; and although the withdrawal 
of Jura Bek greatly weakenecl the attacking force, 
the defenders had been reduced to the very last 
extremity, and Stempel had decided to coilcentrate 
tlie survivors of his small force in the Amir's 
palace-a large building ill the centre of the 
citadel-there to sell their lives as dearly as 
possible. ITad Jura Bek coritinued to assist in 
the attack, or if Kaufinann's return had been 
longer clelayed, nothing could have saved tlle 
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Russians, and Samarlrand must have fallen into 
the hands of the Bofiarans. Such a disaster 
t o  the R~~ssian  arms woulcl have been the signd 
for a general coinbination to expel the troops of 
the ' White Czar ' from Turl~estan. Kaufinann 
would have found himself hopelessly cut off 
from all assistance, ancl the small garrisons in 
Tashkent and the other towns in Russian occupa- 
tion, would have been attacked by the colnbilied 
amlies of Khokand and Bolrhara, aided, most 
probibly, by the Xirghiz and Kliivans. 
After Kaufillann's return to Samarkand all 
resistance ceased, and oil July 5, 1868, a treaty 
of peace was signed, whereby tlie Zarafslian 
Valley, including Sainarkancl and Katti-Kurgm, 
was surrendered to Russia,,' vho also obtained 
the riglit 01 establishing cantonments at Kermiiieh, 
In ordor to allay the excitement which had been produced i n  
England  by the 'apid advances of Russia to the borders of 
Afghanistan, Prince GorLchakoiT informed tho Earl of Clarendon 
on September 2, 1860, that the Czar did not inlend to retain 
galnarkand, and stated that he could give no better proof of his 
Majesty's dotermination not to proceed so~~thwards.' This promiso 
was hoquontly repeated, and on February 20, 1870, the Russian 
Chancellor informed the British Ambassador at St. Petorsburg that 
the c i ty  was not rostored Co BoLhara only 'because the Emir will 
not p a y  us tho war indemnity which he is engaged by treaty to 
do.' T h e  payment of this indemnity had been delayed on account 
of the continued rebellion of the Icatti-Tinma; but altho~lgl~ the 
final instalment of the contribution was paid in 1870, Samarkand 
was no t  restored to the Amir, and in April 1876 Prince Gorlchalroff 
finally announced in tlie following words that all idea of its 
rend i t io~ l  had been allandonod :- 
' T h o  necessity of holding the Amir in checlr, and the wishes of 
Lht3 poplllatioil, have been the principal reasoils which have com- 
pelled us to rolojn Sm~arlrmd.'  
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Charjni, and Karshi. By this treaty it was also 
agreed :- 
(I) That all Russian subjects, without distinc- 
tion of creed, should be permitted to 
trade freely throughout the khanate of 
Rokhara, the Amir being responsible for 
the security of all such merchants, their 
property ancl caravans. 1 
(2) That all Russian merchants shoulcl have 
t,he right to appoint agents i11 all towns 
throughout the Amir's dominions. I 
(3) That a maximum ad valo~~em duty of 
24 per cent. shoulcl be levied on all 
Russian goods imported into the khanate. 
(4) That Russian merchants tracliiig wit11 
neighbouriiig States should be granted 
free passes through the khanate. 
( 5 )  Tliat the Ainir was to pay a war indemnity 
of 125,000 tillas, of which amount 
10,000 tillas were to be deposited im- 
mecliately, the balance being paid within 
one year. 
By the occupation of the Zarafslian Valley the i 
Russians obtained control over the water-supply 
of the city of Bokhara, and they were thus in 
a position to enforce complete coinpliance with 
any demands they might subsequently desire to 
make. 
CEAPTEIi VIII 
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREIE3IEI\'T OJ?' 1S73 
Conferencos botween Lord Clnrendon and Boron Drm~no~r (111 
Russin's ndvnnce toworils Afglln~listnn nnd Illdin --I'rirlcc. I;t,rt. 
~1~~lcoi'Ps mop-Gortchnlroff'~ o ~ s n m ~ ~ c e s - C ~ ~ ~ l t r o ~ ~ r r s y  or) tlln 
liinitnry line-Russia tnlcos time to consider tho Inili1~11 I;ovc.ril- 
ment's proposals-Pin:~l aottle~ucnt of tho nortl~orn frolltic.1~ of 
Afglm~~istnn, nd I'rinco Gortcl~aliofl's lotter-ILussinn 11lodgc~s to 
respect the integrity of Afgl~nniston-An ii~cornplete settlor~~clr~t 
-Present condition of tho bount1a1.y q11ostio11. 
As the Russia11 ailiicxatioil of Samarlinnd and (lie 
Zarafshan Valley created consicleral~le excitt~n~rt~i, 
in Enplaiid, Lord Clare~iclori, tllc Hritish Ali~listcl* 
for Foreign Afhirs, ill the following sprilig 1~:ltZ 
several conferences 11-it11 Baroil 13runnow, the, 
Russiail Ambassador, regarcling tlie rapid ail- 
vailces of Russian troops towards Afgliaiiistnii ancl 
India ; and he then said, that wliile her 1I:;iesty's 
Government felt neither suspicioli iior al:u.~u :~t, 
tliese nioveuients, yet so~iiethiiig liad to be clone 
to allay the uneasiness of the British arid 'Inclinn 
public. With this objecl, therefore, lie reconi- 
mended ' the recognition of solne territol-y as 
neutral between the possessioils of Engla~~tl  and 
Russia, wliicli should be the limit of t l i c~s~  110s- 
sessions, aiid be scrnpulonsly respectcil 1)y l~otli 
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Powers.' Baroil Brui~now cominuilicatecl this pro- 
posal to his Government ; but, before replying, 
Prince Gort,cllaBoff wished to obtain some clear 
knowledge of the political geography of the coun- 
tries between the Russian frontiers and India, 
arid to this eild he obtained from Sir Rodericlc 
Mul.chison-then President of tlie Royal Geo- 
graphical Society-a inap of Persia, Afghanistan, 
and Belnchistan, which liad been prepared by 
Mr. Weller, a well-known cartographer. 111 corn- 
lriling illis map, Mr. Weller had been more 
by the ethnogral~hical than by the political divi- 
sions of the country; and, therefore, instead of 
colouring the whole of Afghanistan with one dis- 
tinctive colour, he showed Afghanistan proper 
as being bounded to the north by the Hindu 
Xnsh Range, while Afghan-Turkestan-i.e., the 
couiztry belween the Hindu Kush and Oxus, and 
exterldiilg from Badakshan to Maimana-was 
painted a different colour, as if it coilstituted an 
independent State. 
Armed with this nlap, Prince Gortchakoff sent 
an answer to the proposals of the British Foreign - 
Minister, in which, after expressing his satisfaction 
at the friendly sentirner~ts of the English Govern- 
ment, and after referring with true diplomatic 
insincerity to the ' profound wisdom ' of Lord 
Lawrence's policy of ' masterly inactivity,' he 
gave ' the positive assurance ' that ' His Imperial 
Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as conlpletely 
outside the sphere withill which Russia may be 





i l r ( ~ l q ) d  so 
NEUTRAL ZONE ABANDONED 
1 Clarenilon consulted the India Ofice before any 
i further steps were taken for the establishment, of . 
t 
I a ' neutral zone ' between India and the Russiall 
1 
\ 
frontiers in Central Asia ; and in accorclance wit,Jl 
the opinions of the Secretary of State, he, 011 
April 17, 1869, informed Baron Brunnow that 
her Majesty's Goverilmeilt 'had arrived at the 
1 
I decicled opiilioil that Afgl~anistan would not fulfil 
those conclitions of a neutral territory that it was 
the object of the two Governments to establish, 
as the frontiers were ill-defined ; ' and he the11 
suggested 'that the Upper Oxus, which was south 
of 13olcllara, should be the bouildary line which 
neither Power should perlnit their forces to cross.' 
Froin this time the iclea of a 'neutr~zl zone ' 
i was clefiilitely aballclonecl by the British Govern- 
, ment, alt110ugll Russia for obvious reasons en- 
cleavoureil on more t l~an  one occasion to revive 
the iclecz. I t  would, of course, have been to her 
advantage tllat Afghallistan-as shown in Mr. 
TVeller's map-shoulcl have been placecl oixtsicle 
? British influence, ~vllile she was to be permitted 
to :ihsorb the vrrl~ole of llie States lying between 
.s all il the I-Iindu Kush ; but fortullately 
authorities clearly recogilised the ex- 
and one-sidedness of the Russia11 pro- 
tlle idea of n 1zeutr:ll zoiie was absolutely 
I fiir as Eriglai~d was concenlecl in April 1 
1 S(i9 ; the subs~clueut negotiations being based on I \ 
t l ~ c  nssunq)tioix that il mas desirable tc  Gx some I 
limil;~,ry line 11egond wllicll ileither Power should 
The idea of Lorcl Mayo's Government was that 
a girdle of semi-independent States should be 
formed on the frontier of each ~0~11t~y-Afghani- 
stan, Beluchistan, and Kashgar being subject to 
Britisli influence ; while Khiva, Bolrhara, and 
Kholrand remained under Russian control. But 
Russia did not relish this idea. Altl~ough tlle 
English thereby clearly displayed their desire for 
peace, Russia had no intentioil of putting a linzit 
to her advance until she hacl arrived in close 
proximity to the frontiers of British India; ancl, 
therefore, after some further interchange, of com- 
munications, this idea also was al3ancloized, ancl 
all that resulted was a repetition of the Russia11 
promise that Afghanis tan shoulcl be coinpletelj~ 
outside the sphere mitl~ili wl~ich Russia should 
be callecl upon to exercise her authority. This 
guarantee, however, was of great value, and steps 
were then talren to arrive at a clear definition of 
the actual bouildaries of the Amir's territories. 
The Iiidia,n Government insisted that the true 
northern bouiidary of Afgl~anistaa was rnarlrecl by 
the course of tlze River Oxus ' from the district of 
Ballrh on tlie west to the extrelne east of Badak- 
shall ; ' and they based their arguineilts on the fact 
that the various khanates between the Oxus ancl 
Hindu Kusli hacl aclrnowledged the sovel.eigliity of 
Dost Mahoininecl, ancl had since recognised the 
government of Shere Ali. After reviewing the 
conquests a i d  rule of Dost Mahommed, the Indian 
Gover11men.t said : ' The north-western boundary of 
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Ali's dominions, runs in a south-westerly direction 
from a point on the Oxus between Khoja-Sale and 
Karki, skirting md including thc provinces of 
Bdkh, Maimana (with its dependencies of Alldlrllui, 
&c.), and Herat (wit11 its depellclencies between 
the Murghab and I'Ieri Rud). The ilortheril 
boulldary is the Oxus, froill the same point between 
Karki and Khoj a-Sale eestwarcls lo Puizj abl and 
W alrhan, and thereafter the stream which passes 
Walcl~all up  to the point where the range of the 
Eindu Kush meets the soutllern angle of tlie Pamir 
Steppe.' When a copy of the letter containing 
these renlarks was forwardecl to the Russian 
Governineat, M. S~remooulroff, the Director of the 
Asiatic Departinent of the Russian Foreign OIIice, 
ststccl that Khoja-Sale itself should be the point on 
the Oxus from ~rhich the western boundary shonlil 
conlnleilce ; a i d  after a brief discussion this was 
practically agreed to, oil the understanclillg that 
the district of Khoja-Sale shoulcl. be coilsidered as 
constituting a portion of the territories of the Ainir 
of Kabul. From ICl~oja-Sale lhe frontier line was 
to he drawn towarcls Persia so as to incluile 
Anclkhui and Maimam in Afghan. territory ; but 
M. Stren~ooulrofl' added the significant reinarlr 
i,l~nt ' great care would be required in tracing a 
lillc from llieilce (i.e., Khoja-Sale) to t,he souill, as 
Mcvv anil the country of tlie Tnrlroinans were 
1 Tho moaning liero is ~oinowhnt obclc~~ro. 7'ho morrl Punjnb ' 
is ovide11t1-y n u~~iisprint for P:u!ji~h, nncl tllo 111ili1~11 Ctoverlu~n~l~t 
evidently roforreil uither to tho River Ab-i-l'n11ju11 01. to one of the 
towlis 0x1 ils bn111ca -vix., En17 1'1~11jt~li 01, UiliL Pull j~ll .  
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becorning coln~llercinlly iinporlnizt ; ' a rcilznrk of 
whicli tlie full ~nealii~lg was only rcalised some 
fourken or fifteen years later wheil Mcrv was seized 
by Russia, ancl Russian troops had cstal~lislicd 
themselves withill etuy strilcii~g (lista11cc of Her:~t. 
Before the Russia11 Governinent gave any 
clecisioil regarding ihe remainder of the 11roposc:(l 
frailties line, they referred the iliatter to Geiier:il 
I<aufinann, as being a person on the spot who 
could forin the best opillioil as to tlie corrcclness 
of the arguments put f'orasrcl by Lord Mayo's 
I Goverriment. But inolltlls pnsseil, ai i l  eve11 yews, s witliout any definite reply having been vo~zcl~sal'ecl, 
d and tlzerefore 011 October 17,1872, Lord G1-ailville 
acldressed a co~ninuilicatioil to Lord Angusius 
Loft us, tlie British Aml~assncloi* at  St. pet el-sburg, 
in which tlie northern bouaclaries of Afghanis tan 
weyc ilcfilled in tllc f01lowing ivords :- 
' For your Xxcelleacg's moye ccmplete illfor- 
matioiz I state Idle territories aucl bomld:~l*ies 
wllicll Her Majesty's Govcrillilcilt coiisi~ler :is lully 
1)cloilgiug 10 t,llc: Alrleer ol' C:I~) 111, T T ~ Z  : 
' (1) 13nd:~lcsli;nl~ ivitll its di~l)cntlp~ll, c is~ricat, of 
WilliIlsll, ft.'0111 Ill(; Sir-i-kd ( I ~ O ( > ( ~ S  IJ:L~<c) oil 1  IF: 
eas[, lo (llr? ,jl~lir(i( 111 ol' 11~1  Iiolc(~11:~ ILivc~10, wii,l~ t 111: 
Osus (or l':u~jall) i i )rnl i~~g 111(! nor1 l l ~ i  11 1~,111ltl:i I-y 
oS illis ASgli:~r~ l)rovi~ivi~ 111 t~oi~g110111, iis ( t ~ l t i y r :  
astclll<. 
' (2)  A l:411:1,1l r I '~~~~lx~s t~ : i~ t ,  (v j i i l i* is i i~~~ t l i ( '  t n i ( 1 1 s  
OS I \ I L ~ I ( ~ L I Z ,  lil111111l :LII[~ I l ~ i t l l ~ I ~ ,  I I IC I I O I ~ L  l i i ~ i ~ ~ ~  
l~oi~ii( l :~ry id wl\i(#11 vo111tI 1111 1 I I P  L ! I I ( J  or (1io ( )XI IS ,  
fi=ot11 t,11(: j ~ i l~ ( ' l  i  111 ol' I ~ I ( J  I < (  lli(-l~:~ l t i ~ ~ ~ ~ '  1( I ( I L L '  ~ ) O S I ,  
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of the Khoja-Sale inclusive, on the 11igl;ll road fro111 
Rokhara to Bdkll-notl~ing to be claimed by the 
Afghan Ameer on the left bank of the Oxus below 
Khoja-Sale. 
' (3) Tlie internal districts ( 2f Akcha, Siripul, - 
I Maimana, Shibergllan, and Andhi ,  the latter of 
which would be the extreme Afghan frontier 
possession to the north-west, the des5l.t beyoilcl 
belonging to illdepeilcleilt tribes of Turcomans. 
' (4) The western Afghan frontier between the 
de~enclencies of Herat and those of ishe Persian 
I province of Khorassan is well lrnown, and need not 
P 
i h e ~ e  be defined.' 
I n  reply, Priilce Gortchakoff, on Deceinber 7, 
1872, forwarded a copy of a report which he had 
receive~l from General Kaufmaiin, md~erein tlie 
Governor-General of Turkestan disputed the Amir's 
i authority over Badalcshan and its clepeildent district of Wakhan, and also threw cloubts on Shere Ali's claims to the districts of Akcha, Siripul, l!taiina.i~a, 
Shiberghan, and Anclkhui. But in the meaiiliirle 
Russia had comnleted her meparations for the - - - 
iixvasion of Khiva, ancl it was necessary that she 
shonld do soinetlling to conciliate tlle Englisll, i i ~  
order that her military operatioils against that 
lcllai~at-,e might not be interfered with. Therefore, 
on January 31,1573, Prince GortchakofI' definitely 
aixnounceil the Czar's acceptczace of the northern 
frontier of Afgl~anistan, as defined by the British 
Cnl>ii~et, ancl therel~y forlnally agreed to a limitary 
line wllicli iieitlier England nor liussin sllo~zlcl cross. 
As this GIL:L~ settlement-so arrivetl at-co~istitutes 
u 2 
one of the most importai~t agreements between tllc 
two Powers co~icerning Central Asian affairs, and 
as it is the key-stone of the present political situa- 
tion, the Russian Chnncellol.'~ leticr is gil-en in 
extenso. It was addressed to Bnroii Br~ul~uow, Illy 
whom it was comm~u~icateci to Zarl Qra~iville 011 
February 6, 18'73, and was as follows :- 
St, P O ~ C P B ~ I I T ~ ~ I ,  J n n ~ l n ~ y  $?, 1873. 
'M. le Comt;e,-Lord Angustns Loftus lins 
coin~nuuicated to me the reply of Her Rritnn~iic 
Majest;y's Priilcipal Secretary of State to our 
despatch on Central Asia of the 19th of December. 
I inclose a copy of this documei~t. 
We see with satisfaction that the Englisl~ 
Cabinet continues to pursue in those parts tlie 
same object as ourselves, that of ensuring to tllellz 
peace, and, as far as possible, tranquillity. 
'The divergence which existed in our viexvs 
was with regard to the frontiers assigneil to tlie 
dominions of Shere Ali. 
'The English Cabinet iiiclucles witllin tllcnl 
Badkshan and W al~han, whicll, acc:orili~ig to 011 r 
views, enjoyed a certain inclc+peiitle~.~r:r:. ( : ;~IIL-  
sidering the clificulty ex~esiei~cecl in c?sf;:J,)lisliirig 
the  fact)^ ill all their cletails in. those clistJ:n~t p:lrl,s, 
considering the greater facilitks wl~ic l~  ~ l i c ?  Ilrit,isll 
Government possesses for collcctJng p~.c:c:isc! tl;~~.:l, 
and, above all, corisideri~lg 0111' ~rifill 1101, t o  give! 
to tllis quest;ion (3 detail gru",er i~nl)r)x.ta~~(o(! tlk:l11 
is due to it, we do not, I'(?~LLs(? to ;t(:i!(?l,!: 1.11(! ]ill(! 
boundnry lnirl (ZOMTII by IC~iglai~il. 
' We are the more inclined to tliis act of 
courtesy as the Englisli Government engages to 
use all her ii~flueiice with Shere Ali, in order to 
induce him to  maintain a peaceful attitude, as 
well as to insist on his giving up all measures of 
aggression or further conquest. This il~flueilce 
is indisputable. I t  is based not only on the 
lnaterial and moral ascendency of England, but 
also on the subsidies for which Shere AX is 
iridebted to her. Such being the case, we see in 
this assurance a real guarantee for tlie maintenance 
of peace. 
' Your Excelleilcy will have the goodi~ess to 
lnalte this cleclaration to Her Britannic Majesty's 
Frincipal Secretary of State, and to give Bin1 a 
copy of this despatch. 
' We are convinced that Lord Granville will 
perceive in it a fresh proof of the value which 
our august master attaches to the ma,intenance 
aild ~011~0lidatioll of the most friendly relations 
wit11 the Govenlmelit of EIer Majesty Queen 
Victoria. 
' Receive, &c. 
' (Signed) GORTCIIAEOW.' 
Such was the famous Agreement of 1873- 
sollietimes erroneously referred to as the Agree- 
ment of 187 2-and although Iiussiarl writers have 
frequently encleavou~~ed to revive the question of 
a neutral zone, and have tried to explain that tliis 
agreement merely cl.c%ned !;he uortherii limits of 
the Amir's do~ninions, ailcl in no way interfered 
witll Russia's freedom of action .cvith regard to 
Afgllanistan, the Czar's Goveriimenl have repeat- 
edly themselves to respect the integrity 
of Afghanistan, a i d  have frequently recognised 
tllat by this agreement they had bound themselves 
to abstain from ,211 interference in the affairs of 
that State. They have stated that while they saw 
no objection whatever to Bnglish officers visiting 
Kabul, they agreed that Russian agents should 
not do so ; and they have even gone so far as  to 
declare that ' IIappen what might, in the internal 
state of tllat country, the Imperial Government 
lvould not interfere ' ; and further, that ' 11 Eng- 
 land foul~cl it to her iiiterests to annex Afghanistan il
'j to tlie Inclian Government, tlie Russian Govern- 
I ,, ment woulcl not regard it as a menace to them, 
'nor would they endeavour to prevent it.' 
i' But although this agreement was satisfactory, 
so far as it went, the frontiers of the kingdom of 
Iiabul were clefined in such an ambiguous lnaliiier 
as to render it very probable that disputes would 
arise in the future; for while the central portioli 
of the frontier-from the month of the Kolrclis 
River to Khoja-Sale-was clearly marked b y  the 
course of tlie River Oxus, the eastern and western 
portions of tlle boundary were merely defilied in a 
general way, ~vithout 'any attempt being made to 
fix tlie precise boundary in those parts. Thus, 
the north-vestern ' territories and boundaries ' of 
Afghanistan-i.e., between Khoja-Sale and Persia- 
were said to inclucle the interiial districts of Alrcha, 
Siripul, Maii~lalia, Shibergllall, a11cl Allclkhui ; b ~ t  
the limits of those proviilces were not specified, 
and thus the frontier of Afghanistan in this direc- 
tion remained unde.lined except in so far that it 
was recogilised that those districts formed a portion 
of the Amir's dominions. Then, again, in the first 
clause of the Schedule, certain words were omitted 
by a careless copyist, and thus the clause was 
renderecl obscure and almost without meaning. 
The late Sir Henry Rawlinsolz who first pointed 
-_-_,_,-a.s ' .,,a. ~,.... , ". ,,, , ". , ,, .. .. d 2  
out s r r o r ,  stated that this first clause should 
read as follows (the omitted words being shown in 
italics) :- 
' (1) Badakshan, with its dependent district of 
Walrhan from Sir-i-kul on the east to the junction 
of the Kokcha River with the Oxus (or Penjah) on 
the west; the styeam of the 0~26s thus forming the 
iiorthern boundary of this Afghan proviilce through- 
out its entire extent.' 
He then claimed that, such being the case, the 
frontier line between Afghainistan and the Central 
Asian States under Russian influence sllould fol- 
low the course of tlie main streain of the Oxus, 
which rises in the Chak-Mak Kul, or Little Pamir 
Lake, and, after runling for some distance in an 
easterly clirection, then turns to the north-west, 
aiid under the nanie Alr-sn, circles round t.he 
elevated plateau of the Great Pamir, where it is 
joined by the Alc-Baital streain, from -whence- 
.under the name of tlie Murghab-it flows down 
tlle great Sl~ignan Valley, and uai~es with the 
soutliern l.~ranch of the Oxus :I,[; Kila-Walllar, 011 
the coiifiiies of ICosliaii ; and, . ill support 01 this 
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colltelltioii, he stated tliat tliis Mnrglinl) br:uicli of 
the Oxus was well kliowil to for~li tlie nortlierii 
boundary of the clistricl 01 Walchan. 
The wit11 wliicli llie iiosth-e:~sterii 
and llortl~-~resterli portions of the Afg1i:~ri fi'olitit?~ 
were definecl in tlie Agreement of 1873 Ii:~ve, :LS 
lni$t have becii espeoted, givclii rise to serious 
misunderstai~dilig~ l)etwceil the 13ritisli aiid 1tussi:ln 
Governlneill~. 111 1884, :tfler the ~iussi:uis oc:cu- 
pied Merv, they took ndvaiitnge of llie ilico~ul)lcte- 
ness of tlie setllenlent, scizccl several il11porl:ull 
l~o"tions wliicli hacl long beell recogliisecl :IS 
forming part of Afgliniiistali, nncl evciitu:llly 
gained possessioii of :L large slice of territory 
which undoubteclly beloiigccl by riglit to tlic Aitiir 
of Kabul ; wliile at tlie preseiit tiine, also, negotia- 
t,ioiis are bciiig carried on between Loridoil n11cl 
St. Petersbul*g regariliiig tlie north-eastern portioii 
of the frontier. 
The Palnir rogion is divided aiixong tlic 1)ctty 
States of Waklinn, Sliig~l:ui, ltoslinn, P ) ;L~w;L~,  :111(1 
Sir-i-kul. Of tlic?se, Wnklinii, Sliigiiaii, :~iiil I~OSII;LII, 
wit11 a, portion of Dnrtvnz, have long ibrliicil n 1):11*1, 
of Afgliaiiistnri ; tlic clistrict oS Sir-i-lr111 1 ,c!lollgs t o 
tlie Cliiriese ; and tlial l)ortioil ol' J):L~w:L% ~vlli(:l~ 
lies to tlie ilorlli of tlic Oxus is ilr~l)(~li~l(lllt, 011 Ilt)li- 
Iiara. Durirlg tile great &f:~l~oiiii~~o~l:tli ~ (! )(~lliot~ in 
tile wester11 provilicc?~ of (Iliilz:l, sl~tl wliilo Y:~lcool, 
Ucg v7ns all iiidcl~c~iiilil~it sovr!rci.g1~ iri 'l[:La]lg;U'i:k, 
tlie Cliincse nnt,ur:~lly lost, f l~ci r  lroltl ovclr 1,1~(! Silv-i- 
knl (listi~i(*l ; :~ri(l sit~iil:~rly, :~St(!r Sli(11~ A l i ' ~  cl~4:11I1, 



















S~lignaii, Roshan, and Wakhan mere left to look 
after tliexnselves. But after the Chinese had re- 
conquered the western provinces, their troops were 
once again sent into the Painirs, and in 1883 
Chinese posts were re-established tl~roughout the 
Sir-i-lcul district; and in tlie same year also the 
Amir Abdur Rahman re-occupied the districts of 
Shignan, R o s h n  a n  Wakhan. The ~ussimis a t  
once protested against this inovemeiit on the part 
of the Afghans; they denied that S11iglia.n and 
remained in possession. , 
I t  will be thus seen that the boundary ques- 
tion wl~ich the British and Russian Governments 
are now endeavouring to settle is a very com- 
plicated one ; and its settleii~ent has been rendered 
211 the more dificult oli account of the careless 
ornissioil of the line in the first clause of the 
Scliedule of the Agreement of 1873, and also 
because tlie English Foreign Office and India 
Office, by an extraordinary oversight, neglected 
to include Shignali and Roshan in the list of 
districts under Afghan control, although they 
.. nlust have known that such was the case. Tlie 
.complication, moreover, has been still f ~ ~ ~ t ~ l l ~ r  
increased by the I'lolrharan occul)nf;ioi~ of a l~ortion 
of Daraaz, wliich lies on the left 1:)alili of the 
I Oxus, and allicli tlle Russian C+ovornmc!nt: c1.i- dently intend to adhere to as n set-011' against llic 
Afgllnll occul~~t ion of Shignail al~il 1losli:ni. 
But although tlle cluestion is undulil.)teillg 
beset -wit11 diificulties, four facts rei~i:~i~i  1)e~fc:ctly 
clear, and these are : (1) It~lssia ~ailii~)i;, 1:)y : I I L ~  pas- 
sible interpretation of the clause in clllestion, lay 
claim t o  any influence over the ten*itoi:ics 1.0 [.he 
i. sout11 of tlle Sir-i-kul branch of the Oxi~s, :lid I'lus- 
: sian incursions into the countries to tlic soutli of 
~ 4 ,  that branch of the river can, tlzerefore, only 11c 11i:~ilc 
in direct violation of the Aiiglo-Iiussian Agree- 
ment ; (2) the Bokharan occupation of territory 
to the south of the main strea~u of the O s ~ s  is
totally inadmissible arid ur!justifinl~le ; (3) t.lio 
Sir-i-$121 clistrict to the east of 13ilrziln-;Jni, :ui(l 
PC~'---~ 
to the north of Lalie Victorin, belo~lgs to 0liil1:i ; 
(4) it would ilot Le clifIiculi; to prove liisi:toric.:;llly 
that Sliignan and Darivaz have loilg fi~nrlcltl :I 
portio~l af ~1ie 13:.~cl;~l<sli:11i ~~rc)vitl(x: of .~ISgl~;~ti is~:~t~,  
and the Ainir '~  clni~ii to tlloscl? dist1ricts ( : : L I I ~ L O ( ,  

















KULJA AND XASIIGAR 
Bolrl~a'an illdependence '--Petty native disturbances in Boldiar:~ 
-Tho Ieltandcr E d  Expedition-&i\jn snd its history-Affnirs 
of Kashgar, and the rule of Yakoob Beg-Russia11 occupatiou 
and annexation of ICulja perpetuity '-Ydiool, Beg dofies 
Russin-British relations with Knshgar-Russian propossls to 
Yalcoob Bag-Ksshgar and the Porte-Treaty of coimnerce be- 
ween the Indian Govarnlnent and Iiashgnr-I'rojected 12ussil~ii 
invasion of Ksshgar-Subjugation of Kashgar by the Chiuose- 
Rendition of Kulja to China. 
AFTER the capture of Samarlrand there was a brief 
pause in Russia's career of conquest and annexa - 
tion in Central Asia. By Kaufmann's rapid and 
\ successful campaign, Bolchara had been reduced 
to a condition of complete subjection ; for although 
the Amir nominally retained his position as the 
ruler of an independent State, he, in reality, be- 
came nothing more nor less than a feudatory chief 
of the Russia11 Empire. Had it beell necessary for 
the improvement of Russia's strategical position in 
regard to her designs against Inclia, the Czar 
could have annexed the whole of Mozuffer-Ecldin's 
dominions without striking another blow, for the 
victories of Cl~upan-ata and Zara-Bulak, together 
with the brilliant clefence of Sainarkand, had com- 
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pletely cowed the Bokharans, and made them feel 
tile utter uselesslless of coiltinuing the shruggle 
against tile great Muscovite nation. But it was 
well hllowli in  Russia that 110 such annexation was 
necessary, nor would such a step have been politi- 
cally sound. By permitting the Amir to retain 
some seii~blance of indepenclellt authority, the 
Czar's Government avoided the expenses of a 
niilitary occupation of the country, with its atten- 
clant dangers ; while they at the same time were 
able ,somewhat, to allay the irritation in England 
wliicll had been caused by their recent; advsilzces, 
by pointillg to their inoderatioil witli respect to 
Bokhara as a proof of their desire to abstain from .& 
fresh conquests. The Russiails wkU. knew that so 
far as the military situation was concerned, an- 
nexation would offer no adTantages; for from 
their position in the Zarafslian Valley, command- 
ing the water-supply of the city of BoUlara, they 
coulcl. enforce coinlsliance with all their demands, 
and could move their troops through any portion 
of the country without clifEculty or opposition ; 
and their strategical position was therefore just 
the same as tliough they had advancecl their 
frontiers to  the banks of the Oxus. 
They iliesefore decided-and decided wisely- 
that Bolrliara sliould not be arlaexed ; and they 
thereby, m~itliout losing any strategical advan- 
tages, avoided the dangers and eqense  of an 
occupation of the country ; while the Ellglish 
people-who would have been reduced to a frantic 
















actually advanced to the borders of Afghanistan- 
in their ignorance still cherished the belief that 
' independent ' Bolrhara lay between Russia and 
the kingdom o.£ Kabul, little dreaming that for all 
practical purposes ' Bokharan independence ' is 
but an idle phrase. 
But although the Russiai~s made no further 
advances towards the middle course of tlie Oxus, 
they did not reinain idle, but found ainple einploy- 
ment in the consolidation of their positioil in their 
. i~ewly acquired territories, and in ~nalciilg prepara- 
tions for . fresh campaigns. Mozuffer-Ecldin had 
rendered himself obnoxious to his subjects because 
he had concluded the disastrous peace whereby 
Sainarlcand and the ZarafshanoValley hail beell 
lost to Bolchara; and Russian troops had to be 
employed for the suppressioil of rebellion against 
the Ainir's authority, and for the subjugation of 
certain inalcontent chiefs who, having established 
themselves in the niouiltainous district to the 
south-east of Samarlrancl, kept the country in a 
constant state of disorder. Then, again, the rapid 
extensloll of Yalioob Beg's power throug1;llout East- 
ern Turkestan was viewed by Icauf~nann with the 
greatest anxiety ; the relations between Russia and 
the Atalyk Ghazi thus becarne daily mofe strained; 
and eventually the Kulja Valley was annexed, in 
order that it miglit not fall into the hands of the 
remarkable rules who lincl formed a new ai~il 
Sl;ate on the western borders of the 
Cllinese Empire. Nor were these the only irn- 
portant matters wllich occupied the attention of 
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tile Russia11 Governlnellt aft.er Samarkaild had 
been cill j t~red and Bokhara subdued. They clear-ly 
sate that the whole military positioil in Central 
Asia was a very weak one, ailcl that until Tur- 
kestan was in communication with European 
Xussis by illeails of some shorter and inore clirect 
line than the old Orellburg-Kazala route, the 
new districts would never, by their trade, repay 
the great military expenditure which had been- 
arid was still being-incurred, nor would T~~rlcestan 
make a satisfactory base of operations against 
Iadia. Several alternative schemes for the esta- 
blishment of direct communication between Tus- 
kestail and the Caucasus were therefore carefilly 
coasiclerecl, and i t  was not long before a Russian 
force landed at Krasnovodslc, on the east coast o l  
tlle Caspian, to prepare the way for the concluest 
of Kliiva, ancl for the final absorption of the wllole 
of tlie Turkoman country fronz the Gulf of Astrabad 
to Merv and the Oxus. 
I t  lias already been llientio~lecl that the greatest 
discoillei~t and restlessiless prevailed among the 
peolde of Boldiara for some time before Kaufina~zn 
invacled the State ancl seized Samarlrancl. Two 
parties had been in a state of open rebellion 
against the Ainir's authority, and disturbances 
liad broken out in Sainarlrand and in the cil,y of 
Bokhara itself, MozuKer-Eclclin having been pull- 
licly insulted ancl ill-treated in his capital. Tile 
loss of Samarkancl, ancl the disastrous peace vrrllicll 
11ad been concludecl with the Eussims, dicl not 
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l1lly 
before the general dissatisfaction manifested itself 
in a fresh outbretllr of popular feeling against 
tlze Amir, who was considered to have betrayed 
his country. The Katti-Tiura-who was then at 
Shahr-i-Sebz, and to wlzom tlze Beks of that place 
had transferred their allegiance-seized the oppor- 
tunity, ancl issued a proclamation declaring his 
father to be an infidel, and therefore quite unfit to 
rule the State. 
The reb,el prince then entered into negotiations 
wit11 the Turlcoinans, Klzivans, and Kirghiz ; ancl as 
the revolt soon began to assume serious propor- 
tions, Kaufmaiziz determined to talre steps to show 
the malcontents that the Russians intended to 
uphold tlie Amir's autlzority. General Abramoff 
was thererore ordered to take the Geld; Jam, 
Kara-tepk, Urgut, aizd Karshi were speedily occu- 
pied by Russian troops; aizd when tlie Belrs of 
Shdir-i-Sebz found that the Russian forces were 
closing round them, they sent in their subinissioil 
and the rebellion collapsed. 
As soon as this insurrection hacl been suppressed, 
Kauliaann was able to turn liis attention to the 
restoration of order in tlze mouiztainous district to 
the east of Samarlrand. Duriizg the disturbances 
which followecl the coriclusion of peace betwecn 
Moznfr'er-Erlcli~-~ and the Russians, the Amir lzncl 
nzarched n force into IIissar ancl Kulab-the two 
most casten1 clistricts of the lcllaiinte of Bo1diar.a- 
for tlie pnrpose of sul~cluirig die local Ueks, .cvlio 
llntl eililenvo~u.ecl to asserl their iilclepcllilcnce. 
Wliile so employecl, a portion oT tlic 13olrliarail 
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army had been detached towards the north to 
operate against Karategin, which was then a de- 
pendeilcy of Kholcand. Shere Ali, tlie Bek of the 
district, was driven out of the place, anrl forcecl to 
take refuge in Khokand ; and IOludayar I<ll:~n 
tllereupon c,omplainecl to Kaufilzalln of the u11- 
provolced ii~vasion of his clomi~liolls by the 1301;- 
11ara11 troops. Mozuffer-Bclilin, on being exposku- 
latecl with, triecl to prove that Sllere Ali hncl been 
secretly assisting the rebellious Belr: of I-Iissar ; but 
this charge could not be su.bstantint;ed, ancl Kauf- 
lnailn therefore ordered the Bolrllaran forces to be 
withdrawn, allcl suggestecl to Khuclayar t,llnt he 
shoulcl restore Karategin toits fornler rulel*,RIozuff:tr 
Sllall, wlio had been some time previo~zsly cleposecl 
and kept as a prisoiler in Khokalld. This was 
done, ailcl Kwategin was thus formed into a semi- 
indepencle~~t S ate between miokand ancl Bolrllarn, 
~vhile the Russians acquirecl smile considera1)ln 
influence over the affairs of the district. 
But Moznff~w Shah had not lorig 1,)een rcins[;nt cd 
when lie in his t ~ x n  illvacled Dolc11nr:ul ten*it;ory. 
nut, while mnl.clliiig to attack Hissay, llis t;rool~s 
~nutinied, ancl 1,roclainlecI a Innil ~1:~nletl I';L~(:~I:L 
.TIoclj:~ as 13ek of Karatcgill ; nilcl tlms in l,llc c:onrsc? 
of ,z i'ew ino~ltlls tlie Russi:nl nc.)ininoe ~1':1s (lrivc!~~ 
fronl Ilis tliroi~e, 2nd llle ml~ole (I! thc ICohist:~~~ 
c?:~sl; o S  S : L I I I : L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I . ~ ~ ~  was tliro~vil i111,c) :L st,:~t,t? ot 
tlisortlor. 
1.J1icler tllcsc! ci~-c.:iu~~stn~zc:c!s 1<:111 !III:LII n dol.r!r- 
xnin(!(l t.o s(?1~1 :LII (:xl)(!(li I,i( J I I : L I * ~  Ii,)~*(\e ~ I I I  o tali(! 
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i fitre M-liich was there being carried on, while at the 
1 
1 i 
same t,inle the opporlunity was talren of exploring 
the heacl waters of the Zarafsharl, and tlle passes 
to tlie south of Lake Iskailder Kul. 
General Abrainoff, to whoin the charge of the 
expedition was entrusted, occ~~picil Urinitan ai~cl 
Varsaminor, and destroyed tlie forts at Palilorak. 
IIe explored the Glacier of the Zarafsllan, and, 
alter two severe encounters with tlie enemy, re- 
t,uriIed to Samarlrancl. 
During Al~raiiioff's absence on this expedition, 
ilifliculties again arose between the Russiails aucl 
I l,he Beks of Shalir-i-Sebz. Priilce Urusof, with n 
detachmelit of Cossacks, llacl been sent out into 
the couiltry round Samarkancl to collect taxes, 
and while so employed he was attaclrecl by a l~allil 
o l  robbers, who succeeded in lrilling seine o l  his 
escort. In  conseclnence of Jura Bek, of Slialir-i- 
I Sebz, ref~~sing tlle Russian cleinancl for the sur- 
I render of the leacler of the band, an expeclitior~ 
i was pron~ptly sent apinst  him. Kital, was carried 11y assault on August 26, 1870. Sllallr iinn~ecli- 
i ntely surrenderecl witliout ofIbl-ing any resistance ; 
i r t i~il  Jura Belr a i d  Baba Belc-the two leading chief- 
tains of Llle clistrict-fled for safety to I(holcanc1. 
The twin cities we1.e tlien llanclecl over to the 
Amir, in order to eillphasise the great desire on 
the part of ille Enssiaiis to abstain from f~irtller 
Tlic l~ainc Slinlir-i-Sobs, or Grecn City, is nppliuil to tho twin 
citics of Shnhr end ICitnb, wliicll nro about Sour ~llilcf~ epnrt. Tho60 
two towns, with IL SOW of tho ecljncent villagos rind ct~ltivnted lielcls, 
wero Sorlncrly ~urroi~iiclerl by a, ~oessivc illttd wall, some fifty-tlirro 
inilus ia  lo~igllt, niid wcro L11oll k~lornll by the acullo of I<usl~. 
YO!,. 1. 1; 
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advances ; and Abralnoff's force returned to Saniar- 
Itand, a small detachment being, however, sellt 
once more into tlie Kohist~~ll to puilish tlie Belts 
of Farab and Maghian, who were believed to have 
been implicated in the attack on the Russiai~s on 
the lieights of Kuli Kalan during the Iskander 
Kul expeclitioii. The two places were soon oc- 
cupied, and were at once annexed to the Russian 
district of Urgut ; and in the followiilg year-1871 
-the remailling moulltainous districts were incor- 
porated into the Russian Empire as a portion of 
the province of Zarafsh an. 
Having thus briefly reviewed the Russian 
operations i11 Boldiara subsequeilt to tlie conclu- 
sion of peace between the h n i r  and his Muscovite 
neigllbours, it is now necessary to return once 
more to the consideration of Russia's movellients 
on the extreme eastern frontier of Ksuf~nann's 
?seat proviace. 
Far away in the very heart of Central Asia 
there lies a broad fertile valley, watered by a 
swiftly-running river and its numerous amuents, 
and e~icompassecl on the north, ewL, and soutli 
by an apparently endless succession of gigantic 
uiountain pealrs which are clothed in a inaiitle of 
everlasting saow. Tliis is the clistrict of Kulja, 
which once formed a portion of tlle ancient lcing- 
do~n  of Dzunga~ist ; and the name of tlie river is 
the lli. For lllaily centuries this well-favoured 
district hacl been the theatre of bitter iatertribal 
warfare ; and it  hac7. beell occupied in successiol~ 







lanlnl.- 1 I couiltries of Central Asia. In  the secoild century 
, ~ ~ l l t  1 i before the Christian Era, the Usun-who are sup- 
: Ilelrs posed by some to 1se the ancestors of the Suiones 
) ll:~vc! -were drivel1 out of Moilgolia by the Eluns, 
,IIS 011 forced to migrate to the Ili Vallcy, where they 
;:ulilcr setiled clowil and became a powerful people. 
111 c)(~- There, llowever, they fouilcl that they were much 
lissin~l lla~assed by the neighbouring nomacls, and in the 
-1S71 fourth century of the Christian Era they again 
i ~ ~ c o r -  i 
i migrated, and left Kulja to be occupied by the 
io11 CJT Uighurs-a Turkish tribe that descended from 
the ilortll and occupied the slopes of tlie Eastern 
11ssi:ul Thian-Shan range. After the Uighurs came the 
cttlcllu- I I<ara-Kliitai, and these again were coilcluered at, 
c+ovif,u I tlie coillineilcemeilt of the thirteenth century by C)II(+(: tllc Mongols. Wheil the great Gei~ghiz Khan died, 
! 
- - - 
l~nt*~l l  s Dzungaria, with other regions, fell to the &are of 
I ~ ; L I L ~ ' H  his son Jagatai, ancl liis successors held the country 
I 
uillil Timur made it a portion of his vast empire. 
1 Asia During the sulsreinacy of the Mongols, Dzuil- 
lty :1 I gari:~ was occupied by the three powerful Mongol I I I C ~ I ~ ~ S ,  tril~es of Tclioros, Hoshot, and Torgot, m~ho, to- 
sol~tll warcls tlie c,lose of the fourteenth century, formed 
g:ttlt I(! an alliance for the purpose of obtaining supreme 
I I ~  l ( ~  o f  power ; and after having overthrown the opposing 
Kl~l,i:~, f:~ctions, they hecnine predoininant tliroughout 
lii  ILF- Dzui~gnria. I11 the following ceiltury the Tchoros 
ivtar is tribe becaine separated into two branches-the 
*o11 r(v1 Tclloros nilil Durl~ot-and thcn the confederates 
I,! ril 1)ecnme I < ~ I O M T I ~  by the name of ' Durben Oirat,' 
S ( ~ , ~ S ~ O I I  F or ' four allies,' and extcnclecl idieir influence 
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Thus matters remained till the colllmencelnent 
of the sevei~teei~th century, wllen disseilsions arose 
wllicll led to the secession of certain petty chiefs, 
tvl~o, with their supporters, migrated to Siberia, 
m~11el.e they receivecl froin the Ta r t~ r s  and Kirghiz 
the ilaine of ' Kal~nulcs '--i.e., the remnallt. For 
the next hundrecl years Dzu~lgaria, under the so-' 
~rereignty of snccessive Oirat princes,' was the scene 
of almost, illcessai~t warfare ; ancl early in the eight- 
c:enth century the Torgot tribe was defeated by 
Tsevail-Rabdan, and forced to migrate to E11ropean 
Eussia, where it settled along the banks of the 
Volga. 1 x 1  1745 Galclan Tcliirin, the son of 
Tsevan-Rabclan, died, and was succeedecl by one 
of his sons ; but this prillce mas so011 xfter-wards 
murclered by his brother ; the murderer ill his 
turn was then killed by ~znotl~er b other, who was 
finally overtl~rown by two tribal leaders namecl 
ilmursalla hid Davatsi. These two conspirators, 
llowever, c~nar~elled, when the former ii~voked the 
aid of the Eillperor of China, and with the assist- 
ance of a Chinese army overthrew his opponent. 
China havillg thus acquired an influence in the 
country, hacl no illtentioil of abandoning it, and 
A~m~rsann thus founcl llirnself to be merely in the 
11osil;ion of a Chinese governor instead of being an 
iuilependent sovereign as he had expected to be. 
I-Ie Lherefore instigated his followers t,o rise ancl 
expel the Clinese forces ; but was defeated, arid 
fled to Siberia, where he clied in 1557. 
' T11ee.e were ICho-no.ltho-tsia (or Entnr Ihn-trcitsi), Zenga, 
Gfildan, Tsuva11-Ibnbdan, aqd Gnldoil Tcliirin. 
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The Chinese, a fhr  having gained this victory, 
deterinined to prevent a repetition of Lhe rebellion, 
and they tl~erefore. at once proceeded to indis- 
criminately massacre the reillainiilg Dzungari:tii 
population. This was done so completely tliat 
about 600,000 persoils were either lcilleil or forced 
to save their lives by fleeing from the country. 
By these drastic measures the Einperor of Cliiiln 
fo'ound llimself to be tlie liappy possessor of a fer- 
tile proviiice, but one wliich was en.lirely witliout 
inl~abitaiits, with the exception of tlie few soldiers 
who had efrectecl its subjugation. This diIliculty 
was, however, speedily surinounted by enforcecl 
colonisation. Agliculturists were sent fi.0111 East- 
erii T~u.liesLan, w l ~ o  became lino~vn ns Tarantchis 
(from tarau-i.e., millet) ; crimiiinls, callecl Tcl~alli- 
1)a11s, were de~ort,ecl from tlie prisons of Sou.tlie~-11 
Cllin:~ ; wliile mi1it:lry coloilics were ilrufl;c(l ~vliolc- 
sale hoill Mancliuria ; ancl tlius in a sl.iorL tinlo 
Dz~ulgaria  as re-iiillal~ited l ~ y  a iiew l~olplatior~ 
en~irely ullcler Cliinese subjecttion. 
Sonie years after this (in 1771) the ICnlinnlis- 
i.e., the Torgot tribe-wlio llad settled 011 tlie balllts 
of tlie Volga, linviiig heard of tlie clepopnlation 01' 
I)ziulg:u-in by tlie Cllii~ese, returlied thel.e, esl)ec:tilig 
i.o Liilil tlieilisclvcs iilaslers of the prosri~~ce oil their 
:~t.rivnl. Filulillg, liowcver, tllnf; tllc Cllii~~esc! wcrc! 
ill full 1)ossessioii of tlle corultry, Ilicy 1i:~cl 110 
:~Iter~lai;i\re 1.1uL Lo tei~cler tlieir s~1ln1iissio11, ~rli(:11 
i.liey \JTcrsc grnii~eil alids on tlie l~nlilis of tlie 'l'ekces 
:11lcl R~ulges Bi\~crs. 
Tlic ~ I U I ) I I ~ : L ~ , ~ O I ~  of 111~ clistric0 t'1111s t:c)i~sisicld 
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of a Ilamber of different tribes ; aiicl, in adclitioll to 
t,llese, allother new race gradually became setblecl 
ill tile Ili Valley during the Chirlese ~dgime. Tllese 
\\:erd tile Dungans, a hardy, telnperate tribe of 
&Jnllolllnleda~ls from the Chillese provinces of Shellsi 
and Bansu, who, on accoullt of their being Inore 
robust than the Cllinese, were chiefly einployecl as 
carriers. These people monopolised the carrying 
tra(Ie between China and Kulja, aild gradually 
settled in considerable nuillbers in  the latter 
i f Tile Cllinese appear to have relied to a great - 
exteiit on  the race-liatred between these various 
llatio~lcllities for the safe goveruinent of the provii~ce, 
as only a sillall n~zmber of regular troops appear to 
have been kept there. They, however, succeedecl 
ill carrying on the government for inore than a 
century, and it was not until the end of that 
periocl tliat general discontent began to manifest 
itself on accoullt of the oppressioli of the Cbinese 
oilicials. In  1836 troubles began. I n  that year 
there was an attempt at rebellion, which, however, 
was easily put down, when theleaders were executed 
or bailislled from the country ; and again, in 1860 
ancl 1863, other rebellions occurred, but these also 
were similarly suppressed. 
But the general insurrection of the Mallom- 
inedail po~ulat ions against Chinese authority was 
rapidly gaining ground tllroughout the empire. 
The Chinese garrison of Urumchi was attnclred 
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inhabitants ancl garrison. The Dungans, by the 
possession of Uruinchi, isolated Kulja from China 
proper, as the direct roads ran through that city. 
13ut tliey were not satisfied with this success, c211jl 
aclvai~ceil to Yuclia (Kut-clie), and also towards 
Knshgar, while at  the same time a force llloved to , 
Manas, thus threatening the 1l.i province. 
On receiving intelligence of their colnpatriots' 
successes, $lie Dungails of Kulja again broke out 
illto rebellioil in March 1864, bul; were again 
supl~ressed, ancl the Chinese Governor-General 
then despatched a strong force to attack the 
insurgents m7ho had advainced from Urumchi to- 
wards Mailas. The Chinese troops were defeated 
and driven back to Kulja, and this was the signal 
for a renewed rising on the part of the local 
Duugans, who were shortly after joined by tlle 
Tasantcliis. Ili (Mantchu-Kcrlja) and Bczyanclai 
were besieged by the Dungans, a i d  disturba~.ices 
Lro1.e out in Olcl Kulja. 
The Kirghiz now joined in the revolt, and com- 
meilcecl the Chiilese settlements ; aild 
event;ually the Dungans, fillding that the Chin.ese 
were incapable of cleciclecl action, grew bolder, ancl 
stormecl the fort of Baynndai i a  the spring of 1865, 
nncl, havil-18 captured it, illassacrecl the garrison ancl 
i a i s  Suiclun, Losigun, ancl Kl.1org.o~ were 
ill t u ~ r l  besieged, : i ~ ~ d  tl1e ill~sirre(.:tion spread to 
'I'arhngnl,ni, wliilc the siege of Ili dragged oil. 
MaLtws now appeareel to 1:)c in as hol~eless a 
coiiilil,ic.)l~ ii)s the Cl~inese ns can m ~ l l  be irnstgined ; 
l~at,  lhey scernccl ~lel;er~niuc~cl, 1~y misirianagelaeilt~, 
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t,o throw away every possible chance of success. 
The Kalinuks, who had hitherto held aloof, be- 
collling iilceilsecl at a Dungan attack on their great 
temple, took up arms, and iniiicted a severe defeat 
011 the rebels near Ili ; and if the Chinese had then, 
by diplomatic measures, taken advantage of this 
ivoveillent in their favour, it might have still 
l~eell possible for theill to regain their ascenclelzcy. 
They, however, by their ill-advised actions, suc- 
ceeded in completely alienating the Kalinuks, 
who interfered no more in the conflict, and on 
their clepa,rture froin Ili, the rebels resumed 
the siege with redoubled energy, and coinpletely 
surrounded the place, which was reduced to a 
state of starvation. Finally, in January, 1866, 
when the provisions had becoine entirely exhausted, 
a i d  hundreds of the garrison and inhabitants hacl 
died froin disease, the city was asssulted. Tlle 
rebels forcecl their way into the town, where ,z 
Ilorrible butchery took place, in which no consi- 
deration was paicl to sex or age, and the entire city 
was converted illto a disgus tiug slaughter-house. 
The c a p t ~ ~ r e  of Ili was a deathblow to Ohincse 
doiniization in the province, for i t  was sliortly 
fo l lo~~ed by the fall of their remaining strongholds 
in the izortli of the district, mrhere the Dungails ancl 
Tarantcliis became masters of the situation. Tlley, 
however, coulcl not long agree, s l i d  early in 186'7 
coininenced fighting among then~selves, to the 
ultiillate advantage of the Tarai~tchis. 
At the tiine when these disturbances m-ere 
taking place in I(ulja, tlie Russisn district of Semi- 
ss. 
K'- 
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retchinsk forniecl a porition of tlie Siberian proviilce 
of Seinipalatinsk. Russia at  that time was fully 
engaged in her advance towards the frontiers of 
Khokand, and was therefore not i11 a position to 
urfi.ertalse a forward policy i11 Kulja, with the risk 
of being clrami into a quarrel with China, and the 
I?ussiail frontier oficials thus maintained an atti- 
tude of strict neutrality, aild abstaiiied from all in- 
terference in the Ili Valley. In  July, 1867, however, 
I Senliretchiiisk was reinoved from Siberian control, 
F and incoq~oratecl in tlie nevly-forilied province of 
Turkes tan. This change resulted i11 the adoptiorl 
01 a new line 01 policy towards Kulja-a policy 
whicli was dependent i11 a large measure on Kauf- 
ilianil's dealings with the States on his south-eastern 
frontier. 
In the early ages, tlie territory kiiom~ii by ihc 
names of Ksshgaria, Alty Shahr, Little I3okliara, 
or Easter11 Turkestaii (that is, the country extencl- 
illg from tlie Alai Range on tlie west to Lob-Nol. 
on the east, slid between the K~leii-Luen ancl Thiail. 
Shall Mountains), appears to have been subject 
either to tlie Chiiiese or to some of the wander- 
ing tribes whicli iilliabite~l Mongolia. During tlic 
eiglitli century the cloctrines of Mahoiiiet began to 
take root in tlie country; but owing to tlie 1)rc'- 
dolnillaiice of Jjudill~isii1 the religion of tlie Prol~lic l 
at  Cyst inade but  little lienclway, ancl i l  was not till 
five ceiit,uries laler that Mohai~imedai~isi~i began l o  
ob tail1 tlie asceilclenc7y. 
Ilurillg llle fo~onrteelitli and fiftceiith centurichs 
several I c~nc~hc~~~s, or Seids, wlio wcre said to l ~ e  tlic 
I<ULJA AND I~ASI-IGAR 1868- 
clescendants of the Prophet, and who had the 
reputation of saints ailcl workers of miracles, all- 
pearecl in Easter~l Turkestan, where they were 
received with great respect and even entliusiasnl ; 
alld one of these men, ilamed Hoclja-Makhturini- 
Aziam, pined consiclerable renown as a theologian. 
After this man's cleatl~, his two sons, Iinain-Kalian 
arid Hodjn-Isaac-Tali, were treated with a siillilar 
amount of veneration, and from tics time the 
Hocljas (or Khojas) began to obtain a position of 
great authority through Kashgaria, which has been 
inaintaiiied to the present day. The followers of 
Imam-Kdian were called Ishldas, and the disciples 
of Isaac-Tali called themselves Isakias ; and sub- 
sequeiitly these branches becaine l~nown as ' White 
Mountaineers ' and ' Black Mountaineers ' respect- 
tively. These two parties soon became hostile to 
one another ; aild although at first their rivalry 
was confined to religious matters, as each becaine 
stronger and gainecl acU~erents, their clisseilsiol~s 
soon clevelopecl a secular turn, and eilclecl in a 
struggle for political su l~ren~acj~ .  
During the following centuries Kashgrzris was 
the scene or almost continual strife, uiltil, in 1865, 
it fell into the hailds of Yakoob Beg, the Khokan- 
ilian, who had been one of the 111ost prominent 
oppo~ien ts of the Russian advance on the Syr Daria, 
and Chinese supremacy mas entirely broken for 
several years. 
Yakoob Beg first entered the country as tlle 
' Batyr Bashi,' or coinn1ancler-in-c11ief, of a Hoilja 
claimailt to the tlirouc, ilailiecl Uuzurg I<han. Y ut 
vd~en the Chinese troops had been defeated, he 
struck out a line for himself, ancl after clefeating 
his foriner master in a pitched battle outside Kash- 
gar, was proclaiined ruler of the State. . He the11 
eilterecl upon a course of conquest, tvllich, in a few 
yeass, exteilcled his rule as far eastwards as Turhn, 
and to Kllota? ill.. the soutli, thus becoming in 
a short space of time one of tlle most po~verful 
sovereigns in Central Asia. IIe, however, never 
lost his inveterate hatred towards tlie Bussiails, 
and declined to permit their traders to enter llis 
clominion.~. 
There is no cloubt that the rapid successes of 
Yakoob .Beg causecl the greatest alarm to the 
Russian aul;liorit,ies, w110 could not watch tlle 
gromrth of a strong, independeilt State so close to 
their frontier witbout serious misgivings, especia!ly 
as the ruler of this State took no pains to conceal 
llis strong anti-Russian proclivities. At first, how- 
ever, they were far too il~uch occupiecl with their 
own operatioils against Kl~okancl and Eokhara to 
attempt any interference in Kashgarian affairs, am1 
when YaIroob Beg was proclainlecl suprenle ruler 
of Eastern Turkestan, they colltented tllenlselves 
with merely refusing to recognise llis position as 
an inilependent sovereign. 
Rut ill 1867 ma1;ters began to assume a di.Rer- 
ent asl3ect; for the R~~ssisi-ts b e e n  to ilisplay 
unwonted activity in tlie Nary11 Valley to the 
north of. the T1iia.n-Shnn Mountains, ancl, although 
they still refuseil to recognise liis status as an 
iiiilepen~lent~ prince, tlieg nevertlleless :~pl)lieil for 
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permission to coiistruct a bridge across the Naryn, 
and inake a military roacl across the Thian-S11an 
range. Yakoob Beg, homrever, einphatically refused 
I to grant this request; he clearly saw that the 
I construction of such a roacl would place Kashgar 
I at  the mercy of the Russiails whenever they might 
~vish to seize i t ;  ancl the Russians, being illucll 
irritated at the rebuff which they had received, 
I 
hasLily cornlneilced the coilstructioil of a fort ill 
tlie Naryn Valley, and began to make preparatioiis 
for an iilvasioil of Kashgar. 
This fort was coinpleted in 1868, aiicl in the 
spring of that year an enterprising Russiail traclel-, 
rlalllecl Kliludoff, set out from Vel.noye wit11 the 
illteritioil of proceediiig to the city of Kashgar by 
way of Uch-Turfan. He, however, had scarcely 
crossed the frontier when he was attncke~l and 
drive11 back ; but tlie Russian authorities speeclily 
I 
assisLecl him to collect ailother C ~ ~ R T T R I I ,  nlicl, llaving 
obtained a certificate hoin General Kolpnlcoffsky 
(the Goverilor of the district of Semiretclii~lsl~) 
to the erect that liis enterprise was a p ~ ~ r e l y  ~0111- 
lllercial one, he once more crossed tlie frontiel*, and 
on this occasioli succeecled in reaching Yalrool) 
Beg's capital. There he coinbinecl cliplomacy with 
tradc, aild by liis shrewcl concluct managecl LO l~c r -  
sunde tlie Atalylc Gliazi to enter into negotia~ions 
with tlie ~uss ians .  
I<hluclofr'relu~~necl to Vernoye in August 1868, 
accoi~lpariiecl 13y Yakoob Beg's nel?liew, S11:~ili 
Mirza, wllo b ro~~gl i t  with llim a lcttcr nclclrcssctl 
to General ICaufinaiiil. l~nufinnnn, liuwevci., ha(l 
just goi7.e to St. l?etersburg, after the conclusion of 
peace with Bolrhara, a i d  Iiolpakoffslcg, therefore, 
did not permit tlie Kashgarian envoy to continue 
liis journey to Tashkent. He replied to Yalroob 
I3eg's letter, and sent, tlie answer by Captain Rein- 
t l id,  wllo was also instructed to try to co11~1ude a 
corninercia.1 treaty wit11 tlie Atalyk Ghazi, and at 
the s3,1lie time to de1lzan.d the surrender of cer- 
tain I<il:gliiz ma~:auders, ancl tlie retnrii of soine 
111:isoliers wliom these men 11a.d captured. 
Reiiitlial was received in Ka,sligar with due 
co~lsiderntion, aiiil he was treated cluriilg liis stay 
in a liospitable manner. But his movements were 
closely watched, aild he was not allo~ved to visit 
other parts of tlie country ; and, on his return, he 
was forced to confess that he liad bee11 able to clo 
little or notliillg to remove the misunderstaildings 
ljetqreen the Atalylc Gliazi and tlle Russian antlio- 
~bit;ies. Shortly afterwards ICaufinaiin, wliile *in St. 
I'etersburg, received a report of Shacli Mirza's 
iuissio~l, axid gave orders for the eiivoy to be sent 
' t.o tlie Russian capital. 011 his arrival there, how- 
ever, Yalcool-, Beg's ambassador failed to obtain an 
nudielice of tlie Czar, ancl he therefore returned to 
I<asllgar in January 1869 without llaving bee11 able 
to a,rrive at ally satisf:~ctory settlement. Thus tlie 
relntions between Russia and Kasligar coil tinued 
ou their former unsatisfactory footing. 
During this l~eriocl Yakoob Beg hacl been 
consoliilating liis power over Westerii Kashgaria, 
ancl liad ste:~clily extended his a~tllori$ over tlie 
c:om~t,ry toynrtls the east. IIe at first, elideavo nred 
h 
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to enter into friendly relations with the Dungans 
and Tarantcl~is, but failing in this, he soon changed 
his tactics and picked a quarrel with them. At 
first t,lley succeeded in holcling tlieir ovn, but after 
occupying Karashar, Kucha, and Sairanl, he, in 
the spring of 1870, besieged Turfan, which place 
also s~urendered, to hiin, after a defence of four 
months, in July 187 0. 
As these movelnents appeared to be directed 
against Hulj a, the Russians at last determined to 
occupy that province, so tliat it might not fall into 
Yakoob Beg's possession. They tlnerefore occupied 
the Muzart Pass as a prelinliilary step to hold the 
Kashgarians in check while they carried out the 
annexation of the district. The Eussian authori- 
ties, however, considered it necessary to brillg 
forward some grievance against ?.he Tarantchis to 
justify their action, ancl this was easily obtained. 
During the revolt of the Dungans and Tarantchis 
against the Chinese, the Icirghiz llad (as has already 
beell inentio~led) joined i11 tlie insurrection, and 
from that time they carried on zt system of raids 
both in Russian and Kulja territory. This gave 
rise to mutual complaints between the Russians 
and Tarantchis, which were never satisfactorily 
settled. Tlle Tarantcliis repeatedly sent envoys 
to Vernoye to assure tlie Russians of tlieir friend- 
ship slid desire to retain friendly relations ; but a 
ready cause for Russian interference existed, al- 
though it is probable that the chief delinquents 
were Russiali Kirgl~iz, who took advantage of the 
unset;tlecl state of the border to conlinit their 
depredations, a i d  who then tool~ refuge in the 
momitains outsicle the IZussian territory. Yakoob 
Beg'mclvance to ICuclia atlcl Turfa11 having l~ronglit 
matters to a cliill,zx, tlie Ir'irgliiz raids were put 
forward as the imrnecliate reason for tlie 12ussiail 
advmce. , 
At the elid of 1870 Baroil ICanlbars was sent 
to IZulja, ostcilsibly for the purpose of coming to 
terms 1vit11 Sultan Abil Ogla (tlie ruler of the 
Tarxiitcllis) ; but there is reason to bclieve that it . . 
mas not iiitcilclecl that a satisfactory solution 
shoulcl be arrived at, and the negotiations fell 
t11rougli. 
On his return preparations for an advance 
were begun. On June 24, 1871, General IColpa- 
I i ~ f h l ~ y  left the town of Uorolihudzir wit11 about 
1,S00 ineiz, a1.d commenced a rapicl ailvallce on 
Kulja. On June 2s he defeated about 4,000 
Tarailtchis at Aliiu-tu ; a,ilcl two days afterwards 
nailled auother victory in front of Cllin-clia;.lio-tsi, h 
~vllich t o ~ ~ n  feu into his liaitds on t l ~ e  salile clay. 
011 July 1 lie occupied Suiilun, aiicl two clays later, 
vhile near Bavanilai, receivecl an embassy from 
Snlt,:~n Al~i l  Ogla, ~ d i o  forlllally tendered his sub- 
niission. In  the evening of the same day tlie 
Sr~ltnn arrived in tlie Euusi:~sl camp aucl ilelivered 
himself up, :~nd on t;hc next clay (July 4) IColptl- 
Ia,lrsl-y o~:eol:)iecl 1\Tnkj:~ just too late t;o prevent tile 
n1:lss:icl.e of ovc!r 3,000 131ulgalls nut1 Chinese, mllo 
Iiad l.,cto~l ~nercilcssly sl:~uphtc?~.c!d by tlic Tar.nnltcliis 
:IS soon ns tlwy he:lrd of tllc surreililcr. 01' tlicir 
(hlii(!f. 
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Kulja-or ' Dzungaria,' as it was called in the 
p~oclamatio~~-was sliortly aflerwarrls annexed to 
llussia ill an.d received tlie nanze of 
the Priiliilskaya Gubernaya,' or the ~overnillerit 
of Priilinsk. 'The Russian Foreign Office, however, 
ilnnlediately informed the Cliillese Governi~lei~t 
that the province would be restored , to China as 
so011 as the Emperor coulcl send a suficieilt force 
for the permanerlt occupation of the country, so as 
to preserve it from external attaclrs and to main- 
t,aill order among its turbulent inhzbitants. 
I t  is now necessary to return for a moment; to 
ICashgar to follow the fortulles of its remarlcable 
ruler. As direct relations betveen Russia ar1il tlie 
Atalyk Gliazi had been suspeinclecl, General Kauf- 
nlann turned to Khudayar Khan of Kliokand, in  
hopes tlmt that; chief might be persuaded to ntt,ncli 
Kashgar, and thus save Eussia the trouble ancl ex- 
pense of military operations beyond the Tliian-Sh:ln 
range. He tried to worlr on the Khan's vanity, alld 
e x ~ l a ~ i n e ~ l  how Yakoob Beg and his best lieutenar~ts 
11ad been his former subjects, nncl that, therefore, 
Kashgar slioulil form, not an iltdepeilclellt xnil 1.iv:~l 
ailministration, but a province subject to Iillo- 
lcancl. I<huclay,zr was tliel.efore urged to invade 
Easter11 Turkestan, and to add tlie comitry to 
liis cloininions. 
The Khan, however, liail no desire to be draurn 
into a clutirrel with his l~owe~ful  neigW,our. IIa 
ileclared that Yakool.) :ikg liacl given lliln 110 
olrellce ; and then wit11 hittcr irony llc l l o i ~ ~ ~ c c l  l;o 
the 1nap a1i.d sIiowed liow 1~liol~:~lid sll~llld extclltl 
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further towarcls the west;, ancl ended the matter by 
saying that the conquest of the plains of Kashgaria 
would be but a poor equivalent for the loss of 
Tashkent ancl I<hojent. He, however, promised to 
use his illfluence to persuade Yal.coob Beg to come 
to terrlls wit11 the Russians, and he therefore sent 
Sarymsalc Udaitclli with. a letter to the Atalylc 
Gliazi, counselling him to make peace with Russia. 
Yakoob, however, wvhile receiving the envoy with 
' respect, declined to enter into negotiations with 
the Eussialls, as they had refr~sed to aclc11o~7ledge 
his position as tlie ruler of an independent State ; 
aiid in reply to the suggestion that he should enter 
into cornn~crcial relations with Russia, he said, 
"he Xussians that have come here, into my State 
of Xashgar, loolr at these localities ancl become 
acquainted wit.11 the state of tlie couiztry ; ancl 
therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for 
tlley are cz treacllerous and crooked-minded people.' 
This defiant reply clearly demonstrated to Kauf- 
mann that the Atnlyk Gllazi was determined to 
insist on being treated as nil equal, nild that he 
llad no intentian of being frightened into granting 
any political or coiiiinercial concessions. 
Bnt just 't~efore t.he receipt of this bold letter, 
I(anf1narin llad llilnself written a, letter to Yalcoob 
13e.g tlircateilii~g x a r  if he did not meid liis ways 
:~nd enter into friendly intercourse with the Rus- 
siarls, in t , l ~  auile xllaiiner as hacl beell done by 
t;lle Khok:~ncIialls and Bokharnns ; ill other words, 
J<asllgar was to hccoiue subservient to Russia, 
o~llel+~;\risr. th(; c!onnt.19y ~ ~ ~ o l ~ l i l  .)e attac:kc?cl %nil 
Ylll , .  1. s 
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probably annexed. Nor was this an idle threat. 
Russia had fully deternzineil to go to war if nothing 
else would bring Yakoob Beg to reason. But, 
before taliiiig this hnal step, Kaufmaiin tried still 
once again to bring al~out the re-establishnient of 
cliplomatic, relations wit11 Kashgar tl~rongli the 
goorl offices of tlie Kliolrandians. ISe therefore ill- 
d ~ ~ c e d  Mirza Halriln to write a letter to a certain 
Kllokancliail named Alchrar . Khan, mllo had 
formerly held high ofice under I<huclayar Khau, 
but had since migrated to Kashgar, informimg 
him of tlie 12ussiall preparatiolls for the i~lvasioil 
of Eastern TurkesLan, and aclvisillg him to induce 
the Atalyk Glmzi to aclopt a more conciliatoryline 
of conduct. To this letter Alrllrar I-lhan replied 
t1.1at liis master Yakoob Beg co~isiclercd it was 
useless for the Governor-General to attempt to 
really desired to form ail alliance with lli111, they 
could send an e~nl~assy, when the envoys would 
be well received and the matter favourably con- 
sidered. < Tlle Baclaulet '-it was said-' does not 
ileily eit,her the power or resources of Russia, but 
as a brave man he places his trust iiz God, ancl will 
never refuse to fight, for he does not fear clent,li, 
and all he  aspires to is to die for the faith.' 
Thus, for the first time in the hisl;ory of 
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first izzove to erect a reconciliation. The Governor- 
Generd of Turlcestan lsegan to realise that he was 
confronted by a determined cliieftain whose power 
was claily increasing, and wlio might, unless pro- 
ljitiated, set hiillself up as tlle clzanlpioii of Tslam, 
anil incite the Mdioinmedai States of Central Asia 
to undertake a holy war against the Russians. 
Ile therefore decided to send a inission to I<ashgar, 
aiid i11 May 1872 Baroii Icaulbars set out froin 
Kulj a for Yalcool, Beg's capital, accompa1zied 
by an engineer, a topographer, and a merchant. 
Meailwhile, however, the warlike preparations 
were continued, troops were massed along the 
Iiussian frontier to the south of Lake Issik Kul, a 
military road was made across the mountains, and 
stores were collected at the Naryn Fort. 
The objects of Kxulbars' inissioil were threefold. 
JXe, firstly, was to acquire information regarding 
the country, aiid to ascertaiil if Yakoob Beg really 
was the powerful ruler he Tas generally supposecl 
to be. T4ien he was to endeavour to obtain a 
lnonopoly of the trade in order that the British 
might be shut out from comr~wrcial relations with 
the country. And, finally, he was to hiid out 
what the Atalyk Ghazi's inteiltions were regarding 
Kulja and Khokaizd. 
Russia at lhis time was very jealous of English 
interference in Kasligarian coneeras. Some few 
years previously-in 1868-after Hakoob Beg had 
established his position in the country, he had 
sent a man nained Mahon~med Nazar to tlie Pun- 
jaub to take nol,es of the strenglh and resources 
s 2 
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of the Indian Empire. Mr. Shaw, who was then 
in  Ladakh, then told this envoy that lie greatly 
desired to visit Kashgar, and after some little de- 
lay the Atalyk Ghazi's conseilt was obtained, and 
Shaw entered Eastern Turkestan in December 
1868, being the first Englishman who had ever set 
foot in that country. I-Ie remained there for three 
months as the guest of the Atalyk Gllazi, wlio 
treated him most hospitably and had several 
friendly interviews with him. While there, Mr. 
IIayward-who afterwarcls was murdered in t,lle 
wild country north of Gilgit-also reached Kashga,~, 
and nlthough this fresh arrival for a short time 
rendered Yalroob Beg suspicious ancl caused l1i111 
to detain the two Englishmen in a lrincl of honour- 
able captivity, the matter ended happily, ancl the 
iirst two English explorers of Eastern Turkestan 
returned to India in safety. 
While in Kashgar, Mr. Shaw had strongly 
urgecl Yalcoob Reg to maintain a representative 
in the Punjaub, ancl some months afl;er the E n g  
lishmen's return to Ladakll, the Atdyk Gllazi de-  
spatcbecl Alshrar Khan on an embassy to India, to  
urge the British Government to enter into coin- 
mercial relations with Icashgaria, and to send :L 
British oficer to his do~ninions as an oficial repre- 
senta,tive of the Indian Government. Lzl response 
to l;l.iis invitation, Mr.-afterwards Sir Douglas- 
Forsyth was sent as the first British envoy to 
Eastern Turlsestan. Accompaniecl by Mr. Shnw 
and Dr, Eenderson, he reached Yarlrancl in 1870, 
but there heard that; Y,zlrool-, Rrg was a ~ ~ a - y  011 tlie 
far eastern frontiers of hiis dominions, engaged in 
suppressing the Dungalls of Turfan ancl Uruinchi ; 
and, as nothing could be effected, the mission was 
obliged to retrace its steps in Septeilser 1870. In 
the followins year, however, Yalcoob Beg once 
illore sent Alcbrar Khan to India to renew his 
protestations of frienclsbip, entrusting him with 
letters to the Q ~ ~ e e n  a d Viceroy of India. 
Thus while the Atalylc Ghazi was persisteiltly 
refusing to negotiate with tlie Russialls througl~ 
tlie me~liation of the Kholcandians, he was opeilly 
clisplaying his friendship towards the English, and 
this fact, no doubt, greatly influenced Kaufinalln in 
his decisioil to send Baron Kaulbars to Xasligar. 
Wllen the E~~ss ian  artibassador first reached 
Yakoob Beg's capital, he was receivecl in Llie most 
corclial nianuer. At the first audience the Atalyk 
Ghazi said : Ye are guests sent to me from heaver1 ; 
sit up011 i11y knees, on my bosom, or. where ye 
like ; ' mid then a short time later, aft;e~: the 
Xussialls hail been show11 all Llie objects of interest 
ill the neigl~bourhood, and ha,d atteiidecl reviews 
of the Kashgarian troops, lle again said : I look 
upon the Eussialls as lily best friends ; if I dicl not, 
sllould I lmve sliowll you my rnililary power ? 
Surely iL is 1101; usual, even with you Russians, to 
make k l l o ~ ~ i l  011e's actual c,undit,ion to a possible 
enemy.' B ~ x t  when he f'o~uld t1ia.t bhe Russians 
were still continuing to mass troops on his north- 
eyn frontiers, his manner soon changed, and he 
cleclinecl to sign the proposed comrnercial treaty 
until Lhe warlike prcpnra~ions had been s1;oppetl. 
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Eventually, however, the treaty was signed on 
June 22, 1872 ; but Baron Kaulbars, in order to 
prove the coinplete success of his negotiations, liad 
it dated June 2 (old style, May 21) or St. Con- 
stantine's clay, and then wrote to Kaufmanii saying 
that, as a Inark of especial goodwill, Yakoob Beg 
had insisted on signing tlie treaty on that day in 
honour of Ksufinaiin's patron saint This, hoa- 
ever, was a little too much even for Kaufinann's 
vanity, aiid he therefwe, in forwarding the despatch 
to St. Petersburg, substituted the name of the 
Grand Duke Constalitine (the Emperor's brother) 
for his own. This treaty, however, remained a 
clead letter, and no good feeling sprang up between 
the two countries ; the mutual distrust continued, 
and trade languished. 
Soon after Baron Kaulbars had left Xashgar, 
Yalroob Beg sent his nephew Seid Yakoob Kllai~ 
-commonly called the Hczclji Torall-on a return 
mission to St. Petersburg, where the envoy was 
treated in the most princely fashion. After con- 
cludiilg his business in the Russian capital, Haclji 
Torah turnecl southwarcls, aiid after visiting Moscow 
and Odessa, he arrived i11 Coi~stantinople, from 
whence he relurned to Kashgar vi& the Suez Canal 
and Inclia. Wliile at  Constantinople this ambns- 
sador concluded certain secret negotiations wit11 
the Sultan, and i t  shortly afterwards became 
geiierally k~lowii that the Sultaii had conferred the 
title of 'Amir-ul-M~~miniii' on Yakoob Beg, who 
iii his turn acknowledged the s~ze~czinty of the 
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bearing on one side the head of Sultan Abdul Aziz. 
When this became known in Russia, the mili- 
tary party at once declared that such an illliailce 
'between the two Mahornmedal1 States constituted 
a great danger to the Russian position in Central 
Asia, and they clarnourecl for an expedition to be 
sent to finally subdue the haughty ruler of Kashgar. 
Rut at that time the Czar's Goveril~nent had decided 
to irlvacle Xhiva, and peremptory orders were issued 
that oper,ztions beyonci the Thian-Shan range were 
011 no accou~zt to be unclertaken; and thus the 
projected il~vasioll of Kashgar was once more 
postponed. 
The troubles about tlmacle meanwlzile continued, 
a i d  in 1873 a Russian caravan was sent to Kash- 
qar ~ i l d e r  a lnan ilamed Sornof, the clerk of a 
Mr. Pupyslle.X, who had large business coililectivns 
with most parts of Central Asia. 011 arriving at 
Kashgar, however, Yakoob Beg Hiiriself bought 
up the greater part of the goods, and proIlihited 
Somof from making any cominercial expeditioils to 
Yarlcand and Kllotan. This wl~olesale purchase 
of stores was a very astute move on the Atalyk 
Gl~azi's part, as thereby he gave tile Russinils no 
excuse for lingering at Kasl~gar ; but wheii pay- 
illelit was made the mercliant found that he re- 
ceivecl his l~ay  in Chinese coins at iz va1~1e fixed 
by the At,alyk G.hazi himself, urhich was con- 
siclerably above their real coililnercid value, aucl 
in this way tlle trader lost some 15,000 roubles. 
The Bussiali authorities I;ook LIP the matter, aucl, 
after consiilerablo clelky, Ynkoob agreed to pay 
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12,000 rou~bles, which was tile final amounl; claiinecl 
after the matter had been investigated by a com- 
mission at Tashkent,. 
In the meantime the English Government de- . 
cicled to send another inission to Kasllgar in re- 
s~onse  to Yaltoob Beg's second invitation ; and in 
tlie autumn of 1873 Mr. Forsyth once more set 
out for Eastern Turkestan, accompanied by Colonel 
T. E. Gordon, Dr. Bellew, and Captains Cl~apmal~, 
Trotter, and Biddulph. The learned Dr. Slo- 
liczBal also joined the party, and there was an 
escort of ten sowars, and one naiclr and ten sepoys 
of the Corps of Guides. On reaching the frontier 
district of Xanju, the embassy was joined by the 
Hadji Torall, who hacl pushed on by forced illarches 
as soon as he reached India, slid from this time 
he, by his tact and good-will, did much to assist 
Forsyth in the execution of his delicate task. On 
December 4 the mission reached Yakoob Beg's 
capital, and seven days later Forsyth hacl his first 
formal interview with the strange chieftain who liad 
become so famous tl~roughont the wild countries 
of CentJral Asia, and who, by his bold and clever 
policy, had inade ]sot11 England and Russia anxious 
to cultivate his friendship. Forsyth and his com- 
panions were received wit11 the utmost clistinction 
and cordiality ; they were perinittecl to i-nove freely 
about the country, and the IZashgzzrian oflicids, 
ancl even the comrnon people, vied with each other 
treaty of 
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towards the British Elchi and his staff. Through- 
.out their stay they travelled free of all expense, 
and Yakoob.Beg insisted on paying his subjects for 
whatever service they rendered to the members of 
the Embassy. 
On February 2, 1874, Yakoob Beg signed a 
treaty of coininerce vith the Indian Etoveriment, 
whereby the subjects of either State were tgbe per- 
mitted to trade freely a id  without restriction in 
the dominions of the other contracting party ; and 
on March 16 Forsyth took leave o f  the Atalyk 
Ghazi, and commeilcecl his return marc11 to India ; 
Colonel @ordon, with a portion of the escort, turn- 
ing westward to explore the little krlowl~ regions of 
the Pamir Plateau, which had previously been 
visited by only one Englishman-the iiltrepicl Cap- 
tain John Wood of the Indian Navy. 
T l ~ e  Xussians were by no means pleasecl at the 
conclusion of this commercial treaty between 
Ellgland and Kashgar, as they had no wish to 
see British traders colnpeting with theirs in t l ~ e  
markets of Eastern Turkestan. They therefore 
coilsidered it necessary that immediate steps should 
be taken to increase their influence in Yakoob Beg's 
dominions, ancl for this purpose Coloilel Reirithal 
(the same oficer who visited Kashgar in 1868) was 
sent to demanil that Russian consular agents shoulcl 
be permitted to resicle in the chief cities in Kash- 
garia, But Yakoob Beg too clearly realisecl the 
dangers which would follow the estdslisbnlent of 
suc11 Russian agents in his clominions, a i d  he reso- 
lutely set his face against any such collcessions. 111 1 
1 
1 
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Article 111. of the Coinmercial Treaty of 1872 it 
had been stipulated that ' Xussiail merchants shall, 
if they desire it, have the right to have commercial 
agents (caravan-bashis) in all the towns of Djety- 
Slialir (i.e. Kashgaria), whose busiiless it is to watch 
over the regular courts o:F trade, ancl over the legal 
imposition of customs dues,' a i c l  Iieinthal contenclecl 
that this clause was intended to mean that Russia 
could appoiilt colxular a.gents in tlie chief towns 
of Yakoob Beg's kingdom. Tlie Atalyk Ghazi 
would, liox~ever, permit; no such construction to 
be placed on the article in question. A caravan- 
l~ashi-as both he and the Eussians knew full well 
-nieans the leader of a caravan, wlio is gene- 
rally an uneclucated ancl unimportant personage, 
vr~ho merely looks after the personal affairs of tlle 
traclers. He llacl no iliteiit8ion of permi1;ting this 
personage to be supplanted by a prying Aksalcal 
or Mirza, who would foster intrigues and fo'oment 
rebellion against llis authority for the advancement 
of Bussia's aggressive designs ; and he therefore 
rejected Reinthal's proposals, ancl the Russian am- 
bassador was forced to returii without a vestige 
of success. 
On his return tlle Turlrestan authorities decided 
that force shonlcl be used to remove the ol~jection- 
able rulel- who llacl so ofLen thw-artecl their clesigi~s, 
a ~ i d  had even ranclereil them riiliculous in the eyes 
of t 'l~e other chiel's in Cenh-a1 Asia. I're1)nr:~1,ioiis 
~n:se, tilerefore, o11c.c illor(; 1n:lcle for co~ninei.l(;i~~g 
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nussiall mission was sent to Khokand to obtain 
Khuda~rar Klzan's consent to the passage of a sub- 
sidiary column through his dominions, in orcler 
that Kashgaria might be simultaneously invacled 
from the north ancl from tlze west. But, as will be 
subsequelltly clescribed, a serious rebellion broke 
out  in Kllokancl, when Khuclayar was driven out of 
his dominions, and bands of Khokandians crossecl 
the Russian frontiers ancl even threatened Tash- 
kent and Khojent. Thus the projected invasion of 
Eastern Turkestan was turizecl into an attack on 
Kholrancl, which resulted in the anllexation of that 
province to Russia. But even after the concluest 
of Khokaizd the relations between Yalcoob Beg ancl 
tlle Eussians still colztinuecl to be most unsatis- 
factory ; and Kauf~nann was seriously medi.tating 
a n  invasion of Eastern Turkestan, when events 
occurred which rendered such a step unnecessary. 
The days of the reinarlcable Atrtlyk Ghazi, or 
Anzir of Kashgaria, were fast drawing to a close, 
ancl China, by once more establishing her authority 
througllout the countries to the south of the Tliian- 
Sllan range, cleprivecl Russia of any further excuse 
. for interference in Xashgarian affairs. 
I n  the autumn of 1876 messengers arrived in 
Knsllgar, briilging to Ynlcoob Beg strange ancl ter- 
rible news from the north-eastern frontier of his 
clominions-strange on account of its veyy nnex- 
pecterlness, and terrible to the Atalylr Gha,zi, be- 
cause tlze message thus brought clenrly proved 
that tlle Xluperor OF China had, after many grears 
of apparent fo~~getfuli~css, once more turned 14s 
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attelltioil towards the West, aiid deteriiiined to ein- 
ploy the whole strength of his Einpire to overtllrow 
the usurper, and to re-establish Chinese supremacy 
througliout Eastern Turkestaa. The iiitelligelice 
thus suddenly brought to Kashgar was to the effect 
tllat a large Chinese army, under Tso Tsung Tang, 
llad appeared iii the country to tlie north of tlie 
Thian-Shan range, and, after capturing Uniinclii, 
was closely besieging the town of Maiias, while a 
subsidiary force, uiider another Chinese general, 
C11aiig Yao, was i11 possession of Hainil, to the 
south of the mountains. 
The Atalyk Ghazi at  once nerved hiinself for 
the conflict, and hastily collected an army of some 
i 17,000 men, he inarched eastwards to do battle in 
defence of his kiiigdom. 
Be occupied the towns of Turfaii aild Tolcsoun, 
on tlie extreilie eastern frontier of Kasllgaria, aild 
there halted, after detaching a sillall force of 900 
inen aild two gmls to the village of Devanclli, at; 
tlie southern entrance to the Devan Pass. But 
here he was fairly caught in a trap. Chailg Yao, 
in the middle of April 1874, seized tlie towns oS 
Chightain aiid Pidjall-1, to the east of Turfail ; and 
t.hen a siniultaneous advniico was illade by the 
Chinese al-inies from the north and easl;, which 
soon resultecl. iii the coiliplete overthl-ow of the 
Atalylc Gl~azi's army and his headlong I-light 
towards ICurlaj, where-on May 1, 1877-he was 
assassinated by Eakim Khan Torah, the chief of 
Kucha and son of his old Illaster and s~zbsecjuent; 
eiieiny, Buzurg Khan Hodjn. Tlius ended l11a 
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career of this ren~arl~able soldier of fortune, who, 
without birth, power, or even any great amount of 
genius, constructed an indepeildent rule in Central 
Asia, and maintailzed it against many adversaries 
during the space of twelve years.' 
After some months' halt in the neigl~bourhood 
of Turfan, the Chinese asmies again began to move 
forward in August 1877 for the complete subjuga~ 
tion of Kashgar. 
i All hope of resisting bhe invaders v,misl~ecl, r; 
and after an absence of fourteen years, the Chinese 1 
regailled complete asceildellcy over tlie whole of 
Easteril Turkestan. By this remarlcable campaign 
China thoroughly vindicated her r0ight' to ta,ke 
place as one of the t411ree Great Powers of Asia, 
and clearly demonstrated to the startled politicians 
of Europe tliat she is a potent factor in the Centmi 
. .J 
Asian Question. 
As soon as the Chinese had thus firmly re- 
estal~lishecl tliemselves in Eastern Turkestaiz, the 
Emperor determined to remind Russia of her pro- 
mise to restore Kulja to China as soon as the 
Pekin authorities co111cl send a force su~cient ly  
strong to maintain order in tliat province. Such 
a force had undonbtedly established itself ill 
k ' a ~ h ~ r i r t ,  aiid Cllilia now was perfectly capable 
of f~~lfilling the Russians conditions wit11 respect to 
Iculjn ; axid TYO T S U I I ~  Tang therefore preferred a 
forsnal delnand that the Ili Valley shoulcl be hanclecl 
over to him. This request;, thougll by no means 
mlexpectcil, ~ r n s  ncverl;l~eless ~nlost annoying to the 
:Itussin~ls, :111il I,llc!y plr~inly showeil tliat t . l q  l1:~il 
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110 intention of quietly abandoning one of their 
richest in Central Asia. Eventually, 
after some months' delay, a high Chinese official 
riamed Cllung Hao was sent to 81. Petersburg for 
t l ~ e  purpose of arriving at an amicable settlement 
of the clifficully ; and in Septenlber 1879 this 
anlbassador concluded a treaty a t  Livadia, aherein 
it was stipulated that a portion of the Kulja 
province mras to be restored to Cliina, Russia liow- 
ever retaining the Telres TTalley and the passes of 
tlie Tl~ian-Shan leading into Xastern Turlrestan. 
Cliiila was further to pay five million roubles to 
defray the expenses incurred in the temporary 
1 
1 occupation of the country, and as indemnity to 
: tlie Russian traders for losses incurred through 
Y 
Mdiommedan revolts and the oppression of the 
Cllinese officials. Tlie treaty also contained clauses 
granting to Russia some important trade privi- 
leges, and some imporlant references were also 
nlade to tlie boundary line between Khokand and 
Kashgaria. 
Chung Hao returned to Pekin early in January 
1880, but on his arrival there he was greeted with 
a perfect storm of popular indignation. He was 
declared to have betrayed his country, was de- 
prived of his State offices, and was handed over to 
a competent tribunal for trial and punishment. 
On January 28 the comn~ission recommended that 
lie should be disnlissed from the public service ; 
and he was then cast into prison, an orcler being 
sliortly afterwards issued for his decapitation. 
Marquis Tseng, the Chinese ainbassaclor to Eng- 
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land, was then appointed special ambassaclor to 
*,he Russian Court for the negotiation of a fresh 
treaty, as the Chinese Emperor absolutely refused 
to ratify tlie Livadia Convention. Russia, how- 
ever, declined to resume negotiations uilless Chung 
was first parcloi~ed and set at liberty; alld for 
lllany months the relations between the two coun- 
tries were very strained. 130th parties made ener- 
getic l)reparatiolls for war ; Chinese. arluies were 
lllassed along the Amour and 011 the frontiers of 
Kulja, while the Russians in turn pusllecl forwal-d 
reinforcements to the Ili Valley ; and for a tinle it 
seemed as if nothing could prevent the outbreak 
of a tremendous struggle between the Chinese and 
' the Barbarians of the West.' All the foreign 
am~assaclors at  Pekin, however, support;ed the 
Russian demand for Cllung Bao's accluittal, and 
finally-on August 13-an orcler for his release 
appeared in the Pelrill Gazette. The negotiations 
between Russia and China were then resumed; 
hnd after a lapse of what, under the circumstances,. 
may well be consiclered a very short period, Tseng 
succeedecl i11 iiiclucing the Czar's Government to 
agree to the rendition of the whole of the Kulja 
province, except a small and unimportant portion 
which was t o  be used as a refuge for such Dun- 
gans as might clesire to reinnill nnder Russian pro- 
tection. In  other respects th.is treaty differed but 
little horn the previous one which hacl been nego- 
tiated by Cllung Hao ; but the Cl~inese liad inacle 
up their mi~iils that ICulja sliould be recovered, 
,zrl.il, oilcc thu,t 1)oint hacl been gai~iecl, the naLional 
seiltimeilt was satisfied, and they paid but little 
heed to the other points. 
Tseng's treaty was collcluded at St. Petersburg 
on February 12, 1881, a id  was ratified within six 
moaths, but; it was not until tlie spring of 1883 
that t l ~ e  Russiails fii~ally evacuated the Ili province, 
Early in March of that year the garrisoils were 
marcliecl across the newly-rlefined frontier into 
Russia11 territory, leaving a small cletacllmellt of 
Cossz~clrs in tlie town of ICulja for the protection 
of the Russian Consul ailcl traders in that place. 
They, however, llacl scarcely lefl; when trouljles 
brolre out amorig the tribes, wllo were by no means 
friendly to the Chinese, a11d serious disput;es also 
occurrecl between the Chinese and Russian frontier 
officials, owing to tlle Russians having a~lvai~ce(l 
some five miles beyo~ld the boundal~y line as iisecl 
by the treaty. Tlle matter was, llowever, sooil 
arrangecl, the delimitatioil of tlie new frontier was 
speedily conclucled, and a protocol was signed a t  
Ch~lguchak on October 19,  1883, by the plenipo- 
























CONQUEST O F  KHIVA 
OCcuPRtioll of Rrasnovodslc and its objcct-Gortchalcoff's esplann. 
tiolls to Grmt Britain-Protestfitiolls from tho IU1a11 of IllGvrt 
and the Persian Gove~nmeat-Iiirglliz insurycion--Sloeleff 
and RIarlrozo8's recon~~aissances-Council a t  St. Pctersbnrg- 
Advance to ILhiva alldmarcli of tho l3t1ssisn columns-Disasters 
of MarlrozoCf's column-Bombardmel~t of Iifiiva-Surrender of 
I i l~iva and IC[ia~zfmaim's triuml~hal entry-Treaty of peaco- 
Reaction in England against Rusuin. 
SIIORTLY after the capture of Samarkaild, a n ~ l  while 
t,lle Russians were engaged in restoring order in 
the Khanate of Bokhara, ailcl in subiluiilg the petty 
Relcships in the lnountaiilous dislricts round the 
heed-waters of the Za~afslian, altllotlier inzportant 
liioveillellt was beiilg lilade far away to the west. 
I11 Noveiilber 186 9 a sliiall Russian detachment 
cl~lietly left the port of l'ctrovsk, a11d shortly after- 
wards lailded at ICrasnovoclsk, on the eastern shores 
of the Caspian Sea. Tlie force which thus estab- 
lished itself at the mouth of the a~lcielzt bed of the 
Oxus was mlclel* tlie coinllzand of General Radc~sl~y,  
the oficer ~vlzo dterwarcls distinguished himself by 
his successful oper~tious in the Sliiplra, Pass during 
t,lic last Russo-Turkish war. A site was at oiice 
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selected for the constructiol~ of a fort, and as soon 
as the garrison had been properly established, 
Racletsky returned to the Caucasus, wllell the com- 
inaiid clevolved on Coloilcl Stolietor, who nfler- 
wards led tlie Rl~ssiaii missio~i to Kabul in 1878. 
This occupation of ICr~zsnovodslr, though appn- 
rently iilsigiiificallt in itself, was nevertlleless an 
act of the very greatest importance, for thereby 
Russia initiated the nlost iinportal~t movement in tlie 
whole of her great scheme for empire in Central 
Asia-a movement whicli has not or11y resulted 
in the coi~ileclioil of Turlcestaii wit11 the Caucasus 
and the co~isoliilatioil of Russia11 power in Central 
Asia, but  ~vhicll has brought the Czar's troops 
within close striking clistailce of the inost vulner- 
able portion of Afglianistan. I t  is well, therefore, 
to clearly uriclerstalld why this 1x0~-e was macle, 
and to consicler tlie reasons which iiiduced the 
Russia~is to deliberately occupy a position oil the 
eastern shores of the Caspian, where they woulcl 
assul-eclly come into collision ~vilh the warlilce 
Turlcoman tribes who iilliabit the countries be- 
t~veen Pcrsia ancl tlie River Oxus. 
While the Russians were aclvailcing along the 
Syr Daria from Port Aralsk tlowarc1s Tashlreill ailrl 
Samnrlrnnd, tlieir position in Centra1" Asia. was one 
of consideral~le strategicsll weakness. Reinfort:e- 
ments could oidy reach Turkestan from Orellburg 
after great delay ancl t,oilsoine mczrches across tlie 
Steppe" a11c1. 11ad ally serious tlisaster occurrccl 
to the Russian arms, it  would liave ine.iritd)ly 
been followeil by a coinplete collapse of RiI~~sco.iri~r, 
- 
supremacy in tlie couiltries to tlie south of the 
Kirghiz Steppes. l'llus it was clear that, for 
military reasons done, it was illost necessary tliat 
Turkestan slioulcl be liukcd to European Russia by 
me;ms of some shorter route than the olcl Orenburg- 
Kazala line. Then, again, tliere were financial aalld 
administ,rative reasoils for such a step. I-Iitherto 
t,he Czar's Asiatic provilices liacl been a coilstant 
(Irain 011 the resources of the Empire. Vast suii~s 
hacl bee11 expended in fitting out tllc ex1)editionary 
forces which were net:cssary ibr the coilcluest! of 
the country, arlcl constant military expencliture 
was neecled for t;Lie rnaiilleilailce or gal.risons at 
the innill stral,egic:~l points in tlie newly-act~uirecl 
territol-ies. A11 this t,inie but litllc or 110 revenue 
was rcceivecl, anil it was clPar tliat uiltil a short 
and safe tdl-ade ronte coulil 1 )c established be1 ween 
Europe ailcl Central Asi:~, tlic Char's Govrrniiie~lt 
coulcl expect lo gain 110 profit from llie oc,cup,ztion 
of tlieir ilem l~rovinces. Anil, finally, there 11~3s 
the cyuestioii of oa'ence to l ~ e  coi-tsidercil as well 
as defence. Tlle Turkestail armjr could never be 
of any use for nil attack on Iiiclia until i t  could 
readily receive rein~orceincnls aiiil supplies from 
European Russia ; ailil as tlie possibilit,y of a11 
attack on Indi:~ lins never heen lost sight o l  in 
Russia, this point ur:cf:ls no doul~t c:~rcr~illy consitl e~ecl 
wlien tlic cluestion of 1)ctLer c;c)mnimlicntioi~ ~ v i t l ~  
r i  1urlresl;:ul c:urlc 1.0 I)(? iliscasseil. 
A ~ ~ : L I L C C  :kt tlie mnl) will sliow l,lint, the sliortest 
line of conlitrn~iic:ntio~l l ~ c  twec~l Eul-oy e:~n l:ussi:~ 
ancl tlic linssiail ~)roviilcc!s in C!erltrnl Asia ~voulil 
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start from some point on tlie east coast of the 
Caspian Sea, and must pass either tlirough the 
Khal~ate of Klliva or through some portion of the 
adjoining territory wllicli is inhabited by tlie 
Turkomans, some of wlzoln were sul2jects of tlie 
Khan of Khiva. But the greater portion of this 
tract of country is nothing better than a barren 
sandy clesert wliich appeared to offer an allnost 
' 
insurmoulltable obstacle to any advance in that 
direction, and it can well be unclerstoocl why the 
Russians for some time hesitated before they 
seriously set to work to open up communication 
with Turkestan by a direct line from the east; 
coast o f  the Caspian. In  1868, however, Clenerd 
Romanoffslcy brought out st pamphlet on Central 
Asian affairs, wliich attracted a considerable 
amount of attention in Eussia at the time, in which 
he pointed out tlie urgent necessity of at once 
establishing direct communication between the 
Caucasus and Turkestan, in order that the military 
resources of the southern province might be utilised 
in Central Asia. In  this ~ T O C ~ Z L T G  Eomanoffslcy 
suggest;ed three alternative routes which might be 
adopted, viz. :- 
I. From Krasilovodsk along the ancient bed of 
the Oxus to Khiva. 
2. Prom the moutli of the River Elnba round 
the nortli of tlie Sea of Aral, to Kazala on the Syr 
Daria. And 
3. Across tlie Ust-Yurt plateau, tl~roug.1~ Khiva 
to the Oxus.' 
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ITe lliillsclf recoi11i11cil<le(l tlie adoption of t,lle 
tliird line ; nlid tl1eI-e is no doubt that the first and 
last were tlle 0111~ two ro~ztes which \Irere ever 
seriously coilsidered by the Russian :lutllorities ; 
for tlle line from the Eillba round tlie iiortllerll 
sllorcs of tlic h : ~ 1  se:t was a long aild circuitous 
one, :lilt1 consiilrr:d~le outlay woul(1 llave beell 
retluirchtl to l)rovi(lc water ill the portiolls on tlle 
sl;irl,s of t,lie li:u':~-Iiuii~ snnrls near the nioutll of 
l i e  1 After sc~lilc consiclerntion the R,~lssi:lll 
Goveninient rlcc:it'led to 111:~lie I~rnsnovotlslc tlie 
s~ , :~r  1 i~ig-l)c ~i i i t  for tlie ilcm ro~zte to Central Asia, 
:~11tl t l~us,  as h:1s beell ~nentioncd, a force sailed 
:~cl.oss tlie Clas11i:~n ill Novcnlber ISGO, and occu- 
l~ictl tliat 1)l:~cci. 
N o w  i t  will 1)e ~vcl l  to p:tnse and inquire ~ 7 1 1 ~  
tlie Clz:lr's nilviscrs selected Iiras~lovoilslc as tlle 
~vcstclrii teniiilius of the propose(l route to Turlce- 
stall, iilstc:lil of : ~ d o l ) t i ~ ~ g  tlie more northerly line 
across ~ h c  Ust-YilrL pl:lteau, wliich woul~l have 
beell sliorter nrltl woultl also Iiave been safe f'rom 
11:uilr :~tt:lc:ks fi'om the (lircction of I'ersia. I t  must 
1 ~ :  l~orrie ill i~liiltl lllnt ill Llie year of grace 1SG9 
1111 t lit t lcl -\\.:is lruo\~ii  cr ~uceniing the regions to 
t 11~: nor  tll ol' l'c*rsi:l, :iii(l 1 hc! gc>ilc,ml googral)l~y 
of ( I 1 i s :  i s  ~ i t  1 ~ i l s t o l .  Tlie 
lC~i(:lisli, lio\vtlvcJr, l i ~ i t ~ i i ~  of (11~1 t1sislellc:e of liliivn, 
:~11(1 1 i~y  l~t~li(ive(1 tli:~t, lt~~ssin's o1)ject ill l:~~i(liiig 
I I ~  I ' r i l ~ c . c i  I ; ~ ~ r i ~ ~ l i l i * ~ l r y ,  t v l l o  t i u f ~ c ~ s l r t l  l l r ~ ~ t  n r l ~ i l w l ~ y  ~ l ~ o i ~ l d  110 
~ + I I I I S ~ I . I I ( . L ~ I I  111~1.11q I 11111 U h t . T l ~ r t  ~ I ~ U ~ ( \ I L I I  L ( ~ L \ V O I ~ I I  t110 hIcv.tvii- 
li11li111, I;;,) (111 t l ~ t *  ( ' 1 i q 1 i i : i l l  1 ~ 1 1 1 1  ( ' I I ~ ~ I * I I ~ ~ I I I ~  Ihy 011 1110 A r 1 1 1  SCIL. 
t l ' I ~ ~ .  I * ~ I ~ I ~ I I ~ ~ ~ ~ I I I  1 1 1 '  1 1 1 i & +  ~ I I ' L ! ~ I ~ I & ~  l 1 1 i 1 1  f i l l*  t-01111: Z O I L M  L C C ~  B O Y ~ O I ~ H I Y  
c c ~ i ~ t i * ~ i ~ l ~ I : r t c - ~ l  1 5  1111. 1i11t:t,ira11 ( ; ~ \ ' ~ ~ I ~ I I I I I I ~ I I ~ .  
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on the eastern coast of the Caspian was in orcler 
tliat she might obtain a inore coilveilieilt base of 
operations froin ~vhicll Khiva could be successf~~lly 
attacked. Sucl~, no doubt, was partly the object 
of the occupation of I<rasnovodsk ; but, altl~ough 
t.he English peol~le clid not know it, Russia had 
ailotller and more importallt object in view wllicli 
could not 11ave been attained if the Ust-Yurt line 
had been adopteil, and if a point on the Mertvii- 
K~~ l tu l r  Bay had been occupied, instead of Kras- 
I novodsli. Russia knew full well that between the 
! Caspian and Turkestan there were only two 
1 u possible lines of coilzinullication, viz. : one through 
Khiva, ancl the other along the northern frontiers 
of Persia, and thence through Merv to Bolchara. 
By occupying Krasnovodsk she gained a positioil 
from which she could push forward 011 either or 
both of these lines as the opportunitylnight occur, 
~vllile, from the Mertvii-Kultuk Bay, she could 
have oilly clealt with the route through Khiva. 
Thus it will be seen that the occupatioll of Kras- 
novodsk m a ~ k s  the conlmencement of a most 
important design, not merely for the conquest of 
IChiva, but it was also part anci parcel of a niore 
elaborat,e sclielne for the collllectioll of Turkestau 
with B ~ ~ r o p e  by meails of a direct route from the 
eastern shores oT the Caspian, ,and for tlie subjuga- 
tion of the Turkomaa tribes between the northern 
lroiitiers of Persia and the River Oxus. 
For some years it was not realised in Englancl 

























Russian advance along th.e ilorthern borders of 
l'ersia towards Merv and Herat. Sir He~iry Xaw- 
liilson and a few other experts did indeed clearly 
explain how Russia would assuredly obtain a for- 
midable atld threatening positioil on the borders 
of tlie Herat province as the natural result of this 
preliniinary occupation of I~rasnovodsl~ ; but their 
marnings were unlleeded, they tl~einselves were 
believed to be alarinists a i d  Russophobes, and the 
English people, after sollie slight show of interest, 
oilce illore relapsed illto tlicir usual condition of 
calin indiff'erence to Central Asian ~Eairs, happy in 
their belief that the Turkomans would, by their 
re.sistance, offer a barrier to the Russian advance 
which vrrould at least last for many years, and that, 
even if that obstacle were overcome, Herat would 
still be safe behind the mythical range of snow- 
clad mouiltaiils wit11 whicll cartographers delighted 
to elilbellish their maps. 
But, although the danger of a Russian advance 
towards Merv and Herat was at this time imper- 
fectly understood, such was not the case wit11 1;he 
Khiva question. The British Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg at oiice denlanded explanatioas regattd- 
ing the occupation of Ilrasnovodsl~, and Priilce 
Gori;chakofI'tl~eu stated that the proposed estab- 
lishment at  t.11at place ' would be merely a factory, 
which would, however, of course, require to be 
protet:ted by a si~iall arined force.' He Eurtlier 
obscrveil that ' its object;. would be entirely coin- 
mercial, as it would open a sllorter caravan route 
to Central Asia, and also give increased security to 
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tracle by restraining tlie predatory practices of tlie 
Turlcomans, and by warning the Khan of Kliiva 
that hostility on his part would not be tolel-ated 
hereafter.' But, as persistent ruinours began to 
ber 1, 1869, asked Prince Gortclialcoff whether 
there was any trutli in tlie reports; and the 
Russian Chancellor then repeated what he Tiad 
previously said as to the commercial objects of the 
occupation of I(rasnovodsk, and went 011 to cleily 
in the most positive manner that the Czar had any 
illtelltioil of attacking Klliva. His Excel1enc.y said 
that, unless 1;he Khan gave provocation by the 
.renewal of iiltrigues among the Kirghiz,l tliere 
1 As the Khivai18 were accused of instigating the Kirghiz to 
revolt in 1860 a i d  1870, and as the final conquest of the I<hanate 
was undertaken on the pretext that the Khan was always interfer- 
ing with the Icirghix and inciting theill to rebellion, it will be 
interesting to see what General TchomaieR says on the subject. 
This clistingdshed oflicer, who thorouglily understood what he wns 
writing about, made the following statemeilts in  the Rt~aslii Aiiv of 
Pekrnary 14, 1875 :- 
' The IChivans did not incite the Kirghiz to rebellion, bnt, on the 
contrary, they were made to rebel by the  introduction of the new 
rcg~dations prepared by the Millistry of Wtw, the liberal and 
h~ullane nilns of which, for some reason, always meet a strei~ge 
fate. So it wns in the present instance. Instead of the expected 
gratitude of the pop~dation for the introduction of the humane aild 
liberal regulations, the only reply was rebellion. 
' When Cossnclr detachments were sent out to pnt down these 
disturbances, the Kirghiz threw the blame 011 the distmt Khivalls, 
and the oficials accepted these excuses to cover their ow11 mistalres. 
I n  this way the idea grew up at  St. Petersburg of the instigbtiotion of 
the ICirghiz by the IChivans, who had no thought for foreign unrler- 












was ' no iclea of goiag to war with him, mucli less 
of occupying his country, the possessio~l of which 
~ ~ o u l d  oilly be an einbarrassmeiit to the Govern- 
ineizt.' 
I11 spite of these declarations of the Russian 
Ch,zncellor, there is, however, no d o ~ ~ b t  tliat at 
this time the subjugation of Khiva was seriously 
contemplated by the Russian Government ; for irn- 
mediately a f ~ e r  K1-asnovodslr had been occupied 
Geileral Kaufnlann reported to the Ministry of War 
the necessity of adoptiilg harsh measures with 
Khiva, slid proposed that the Khanate sl~ould be 
attacked by two forces, one acting froin the 
I~:(r,zsi~ovodslc base, while tlie other advanced from 
Tashkent ; and it is now well know11 tllat this sug- 
gest,ion was approved of in a letter clated March 
26, 1870, wherein the Minister of War illforriled 
General Kaufinann that his views had met with the 
Emperor's approval. The projected attack was, 
however, postponed, not out of respect for the  
pacific assurances which had been given to the 
Britisli Governmei-lt, but because the Russian 
troops in Celitral Asia were occupiecl in the 
Isliaiider ICul ancl Kulja campaigns, nild it  was 
also ilecessary that tlie country through ~vhich tlie 
columns would have to move should be thorougl~ly 
reconnoitred. 
The seizure of Krasuovodsk createcl a profour:lil 
against  the  T ~ u k o i n a ~ l s .  We rn11st remember,  too, this fact, t l m l  
w 7 ~ c n  zue aye quiet ,  our neigi~bours are quicl ,  but a s  soon as zuo 
exc i te  Ihe discontent of ozw own I C r g l ~ i ~ ,  sonzc of o u r  ne ig l~6ours  
a r e  i?)znzediately fozbnd t o  be to blaine.' 
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ililpressioll i11 Khiva, where it mas generally be- 
lieved that 111e Russia11 laildiilg was but LZ pre- 
liniinary step to an immecliate illvasioll of tlie 
I<hnnczte. Tlie Khan iilcligriaiitly protesteed against 
tlie occupation as being an uilwarran~ed seizure of a 
portion of his doniinioizs, and a ilirec~ inenace lo 
tlie safety of his lringdom, and he cluiclrly cle- 
spatchecl an envoy to the Caspian, to coluplain of 
the encro,zcl~nient. Stolietoff, however, was in- 
structed to abstain froin entering into negotiations 
wit11 this ainbassador, and the man was thus 
obligecl to.returil without having even obtainecl an 
audience. Tlie Persia11 Government also displaj~ed 
coiisiclerable concern at the establisllnlent of the 
Russians a t  the inout,h of the Balkan Bay, and 
tliey a t  once asked for explanations as to the 
Russian irlteiitions in tliat direction. They clearly 
recogiiised that the chief danger to be expected 
froin this new movement lay in the probability 
tliat other points furtlier to the soutl~ would be 
siniilarly seized, md that Russia, afier establishing 
llelvself on the shores of the Gulf of Astrabad ailcl 
along the banks of the Atrek alld Gurgen rivers, 
woulcl graclualljr pus11 forward eilher throngli 
Kllorassan itself or along the slrirts of the liills to 
the norlh 01 Bujiiurd a i d  I<uslian, in tlle clirectioii 
of Merv ailcl IIerat. After soinewliat ~rolongeil 
negotiations on tlie subject, however, tlie Iiussinas 
gave a clear promise tliat tlie Persian frontier l i~ lc  
of the Atrek mould be carefully respected l)y 
Russia, aild the Shah's Goverilinent were ol~li~ocl  
to  be content wit11 this assurance. 
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I11 the ineanm~l~ile the Kirghiz  subject;^ of 
ltussia hacl been engaged in one of tlieir periodical 
rebellions, on account of the mismansgeilleut of 
the Russian officials. Ainongst these iloi~lacis 
tliere is a tribe Irnom~n as the Adaieffs, who for 
yews llnd beell subject to the Kl1a11s of Kliiva, ancl 
llncl been in the Iiabit of paying tribute to the 
rulers of that State. But wlleil tlie Russians 
built the Port of Novo-Alexailclrovslr, on the 
nortll-eastern shores of the Caspian, they also 
begail to tax this tribe, and thus inucll cliscon- 
tent was caused. The wretched nomads,' how- 
ever, were forced to submit to tlle arbitrary 
exactions of their two stronger aeig11bours, and 
no serious trouble occurred until 18G9, when the 
Russiails increased the taxes by as llluch as 150 
per cent. This ilaturally created the very greatest 
clissntisfaction, and ill t,he spring of 1870 the 
Adaieffs displayed their resent~nent by makiilg a 
rlete~mined attaclr on the Russian positioil in tlie 
Mangishlalr Peninsula. A party of Russiaas, 
uilder Colonel Rukin, was surprised by tlle i l o ~ ~ ~ a d s  
near the I(och,zB Bay, oil whic-11 occasio~l four- 
teen Cossaclrs were lrilled and the remaillder car- 
ried into slavery, nukill llimself committing 
suicide to avoicl cap t~~re .  The I<ir.ghiz then 
closely besieged Fort Alexaiidrovsk, ancl ill spite 
of the fact that the fort was arlned with fourtee11 
guns, the garrison were reduced to the greatest 
straits, and were on the point of surrenderiag, 
when reinfo<-cements arrived from the Caucasus, 
allcl the Adaieffs were completely overcome. The 
Russians at once accused the Khivails of having 
I instigated this serious attack, and this supposed 
act of hostility on the part of the Miivan I<han 
was added to the list of offences which was to 
be put forward as the reason for invading tlie 
Khanate, as soon as the preparat,ioils for a corn- 
biriecl attack had beell completed. I t  is imposs- 
ible to say whether tlie Khivans did support tlie 
Aclaieffs or not ; and it is not impossible that 
they did incite the nomads to make this attack ; 
but it is far more likely that they were driven 
to rebellion by the long series of errors which 
Geiierd Tcliernaieff has so forcibly referred to, 
and which culminated in the arbitrary ancl extor- 
tioiiate increase of taxatioii in 1869. 
As soon as Stolietoff had established his posi- 
, tion at Krasnovodsk he began to send out recon- 
noitring parties into the neighbouring country ; 
and proceedillg eastm~arcls along tlie northern shores 
of the Balkan Bay, he built a small fort at a place 
called Tash-Arvat, at the foot of the wes ten1 
slopes of the Great Balkan range, where there was 
a fair supply of water. By the occupatioll of this 
pointJ, the Russiail co~ninallder expected to be aljle 
to get n firm hold over the Yoluud tribe of T~wlro- 
mans, who were in the habit of iriigrating every year 
from the south to the Ust-Yurt plateau; but in 
this he was clisappointed, for the nomads in t,heir 
annual migrations used a route far to the east 01 
the fort, and thus kept well out of strikillg dis- 
tance. Shortly afterwards the Russians built a 
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there was little or no drinking water, nncl all tlie 
water for the garrison of 100 men had to be  
brought from Krasaovodslr, at a cost of about 
three roubles per buclce t, ail0 tller fortificatioil 
was built, some fourteen iniles to the east of 
Micliaelovslr, a t  a place called Mulla Kari, where 
goocl springs were found. 
In tlie spring of 1870 the Russian Government 
determined to develop their positioii on the east- 
ern shores of the Caspian ; and, in accorilance 
wit,h the orders issuecl from St. Petersburg, Trince 
Mirsky, who ~vas  then eiitrustecl with tlie direction 
of affairs ill the Caucasus, sent ii~structions to 
Stolietoff to form Krasnovodslr into an extensive 
fortified base of operations, froin which he was to 
conlmeilce energetic offeilsive movements against 
the Yolnud ancl TekkB tribes of Turkomans. A 
good excuse for such an attack on the Turkolnan 
selllements was soon afforded by the Turkomails 
themselves, who in the spring of 18'70 assaultecl 
tlie Michaelovslr post. This attack was easily re- 
pulsed ; and in the following Novelnber Stolietoff, 
acting on the instructions received from Tiflis, 
marched round the head of the Ballcan Ray, and, 
crossing the barren Steppe to the east of Mulln 
Kari, reached the Turlcoman fort of Kizil-Arvat 
on the skirts of the Kuren Dagh Range. The 
Tekkks ]lad however abancloned the place and dis- 
appeared with their families and possessioils iiit,o 
the Akhal Oasis, further towards the east ; and as 
Stolietoff wasnot prepared for a proloi~gecl ca l~~pa ig~ l ,  
he destroyed the TeklcB fort, and returned to 
Krasl~ovod~k, his first considerable velzture into the 
Turlronlan country having thus been of very doubt- 
ful utility. 
But while Stolietoff was marching against tlie 
Teklr6s a far more important reconnaissance was 
being nlade in the direction of Kliiva. Captaiil 
Sl;oljeleff, the f ~ ~ t u r e  h ro of Plevila and idol of 
the Iiussian army, set out froin Krasnovoilslr with 
n sinall party of Cossaclre, ancl after a trying and 
aclventurous illarch in cz north-easterly direction, 
reaclled tlie Sari-Kamish Lake -in safety. But this 
brilliant oficer was by no means satisfiecl with this 
achievement, and he therefore pushec'l on, nccom- 
pnnieil hy oilly three Cossacks, all disgaised as 
Usbeg inerchni~ts, as far as Dekche, on the borclers 
of the Khivan Oasis. Having thus recoi~noilrecl 
tlie route froin Krasnovodsl< t o  Khiva, SkobelelT 
returned m-it11 m excellent sketch of the country 
traversed, and by the following sun~mer was in 
TiHis, rnllen he was able to add very consiclerxbly 
to the meagre stoclr of lrnomrleclge respecting tliese 
regions mliich was tlian possessecl by tlie C>~ucasus 
aut'rlorities. 
I11 tlle spring of 1871 Stolietoff was re.cdlec1, 
and Colonel MarkozoEf -crras then appointed to 111e 
chief coln~lland at ICrasnovodsl<. This olficer re- 
ceived orders to carefully examiiie the country t o  
the north-east of the Balkan Bay, as far as Tunr, 
tt spring some few lviles from tlie eastern sllores 
of the Kara-Bugaz Gulf; and, in  accordance m~illl 
tlllese instructions, be asseinbled a colu11lll at  Mulls 
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Proceeiling norl;hwarcls, he reached the Gezli-Ata 
Wells witl~out difficulLy, and after he llad there 
constrnctecl a sniall fort for a garrison of forty 
or fifty men, he coiitinued his march towards 
the norl;ll-east. At the Chagil Wells another small 
fork was buill;, ancl on October 3 the force reached 
Tuar, \~llich is situated in a trough-liltc clepression 
at the foot of a precipitous range of hills. Here 
a tlliril fortification was constructecl, ancl with 
it the actual instructions of the TiRis anthorities 
h i d  been successfully carriecl out. But Marltozofl, 
talting advantage of the excellent condition of his 
troops, determined to extencl the reconllaissance 
on llis own responsibility; and he therefore, on 
October 5, set out from the Tuar post, and reached 
the Iinrn-Sabshan Wells on October 9. There a 
halt was made for some days to perinit of the con- 
struction of a fort for a garrison of fifty infantry, 
twenty Cossacks, ancl one gun ; and while this was 
being built, the coinnlallder of the force started off 
to examine the wells at Dapini and Dirin, ~r l i ic l~  
me situatecl at a clistance of soine twenty miles 
to the north-west of Kum-Sabshan. On his re- 
turn he resumed his march t o ~ a r d s  Kazalchli, 
ancl. on reaching that point he let the column con- 
tinue its march towards Uzun-Kuyu, wliile he, 
accornpaniecl by a few Cossaclcs, rode to the spring 
o.f Dakhli, some miles to the south of Kazaklili. 
He the11 hastened back and overtoolc the main 
l~ocly while still on the march to Uzun-Kuyu, 
wllicll poillt was reached after terrible sufferiilgs 
from want of water; alld anotllcr fort was tlfere 
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built for the reception of all the Cossacks and 
their llorses and fifty infantrymen. Prorn theilce 
the remainder of the force pushed on towards 
' the Sari-Kainish Lalre, reached EIaji-Kuyusi on 
October 29, aid two days later struck Skobe1clf"s 
route at the Sari-Ka~lzish Wells. There he left 
the bullr of his force, and wit,h fifl;p inen nilcl all 
his camels he pushed on to Dekclle, ~ ~ ~ l ~ i c l l  he 
reached on the same day, and found tlie banks of' 
tlxe ancient channel of the Oxus clotlzed wil;ll 
vertlure, sLwraul bushes, and even trees twenty 
feet in height and some eiglzt inches in diameter. 
Here the Russiaiz advance was checkecl by the 
Turlromans, who attaclied the party, and (zltl1ougl.i 
tiley were easily dri~ren off, Marlcozoff felt that it 
would be a highly injudicious proceeding to ven- 
ture ally closer to Khiva. He tllerefore com- 
menced his return march towarcls the Caspian, 
and altliougl~ the Turkoinans followed the colunln 
as far as Chagil, they kept a.t a respectful distance 
aixd never ventured to make ally serious attack. 
From this point Markozoff sent a portioil bq c ~ i  5 1  to 
Krasnovodsk by a new route through Portolrul:, 
and Yangi-Su, while he 1-rimsel.f wit11 the resl; 
the column marclled to ICulinughir, on the enstern 
shores of Llie Ksra-Bugaz Gulf. On his rel;urn 
from thence to Gezli-Ata, another de~nchment mra,s 
sent back to K~~asnovodslc, and tlze Coloilel witll 
the renlainder of tlie troops marclled eastwarils, 
vih Kilnal a id  Alti-Kuyurulch to the Topatnil 
Wells and Laltes in the Uzboi, or ancient channel 

























encouiz~ered and several slight skirmishes ensued, 
but the llomzids were easily repulsed, and on 
November 26 Markozoff returned to Mulla Ka1.i. 
This expedition, though but little lmosn, had 
very important resulter, for during the two moilths 
i t  lasted all the routes to the north-east af Kras- 
novodsk, and between that place and the borders 
of Khiva, had been thoroughly examined, and the 
Russians thus accluired valuable iizlormation as to 
the difficulties which might be expected in an 
advance against Klliva horn this direction. But 
the indefatigable Russian commander had no in- 
telltion of resting content wit11 lzis achievemeilts; 
the winter Fas yet young, and he hacl many other 
important matters still to attend to. It  Lad been 
found that camels could not be procured s t  Kras- 
novodsk in sufficieilt numbers for the projected 
invasion of Khiva, while it  as knomn that they 
could be more easily obtained from the Goklan 
tribe of Turkomans which inhabit the country 
near the Atrek and Gurgen Rivers, and for this 
purpose, and also to emplzasise the Russian claims 
to the country north of the Atrek, it was decided 
that a fort should be erected at the mouth of that 
river. Therefore, after a brief halt of four days, 
he once more set out from Mulla Kari, but on this 
occasion he moved in a southerly direction to- 
wards the Atrek River and tlie settlements of the 
Goklmls. He reaclzed Chikishliar, about twenty 
miles tu the north of the mouth of the Atrek 
River, on December 13. Here he was attacked 
by the Turlromans, but they were easily drivel1 
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.tf, 311d tile colistruction of the fort Vas corn- $1 
I,lcllced. 011 the following night a more serious 
attack was made, when Marlrozoff narrowly 
A small band of nomads 
wclcleuly burst illto the Russian camp, cut down 1-1. 
tile sonrcls, 2nd nmacle their way into the Colonel's 11' 
tellt witll tile evideilt intention of killing the C O ~ I -  C( 
luaIlcler, 1~110 hacl proved to be sucll a relentless 
I 
3 tl 
:illd foe to the Turlcoman tribes. He, 
lloll~ever, was at the time fortunately dssent on a 
C1 
visit to tile picquets, and thus e~caped, alld tile CI 
lllnrauders were soon forcecl to retire with some 
sligllt loss. After the fort had been builb, Mnrko- 
x 
tlle irltention of crossing i t ;  but the stream was I3 
much swolleil by the recent heavy rains, and it ir 
.rlTns fouild that even horses could not live in the a 
current. Tlie idea was therefore abandoned, and a: 
after leaving two companies and two gulls as a o 
garrison for the new fort, 14arlrozoff returned to 
Ii'rasnovodsk, and from thence proceeded to Tehe- 
rzn, where he concluded a definite treaty with 
Persia respecting the Atrek frontier line. After 
this he went to Tiflis to report the result of his 
recent operations, and to receive orders as to what 
\\-as to be done during the following winter. 
In the meanwhile the Russians in the Mang- 
ishlnk Peninsula hacl not been idle. After the 
death of Iiukin that officer had been succeeded 
h s t  by Mttjor-General Iiomaroff, and then by 
Colollel Lonlalcin, and both of these ofljcers made 
several recoilnaissances between the year- 1870 
1 
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and 1572, in ordel- to introduce the new system 
of aclmiriistratioil alnong the Xirghiz which it was 
llopecl would insure the speedy settlement of tlie 
country. For this purpose small Russian detach- 
ments constantly visited the (Auls ' of the nomads, 
who were thus soon convinced that they were 
completely under the power of the R~~ssians, ancl 
that the best thing they could do yiras to subillit 
quietly to the new order of government. 
111 Turlres tan also Ksufn~ann had been energeti- 
cally exploring the country between his froi~t~ier 
posts and the Oxus, and was quietly preparing for 
the .projected invasion of Klzivn. As soon as he 
arrived in Tasl~kent he m o t e  a letiter t,o the 
Khivail Khan, Mahominecl Rahim, in which he 
infori~led hiill of I.lis a l~~~ointment  and arrival. He 
at tlie same time sent sinall coluinns from Kazala 
ant1 Fort Perovski as far as Irkibai, for tlle purpose 
of ex,zminii~g the ~zortliern portioil of t/be Xizil 
Kum Desert, and for the protection of Russia11 
caravans ; and in his letter to Mahonl111.ed IZahiin 
he ille~ltionerl the despatch of these columns, and 
stated that they had been sent out to punish the 
marauders who had pillaged certain camvans. I n  
the following February a reply was received from 
the Khivan Kush-Begi, claiining for Khiva all 
territory to the sout7ri of the Syr Daria, protesb- 
irlg against the violatioil of the IUlan's dom.iilions, 
and promisit~g to punish all persons who molesbed 
traders crossiilg the Steppes to the sout l~ of the 
Jaxartes. 
For some time following this Raufinsnn was 
u (1 
engaged in the war with Bokhal-a, and in the sub-  
sequent pacification of that Khanate, and Khivan 
airairs therefore for a t#inle became of secoiiclary 
importance; but in IS69 the outbreak of the 
Xirghiz rebellion gave the Governor-General of 
Turkestan an opportuility for renewing his inter- 
ference with Ehiva, and on August 24 of t h a t  
year he wrote a letter in which tlie X h m  was told 
that iuflammatory proclgmations had  been sent t o  
the Kirplliz and Turkomaas, that his officials ac- 
0 
companied by tinoops had crossed the Russia11 
frontiers for the purpose of' fomenting rebellion 
amongst the subjects of the Czar, thal Russians 
had been carried off to Khiva with the full know- 
leclgc of the Khan, and that rebels and marauders 
llad evaded punishment by taking refuge in Khiva, 
where they had been hospitably receivednl At 
about this time also a detachment was sent f~*on? 
Kaxala to the Yani-Daria, while another force was 
sent fro111 Jizakll to the Bulran-Tau Mountains. 
These movements, and the occupatioil of Kras- 
novodsk, caused the greatest alarm in the Kllivan 
capital, and the Khan began to take measures for 
the defence of his kingdom. A small fort w a s  
constructed at Cape Urga; the chief brancl.1 of 
the Oxus was diverted, and canals were cut t o  
render it shallomr and impassable for any of the 
ships of the h a 1  Sea flotilla ; a new cit,adel w a s  
built for the protection of the capital, and i t  was 
This is ICaufumnn's version of the causes of the Rirghiz rc. 
bellion. Tchernaieff, however, as has already been seen, attribuLerl 
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arrnecl wit11 twenty guns ; and a force of cavalry 
was sent out to poison the wells on the road to 
Krasnovodslr by throwing dead clogs into tliem. 
The Khan also insisted on the recognition of his 
uadoubted right to th.e country i r ~  the vicinity of 
the Uukan-Tau Mountains; asserted with a con- 
siderable show of reason that the disturban.ces in 
that region liad been caused by the dissatisfied 
Iiirglliz subjects of the Czar, and had in no way 
beell encouraged by tlle Kl~ivan ollicials ; and, 
finally, after once inore bitterly coinplaining of the 
violation of his territories, he conclucled one of his 
lebters by saying : ' If, relying on the strengtll of 
his armies, tile White Czar wislles to make war 
against us, then before the Creator of heaven and 
earth, before the Great Judge of all eartllly judgers, 
all are equal, both. the strong and the weak. He 
gives tlie victory to ~lio~nsoever He wishes, and 
no~hing  can be accoillplished against the desires 
and pl-edestination of the Most High.' This letter 
was written in April 1870, after much pl-evious 
correspondence whicll clearly provecl to Mallonlinecl 
3:~llim tliat tl-le R~lssialls were fully deternlined to 
iiilcl sollle excuse for invading his clorninions. Re 
plaiilly saw that llis e~lelnies were gradually en- 
conll)assiil~g hiin on a11 sides, and that he was 
~uar.]red ~ lo~v i i  as tlie next victim to the insati- 
nl.11.e lust after territu~:i:~l aggrandisemcnt wliicli is 
~ l l r ?  lcadiilg cl~aracteristic of the X~ssian rule i n  
C'cnt.ral Asia. IIis dnrm graclually illcreased as 
tlle ltussitlrl recorirloitri~lg partics puslzecl forward 
closer 2nd closer to  his ca,pit.al, and at the close of 
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the year 1371, when Markozof was advancing to 
Delrche on the west, and when anotlzer detach- 
ineilt uncler Colonel Golovatcheff llad been sent 
from Jizczkll through the Bulran-Tau Moulltains to 
the Oxus, he decided once again to try to coiize 
to terms with his formidable enemies. He there- 
fore, early in 1872, sent two embassies, one to 
Tiilis and the other to Orenburg, bearing letters 
addressed to tlie Czar, in which l ~ e  declayed that 
he had always been acluated by feelings of frieiicl- 
ship towards IZussia. After reviewing the nume- 
rous tl~reatening expeditions which hail advanced 
into his dolniriions, both from the clirection of ' 
Turlrestan and from the Caspian, he asked tllat a 
treaty might be conclucled whereby each of the 
two Powers shoulcl. agree to be content with its 
existing frontiers, and lie then offerecl to return all 
the Russiall subjects wlio remained captive in the 
Iillanate. ' But,' corllinued tlie Khan, ' if these 
prisoners serve you only as a pretext for war 
against us wit11 tlie aiin of extellcling your do- 
minions, then a decree will clescend from Providcilce 
whose purposes we canliot alter.' 
Of the two embassies sent to Russia, one pro- 
ceeded via Fort Novo-Alexancl.rovsls ancl Petrovsk 
to Tiflis, while tlie other went to Orenl.)urg. But 
they were not allowecl. to co~i~ iuuc  tlieir jonriley to 
St. Petel.sburg, and vrTere i~lformecl tlint negotia- 
tions with Kllivn woulcl not be enterecl illto until 
every llussinn captive in the I<llanate llncl beell 
released. Tlie Xliaii tBen sulit an eiivoy to tlie 
Incl.iaii Government asking for assis Lance, but tllis 
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n~essenger was inforilled that he could expect no 
llelp from England, and the Khan was advised to 
restore the Russian captives arid to come to a 
reconciliation with the Russiail authorities; a reply 
which must liave greatly pleased the Muscovites, 
who now clearly learnt for the first time t l ~ a t  
Ellrrlancl had no intelltion of waging war ill defence 
of h i v a .  
During the nutuinil of the year 1872 important 
recoiiilaissallces were made, both from Fort Alex- 
anclrovsk allil Krasnovodsk. On September 20 
Colonel Lolllakill left tlie former place, success- 
fully explored a considerable tract of tlie acljacent 
country, a i d  liinrclied 670 miles in thirty-two days . . 
wi1;hout loss of eitlier Inell or llorses. 
In the ineai~wliile MarlrozofT liacl returned to 
K~.asnovodsk, and was husily eng,aged in preparing 
for  Inore estelisive operatiolis iu the Turkoma,n 
country. I11 Julie 1872 he left IIrasnovodslr a i d  
made s careful examination of the Caspiail coast 
between that point nncl Clllilrishli,zr. Landing a t  a 
small bay about linlf way b e t ~ ~ e e n  the two Russiaii 
forts, he captured soiile three h~uidreil camels, ancl 
after explorilig tlie iieiglibouriiig couillry ret;urnocl 
to his I.ieail(lu:u.ters. Uut tlie great sunlnier lieat 
of tliose regions arid the scarcity of w:~ter rendered 
it necessary t11:~l; 110 cxtelisive inilitary llloveilleilt;s 
slloulcl be cxrrieil ont until tlie wil.l.ter llatl fnirly 
se t  in ,  aiid t;llus ilo1,liing of izlucli iirq)orti~1,1(:e was 
done ur1l;il Septcnll.~er. Tlieli, Ilowcver, t1800ps were 
concent;ratei[ at T<r:lsnovoclsli, 13elc:k, aiid Clliliisli- 
liaj, and oil tlie : L O r  11 of' t;he riio~itli tTic Rsasiiovodsl~ 
and Belelc troops left the latter place and marched 
tlirougli Tash-Arvat and Buruclji to Topatai~, where 
they were to join hands with the Chikishlinr de- 
1 tachment, which started on September 23 under 
the coinmaild of Markozoff himself. The two 
columns united at Topatan nn October 7, and the 
combined force then consisted of about 1,450 men 
and fourteen gulls. 
I I t  was at  first intended that this force should 
rapidly advance on Khiva and try to gain pos- 
session of' the capital of the Khanate by n sudden 
- 
attack. But this idea was eventually abandoned, 
for just as Markozoff was on the point of com- 
illeilcing his advance from Topatan, and before 
ally encounter wit11 the Turlcomans took place, an 
officer arrived from Tiflis, bringing strict orders 
froin the Graad Duke that the attack on Khiva 
was on no acaount to be attempted, and Marlcozoff 
therefore had to rest content with a less exciting 
campaign against the hlrhal TekkBs. Leaving 
Topatan on October 16,  the column reached Jamala 
on the following clay, when they at once began the 
construction of a small fort. While thus employed 
they were suddenly assailecl on all sides by some 
two tl~ousancl Turkomans, but after a sharp fight 
tlie enemy were driven off, and the Russians shortly 
afterwads uontinued their march eastwards aloilg 
the Uzboi. Igdi was reached on October 28, and 
after a three days' halt at  that place the column 
rnarcl~ed soutl~\;r.ards towards the TekkQ settle- 
lnenls in tlie Akhd Oasis. Kizil-Arv~t, Bnmi, and 
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s ~ ~ i r m i s h e s  with the Tek1ri.s Marlrozoff turned west- 
ward, aiid marched down the Sunlbnr arid Atrek 
valleys to Cliikishliar, where he arrived on Decem- 
ber 30. There he heard tliat it liad been definitely 
clecicled that Xlliva should be iilv;tded in the fol- 
lowing spring, and he started at once for Tiflis to 
confer with tlie illilitary authorities in tlie Caucasus 
regarding the part ~ h i c h  was to be played by tlie 
KrasnovodsIr troops in the comiilg campaign. 
Colonel Marlrozoff's operations 011 tlie eastern 
shores  of the Caspian hive received little or no 
not ice  from English w~iters on Central Asian 
:~ffairs, and have generally bee11 clisillissed in a few 
worciu as thougll they were absolutely iiisigriificarit 
and devoid of important results. As a illalter of 
fact ,  this in~lefatig,223le oficer, ~ 1 1 0  is b111 little 
Imown in England, except as liaving been the 
unfortunnte coinmancler of the one Bussiaii colulnil 
I$-liich failed to reach Klliva in 1873, laid tlle 
founclntion of Russia's present position at Merv, 
and on the frontier of the Herat proviilce of Af- 
glxtxistan. Eisoperations in tlie winter of 1871 mere 
completely snccessful, and by them all the routes 
between Krasnovodsk and Khiva were tl~orougllly 
examined and surveyed ; but the subsequent expe- 
di t ion of 1872 mras even more important in its 
a 1011 ~-'esults, for thereby he gained complete inform t' 
regarding tlle various routes froin Krasnovodsk to 
the TekkB co~mtry nor1,h of the Kuren Dngh Iiange, 
t;he &ernative line of advance froin Cliikishliar 
a long the Atrek and Sumbar Rivers was also ex- 
plored, ancl, above all, by. his successf~~l aclvnllce to 
Beurma, he toolrtlle firstiinportailt step in that great 
movement towards Herat, wllich, after many inter- 
vening checks and disasters, has been so success full^^ 
completed, through the military skill of SlcobelefI', 
ancl the subsequent intrigues ancl ullscrupulous 
actions of Icomaroff and Alikhanoff. In England 
the full significance of the Russian operations on 
the borders of tlie Akhal TeklcB country mas com- 
pletely lost sight of, owing to  the great importance 
which was attached to the ii~depeildeilce of Kliiva, 
and on account of the ever-increasing belief that 
Russia was steadily preparing for the aunexatioll 
of that Khanate; and it was only several years 
later, when Skobeleff brolre the power of thc 
Turliomails at  Derlghil TepQ, that tlie people of 
Englaild fully realised that Ille Russians hacl ac- 
quired a position m~l~ich, as a base for offensive 
operations against India, was of illfinitely greater 
value than the mliole of Rnssia's other conquesls 
in Ceritral Asia put together. 
But tlie Russians in all their movelllents in 
Central Asia have displayed remarkable patience 
and caution, and they have never undertalcen any 
fresh advance until they have thorougl~ly secured 
their existing position. I n  this instance they knew 
full well that it would be useless to attempt the 
conqnest of the Tekkes or to try t,o gain a footilig. 
at Merv and a t  the gates of TIerat until Klliva had 
been first subdued, aild therefore in December 
1872 the Czar finally issued orders for the imme- 
diate preparation of a large expeditioil for the in- 
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General Kaufixann left Taslilrent for St. Petersburg 
ill order to strengthen his position in the eyes of 
t11e Czar against the iluillerous and frequent attaclrs 
wl~ich were being made against llis admiuistrntioil 
of the Turlrestail province, and also to gain the 
Czar's assent to the despatch of an army against 
mi iva ,  in order that by a successf~ll campaign he 
might be able to divert public attelltion from tllc 
malaclininistrntio of Turlrestan, and gain the sym- 
pathies of the powerful military party in the 
country. On his arrival at the Russian capital, 
t h e  Grancl Duke Micllael (Governor-General of the 
Caucasus) and General ICrijhanofrslry (Governor of 
t h e  Orellburg district) were suil~illoneil to St. 
Petersburg to give their ol~inions regarding llis 
proposed sclienle fcr the ii~vasion of ICllivn. IIe 
s~zggested tll:lt, while one columil advanced under 
liis coillinanil from Turlresluli, niiotlier h r c e  slloulil 
operate fro111 ICrasnovodsk or Cllikisliliar. A small 
suT3sidi;~ry (let~~clliileilt was at the same time to 
s t a r t  from Fort No. 1 on tlie Syr Daria, aild join 
t h e  Taslikeilt trool~s at  soinc point on the Oxus, 
a i d .  ~rlleil the eastern and western armies had 
united at  some poilit in tllc Iiliivxn Oasis, tllcy 
were  Illen to carry out conil~ined o1)erations uiider 
the sul)relae con1m:uid of Gciieral I<aufi~1:uu1 21im - 
self. On the reco~urnei~clalio~~ of Gene~.al Krijlii~n- 
oK'skg, it was aftc~rwnrds ilecided t11:~t; a stroilg 
de tncliineilt should :~ilv:uicc from 0renl)urg in ad- 
cli tion to tdiosc proposcd 11y Knul'innnn ; nild minol. 
c11:~ngcs were also snl.)sccluc!lll,ly introiluceil into 
t l le  plan of cnrnl)nig~l on aaco~~ii t  of tlle ililficwlly 
ex~erienced in procuring a suficient number of 
camels. The Caspian colunln was divided into 
two distinct and independent forces, one of which 
under Marliozoff was to start from Chilcishliar, 
while tlie other under Lomakin was to operate 
from Fort Alexanclrovsk; and tl~us, by the final 
orders for the expedition, it was arranged that five 
different cletachlnents should converge on the oasis, 
viz. two froin the Caspian, one from Orenburg, 
and two from tlle Russian proviilces east of the 
Sea of Aral. These orders were sailctioned by the 
Emperor in December 1872 at a council at  which, 
it is said, that thirty-five of the members voted for 
the annexation of the Khanate, while the sinall 
ininority of iiine (among whom was Priilce Gor- 
tclial~off) voted against such a step, belicvillg that 
it would be better rather to pullis11 the Khan and 
retire t l~an to retain possession of tlie country. 
Having thus clefini~ely decided that Klliva 
slioulcl be invaclecl in the following spring, the 
IZussiail Government at  once deterinineci to break 
the 'news as gently as possible to the British 
Goverllment ; for it was well known that public 
opinion in E~lglalld was strongly averse to any 
Russian interference with Kliiva, and as the Czar's 
Government had so frequently disavowed any 
intention of attacking the Khanate, it was clearly 
ihcumbent on them to at least explain the reasoils 
which had caused such a change in their declared 
policy. For this purpose, therefore, Count Scllou- 
valoff, a statesman enjoying the full confidence of 
the Czar, left St. Petersburg for London, by the 
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i express command of the Russian Einperor, alld on 
January 8,1573, had an interview with Lord Gran- 
1 ville, wl~en he nlade an important statement regard- 
1 
I ing Russia's intentions conceriling Khiva, and of 
, the Czar's general policy in Central Asia. After 
i I expressi~lg surprise at the amount of exciteinellt 
and susceptibility displayed by the English regard- 
l 
irlg Centr:d Asian &fairs, and after he had the11 
asserted tliat an agreement regarding the Afghan 
I fronticr miglit be expected at an early date,' this 
I trusted adviser of the Russian Czar then went 011 
4 to  say that : ' TVith regard to Llie expedition to 
I 
I Khiva, it true that it was decided upon for 
I 
I 
next spring. To give an  ideu of its cl~a~'acter, it 
was sz~ficierlt to say tl~at it woz~ld consist of four C ~ I Z U T  
I a ImZf bnttalioas. Its object was to punish acts of 
i 
I briganclnge, to recover fifty Russia11 prisoners, a id  
i to tencli the Iclian that such conduct on liis part could not be contiilued with the impunity whicl~ I the nioderation of Russia liad lecl liiill to believe. Not OILZIJ was i t  ficl. Jro~n the intenti011 of the A'?npel*ol* 
I to talie possessio?~ of' Ii /~iva, but positive o~ders hud 
.i been p~.epnl?cd to prevent it,  and dil-ections given tl~ut 
t l~c concliiioszs irnposed s1~0z~Zd be SUCIL U S  coz~ld not i l z  
any zu,t?y l e (d  b a prolo?zged occupa?zcy of Iil~iva.' 
Scllouvaloff tlieil aeiit on to say that this positive 
:Lssurance mighl be given to the British Parliaineiil 
as ;L 11roof of the frieiitlly and pacific interilions of 
his nlasler the Cmr. 
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Wlleii this emphatic cleilial or ally intention 011 
tlie part or the Russian Goverlul1,ent to retain pas- 
session 01 Iihiva becwllle klzowa, tlle Eliglisll public 
,zcdeptcci the Czar's proiniscs, :u~cl it was: 
(renerally 1)elicved that, as soon ns t l ~ !  Kh:ui lind 
h 
beer1 puniuhecl for the bnrl,nro~zs acts which he ~ 1 : ~ s  
said to 11nvc co111rilit,Lecl, the 1hlssi:lil troops woulcl 
ollce inore be witlldr:~w~i to 1,llcir l'oorillcr positions, 
and tllnt Iillivn ~vo~zlcl still reilzi~iil nil iiltlcq)e~~leut 
state bcttveeil Arghanistail mid the n~lvsiaiz l'roiliiers 
in Ceiltral Asia. 
I t  is but ilnturnl tllnt Sc1lonv:~l.o~~ vo1uriinl.y 
cleclnrntions slioulcl have 11:ul a tr:~ncluillising 
effect, for his position as the c*oilfiilential ain- 
bnssnclor fronl the Eussi:u~ Bii1l)cror TWS well 
linowl~, alld it was iml)licitly 1 )clievc!il tll:~t, :~1- 
tllo~zgll Ilussiail dil)lowntists iniglll, 1)e I'ouild who 
would tear tip treaties :~ncl rcput2i:~te tllic:ir clig:lge- 
illenis, still the pledged worcl of t l ~ e  lLussi:ul Clz:~r 
coulcl never l)e 1~rol;eil. Pt TV:LS iilil(!c~tl n rlntturnl 
l)clicf, but u~ lc  wliich was clcstiilc?tl to I)(? rniltbly 
sli:~lcen ; aizil it, will I)(? sucil lin~v It~ussi:~ dicl r.cl:~in 
1)osscssic)i~ of :L 1:~rge sli(cc ur T<lli~:~il t (?rrii,orjr, :~iill  
I I O ~ V ,  to I ~ S B  tile ~vortls of t,li(: 1:~lc Sir Trcl~lsy Iiatv- 
liilsoii, ' :I,I~ X ~ U ~ ) ~ ! ~ ~ O I . ' S  word 11 :~ ( l  l)c~c*ii ~voigllc(l in 
t l ~  l j i ~ l ~ ~ ~ l ( ; ~  :~ild  OILI IN^ W: I I~ I  iiig.' 
111 sl)it(! of C 1( )11111 S(~110u1v:tlo(I"s ~ l t ~ t " l : ~ i ~ ; ~ l  i t rr l  
tll:~t, l l~i? for(-(: ~vou~l(l I)(! li~ni[(*(l to ~ ' C I I L ~  : II(I :L 11:tIr 
l);~ll,:~lio~ i ~ ,t l ~ :  i oi :LI sl i1~11gi 11 :t(ll~~:~Ily :~l~iou~rlI to 
sixty-oil(! ( ; ~ I L ~ ~ I : L I I ~ C ~ S  of i~ 1S:u ~i ry, t w(*iif  y,sis so111i:~s 
of COSS:L(:~CS, :~11(1 s~!v(!I,:L~ S L L ~ ~ ~ ) C T S ,   ill^ l i r~~-- l 'o~~r  
g~z~is ,  Sour iilol.l:~i~s, a i d  five! roi~lcc~l clo~ac:l iiuc?l~~s, 
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Tile four artd a half battalions had in a few weeks 
expancled illto a foriniclable army. 
The Turkestail colui~~n, ulliler tile supreme 
comlnalld of General Kaufnlann, coillprisecl two 
detachmenls, wllicl~ started from Kazala alld 
Jizakh, and were coinmailclecl respectively by 
Coloilel Goloff ahd Coloilel Golovatcl~eff. The 
Oreilljurg column was commanded by Lieutenant- 
General Veref Id11 ; the Kiilclerly columll by Colonel 
T,onlnliir~ ; and the Iiras~~ovoclsk columll by Colollel 
MarlrozoK. 
111 the orders which were issued for the con- 
clucl of the operations, it was slated that the 
Jizalih colunl~l was to proceed by tlie road 
1.1ulning along the Bolrl~aran rrontier to Min 
13ula,lc, in the Uukan-Tau Mountains, where i t  
would be joil~cd by the Kazala detachment, and 
the united forces were llien to march in a south- 
~ r c s t e ~ l y  dil.ection towards the village of Shura- 
ICbana, on the right bank of the Oxus I11 
l ) ~ r ~ i ~ a l ~ c e o f  this design, the Kazala force began 
it,s aclvance on h r c h  11, 18'73, and on llle 25th 
of the same rnontll the head of  he main Turkestall 
xrllly msrcllecl out of Jizakh. But when Kauf- 
luniin, on April 13,  rcncliecl the Wells of Aristan- 
1)cl-ICuiluk, about; 100 miles from the appointed 
l.e~lclczvous, Ile sudclel~ly issuecl fresh orclers, 
c11:ulging the Toutcs by ahicll the two detach- 
lncills wcre to advance to the Amu-Daria. By 
1,llcse fresh i~lstructions the Jizakh force was to 
t u r ~ l  otl' towards ihc west, and proceed, vi8 Ellala- 
:~t:t hclnltl-ICrilgan, to Uch-Uchalr, on the river 
Oxus; while the Kazala detachnie~~t was directed 
to continue its march 'in a soutl~erly direction 
and effect a ju~lctioil with the main column at 
Khala-ata. 
This change of route was most ili advised, and 
very nearly resulted in the complete loss of the 
whole Turkestan army of invasion. It is not cleaT 
what possible advantage Glaufmann expected to 
gain by it, for the route origiilally selected had 
been previously reconnoitred and was well known, 
whereas the new line vas  quite unexplored. 
The two columns successfully joined hands at  
Khala-ata on May 6, and a halt mas tlien made for 
some days, in orcler that the troops might be 
rested before they began their march to the Oxus, 
and for the purpose of building a fort to guard tile 
line of communications. I t  was also necessa1.y 
that the country betmeell Khala-ata and the Oxus 
should be examined, and for thia purpose a si~lall 
detachment was sent forward, uncler Colonel 
Ivanoff. This party arrived near the Adam- 
Krilgan Wells, where they encountered a band of 
Turlromans. A smart fight followed, and the 
Turlromalls retired, after wounding the Colonel in 
two places and killing two of his escort. 
The Xussians the11 proceeded to improve tlie 
wells by digging, so that in a short time a sum- 
cieiit supply of water was obtained for the whole 
column; and on May 12  Ka~~finanii moved for- 
ward, leaving a small garrison in the fort at  
Kllala-ata. 
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and Kazala llacl experienced but lit l;le hardship, 
but tlze weather ilow became excessively hot, and 
t,Ile most trying portion of the march began. No 
one lrilew horn far L11e Oxus really was, but, 
although it was believed tliat no wells existed in 
tlie interveiliiig desert, it was colihdeiitly expected 
tliat the column could reach tlie river in three 
clays. On the morning of May 17 the advance 
was resumed, a supply of water for tliree days 
being carriecl with the troops. I t  was intended 
tllat, t11.e force shoulcl start every day at damn and 
-march until about 10 A.M., rest till the afternoon, 
ancl tlleii continue the marcli in the evening, m~hen 
t h e  great heat had solne.what abated, by which 
means it was expected that the columns coulcl 
cover thirty miles a clay. But this calculatiorl 
was coilipletely upset by the great lieat which was 
experie~lcecl, by the heavy shifting sanil tli~ongh 
' m~hicli the aclvallce was n~acle, and cliielly on 
accoullt of the extreme weakiless and miserable 
coiiclitioli of the camels. 
Duriiig the very first day's ina~ch from Aclarn- 
KrilgLm the troops colzsulned the greater portion 
of the precious supply of water which was to have 
lasted till they reacliecl the Oxus ; and tlie posi- 
tion of tlie force at last became so critical, that 
Kaufinaiin gave himself up for lost, ancl even no- 
iilillateil tlie oficer wlio shoulcl take coinmalld ill 
the event of his death. Advance through an un- 
lrnown desert ~vitllout water was, of course, quite 
impossible, while a retreat would liave liacl a 
inost demoralisiiig erect, iiot ollly on the troops 
VOL. I. S 
coinposing the force, but on all the tribes a~icl 
nationalities of Ceiltral Asia. Russia's position in 
Central Asia clepellilecl largely on tbe prestige 
which the troops of the White Czar had gained 
by their wonrlerful successes in the wars againsL 
Khokancl and Bolrhara, and any reverse at this 
tilne woulcl have destroyed that belief in Rus- 
sian invincibility on m~hich the founclations of 
the Czar's einpire in Asia rested. The Ainir of 
Bolrllara was kno1t711 to be tvatching for a favour- 
able oppor Lunity for at taclcing his old enemies, 
and the Yllail of IChokand was no less hostile. A 
retreat wo1.11~1, therefore, have been the signal for a 
general at1;acl.i on the Russian garrisons in Central 
Asia ; and, instead of co~lcluering Ehiva, it  is 
probable t l ~ a t  the Russians a o ~ ~ l d  have l i d  to 
fight for the retention of tlieir existing possessioils 
on the Syr Daria. 
But a t  this juncture, when defeat and clisgrace 
were staring him in the face, Ksnfmann was saved 
by an insignificant and hitherto despised member 
of his force. While the Kazala detachment was 
aclvancing from Irkibai, a raggecl Kirghiz offered 
his services to Colonel Dreschern, and begged that 
he might be eniployed as aguicle without any pay, 
in order that he might witness t11e punishment of 
the Turl~oma~is vrrlio had lrilled or  enslavecl most 
of his relatioils. This mail now came form7arc1, and 
said he could find water in the immediate vicinity 
of the camp. Yaufinalin took out his flask, anc? 
to give the guide a hunclrecl roubles if 
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the Kirghiz had been absent for a short time, he 
returned with the flaslc full of water-filthy arid 
nauseous, it is true, but, nevertheless, water which 
would save, life. On being questionecl, he stated 
that this foul liquid had been obtained from three 
wells wllicli existed some four miles to the north 
of the ltussian camp, and tliat a sufficient supply 
coulcl be obtained for the whole army. Orders 
were immediately given for the force lo move to 
the spot referred to, and on arrival there it was 
foulld that tlie guide's story was correct. Kanf- 
nlann hacl three more wells dug,l but even then 
the supply was very unsatisfactory, and the troops 
were limited to a daily d lowa~~ce  of one pint per 
man, wliich merely supported life, but did iiot 
relieve them from i~zte~lse uff'ering. 
As there was not suficient water for the camels 
at  this place, they were sent back, under an escort 
of 600 men, to Adam-Krilga~z, in order that they 
might have a good drink and get a fresh supply 
for the force before the final attempt was made to 
reach the Oxus. While this convoy was at Adam- 
ICrilgan it was attacked by some 500 Turkomans, 
uncler their renowiled leader Sadyk, who had 
taken service under the Khivan Khan, and who 
now tried to cripple the Russians by capturing 
their transport animals. The attack was ~ilade in 
the early dawn, and the Turkomans, led by tceir 
brave chief, aclvanced to the attack with con- 
siderable determination ; but they were unable to 
Tho placo thus become lmown as 'Alty Kuclnk,' or 'six 
1volls.' 
1 2  
stand for long before the fire of the Russian breech- 
loaders, and were soon obliged to retreat. 
A week elapsed before the camels returned to 
Alty-Kuduk with a fresh supply of water for the 
force, and during this time the troops had been 
reduced to a deplorable and apparently hopeless 
condition. To add to Kaufii~ann's clifEculties it 
was fouacl, when the convoy clicl return, that the 
camels were so reduced in numbers through sick- 
ness ancl cleath that it woulcl be  ilzlpossible to co11- 
vey all the baggage to the Oxus. The greater 
part of the stores had therefore to be  left behincl 
at Alty-K~~cluls. under a guarcl of two companies, 
and out of six iron boats which had been specially 
constructed for the passage of the Amu Daria, only 
two co~11d be carriecl form~a~d with the aclvancing 
ariny. Taking aitli thein only absolute necessaries, 
the troops continuecl their advance ; and af~er  hard 
marching, and exposecl throughout the wliole of 
the last day to incessant attacks from the enenly, 
the force arrived on the banks of the Oxus at the 
foot of the Uch-Uchak liills on May 23. 
As soon as the safety of the column was assurecl 
by its arrival on the banks of the river, Kaufmann, 
who had hitherto renlaiiied strictly on the clefen- 
sive, proceeded to attack the enemy, who were 
collected in masses at t>he foot of the neighbouriag 
mchntains. The Turlroinans were quiclrly dispersed, 
and pursued for several illiles along the banlcs of 
the river, and eleven ' Kayulrs,' or Khivan boats, 
were captured, which proved most inval~~able wlien 





















Colltiiluing its march down the riglit bank of 
tlie river, the column reached Shura-Khana on 
May 28 ; but the boats, without which the passage 
of thc river could not be effected, hacl not then 
arrived, and I<auTlnann, in his anxiety for their 
safety, rode some three or four miles up the bank 
to see iT there were any signs of their coining. 
Wliile tlius riding dong, a Khivan battery on the 
o~pos i t e  side of the stream suddenly opened fire 
on tlie group of officers, and, by their excelleilt 
practice, iriacle it exceedingly unpleasant for the 
Eussian staff for a short time. As this battery 
would have endai~gerecl. the safe passage of the 
- 
boats, the rLussiaii coll~tnander cileterminecl to 
silence it, and therefore, on the next morniiig, a 
por Lion of Elis force, under General Golovatcher, 
movecl. up from Sliura I<liaiia and colillnenced to 
boiii1,nril the Kliivail position. Tlie IZussians 
opeiluil lire from two six-youmder guns, and after a 
short el~gngement, in wllicli the enemy were coin- 
l'letely overi~natched, the battery was silenced, and 
the I<hivaiis were seen to be withdrawing tlieir 
guns out of range. This ei1gqe1nent lias received 
tlie n:~inc 01 tlle ' Uai,tle of' Slleikll Arik,' Doill the 
f:~(:l tli;~t the I<llivan f o ~ t  (wliicli was a miserable 
s l~~ucture  sonic thirty feet in dinmeler) stood on 
olle o S  [,lie oi~ll~anlrinelits of tlie Slieilrli Arilr canal, 
wllicb, c:orldnct,s waler ilurit~g flood-tinie to tile 
i~~t,criol' T tdle Kllivall oasis. 
111 [dl(: illc~iu~nrllilc tlie 1,o:~Ls lincl :~~*i.ivcd from 
l . J ( ~ l ~ - l J ( ~ l ~ ~ ~ ] i ,  ;\11(l. l ) r ( q ) : ~ ~ ~ : ~ t i o ~ ~ s  \ \ r ~ l r ~  llle11 111:~~l.c  SO^ 
(~russiiig Am11 Uuia.  I t  h;~d origiui~lly bcm 
intended that the. river shoulcl be crossed at Shura 
Khana, but after the affair at Sheikh-Arik, Kauf- 
mann decided that it would be better to cross over 
at  the la t~er  place ; and nt daybreak on May 30 
the Russian troops were put in motion aiicl concen- 
t.ratec1 at the spot where GolovatchefY's cletach- 
merit had stood tlle clay before. The river at this 
point was about 1,200 yarcls wide, and it took 
each boat an liour to make the trip to tlie left 
bank aiid back again, for the current being strolzg, 
the boats were carried some distance domm stream, 
and had then to be hauled back to their original 
starting place ; and it was not until June 3 that 
the whole of the troops had been t~.-allsfel-recl to the 
left balk. The safety of the operation was, how- 
ever, quickly ensmed, for early 011 the first day 
two cornpallies of infantry ancl four light guns 
were landecl on tlie left bank, and taking posses- 
sion of the deserted fort ancl acljacent canal enz- 
banlunents, they conipletelp covered the crossing 
of the reiliailider of tlie army. 
On Julie 4 the tow11 of Hazarasp was occupiecl 
without resistance, ancl Kaufinalm, who was thus 
within forty-five iniles of the capital, there received 
a letter from the Khan stating that a11 Russian 
prisoners hacl been liberated, ancl clecla.ring his 
willingness to comply wit11 the Bassian demalids, 
but requesting tlmt the further advance of the 
columll miglit be stopped. 
One of the other col~umns was fatecl to expe- 
rience even greater difficulties ancl hardships than 
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of desperate e~ldeavours to push forward thus 
to s l ia~e  in the ultimate triumph, it was conlpeDed 
to abandon the attempt and retreat in disorder to 
the Caspian. This unfortuilate coluilln was the 
one which aclvanced from Cllikishliar under Coloilel 
MarkozofY. I t  star tecl from that place 011 JIarcll 3 1, 
slid reached Igcli 011 tlie 29th of the following 
month. There the advancecl guard liad a sharp 
iiglit wit11 some Turlromans, who were easily cle- 
fcatecl with coilsiderable loss, aild tlie force sodn 
a'lerwarcls set out for the Ortakuya wells, which 
were believed to be about fifty miles distant. But 
the coluinn hacl nol; proceecled far before the 
terrible heat began to tell on the troops. The 
water-supply sooil becanle exliaustecl, and altl~ougl~ 
the guides suggested that the store should be re- 
plenished froin the wells of Bala Ishem, which 
were at no consiclerable clistance from the line of 
march, Marlrozofl' cleci-ded t;o continue the aclvallce 
in the hope of being able 1;o capture ICIiiva before 
the other columns could reach the lsl~anate. But 
the attempt failed. The whole force rapidly fell 
into a state of clisorder, and was at last forced to 
retreat to the Caspian. 
On May 2G-while Kaufrnann was marchirig 
down the right banls of the Oxus, ancl two days 
after Verefkin ;L~I.CI Loiilalrill hacl joined hands near 
ICmlgracl-blle last sbragglers of this ill-fated de- 
tachmcnt reacl~eil Krasnovoclsl~, utterly broliell 
down. in heal~li, 11nlfsl;arved on accourlt of the 
sr:izl-ci ty ancl b:iil cl~~nli ty of the provisions which 
been supi~licd, nid clislilaying uilnlistalcaible 
traces of the utter defeat and cleinoralisation which 
hacl been caused through the rascality of the army 
contractors and the reckless indiscretion of the 
coinmancler, who, in his ainbitious desire to cap- 
ture Khiva before the other coluinns c o ~ ~ l d  assist 
in tlie unclertalcing, pushed blindly, on into tlie 
waterless desert, wlien a halt ancl rest at the B d a  
Ishem wells would have refreshed his jadecl troops 
and enabled then1 to make a fresh start with soille 
hope of ultiinate success. 
Early in January 1873, when tlie troops for the 
Orenburg colunln were being asseinblecl at Oren- 
burg, Orsk, ancl Uralslc, news was received that a 
Mailgishlalc chieftain, named Kaphar-Karajigetof, 
was urging the Adaieff Kirghiz to migrate into the 
desolate regioils in the centre of the Ust-Yurt 
plateau, in orcler tliat they might not be compelled 
to give up their caillels to the Russians for use 
in the Kliivan campaign. This man was so suc- 
cessfill in his agitation that tbe Adaiefls actually 
began to move eastwards with the whole of their 
carnels ancl liouseholcl goocls ; and Coloiiel Lomakin 
vns therefore ordered to ~llarch into the Buzachi 
peninsula to restore order. On arriving ilear the 
Kara-Kitsl~u-Tuz lake, he came across a consicler- 
able number of iion~ads, ~7110 were iliaking their 
way towards the Ust-Yurt aitli  some 10,000 
camels. Tlie K i r ~ h i z  at once attaclcecl the Cos- 
sacks, and ,z harcl Gght ensuecl, which ended in the 
defeat of the nomads, who, however, n~ailagecl to 
drive off their caixels. This clefiant attitude of 
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i sian Govenlmeiit cleciclecl that tlie Cas~ian  colulllil 
should be split up illto two detacl~iuents, one being 
sent from tlle Mangishlalc peniiisula to keep the 
Icirglliz i11 checlc during tlie campaign ; and at the 
sanle time Cossack detacllinents were sent to Sam, 
Djebislc, and to the Mogacljarsk Mountains to pre- 
vent inroads of the nomacls into Russia11 territory, 
I and to lreep up communiaation between the Oren- 
I burg and Kiaclerly columns. 
I 
Colonel Loinakia, who coinmanded the Kiu- 
clerly colunm, experienced much clifficulty in get- 
ting a suficjent number of cnillels, and tlie cle- 
tachinent was obliged to slarL with ail insuficieilt 
iluinber ; but at lenglll 380 camels ancl l l0  homes 
were captured from the Adaieffs, in  aclclition to 
some 3,000 sheep ancl goats. 
On April 26 tlle coluillll set out from tlie Kin- 
clerliiislc Gulf and commenced their lizarch lo 
Kungrad by way of Ka~zndi, Senelr, BishekLi, 
Iltegi, and Kizil-Aghir. I t  was not long before 
the troops began to experience all the trials ancl 
sufferings of a desert n~arc~h. The heat was exces- 
sive, allcl the wells were far apart, wllile such water 
as was oblainable was brackish, inucldy, and fill of 
insects. The camels sooil began to clie off, and 
withill the Erst few clays the force found that i t  
was opposed by a11 eiiemy far worse and more 
powerful than any possible coilibillation of nomad 
tribes. During the marc11 from ICauncli to Senelr- 
a distance of about sixty miles-sickness broke out 
anlong tlie solcliers, aiid it was fouucl aecessary to 
utilise  he cavalry horses for Llle coilveyarlce of the 
nlen who were stricken with fever, dysentery, or 
sunstroke. But Lolllakill steadily pushed forward, 
aiid passiiig Senek, reached Bishekti on May 2, 
mheil a small fort was built enclosing the six wells. 
The suiTerings ~vhicli had been experienced 
cluring the nlarch frpm the Kinderlinslc Gulf to 
Bishelcti were but a foretaste of what was in store 
for the Russians during the whole of their nlarcll 
to the borclers of the Khivan Oasis. Intense heat, 
aggravated by the blinding glare from the sand, 
nccoinpailied by a most serious scarcity of water 
and tvith a steacly and rapicl increase in the deatli- 
rate among the camels, marked the progress of the 
column. 
During the march from Bishekti to Kilzil-Aghir 
there were nlaily anxious moments, when it allnost 
appearecl as if the force was iloolned to destruction. 
On May 9, wheii the heaclquarter staff and its 
escort reached Kol-Kil~ir, the well tvas found to be 
so cleep that no means could be devised for Isring- 
ing the water to the surface, and altllough the next 
known well was thirty-four miles further on, there 
mTas 110 alternative but to  make an att,empt to 
reach it. The party, tlierefore, pushed on ;  bub 
by mid-day on the 10th they had still sollle 
tliirteeu miles to march before they could get a 
drop of water ; the men could go no further ; ' and 
everybody, even the officers, with their horses, sank 
~ O M Q  helplessly illto the burning sand. Not a 
drop of water was left in the column ; rounci 
about as far as the eye could reach there was 
nothing but the white sand,' 
I 
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But while the troops were in this hopeless con- 
dition, Loinakiii, in his search for mTal;er, cane 
across a dried-up chailnel, and sent two Kirghiz to 
explore it, when they founcl a small well about one 
and a half mile to the north of the place where 
the troops had haltecl. By this fortunate discovery 
the headcluarter staff and its escort were saved, and, 
after a rest, they once more pushed on and reachecl 
tlie wells of Iltegi on the following day. 
While there, a messenger arrived with the iiems ' 
that the main body of troops under Golollel Gro- 
delroff had come to a complete standstill at a point 
some three miles short of the wells, and were 
uiialde to proceed any further as their water-supply 
had been coinpletely exhnustecl, alld the men were 
dying fro111 thirst. Loillakin at once sent back every 
available animal with vessels contai~lillg water, and 
after the troops had beell thus refreshed, they con- 
tiiluecl their marc11 to Iltegi. There a square re- 
doubt was built to enclose the two wells, and on. 
the afternoon of 11ay 1 4  the force once more 
resunled its journey eastm~arcls. 
Kizil-Aghir was reachecl at 1 A.M. on the 15th, 
and as it was known that Khiva mas not far clis- 
tant, a council of war was held to decide what 
steps should be taken to ensure conlplete co-oper- 
ation with the Orenburg column. It had been 
originally intended that die Orenburg and Kin- 
derly columns should meet at some point on the 
clriecl-up inlet of the Aral Sea called Lake Aibugir, 
a,ncl orders were therefore issued that tlie nlaill 
body of troops should move to Bai-chagir, ancl 
tl~ence turn nortllwards tl~rough Itibai, while a 
force was detached under Colonel Skobeleff to 
reconnoitre the couiltry in the directioli of Kone 
Urgenj. But on the lGth, when the coluilln was a 
short distance beyond Bai-chagir, Lomakin received 
a message froill General Vereflcin, in which he said 
that he hoped to reach Urga on the Sea of Aral 
by May IS, and directed the Kinderly col~iinil to 
inarcll northwards ancl join him at tliat place, SO 
tliat the two coluinns could inalce a coinbilled 
attaclr on the town of Kungrad. Messengers weye 
tlierefore sent to recall Slcobeleff; but this was no 
easy matter, for Skobeleff never let the grass grow 
~~ucler  his feet, and before the order reached hiin 
lie had un the 17th liaci an encouilter with a large 
body of Turlcoinans who were escorting a caravail 
to Khiva. I11 this fight the gnllailt colonel was 
mouiiclecl, but he quickly defeated the enemy, ailcl 
captured 15 prisoners, 150 camels, and a large 
store of provisions. 
On receiving a secollcl message from Vereflcin, 
Loilzakin determined to pus11 forward by forced 
~liarcbes with his staff and cavalry, leaving Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Padurofl to follow on with the 
infantrjr. Throughout the three days' mt~rch which 
followed, oilly one well was found, arid this had 
boen poisoned by the Khivans, who had cast dead 
ztilirnals into it. But, althongh Lomakin's pnrly 
sufiered considerably from want of water, they, on 
Yay 23, crossed the Wed-up bed of ihe Aihugir 
Lalce, which wns tliickly covered wit11 ~eccls 1 ~ c ) l n  
15  to 20 feet high, mrl on tlle follomil~g day ihc: 
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ilying col~zinn arrived in the Khivan oasis, where, 
after two monlhs of incessant privations and 
suffering, they again saw green fielcls and flowing 
water, and lrnew that their troubles were over, 
and that they were within reach of tlie goal 
towarcls which they hacl strugglecl so bravely. 
Loinalrin reached Kungrad at al~out oiie o'clock in 
thc aflernoon of May 24; but founcl that the 
Orenburg coluinll hacl left the place n few hours 
previously in its rapid advance on the capital-a, 
strong cletachmeilt having been left in possessioil 
of the town. He, therefore, pushed 011 after an 
hour's halt, and succeeded in joining Verefkin at 
nine o'cloclr in the evening. He was, however, 
ordered to wait for his infantry, a d  on Pacluroflrs 
arrival to push on as rapidly as possible with tlie 
whole force. 
In the meanwhile the infantry uncler Paclu- 
roil' had been advancing along the regular route 
through Irbasan ancl k'ara-I<~~duli. Tlie force was 
clividecl into two cletachments-t8he main party 
being under the commaiicl of PacluroK himself, 
while the other vas under Major Avarslrg~. The 
march fro111 Ulr-Alan commencecl at 2 A.M. 011 May 
20, and during the first day sollle water was ob- 
tained eiz ~.oz~te, but jt was brackish ancl allllost un- 
clrinllcable ; on the seconcl clay's march the tToops 
had to rely on the scailty supply of water which 
was carried with tllein, for the wells wliicll were 
passed were found to have been poisonecl; while 
on tlle tliircl day they were absolutely without any 
water at all. In fact, througl~out he mrllole lllarcll 
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to the outskirts of the Khivan oasis the force was 
almost entirely without water, and the infantry of 
the Kinderly coluillll cannot be too highly praised 
for their splelldid endurailce under most trying 
circuinstallces. However, at t l~ree o'clock in tlie 
afteriloon of May 23, they reacled'~r.zl i-~otchka~~, on 
the borders of the oasis, ancl a couple of clays later 
were inet by Lomakin, who, after a short rest, 
aclvailced with the whole colunin towards I<l~ojaifi. 
Before describing the advailce of the combined 
Orenburg and Kinclerly columns towards the cap- 
, . 
ital, it is necessary now to give a brief account 
I 
j of the march of Veref'kin's force from Orenburg 
to Kungrad. Although General Krijhanoffsky 
only received definite orders regarding the de- 
spatch of a coluinn from Orenburg at the beginning 
of January, yet by the end of the following inoilth 
.all the preparations had been conipletecl, and tlie 
troops began their march towards the Emba River 
from Orenburg, Ursk, and Uralsk on February 25, 
26, and 27. In  spite of tremendous snowstor~ns 
and severe frost, and the terrible condition of the 
roads, the Emba post was reached on March 16, 
16, and 17, and after a three weeks' halt the force 
resumed its advance towards Khiva on April 7. 
By this time the weather had become much 
milder, and the Russians experienced but litl;le 
difficulty in their marc11 to the western shores of 
the A r d  Sea, and then dong the coast to Yani 
Kala on the borders of the Ellivan Oasis, where the 
column arrived on May 14. 
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countered, the Khivans having merely contented 
I themselves with sending messages demanding tlie 
withdrawal of the Eussian forces. On the ' I  Sth, 
when Verefkin was a short distance from ' ~ u n -  
gracl, he received an amusing letter from tlie 
ICllivan governor of that town, requesting that the 
march of the force might be delayed for tliree 
clays until the garrison had beell reinforced by 
some artillery which was daily expected, on re- 
ceipt of which Be would be ready to oppose the 
Muscovite advance; but it was stated tllat, if the 
Iiussialls Tjlintlly persisted in moving forward be- 
fore the guns arrived, tlie Kllivans would abso- 
I lutely decline to fight. Verefkin, however, did 
' blindly persist ' ia continuing his aclva11ce, and 
wlieil he reached Kungrad on t,he followiilg clay he 
foulid that the Khivan commander hacl kept his 
promise. Tlie place was deserteil, and the fiussiails 
t,ook possessioil of it ~vitllout firing a s11ot. 
On May 23 the advanced guard of the Orellburg 
column marched out of Kungad under Colonel 
Leontscheff, and at about four o'clock in the after- 
noon it was violently attacked by a large number 
of Kllivans, who succeeded in forcing their way to 
the very centre of the Russian camp, but were 
eventually driven off wit11 the loss of several killed. 
Verefkin, as has been already mentioned, left 
Kungrad with the main body of the Orenburg 
troops on the morning of the 24th, and steadily 
pushed forward Lo the capital without seeing any 
further signs of the enemy, either on that day or 
on idle 26th. But at 5 A.M. on the 26th the acl~ailce 
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was continued toward Kara-Baili, and at noon, 
while the coluinn was resting on the banks of a 
stream, the sound of firing was heard lowarcls the 
front, ancl a Cossack arrived with a report that while 
an officer of the Topographical Department was 
inaking a reconnaissa~ce of llle country ahead of 
the columiz, he had been attacked by a numerous 
body of Khivans, who hacl succeeded in killing one 
of the escort and wounding two others, besides 
capturing several horses. 
Colonel Leoiltscheff at once galloped forward 
wit11 two sot.nias 01 cavalry, but on reaching the 
scene of attack, he founcl that the enemy hacl dis- 
appeared, and althougl~ he aclvnncecl some miles 
further he failed to see any signs of them, and he 
was obliged to abaiiclon the pursuit. He had, 
ho~vever, scarcely returned to the main body, wllen 
shots were again heard on the flank of tlie colu~ni~, 
and on this occasioll he overtool< the Khivans ancl 
inflicted consiclerable loss on them. From one of 
the prisoners talcen during this fight il was learnt 
that these two attacks had beell made by so~ne 400 
or 500 Turkomans who had been detached from a 
large Khivczn army which had been sent uncler tlie 
comlnand of the Khan's brother to defend the town 
of Hhojaili. 
On the same evening Loinalrin rejoined with 
the whole of the Kinderly column, ancl fi.om this 
time the combinecl. columns calve uncler the com- 
mancl of General Vereflcin, who at  once issued 
orders regarding the fornlation of the colulnil dur- 
ing its advance on the capital. 
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Tlie force left Icara-Baili at daybreals on May 27, 
and, after a slight skirmish, reached the gardens 
and enclosures on the outslcirts of Khojaili at 
about four o'cloclc in the afternoon. Slcirmishers 
were tlien sent forward, and tlle force steatlily 
puslied on till it arrived witliin about 500 jrn,rds 
from the walls of the town. Here a deputation 
of the leadiilg inhabitants preseilted tlieii1se11-es 
before Vereflcin, infor1lliil.g liim that the lihi~ral:~ 
troops had evacuated the place, and begging that 
they might not be punished. At 5 P.M. the Rus- 
sians marched through the town and took up a 
position three-quarters of a mile to the south, where 
the force remained for two days.. 
On May 30 the advance was continuecl, ailcl 
early the following inorning the outposts were 
, attaclced by large bodies of Turkomans, who, how- 
ever, as usual, fell back as soon as a few shells had 
been fired.. Leontscheff pursued them, for several 
mi.les, and on his return he reported that the Laudan 
Canal on the way to Manghit was iinpassable for 
infantry, as there was no bridge over it. A detach- 
ment of sappers and two sotilias of cavalry were 
. . 
therefore sent forward with the cask-bridge equip- 
ment, but on reaching the canal they were received 
by a heavy fire from the Khivans, who were hidden 
in the undergrowth on the opposite bank. The 
Cossacks, however, swam across and drove the 
enemy away, and the bridge was then so rapiclly 
constructed that by 8.30 A.M. the whole force had 
crossed, and after a short march camped on the 
banks of the Oxus at . a  place called Djelan-. 
VOL. I, Y 
322 CONQUEST OF KHIVA 1809- 
Cheganalr, where the river was about three-quarters 
of a nzile wide. 
The remainder of the clay passed quietly, and 
altl~ough a night-attack was expected, no further 
signs of the enemy were seen until the following 
moraing (June I), when, just as the Bussialls 
%rere strilring their camp, a couple of shots were 
fired from some Kllivan guns on the opposite bank 
of the Ainu Daria. These, however, fell short, 
and the columil shortly afl;erwards set out towards 
Manghit, where the eneilly was kizown to have 
taken up a strong position barring the Russian 
line of advance. 
At 7 A.M. Qererkin came into touch wit11 the 
KAivan army, which was drawn up on a plain 
covered with reeds and high grass-the village of 
Manghit and several neighbouring sancUlills being 
also strongly occupied. As sooil as the Russialls 
arrived within about three-quarters of a mile from 
the position, the Kllivan horsemen, uttering fiend- 
is11 yells, galloped forvrlard with tlie apparent 
intention of charging the Russian centre ; but they 
soon changed their course, and in a few lrlinutes 
spread themselves out into a long line some seven 
or eight miles in extent, which encircled the 
col~~ixn on the south, east, and north-east. Tlie 
four guns in the Russian centre then opened a 
heavy lire, and Verefkin sent three other pieces 
to reinforce the left flank which wm seriously 
threatened. The Khivans, however, made a series 
of determined charges, and at one tiine they suc- 
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l.~undrecl yards of the general and his staff, while 
Leontscl~eff's cavalry on the right flank was so 
hardly pressed that they were o'bliged to dismount, 
and fight like infantryinen before they coulcl beat 
off the assailants. As soon as this fi-ont attaclr 
was repulsed, the I<llivans made a furious onslaught. 
on. the rea,rguard, wl~ich they apparently expected 
to Gild weak and unprovided with artillery. But 
they were soon undeceived, for they were received 
with a heavy infantry ancl artillery fire, wliicll 
caused thein to recoil in confusion, when they 
joined their coinpallions in flight towards Mangliit. 
A short time afterwards the attaclr was renewecl, 
but  on this occasiorl the Khivans did not attempt 
to come t o  close quarters, and soon retired once 
again towards the south. Vereflcin tl~en ordered 
a general advaace, and Manghit was occupied at 
three o'clock. i11 the afternoon. Bere the Russians 
were fired upon by some of the enellly who vere 
lurlcing in the village, and in retaliation the troops 
set fire to the place ancl commenced an indis- 
criminate massacre of the inhd~itants, i n  w~liicli no 
respect was paid to either sex or age. The force 
then continuecl its marc11 and took up a position 
on the banks of the Arna Canal, about a mile to 
the souL11 of the sinonldering ruins of Manghit, 
froin whence Skobeleff was sent with two sotnias 
of Cossaclrs to destroy the village of Kubetan, the 
inhabitants of whicli had taken a leacliilg part in 
the hostile operations. This affair was the most 
seri0u.s engagement of the whole calnpaign. The 
Bussians lost one officer ancl eight inen lrilled, nild 
Y f! 
ten men severely wounded, vllilst Inany others 
received slight wounds. The I~hivan  loss is un- 
known, but i t  must have been very heavy. 
On June 2 the force continued its advance, 
and after repeated encounters with parties of 
Turkomans, reacliecf the Attualick Canal. On the 
follo~ving clay tlie enemy still coiltinuecl to harass 
the column, but they were unable to delay its pro- 
gress, and it was not till June 4 that ally further 
serious figlltiiig toolr place. At  6.45 n.nr. on that 
day, however, just as the R~ssiaiis had struck 
their camp, they were assailed oil all sicles by 
dense masses of the enemy. Their position for a 
time was most critical, for they mere in a closely 
built Usbeg village mhich was surrounded by a 
networls. of gardens aild irrigation channels, and 
they were unable to get a clear field for their fire. 
The Khivar~s were most determined in tlleir attacks, 
ancl returned again aild again to the charrre ; and 
? it Tvas not until I1 A.M., when the Russians had 
broken down some of the surrouncling walls and 
bronght their guns into action, that the assailsl~ts 
were finally forcecl to retire. The s ta f  then halted 
at the village of Urlott, ancl in the afteriloon went 
int;o a camp soine miles to the south. 
111 this fight, in spite of its serious character, 
the Russians only lost five nleii wounded, which 
is clue to the fact that tlie Khivans were only 
armed with swords and spears, s ~ l d  had but few 
guns of a very primitive make. Thus, while they 
invariably lost lleavily froin the f i e  of the Bussinn 
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races, were unable to inflict any serious loss on 
their opponents, because tliey were always defeated 
before they could come to close quarters. Tliis 
clefeat near Udott, together wit11 the previous 
lesson they had received at Mnnghit, appears to 
have col~lpletely disheartened thein, ancl they 
made no inore serious attempts to resist tlie ad- [ vance of Vereflcin's troops towards the capital, 
and the Russians from this time erlcounterecl no 
greater cliEculties tlI~an were caused by the de 
st,ruction of bridges over the nunierous canals 
I 
1 
whicli crossed their line of r n a r ~ l i . ~  
I 




to pers~zade Vereflrin to grant a truce. On June 4 
a messenger arrived in the R~~ss ian  callip bearing 
I 
a letter from Mal~ommecl Rahiin, in wliicl~ he de- 
clared his friendship towards Russia, ancl stated 
that  ilothillg would please him better than to be 
able to entertain such clistinguislied visitors in a + 
befitting manner. He therefore begged tllat an 
armistice niight be granted for three or four days I I 
to enable hiill to make the necessary arral~geinents 
for their reception ; but he urgecl the general not 
to  abstain from ~ttaclciilg tile Turlcoilians, who, 
lie cleclareil, had opl~osed the Russian advance in 
opposition t o  his wislres. Vereflrii~, however, was 
not to be cleceived by such a palpable attempl 1)o 
gain time, aiicl he there10rc pusl~ed on ; anrl pnss- 
iiig tlirough I<yat-TC~~tlgl*nd 011 June 6, and Icush- 
K ~ ~ p i r  011 the following everling, the corllbiliecl 
Orenburg and Kinderly columns on June 7 en- 
camped in the Chanakcllik, or pleasure-gardens of 
tlle Khan, which are situated some three miles 
froin the norther11 gate of the Khivan capital. 
Here the troops reinailled for two days, during 
tvllich time the advanced guard under Skobeleff 
was incessantly attacked by the enemy, ~ 1 1 0  in- 
variably delivered t l ~ e i ~  assaults in the mo~nings, 
aiid rlailjr lost 400 or 500 men besides many gulls 
and horses. 
Verefkin at  this time was in complete ignorance 
of Kaufinana's n~oveinents; for, although on Juile 5 
lie had received a letter froin tlie Coinmaiider-in- 
Chief which had beell aritten three days previously, 
a i d  which contained news of the engagement with 
the IC11ivan forces at Slieilrli Arik r21d S U C C ~ S S ~ L I ~  
passage of' the river, 110 f ~ ~ r t h e r  intelligence had 
been received regarclillg the positioil or move- 
ments of the Turkestan column. I t  was, moreover, 
ruinoured that Kaufmann, after aclvmciag to Haz- 
arasp, had been coinpelled to return to the Oxus, 
and that he was then about sixty miles away from 
Kliiva. 
Verefkin, therefore, decided to attack the city 
witbout waiting for the arrival of the Turkestan 
troops, and a t  about eleven o'clocll on the mora- 
iilg of June Q the troops advnilced from Chcwlak- 
cliilr for the purpose of making a recoiznaissance 
in force so that the breaching batteries coulcl be 
placed ancl the bombarclment commenced. At 
ilooil llle coluliln reached Sliobcleff's advanced 
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fight with the Khivans, and shortly afterwards the 
recornloitring party found the enemy strongly 
-posted in the gardens ancl suburbs in front of the 
nortli gate. A few rouilds from the guns, how- 
ever, soon caused them to disappear, and a quarter 
of a mile further on the colulnil got into a narrow 
road, scarcely four yards wide, with an ahnost 
imp assable network of canals, gardens, and build- 
ings on each sicle. 
While in this confinecl position, and buried in 
cloucls of dust whicl~ rendered it impossible to see 
even a few yards aheacl, the Russians suddenly 
found tliemselves exposed to a heavy G I . ~ . ,  With- 
out  kliowing i t  they hacl arrived in close formation 
within a couple of hundred yards of the city walls, 
which were lined with Kliivaas, a110 opened a 
tremendous fusillade on the astoi-iisl~ed Russians. 
Fortunately, however, for Qerei'kin's men the fire 
was badly directed, and most of the bullets passecl 
high over tlie heads of the troops. For ten nliilutes 
i.he Russians were in this unpleasant position be- 
fore they could get out of the defile ; but they at 
lerigth got under cover, the guns were brought lo 
the front aud openecl a well-direcbed fire against 
the north gate of the city, nncl the infantry movecl 
forv~arcl on the right and left of the road, pre- 
ceded by a line of skirn~ishers, who kept up a 
heavy fire on the wdls. In a short time several 
of tlie Ifllivan guns were put out of action, and 
the Russians pushed on to a brick building just in 
front of tlie canal bridge outside the ilortlz gale. 
Eere their further advance was delayed by a 
,vell-built barricade wllich had bee11 erected across 
tile road about 100 yards i11 front of tlie gate, 
wl~icli coiltailled four pieces of artillery. In 
front of this tliere mas a deep, wide canal, over 
there was a liarrow bridge, wlziclz the 
ICllivails had stu11icUy neglected to destroy. The 
fire from this barricade proved illost galling to 
t h e  Russians, and Major Bourovzoff charged across 
tile bridge a t  the head of four coinpanies of in- 
fkintry, and in a few monlents forced his way 
illto the work, where the Kl~ivan gunners were 
bayoaetecl beside their guns. 
This storming party, which was exposed to a 
lieavy fire from tlie city walls, then took shelter 
behind tlie calla1 embanlcnlent, ancl as an assault 
o n  the town would have probably been less 
claiigerous than relireinent, Lieutenant-Colonel 
1'aduroK wlio co~nmanclecl tlie attack a t  this point, 
sen t  back and asked Verefliiil for scaling-ladders. 
The general, however, clid not iilteiicl to risk an 
assxult, and decidecl to confine himself to a bom- 
barrlnierit till Kaufinann arrived, and he  therefore 
ordered the troops to retire. Bourovzoff's party 
then  fell back, anci in spite of the heavy fire to 
which they were exposed, they succeeded in 
dragging off three of the Khivau guns. This 
acivailced party suffered a loss of four men killed 
a n d  twenty-two woundecl, including their gallant 
leader, who was wou~lded in three places. 
Duriilg the engagement Verefkin was also 
severely wouilded in the right eye, and after 
giving directiolis regnl~liilg the breaching batteries 
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which were to be elnployed against the defences, 
he was obliged to hand over the coin~lland to 
Colonel Sarantsclloff. The ca~a l ry  and staff then 
retired, and were shortly afterwards follomecl by 
the inail1 body of infailtry, Slcobeleff remaining in 
his usual post at the front to continue 1;he bom- 
bardnzent ailcl watcl~ the movelllents of the enemy. 
The gulls lrept up a steady fire on the city 
until about 4 P.M., m~liei~ an envoy arrived froill 
lthe I(lian asking for a suspensio~l of hostilities, and 
saying that vritl~iiin ail h o w  an ambassaclor mould 
be sent to arrange the terms of capitul a t '  1011. 
Colonels Sa~santscllo.ff and Lomakin inforlned this 
messenger that the Russians woulcl cease fire and 
grant an armistice only on tlze unclerstancliug that 
not anoi;her shot vas fired from the walls, but that 
the coilclitions of peace could oilly be arranged by 
General Kaufinann. The Russian batteries, in ac- 
cordance with this arrangement, ceased firing at 
4.30 P.M.; but soon afterrnards the fire fr,om Llie 
rail1l)arts recommenced, and altl~ough a second 
messenger the11 appeared declaring that the Khan 
11~as not respollsible for this hostile deinonstra- 
tion, as the culprits were Yomucl Turlromans, 
over whom the Khan lzad no control, the 
13ussians very naturally ignored the excuse and 
rcsll~~leil the bombardizzent, which was maintainecl. 
till 10 P.M., when the c i ~ y  was on h e  in several 
places. 
An Ilour later a lether le as received from 
General Kauf~x:~lxiln, stahiiig t h a ~  the Turkestaa 
column, ~ 1 l i ~ l 1  had left Hazarasp on June 8, was 
about seven miles rrorn Khiva, and directing Veref- 
kin t;o stop tlle bombardmeilt and to meet hiin at 
eigllt o'clock on the followiiig morllilig a t  a bridge 
some three iniles fi.on1 the eastern gate of the city, 
lvlrllcn tlic I<hnn's uncle, Seid Emir-ul-Umar, would 
he present to arrange tlie ternls of surrender. 
Verefkin mas unable to go to tlie rendezvous on 
account of his wound, aild he therefore sent 
Snrailtsclioff and Lon~alcin. At  the appointed 
place they met Kaufiualn at the head of the 
Turkestan column, and there Seid-ul-Umar, Ata 
Jan (the I<lian's younger brother), and otl~er influ- 
ential persons offered their complete subnlissioll 
and forinally surrendered the city to the Eussians. 
While Kaufinann mas t l~us peacefully obtaining 
tlie capitulation of Ifiliva, certain fiery spirits on 
tlie opposite side of the city appeared determilled 
to keep up the coiltest as long as possible; for 
while tlie Russian and Khivan leaders m7ere pro- 
cecdiilg to the rei~dezvous to settle tlie terms of 
snrre~ider, the Turkoinans at the north gate re- 
opened fire on tlle advanced party uilder Skobeleff, 
alio at once recolnmenced the bombardment. By 
a few well-directed sllots tlle gate m7as clestroyed, 
a id  the11 a storiliii~g colunin of about 1,000 men, 
led by Slcobeleff and Couiit Schouvaloff, rushed to 
the assanlt and speedily gainecl possession of tlle 
gatJe and adjoining ramparts. But the Turkolnails 
still lllniiltailled a running fire froin the houses 
2nd alleys of the city, and Skobeleff, pushiiig on, 
cleared the streets wit11  rocket,^, and finally, with 
a loss of olllp fifteen men, penetrated as far as the 
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Kllau's l~al:lce, Irllere he h e a r d  t h a t  Kaufmanny at 
bead of the r ~ l l r ~ e s t ~ ~ l  calumll, W a s  entering 
tow11 1,). tile ITnaar:lsp g a t e  with all ' the 
h01l0urs of ~ l ; ~ l , ~ l ~ f f  therefore discreetly 
fe l l  back, and mnrclling his force out of t h e  city 
b ~ '  the gate at ivllicll Ilo ]lad entered, left the &m- 
mallcler-in-Cllief to colltillLle his  triumphal progress 
undis turbecl. 
After rc l lmii l i~~~ at  t l~e  Khan's pa lace  for a few 
hours to make, nymlycments fo r  the p ~ ~ t e ~ t i ~ l l  
of property mid dis:rylna,~uellt of the illllabitallts, 
I(aufiilann visited yeref  kin's c a m p  a n d  inspected 
the wo~~nded  ill the Ilnspitals ; 011 t he  followillg 
clay a, ' Te I)euiil ' was S L U ~ ~  alld ~ f a s s  aict for tlie 
repose of tdie souls of I)eter  t h e  Grea t  (wl~ose 
l~irtliilay it 11-as) :ulcl of tllose solcliers who had 
perished in the l~revious wars against Klliva ; and 
011 J ~ m e  IS illc troops evacua ted  t h e  city alld 
marclied illto camps ill t h e  a d j a c e i ~ t  gardens,  small 
rletacbllleilis being, however, left to guard the 
gates of the to~vn. 
In the ~neanrirl~ile, as n/lal~omrned Rahim,  being 
darined at  the l~oitll>nrcl~iient by Veref  kill's force, 
had fled to I~ i~~l ic l l i r ,  near Iliali, and there take11 
refuge anlong the Yonl~lds, his younge r  brother, 
Ata Jan, mas teiilpornrily appoiilted to t h e  khan- 
ship ; but,, on the l S t h ,  Kaufinailll wrote to 
Mahommed Iialiiil~ nclvising him to re tu rn ,  a n d  on 
the evening of the liest clay he presented I-limselr 
at  the general's camp, whe re  he was reinstated, 
a, spec,ial coullcil or clivan,' p a r t l y  r:omposed 
of Rassinn officcrs ant1 par t ly  of Kh iva l~s ,  being 
appointed to assist in tlie goveri~ment of the 
lrhanate. 
On June 24, the Khan, by Kaufinanii's direction, 
issued a decree abolishing slavery, and command- 
ing all his subjects to set their slaves at liberty, 
The captives were permitted, if they so desired, to 
reinain in Khiva, or to return to Persia if they 
preferred to do so. Those wishing to return to 
their l~oines were' directed to assenlble at certain 
bazaars, wliere .they were to be registered, ancl 
thence sent to Persia, vi$ ICrasnovodsk. I11 spite' 
of this order, however, it appears that not inore 
than one-sixth of the wliole number of slaves were , 
released by the time the Eussian forces left the 
oasis. 
Shortly afterwards tlie Russian troops were 
elnployecl in a caiiipaign against the Yoinud Tur- 
komaas, whicli lasted till late in the moiltll of 
Angust; and, on his return froin this expeili- 
tion, Knufniann, on August 24, 1873, coi~cluclecl 
a treaty of peace witli the Khan, the draft of 
which had been previously sent 1 ~ y  a courier to St. 
Petersburg for tlie Ein.peror's sanction, and which 
had been returned duly approvecl by the Czav. 
By this treaty the Khan renoullced llis right to 
inaintain direct relntio1.1s wit11 any of t11e neigll- 
bouring rulers or Icha~is, or to m~ilertalre any 
militnry ol~eratious witllout tlle knowle,dge aucl 
perlnission of the llnssian authorities in C'ei~tl-d 
Asia ; the whole of tlle right bank of t l . ~  Amu 
Darin, and the lnilds a,cljoining the~ennto which 


































had formerly been collsiclerecl as Iselongincr to @. K21iva were allnexed to Russia, and the ancient 
bed of the Oxus was fixed as the boundary between 
the Xussiali ancl Kliivan clominious to the west of 
the oasis ; tlie navig~tion of the Oxus was exclu- 
sively reserved for Russiail vessels, Khivan or 
Bokbaran hoats being only permitted to sail on tlie 
river by special permission fi.0111 tlie Russian an- 
thorities; the Russians were to lmve the right t~ 
coiistrucl wliarves and fitctories at sucli poin~s on 
the left bauk of the Amu Dwia as illigllt 11e con- 
siclerecl necessary or convenient ; Russia11 mer- 
chailts were to have the free riglit to travel 
tllroughout the khanate mitllout paymellt of ally 
taxes, arid to be perlvitted to establish agents in 
Klliva or in any of the other towns of the lchanate; 
and, i11 adc~tion to many other clauses, it was 
fillally agreed that the Khan should pay a war 
treaty with tlle Amir of Bolrliara, whereby the strip of territory on 
the right bank of the Oxus, from ICukertli to Meshelrli, a i d  thcilco 
to the Rusfiinn frontier, was l~anded over to Bolrhctra as  a reward 
for the Amir's n e ~ ~ t r d i t y  during the war. Ey  this treaty it mas 
also agreed that the Enssians might establish wharves ma fnc- 
torios at  any plncea on the Bolrllaran bank of the b u  Daria; thplt 
all towns and villages in the kllenate should be open to Russian 
trade ; that all goods belonging to Russian traders-whether iin- 
po~tea  or exported-should be subject to a tax of 23 per cent. ntE 
ualoi.e~l~ ; thnt Rnssian ~nerchauts hould have a right to transport 
the5 goocls tllrough the lshmate free of all d ~ ~ t i e s ;  that Russian 
traders might establish caravanserais and appoint coilllllercid 
agents wherever they pleased; that Rnnsaian subjects should bo 
permitted to p~wchaso real proporty and to ongage in any trade or 
craft pernlitted by the Shariat ; that no persons should be permitted 
to enter the khanate from Russian te~ritory witllout passes from 
tho Ih~ssian authorities ; and that a Bokharan ellvoy shonld resido 
in Toshltent, a Russian iresiclent agelll being also appointed to 
reiuaiii in Boichara. 
inclemnity of 2,200,000 roubles, payable in certain 
installnents, the last of which was lo be paid on 01. 
before November 13, 1893. 
Such were the conditions imposed on the 
Xhivans as the result of their disastrous overtllrow. 
The Khan was turned into a mere puppet who was 
to be entirely under Russian guiclance ; the great 
River Oxus was to be tllenceforward col~lpletely 
under Bussiall control, from its rnoutlls to the 
borders of Afghnllistan ; ancl in spite of the 
Russian Emperor's solellill declaratioa that he hail 
no intention of occupying the khanate, and had 
even given positive orclers to prevent it, ancl that 
the final conditions to be imposed should be such 
as could not in ally way lead to a prolongecl occu- 
pation of Khiva-in spite of this voluntary and 
empllatic promise, a large slice of Khivan territory 
was annexed to Eussia, Kllivail independence was 
conlpIetely ,destroyed, and instead of abstaining 
from a prolonged occupation of the khanate, a 
considerable Russian force was permanently estab- 
lished in a fort on the Oxus within two marclies 
of the Ehan's capital. 
I t  is not to be aonderecl at  that when this 
treaty was published the British public felt that 
they had been completely duped. I t  is true that 
three years previously they had been taught how 
l i~t le  value Russia attaches to her treaty obliga- 
tions ;l but in spite of the cancelrnent of the Blaclc 
011 October 31, 1870, during the Frlmco-German War, Prince 
Gortchalroff wrote a circular note to the Russian Alnbsssedors at 
Porcign Courts, ~vhoreiil ho dochrod the intentioil of Russia to be 
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Sea clauses of the Treaty of Payis, they could not 
bring tliemselves to believe that the assurances 
volunl;arily given a t  the instance of the Russian 
Czar himself would not be scrupulously observed ; 
and, therefore, wllen they found that tlieir colyli- 
clence liad been misplaced the reaction mas coin- 
plete. 
no longer bound by the Blaclr Sea cla~lses of the Treaty of Pa~is .  
Tho time was well chosen : fiance was the11 vainly endeavowing 
to stoln the tidc of invasion, and was powerloss to take aotiou 
against Russia. England was thus IeR alone, and as she did not 
feel inoliilerl to go to war in  support of tho trenty, n, conforellco 
was nssembled; nt which, after inuch delay, i t  was agreed that the 
Blaclc Sea clauses were to be cancelled; and although it was de- 
clared that no Power had a right to liberate itself from treaty 
engagements, this was very little to set clgainst the tangible advm- 
tages wl~ich hnd been gained by Bnssia. In this way, by a strolre 
of the pen, the finits of the Crimean Wnr were practically destroyed, 
aild yet sollle Englisl~~nen were still to be fo1u1d who believed in 
the good fuilh of Rnssia. 
ICED OF TIIZ FIRST VOLURIP. 
P I m r r I t n  IIY 
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